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Abstract 
 
During the years between the Cold War and the Iraq War, neoconservatism underwent an 
important shift from a position sympathetic to realist thought to a position much closer to a 
particularly conservative form of liberal internationalism. This change has largely been 
ignored in the literature, and when discussed, simply attributed to new, more radical 
neoconservative actors replacing a more cautious cadre. This thesis utilises a ‘history of 
ideas’ approach to examine the evolution of neoconservative thought from an emphasis on 
stability and normality to one of ambitious transformation abroad and wide-ranging 
democracy promotion. It argues that this modification can be attributed to several material 
and ideational drivers. In material terms, the end of the Cold War and the ensuing decline 
of bipolarity in the international system in combination with the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 
2001 were pivotal events in neoconservatism’s evolution. The former removed the primary 
constraint on the use of American power overseas, while the latter demonstrated, as far as 
neoconservatives were concerned, the cost to the US of inaction and restraint abroad. 
Ideationally, the advent of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, an embrace of 
liberal democratic peace theory, and a religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought, all 
contributed to the development of a neoconservative foreign policy much more 
sympathetic to ideas of democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention.  
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis began life in late 2006 as a studentship funding proposal to the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC). President Bush – plumbing new depths of unpopularity 
– had just led his party to a humiliating midterm election defeat, Rick Santorum had just 
lost Pennsylvania by 18 points, and Barack Obama was still a relatively unknown senator 
who had served less than two years in Washington. The radically altered political 
landscape that faces me now writing this is a reminder that while I have thoroughly 
enjoyed working on this project it has been a lengthy process and thus much thanks is 
likely due. My two supervisors on this journey – David Dunn and Adam Quinn – are 
worthy of special mention. David showed great faith in me, encouraging me to apply while 
I was working for the Conservative Party in what he warmly described as the ‘swamps’ of 
Norfolk. Thanks for all your time and hard work on this, from the first tweaks to the 
research proposal to your recent accusations that my grammar had been negatively 
affected by my months living in Virginia! My thanks also go to Adam for his insightful 
input after joining the ‘team’ in the summer of 2008, especially as I’m sure your realist 
instincts recoiled reading much of this! I realise that supervising a thesis like this is a time-
consuming process on top of all your other duties and I want to make sure you both know 
that your efforts have been very much appreciated. Jason Ralph and Oz Hassan also 
deserve mention for their helpful comments on an early version of the argument presented 
in this thesis which appeared in a special edition of the International Journal of Human 
Rights in 2011.  
 
I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science and International Studies 
(POLSIS) at the University of Birmingham for awarding me one of their much sought-
after ESRC 1+3 quota studentships. The whole research project would never have been 
possible without the financial backing this provided. I have thoroughly enjoyed my time in 
POLSIS. Living out in the shires during the bulk of my studies left me a little more 
detached than the average doctoral researcher living in the shadow of ‘Old Joe’ but I 
benefitted immensely from some good friendships and encouragement along the way. 
There was always a bond between the ESRC studentship award holders in the department 
– Laurence Cooley, Drew Futter, Ken Searle and Martin Monahan – after we all started on 
our PhD adventure with the MA in Research Methods in the autumn of 2007. I’m sure the 
others will echo my gratitude to Laurence for his quantitative data analysis skills and SPSS 
prowess which helped pull us all through. Due to the fact we shared supervisors and both 
studied US foreign policy after the Cold War, Drew in particular was always very helpful 
and encouraging – especially as he always seemed to be one step ahead of me in his PhD 
project. Thanks also go to Drew for reviewing my entire thesis – which definitely went 
well beyond the call of duty. Although he was firmly established in the department by the 
time I began my time in POLSIS, Anthony Hopkins also deserves special mention for his 
friendly support over the past few years. Tories in academia are notoriously few and far 
between – especially those fond of quoting President Reagan – so I am glad our paths 
crossed.  
 
Between January and July 2011, I had the great privilege of being a Visiting Research 
Associate at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS-Johns Hopkins 
University) in Washington DC. Richard Lock-Pullan very kindly put me in touch with 
Professor Eliot Cohen who agreed to sponsor my time in Washington. Despite a very busy 
schedule, Professor Cohen was very generous with his time and was undoubtedly an aid in 
helping me obtain interviews with some of my ‘targets’. On that subject, I would also like 
to thank all the people I met in Washington – both those I formally interviewed and the 
numerous conversations over breakfast and lunch with interested observers in various 
think tanks and institutions. Having travelled extensively around the United States on 
numerous occasions, my time in Washington – a city living and breathing political debate 
– surpassed all those experiences. The depth, breadth and vitality of political debate was 
refreshing, especially in comparison to what can often be a stifling consensus back home. 
Certainly Trollope’s observation that Washington was a city “most unsatisfactory” could 
not be further from the truth. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support over the past four years. They 
have had to make some sacrifices, especially financially, that would not normally have 
been required – Grace, I’m sure Daddy owes you some new toys now! Tracy, thank you 
for your love and encouragement throughout this whole process, especially during the 
times when it was not always obvious where we were heading. I would like to think that 
my wilful flouting of Benjamin Franklin’s maxim that a man shouldn’t take a wife until he 
has a house has been proven wrong. You’ve always been there for me through thick and 
thin and I love you very much.  
 
My sincere thanks and gratitude go to everyone who has been involved in the process of 
producing this thesis. A few of you mentioned above have spent many, many hours on this 
project for which I will always be in your debt. It goes without saying that the 
responsibility for any errors remaining, however, is my own. 
 
MJLM 
Bath 
16 March 2012 
Contents 
Introduction         1 
            
Chapter 1            
Theoretical and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Introduction                   17 
1.2 Ideology         18  
1.3 The ‘History of Ideas’ and Ideological Change    21 
1.4 American Foreign Policy and Ideology     23 
1.5 IR Theory: Realism and Liberal Internationalism    26 
1.5.1 Realism        26 
 1.5.2 Liberal Internationalism      29 
1.6 Neoconservatives on Neoconservatism     34 
1.7 The Academy on Neoconservatism      41 
1.8 Defining Neoconservatism       51 
1.9 Conclusion         56 
 
Chapter 2  
End of Cold War to Defense Planning Guidance (1992) 
 
2.1 Introduction         58 
2.2 Reagan: A Neoconservative Assessment     59 
2.3 End of the Cold War and the Future for American Foreign Policy  65 
2.4 The Gulf War         73 
2.5 Democracy and the End of History      85 
2.6 Defence Planning Guidance (1992)      99 
2.7  Conclusion         102 
 
Chapter 3  
Clinton I: Somalia to Bosnia 
 
3.1 Introduction         104 
3.2 Reaction to Clinton’s Victory       105 
3.3 Democratic Peace Theory and the Clinton Administration   109 
3.4 American Interventionism in Clinton’s First Term    115 
 3.4.1 Somalia        115 
 3.4.2 Haiti         122 
 3.4.3 Bosnia         125 
3.5 Ideological Bedfellows? Neoconservatism and the Christian Right  134 
3.6 Conclusion         146 
 
Chapter 4  
Clinton II: The Weekly Standard to Kosovo and Iraq 
 
4.1 Introduction         149 
4.2 ‘Project for the Republican Future’ to ‘Project for the New American  151 
Century’ 
 
4.3 The Defence Budget, NMD, and NATO Expansion    165 
4.4 China          173 
4.5 Kosovo         179 
4.6 Iraq          187 
4.7 Conclusion         196 
 
Chapter 5  
Dawn of the New American Century 
  
5.1 Introduction         199 
5.2  2000 Presidential Election       202 
5.3 The Road to 9/11        207 
 5.3.1 The Case Against Bush: Pentagon Budget and China  207 
 5.3.2 The Case for Bush: Missile Defence, Unilateralism, and  213  
Religion 
 
5.4  The Road to Iraq        219 
 5.4.1 Post 9/11: Afghanistan and the War on Terror   219 
 5.4.2 Post-9/11: Iraq and the War on Terror    228 
 5.4.3 Transformative Liberal Democracy and Human Rights  232 
 5.4.4 State of the Union to Operation Iraqi Freedom   238 
5.5 Conclusion         253 
 
Conclusion          258 
 
Appendix One:         274 
Generations of Neoconservatism 
 
Appendix Two:         275 
Interviews 
 
Bibliography         276 
            
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile 
ABO  Abu Nidal Organisation 
ACSP  American Center for Security Policy 
ADL  Anti-Defamation League 
AEI  American Enterprise Institute 
AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
AQ  Al Qaeda 
CFR  Council on Foreign Relations 
CNN  Cable News Network 
CPD  Committee on the Present Danger 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DPG  Defense Planning Guidance 
EU  European Union 
GOP  Grand Old Party – the Republican Party 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INC  Iraqi National Congress 
INF  Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
IR  International Relations 
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff 
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army 
MAD  Mutually Assured Destruction 
MEK  Mujahedin-e-Khalq 
MFN  Most Favored Nation (trade status) 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NEC  National Economic Council 
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation 
NMD  National Missile Defense 
NPT  Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
NSA  National Security Advisor 
NSC  National Security Council 
NYT  New York Times 
PDD  Presidential Decision Directive 
PKK  Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
PLF  Palestinian Liberation Front 
PLO  Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
PNAC  Project for the New American Century 
PPI  Progressive Policy Institute 
PRF  Project for the Republican Future 
ROC  Republic of China - Taiwan 
RMA  Revolution in Military Affairs 
SDI  Strategic Defense Initiative 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
UN  United Nations 
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
UNOSOM United Nations Operation Somalia 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force – Bosnia 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission – Iraq weapons inspection regime 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WASP  White Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
WINEP Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WP  Washington Post 
WSJ  Wall Street Journal 
WTO  World Treaty Organisation 
 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Irving Kristol’s Eight Features of Neoconservatism   34 
Table 2: Key Premises of Neoconservatism as an Explanatory Theory of IR 49  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
Following the end of the Cold War, leading neoconservative intellectuals began to grapple 
with the future direction for American foreign policy in the absence of its primary 
geopolitical and ideological rival of the previous half century. Given the perceived 
bellicosity of neoconservatives in the months leading up to the Iraq War in 2003, the 
foreign policy views of many neoconservatives at the conclusion of the Cold War provides 
a striking contrast. Circumspection, caution, and a limited, more realist, foreign policy 
vision in 1989-91 gave way by 2001-03 to something altogether more boundless, idealist 
and ambitious. The Iraq War has obfuscated the reality that at the dawn of the post-Cold 
War era, a different form of neoconservatism seemed to be in the ascendancy from that 
which subsequently came to the fore. Why did such a change occur? This thesis seeks to 
explore ideological change in neoconservative foreign policy thought during this period, 
demonstrating both the extent of the change that occurred and the reason for it. In so doing 
it highlights, in particular, the decline of bipolarity in the international system; the 9/11 
terrorist attacks; the political philosophy of Francis Fukuyama; the influence of democratic 
peace theory; and a religious ‘turn’ with increased ideological affinities and synergies 
between leading neoconservatives and the Christian Right. 
 
A 1991 collection of essays taken from the National Interest, entitled America’s Purpose, 
demonstrates with remarkable clarity the surprising ideological distance that 
neoconservatism had yet to travel on its journey to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While there 
were signs of the future bearing for neoconservatism, most notably Charles 
Krauthammer’s essay on unipolarism, for the most part the leading neoconservatives in the 
volume articulated an unexpectedly limited foreign policy vision for the US. In their rush 
to champion the significance of Krauthammer, scholars have neglected to do justice to the 
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dominant neoconservative strain of thought of the time. Ideological change has not been 
suitably acknowledged, let alone analysed.  
 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s Ambassador to the UN, took the opportunity in her essay to 
argue for a return to ‘normality’ for America, with the years of sacrificial interventionism 
abroad were now behind it. The world was not unipolar and ripe for American empire, but 
rather multipolar, with “endless competition for marginal advantages.” The United States 
was not on a global, transcendental mission, but instead should be focused on domestic 
policy, rejecting notions of advancing the “universal dominance of democracy”. 
Kirkpatrick (1991: 155-6, 160) seriously questioned whether it was ‘healthy’ for the 
United States to be too focused on foreign policy now that the Cold War had finished. 
Foreign policy, she argued, only dominated a society when it was mortally threatened by 
an adversary or when the government was driven by notions of imperialism, aggression 
and expansionism. Analogously, Irving Kristol (1991: 63) advocated a limited, almost 
realist vision for the US. For Kristol, the United States should not be engaged in a 
democratic crusade abroad, and argued that the “futility” of basing American foreign 
policy on spreading democracy overseas was obvious to most Americans. While Kristol 
rejected an unequivocally realpolitik parsing of the national interest, he nevertheless 
argued that the national interest should be the guiding principle for the United States. He 
explicitly rejected the notion that the United States should use its troops on humanitarian 
missions abroad, for example, even arguing that if another Pol Pot emerged in Cambodia, 
it was not the role of the United States to send American troops. By focusing on the 
national interest, Kristol hoped that the United States would, in a quite extraordinary 
choice of words, “disburden itself of the incubus of liberal internationalism, with its 
utopian expectations and legalistic cast of mind...” (1991: 73).  
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The title of Nathan Glazer’s essay in America’s Purpose is perhaps the most illuminating 
feature of the entire book. ‘A Time for Modesty’ certainly looks out of place compared 
with the themes of hegemony, benevolent empire, unipolarism and other such concepts 
that had come to define the neoconservatives by the latter stages of the 1990s. Glazer – the 
Harvard sociologist and leading neoconservative although he eschewed the label and 
almost never wrote about foreign policy – used his essay to question the need for the 
United States to retain a military presence in Europe. He further attacked Krauthammer for 
arguing that the US should be upholding peace in South Korea, and argued for a shrinking 
of the military establishment. The foreign policy role for the United States was 
emphatically “not to be the policeman of the world” (Glazer, 1991: 141). Applying H.W. 
Brands’ (1998: viii) taxonomy of US foreign policy-makers divided between exemplarists 
and vindicators, early post-Cold War neoconservatism occupied a more exemplarist 
position than the movement’s later, more vindicationist posture. These three essays by 
Kirkpatrick, Kristol and Glazer are remarkable given the course neoconservatism took 
through the 1990s. Jeane Kirkpatrick’s ideological journey saw her eventually support 
military action in the Balkans, and she conducted extremely covert diplomatic missions for 
President Bush in 2003 to persuade Arab countries to back the invasion of Iraq (Weiner, 
2006). The Iraq War was also fully supported by Irving Kristol despite his earlier foreign 
policy pronouncements (W. Kristol, 2011). Certainly this would seem to suggest 
neoconservatism’s dominant themes of just over a decade previous had been sidelined. 
 
During the 1991 Gulf War there was no recorded dissent from neoconservatives within the 
Bush administration such as William Kristol and Paul Wolfowitz toward the main thrust of 
the campaign or the decision to retain Saddam Hussein in power. Given that a little over a 
decade later, the neoconservative movement was being portrayed as the intellectual author 
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of the regime-change policy in Iraq, the shift is remarkable. Perhaps even more noteworthy 
is the extent to which this shift has gone largely unacknowledged in the literature. Where 
explanation and analysis of ideational change has been forthcoming, it has too often been 
content to analyse simply in generational terms, with any shifts in ideas being ascribed to 
changing personnel in the vanguard of the neoconservative movement (Guelke, 2005: 97-
8). But this argument struggles to account for the fact that neoconservatives of the first 
generation had themselves become enthusiastic cheerleaders for regime change in Iraq by 
2003, and ignores the second generation’s proclivity for realist positions in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War. 
 
The various published studies of neoconservatism have often suffered conceptually from 
ignoring ideological change. Yet, ideologies are contingent and changeable entities that 
should never be conceptualised as immutable or static (Bevir, 2000: 280). This thesis 
utilises a ‘history of ideas’ approach to analyse the evolution of neoconservative foreign 
policy thought between the end of the Cold War and Iraq War; approximately 1989 to 
2003. In doing so, a comparative static or synchronic approach is rejected in favour of 
diachronic analysis. This thesis is not interested in merely describing what 
neoconservatives thought about foreign policy in 1989 and comparing it with what they 
thought in 2003. The focus is instead on exploring the process of change in thinking 
between those years. While claims will be made concerning a comparison of these two 
years, the focus of analysis falls upon the historical process between those two points. 
Why and how did the still predominantly realist orientation of neoconservative foreign 
policy thought at the twilight of the Cold War become replaced by a much more idealist 
approach by the dawn of the new millennium?  
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This thesis is primarily a work of intellectual political history, and represents to some 
extent an amalgam of political science, international relations, and history. Rather than 
confusing the reader, it is hoped this heterodoxy makes for a more rounded analysis than 
simply locating the thesis in just one of these academic disciplines. The focus is on 
neoconservatism as an elite ideology of a small group of intellectuals, most of whom 
locate themselves in think-tanks, academia, or the media rather than occupying 
government positions themselves. Thus, the focal point of this research is not public 
opinion polls nor party politics, neither is it official government documents or national 
security strategies. The direct effect that neoconservatism as a political ideology has had 
on the policy-making process itself is of lesser interest here, and one that has been 
thoroughly explored elsewhere (Halper and Clarke, 2004; Daalder and Lindsay, 2003). 
Instead the focus is more exclusively on neoconservatism itself, taking a step back from 
the policy-making process and interrogating the ideology itself and its evolutionary 
development. What are its fundamental features?  How has it changed? Why has it 
changed?  There are times when output from the policy-making process can be used to 
highlight aspects of neoconservative ideology, for example, Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay 
Khalilzad’s controversial Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 1992. In large part, 
however, the focus will not be on official government discourse, but think-tank reports, 
op-eds, and various publications and interviews conducted with leading neoconservatives.  
 
Despite the almost obligatory chapters on neoconservatism in recent books on 
contemporary US foreign policy, the academy has been surprisingly reluctant to fully 
engage theoretically with neoconservatism. Michael Williams (2005: 308) argues there has 
been little academic engagement with neoconservatism from IR theorists, which, given the 
power that the neoconservatives have supposedly wielded in setting the foreign policy 
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agenda during Bush’s first term, would seem to be an surprising omission. While there 
have been more academic contributions on neoconservatism since Williams suggested this, 
neoconservatism, remains academically under-discussed.
1
 This may be at least partly due 
to the fact that many leading neoconservative intellectuals have shunned a formal 
academic career in favour of careers in government, think-tanks and magazine publishing. 
Aside from infrequent contributions in Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy, such as Kristol 
and Kagan’s 1996 article ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,’ for the most part they 
have not engaged in debate with their ideological adversaries in formal academic channels, 
often preferring a Fox News studio or a Weekly Standard editorial.
2
 While this, of course, 
does not of itself invalidate their arguments, ideology or intellectual capacity, it could be 
an explanatory factor in the academy’s failure to study neoconservatism more 
comprehensively and in more depth than it has hitherto chosen to.  
 
It will be suggested in these pages that analysis of neoconservatism remains an important 
task. Given the capacity of neoconservatives to adapt their political ideology to changing 
political landscapes over the past forty years, and given their influence on the foreign 
policy-making process at key moments in recent history, further engagement with 
neoconservatism is essential. Indeed, Michael Williams (2005: 328-9) makes a powerful 
case for the continued relevance of neoconservatism within American political debate, due 
to its unique challenge to the politics of liberal modernity combined with its ability to fuse 
the domestic with the foreign, leading to a “powerful political logic and a rhetorical 
strategy” which means “it is unlikely simply to fade away”. Too often the academy, and IR 
                                                 
1
 See Timothy J. Lynch (2008) ‘Kristol Balls: Neoconservative Visions of Islam and the Middle East’, 
International Politics, 45(2), pp. 182-211; Aaron Rapport (2008) ‘Unexpected Affinities? Neoconservatism’s 
Place in IR Theory’, Security Studies, 17(2), pp. 257-293; Jacob Heilbrunn (2008) They Knew They Were 
Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York, Doubleday). 
2
 See William Kristol & Robert Kagan (1996) ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 
75(4), 
pp. 18-32. 
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in particular, has chosen to focus its research programme on a world it wishes existed 
rather than engaging with ‘reality’ as it presents itself. As Alexander Wendt (1999: 8-10, 
75) has observed – it is still nation-states that should remain the fundamental focus points 
for research in international politics. This comes despite Wendt privileging a methodology 
that favours concepts of intersubjectivity and constructivism which in many ways 
challenge traditionally conceived IR. He argues that nation-states should be understood as 
the agents of international politics, objective facts that cannot simply be discursively 
wished away. Despite those who argue either the United States will be increasingly 
challenged by China and India for the title of dominant nation-state, or that the nation-state 
itself is becoming an anachronism in a global society and more regional forms of 
governance, the United States remains in economic and military terms, the only global 
superpower.
3
 Foreign policy ideologies, such as neoconservatism, that shape and have 
shaped US foreign policy remain central academic focal points for explaining international 
politics.  
 
* * * * * 
 
Chapter One provides a methodological foundation for the rest of the thesis by moulding 
together a tripartite theoretical component with a discussion of how the existing literature 
conceptualises neoconservatism. The theoretical section begins with a discussion of the 
concept of ideology and how it has been theorised by political scientists. What is an 
ideology? What are its main features? How does ideology relate to both political theory 
and political practice? Why is ideology nearly always viewed in the negative (as 
something that ‘other people’ have fallen in to) and is a more value-neutral definition 
                                                 
3
 See Fareed Zakaria (2008) The Post-American World: And the Rise of the West (London, Allen Lane); 
Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State : The Rise of Regional Economies (London: HarperCollins, 
1995). 
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preferable? The thesis then proceeds to the question of ideological change, through 
discussion of the ‘history of ideas’. How have historians of ideas conceptualised 
ideological change? Emphasis will be placed on the recent work of Mark Bevir, Michael 
Freeden and Colin Hay. The thesis then discusses the relationship between US foreign 
policy and ideology, stressing how scholars have argued there is a broad, bipartisan 
American nationalist ideology underpinning US foreign policy. The fourth part of the 
theoretical section grounds the thesis in a discussion of International Relations theory to 
supply definitional clarity to the key theoretical concepts of the thesis. The thesis overall 
argues for a shift in neoconservative foreign policy thought away from realism and 
towards a more ideologically ambitious idealism loosely based on a conservative variant of 
liberal internationalism. The author is aware that by grounding the thesis in three different 
academic disciplines the thesis may invite the charge of neglecting theoretical depth in 
favour of breadth. By locating at the intersection of Political Science, History and IR, 
however, and not focusing exclusively on one discipline, it is believed that a more well-
rounded approach has resulted. This thesis chiefly is a work of political intellectual history 
with a specific focus on policy areas relevant to IR. It is not primarily a theoretical 
contribution devoted to the more abstract study of ideology or to theoretical debates within 
IR, although its content engages with both fields. 
 
The second half of Chapter One focuses on how neoconservatism has been conceptualised 
by its main protagonists, critics, and observers in the academy. While the thesis primarily 
deals with neoconservative ideology as it relates to the conduct of foreign policy, the 
domestic roots of neoconservative thought will be acknowledged in this section, especially 
its concern with crime, authority, morality and the central neoconservative theme of virtue 
which is an essential point of linkage between domestic and foreign policy. Gertrude 
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Himmelfarb’s reading of the British Enlightenment as opposed to the French 
Enlightenment, and the centrality of benevolence and virtue over pure reason, will be 
stressed as a key feature of neoconservatism. Due to the original neoconservatives’ radical 
roots some have sought to portray neoconservatism as too radical an ideology to sit within 
the broader conservative corpus, however, neoconservatism’s focus on authority, morality 
and stability are sine qua non of conservatism itself.
4
 
 
Turning more explicitly to foreign policy, the chapter examines how neoconservatism has 
been portrayed in comparison with its main ideological rivals. What characteristics does it 
share with the realism of a Henry Kissinger or Brent Scowcroft, the conservative 
nationalism of a Donald Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney, or the neo-isolationist 
paleoconservatism of Patrick Buchanan? What similarities and differences have been 
identified between neoconservatism and the liberal internationalist school? Is 
neoconservatism simply a conservative variant of liberal internationalism, with its focus on 
democracy promotion and human rights – what has been described as “Wilsonianism with 
teeth” (Mearsheimer, 2005) – or does it, while sitting squarely in the conservative sphere, 
represent something altogether distinct?  
 
How the relationship between neoconservatism and realism has been analysed will be 
explored as a defining conceptual underpinning for the subsequent empirical chapters. Is 
neoconservatism merely a realist subset or do its central features “lie in its contrast to 
                                                 
4
 Both conservative libertarians and paleoconservatives argue that neoconservatism should not be regarded as 
an authentic expression of conservatism in general. For a conservative libertarian critique of neoconservatism 
please see Michael D. Tanner (2007) Leviathan on the Right: How Big Government Conservatism Brought 
Down the Republican Revolution (Washington DC, Cato Institute). Tanner (2007: 13, 27-28) argues that 
neoconservatism is a synthesis of the thought of Strauss and Niebuhr, and does not rest on the same 
classically liberal and traditional conservative traditions that have emphasised limited government. For a 
paleoconservative critique of neoconservatism please see Patrick J. Buchanan (2004) Where the Right Went 
Wrong: How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency (New 
York, Thomas Dunne). Buchanan (2004: 35, 53, 57-8) argues the neoconservatives a “tiny cabal” who have 
pursued an agenda that is focused on utopian democratic imperialism that is the “antithesis of strategy”. 
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Realism” (Williams, 2005: 309)? Neoconservative emphases on hard power and the 
nation-state have been too readily viewed as ‘proof’ of neoconservatism’s realist bent. To 
what extent do neoconservatism’s concerns with democracy, human rights, and virtue as 
opposed to what it perceives to be an amoral realpolitik, show that Williams’ observation 
above is correct? Or do the humanitarian themes mentioned above, merely function as 
rhetorical veneer, masking what is essentially hard-line conservative nationalism, rather 
than being closer to either liberal interventionism or realism (Ryan, 2007)? 
 
Chapter One concludes with a tripartite definition of neoconservatism, which argues that 
while there has been change in neoconservative thought in this period there are three 
fundamental themes that remain central to neoconservative thought throughout. First, an 
emphasis on virtue, and a highly moralised account of the political. Second, that domestic 
political life is an essential consideration in making foreign policy, both in terms of 
predicting the likely behaviour of other states, and in terms of the impact that American 
foreign policy has on domestic socio-political life in the United States itself. Third, in 
comparison with other foreign policy schools, there is a preference for the United States to 
use hard power to solve foreign policy crises, with an accompanying privileging of 
unilateralism.   
 
Chapter Two explicates the state of neoconservatism at the conclusion of the Cold War, 
focusing mainly on the second half of the George H. W. Bush administration. What were 
the dominant strains of neoconservative foreign policy thought as neoconservatives came 
to terms with the end of the Cold War? What role should the United States play on the 
world stage, now that its primary geopolitical adversary had collapsed? Should the United 
States continue to pursue a balance of power or more novel forms of unipolarism and 
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power preponderance? How should the United States respond to the biggest foreign policy 
crisis of that time, following the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? It is 
argued that the answers to these questions reveal a neoconservatism that was coming to 
terms with a new geopolitical and ideological landscape, and that its later more ambitious 
and unrestrained form should not obscure the fact that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a 
far more circumspect neoconservatism, certainly not diametrically opposed to realism, or, 
even perhaps surprisingly, neo-isolationism, appeared to be in evidence.  
 
The seeds of neoconservatism’s transformation had, however, been sown. The few 
accounts of neoconservatism that touch on ideological change, invariably attribute change 
almost exclusively to material factors, the most obvious being the perceived unipolarity of 
the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Charles 
Krauthammer’s much heralded trumpeting of American unipolarity, seemingly rested quite 
heavily on the fact that the Soviet threat was no more. The new role for the US was not 
one to be found in the abstract, but in response to the perceived structure of global politics 
(Krauthammer, 1991a: 23). This thesis argues, however, that this only partly explains the 
early stages of change in neoconservative thought. It will be argued that Francis 
Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis is a further potent source of explanatory power for 
analysing change in neoconservatism. Fukuyama’s thesis has been often incorrectly 
viewed as striking an unduly triumphal tone in response to a collapsing Soviet empire. A 
closer reading reveals his thesis does not ultimately rest on the material collapse of the 
USSR – its publication marginally predates it – and is a more abstract philosophical 
defence of the ultimate victory of liberal democracy, rather than a simplistic boilerplate 
response to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  
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Chapter Two concludes with discussion of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 
document as a harbinger of the direction of ideological change in neoconservative thought. 
The document made an unabashed call for continued global American geopolitical 
predominance, and for the United States to prevent the emergence of any new geopolitical 
rival in Europe or Asia (Tyler, 1992a: 1). It is argued the DPG represented an important 
milestone in neoconservative ideological evolution, and is an essential component of the 
overall ideational change that occurred. The thesis nonetheless cautions against placing too 
much emphasis on this alone. Some scholars such as Halper and Clarke have seen the 
George W. Bush administration’s Iraq policy, and by extension that of the 
neoconservatives themselves, as a direct reflection of the DPG in 1992. In so doing, this 
once again precludes rigorous analysis of ideational change in neoconservatism by, in 
effect, stating that the predominant form of neoconservatism that existed and influenced 
Bush in 2003 was the same as that which produced the DPG in 1992 (Halper and Clarke, 
2004: 146). It is argued in this chapter instead that important neoconservative foreign 
policy themes, most notably democracy promotion and humanitarian interventionism, were 
absent from the DPG, and were not developed until later in the 1990s.  
 
Chapter Three focuses on the development of neoconservatism during the first term of the 
Clinton administration. While neoconservatives increasingly argued for humanitarian 
interventionism in response to Clinton’s perceived failures in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and 
Rwanda, simultaneously they increasingly adopted his rhetoric and language of democracy 
promotion, which had hitherto been of lesser concern to them. Thus while aspects of 
Clinton’s policies abroad were presented as examples which were not to be followed, at 
the same time, the democratic peace thesis, coupled with the  interventionism of the 
Clinton Doctrine, at the very least at the rhetorical level, moved more centrally into 
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neoconservative thought. The interventionism of Clinton’s first term revealed that 
neoconservatives had become generally supportive of certain interventions abroad and 
justified them at least partially, and often more systematically, on humanitarian grounds. 
They were still, however, largely reluctant during this period to use direct American 
military force to bring about regime change and democratic change. 
 
The latter section of Chapter Three explores the relationship between neoconservatism and 
the Christian Right, and with religion more broadly. Early neoconservative intellectuals 
extolled the virtues of religion for the benefits it brought to society in the form of stability, 
but had a somewhat ambiguous personal association with religion. During the 1990s, 
however, there was a  shift within neoconservatism to a far less vague relationship with 
religion that went beyond simply seeing its value as a source of stability. Leading 
neoconservatives went beyond seeing religion in merely instrumental terms, for example, 
with some regularly attending temple services and living in kosher homes. Both 
neoconservatives and the Christian Right also supported humanitarian interventionism and 
the promotion of political and religious liberty abroad. The last part of Chapter Three 
explores the significance of this in more depth. In what ways did increased 
neoconservative concerns with human rights and democracy promotion during the 1990s, 
and the idea of the United States as the indispensable nation, connect with similar themes 
that were developing within the Christian Right at this time?  
 
Chapter Four discusses the evolution of neoconservative thought during Clinton’s second 
term. It begins by discussing institutional developments within neoconservatism, 
especially the creation of the Weekly Standard and the Project for the New American 
Century as vehicles for their foreign policy platform. It follows this with discussion of the 
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defence budget, missile defence and the expansion of NATO, and analysis of the US 
relationship with China. These topics were important for showcasing how 
neoconservatives were developing a more radical foreign policy platform which often put 
them at odds with Republicans in Congress as much as President Clinton. The libertarian 
and economically-focused philosophy underpinning Newt Gingrich’s Contract with 
America meant neoconservatives advocated positions on the defence budget and relations 
with China which differed markedly from the congressional Republican mainstream. 
Missile defence, however, was an issue that brought more unity; although 
neoconservatives such as Robert Kagan favoured it on the grounds that it would create a 
domestic political environment more conducive to overseas interventionism, rather than 
purely as a defensive measure. 
 
The latter half of Chapter Four discusses the debate surrounding interventions in Kosovo 
and Iraq as embodying distinctive features that demonstrated ideological shifts in 
neoconservative thought. In the early 1990s neoconservatives had supported a limited 
policy of ‘lift and strike’ in Bosnia to protect the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) population 
from Bosnian Serb forces, and backed George H. W. Bush’s limited policy during the Gulf 
War of retaining Saddam Hussein in power after removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait. By 
the latter half of Clinton’s second term, however, their approach had hardened 
significantly. The neoconservative solution to the crisis in Kosovo was not a ‘lift and 
strike’ approach but full scale use of American ground forces to defeat the Serbian army 
and bring regime change and liberal democracy to Belgrade. Equally, in Iraq, Wolfowitz 
and other neoconservatives abandoned a limited policy of retaining Saddam Hussein in 
power and openly argued for using American military power to bring about regime 
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change, although they still retained a significant role for the Iraqi opposition in bringing 
this about. 
 
Chapter Five examines neoconservatism after the Clinton administration until the start of 
the Iraq War in 2003. It will be argued the dominant strain of neoconservative thinking 
was now substantially altered from the realism-isolationism that featured at the end of the 
Cold War. Bellicosity in the name of the national interest, democracy, and human rights, 
now led many neoconservatives to support Bush’s offensives in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
pressed him to go further in confronting Iran and North Korea. The impact of 9/11 on 
neoconservative thought will also be discussed. Were the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks a 
substantive turning point in neoconservative thought, or merely of instrumental value in 
enabling neoconservatives to more successfully make the case for a pre-existing foreign 
policy vision to be put into practice? The chapter argues the 9/11 attacks were important 
for moving neoconservatives such as Krauthammer, Perle and Wolfowitz to a position 
much closer to the one that Kagan and Kristol had sketched in the latter half of the 1990s. 
Neoconservatives, now conscious of the direct Islamist threat to the US, consistently 
linked a lack of political liberty in the Middle East to American national security. The 
links between George W. Bush and the neoconservatives, however, should not be 
overplayed. The neoconservative foreign policy worldview had developed after 9/11 into 
something that was more expansive and ambitiously radical than Bush was capable of 
delivering on, even if he was so inclined, and went beyond merely toppling Saddam 
Hussein and the Taleban.  
 
The concluding chapter summarises the central argument that neoconservative foreign 
policy had undergone a substantive and fundamental shift between the Cold War and the 
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Iraq War. Neoconservatives ended the Cold War urging caution, restraint and normalcy, 
but began the new millennium in an altogether different position, urging the United States 
to throw off a moderate approach in favour of a more ambitious and far-reaching agenda. 
The use of unilateral American power to topple rogue states and promote American liberal 
democratic values was now viewed as essential. Two material factors and three more 
ideational drivers of change had been significant. The decline of bipolarity in the 
international system; the impact of the 9/11 attacks; Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ 
thesis; democratic peace theory; and a religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought, all 
contributed to a substantial shift in neoconservatism toward a foreign policy emphasising 
liberal democracy, humanitarian interventionism, and US national security, all predicated 
on American hegemony. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Chapter One  
Theoretical and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a foundation for the subsequent empirical chapters in two significant 
ways. Firstly, the chapter draws upon existing theoretical literature in Political Science, 
History and IR, to explore the study of ideology, the ‘history of ideas’, and IR theory. It 
will be argued that a conception of ideology that is value-neutral and pertinent to both 
political theory and political practice, rather than privileging one over the other, is to be 
preferred. It is also suggested that ideological change is often too readily attributed simply 
to just material factors instead of ideational drivers. Drawing upon the ‘history of ideas’ 
literature, it is argued that ideology should be seen as something changeable and 
contingent, which alters in response to specific dilemmas. The best way to analyse an 
ideology is to diachronically trace its historical evolution by examining what people 
actually wrote and said. The theoretical section concludes with a brief discussion of IR 
theory, particularly as pertaining to realism and liberal internationalism. 
 
Secondly, the chapter draws together the various ways in which neoconservatism has been 
conceptualised in the existing literature by both neoconservatives and academics. It is 
shown that at times it has been seen variously as an alternative form of realism; a 
conservative form of Wilsonian liberal internationalism; a theory of IR sharing much in 
common with Alexander Wendt’s ‘thin’ constructivism; a form of conservative 
nationalism with only a thin, rhetorical, liberal internationalist veneer; and a Likudite 
ideology privileging the interests of Israel above those of the United States. This thesis 
argues that for neoconservatives, the one overriding conceptual theme that is continually 
emphasised in both domestic and foreign policy is the centrality of virtue, which will also 
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be explored in this chapter. For many neoconservatives, especially in foreign policy, what 
distinguishes their approach is a signal attachment to what they perceive to be the intrinsic 
moral virtues of the American republican tradition. They consider these to be threatened 
by both a realism that strips the United States of its virtue through amoral realpolitik, and a 
liberal internationalism that forces it to relinquish its virtue to the international community, 
thus setting itself in opposition to notions of American exceptionalism. It is argued that 
there are three broad central pillars of neoconservative foreign policy thought that remain 
relatively constant throughout – a concern with virtue; a focus on domestic socio-political 
conditions both in other countries and the United States; and an emphasis on hard power, 
often used unilaterally to solve specific foreign policy dilemmas.  
 
1.2 Ideology 
It would be problematic to draw conclusions regarding neoconservative ideology without a 
consideration of what an ideology actually ‘is’. Its definition is somewhat nebulous, and 
certainly contested. Ian Adams (1993: 2-3) suggests that there are three main approaches 
to ideology. Early Marxists argued that ideology was just another type of false 
consciousness, used by the ruling class to further its interests, and Marx’s teachings were 
scientific rather than ideological. Liberals, on the other hand, equate ideology with closed 
systems of thought that make claims to truths which are absolute, ultimately leading to 
totalitarianism, since those in possession of the ‘truth’ should not be hindered by those 
who wish to stand in the way of truth and progress. From this perspective, liberalism is not 
an ideological doctrine in the sense that Fascism or Marxism are but instead a collection of 
perceptive philosophical principles, based around openness, tolerance and rationality. 
Conservatives, however, argue ideology is an attempt to apply abstract theory to the 
political, and that in contrast to this, conservatism rests on pragmatism and common sense, 
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ultimately treating society as an organic entity that cannot be ‘improved’ by recourse to the 
abstract. Ideology has thus usually been treated almost exclusively in the negative, with 
Marxists, liberals and conservatives all united in arguing ideology is not a label that 
applies to their scientific, rational or pragmatic systems of thought.  
 
While admittedly attempting to be more objective about the issue of ideology, analysis of 
ideology by political scientists is often couched in terms of it being a ‘false’ mode of 
thinking, without which we would be better off. A prime example is David Hawkes (2003: 
1) in his analysis of ideology and globalisation. In a similar construction to that of 
Marxism, he suggests the market economy “produces a systematically false consciousness: 
an ideology”.  However, in recent years, this penchant for viewing ideology as inherently 
negative has been replaced by a more neutral or non-partisan definition. It has become 
“simply a set of political beliefs about how a society ought to be and how to improve it, 
irrespective of whether those ideas are true or false or good or bad” (Adams, 1993: 3). 
Tibor Mandi (2004: 1) refers to ideology as “a distinctive, more or less coherent system of 
political beliefs with a view to informing political action”. These definitions have enabled 
ideologies to be discussed without necessarily having to engage in factional and often 
highly partisan disputes. 
 
While the concept of ideology has then been somewhat neutralised, and stripped of its 
negative connotations, other conceptual dilemmas nonetheless remain. Perhaps a central 
issue is where ideology stands in relation to political practice. Are ideologies conceived as 
being highly abstract theoretical structures of thought that are, in some sense, divorced 
from actual real world events? Or are ideologies orientated purely to the conduct of 
political practices? (Freeden, 2000: 303-308). Freeden argues that the debate over theory 
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versus practice, initially highlighted by Immanuel Kant, is a false dichotomy. Instead, he 
envisages a two-way flow between ideology and political practice, with both influencing 
and folding back on each other. Ideologies such as neoconservatism are often less 
interested in clarifying thought-practices but instead set about “providing readily available, 
applicable and widely consumable solutions for groups” (Freeden, 2000: 308). The 
relevance of groups should also not be overlooked, since “ideologies always are group 
practices” rather than the result of one individual political theorist (Freeden, 2000: 307). In 
that sense, an ideology consists of a synthesis of the political thought of its contributors, 
and to that extent is greater than the sum of its parts.  
 
This thesis embraces this relatively broad conception of ideology. When it refers to 
ideology this does not connote any notions of false consciousness or merely a reflection of 
the ideas of the ruling elite. Ideology instead is utilised in a neutral fashion, almost 
analogously with the concept of ‘worldview’, as a broadly cohesive group of ideas that 
individuals hold to enable them to make sense of the world as they perceive it presents 
itself, and to enable them to develop policy prescriptions on the basis of that ideology or 
worldview. On the basis of this general definition of ideology, it is difficult to envisage 
actors who have political outlooks that are not ideological in any way. This does not of 
course necessitate endorsement of the rationalist model of ideologies as consciously 
articulated systems of belief, and there remains an important role for the “affective, 
unconscious, mythical or symbolic dimensions of ideology” (Eagleton, 1991: 221). 
 
In the broader dialogue in political science between material and ideational explanations of 
politics, this thesis takes a position of scepticism towards approaches that ignore or 
downplay the role played by ideas in determining political outcomes, yet, acknowledges 
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that political actors must formulate ideas in a material environment.
5
 This thesis is 
somewhat sympathetic to Alexander Wendt’s form of ‘thin’ constructivism which eschews 
the materialism of realism or Marxism, but holds to a “rump materialism” – that basic 
material factors such as natural resources, geography, climate etc. still matter (Wendt, 
1999: 93, 110-1). The most useful analysis of the interplay between the material and 
ideational, however, is provided by Colin Hay (2002: 208, 212-215). According to this 
argument, ideas are only ever “relatively autonomous” of the material. The material 
context in which political actors operate and develop ideas and ideologies imposes a 
strategic and discursive selectivity on the ideas constructed. Ideas are of signal importance, 
but do not develop in a non-material ‘vacuum’. 
 
1.3 The ‘History of Ideas’ and Ideological Change 
The ‘history of ideas’ as an academic sub-discipline, pioneered by Arthur Lovejoy in the 
first half of the twentieth century, was proposed as an amalgam of different academic 
disciplines sitting somewhere between history and philosophy, combining Anglo-
American empiricism and German idealism (Parsons, 2007: 684). The discipline 
somewhat conservatively defended the western intellectual tradition and as a result 
declined in popularity.
6
 In recent years, it has emerged as a discipline less concerned with 
the grand sweep of western intellectual history over millennia, and more focused on 
contemporary intellectual history, as “a kind of gazetter (sic) of current intellectual 
discourse” (Parsons, 2007: 693).  
 
                                                 
5
 For a good example of a material explanation please see Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of International 
Politics (Boston, McGraw-Hill, and of the ideational please see David Campbell (1998) Writing Security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Rev. Ed.) (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press). 
6
 Indeed, the Journal of the History of Ideas itself was one of the few academic journals to receive 
clandestine support from the CIA during the Cold War (Parsons, 2007: 686). 
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It is impossible to write of the ‘history of ideas’, without discussing ideational change. To 
write of the ‘history of ideas’ is to write of change. Colin Hay (2002: 144-50) suggests that 
there are three analytical strategies for the investigation of change. Firstly, synchronic 
analysis, which “freezes” the object of analysis, and in effect scrutinises it at one specific 
moment in time, and can therefore reveal little about change. Secondly, comparative static 
analysis, which in effect takes two (or more) snapshots of the object of analysis, at more 
than one moment in time, to enable comparisons to be drawn. Thirdly, diachronic analysis, 
which is the favoured analytical strategy of this thesis. This approach “emphasises the 
process of change over time” and allows the analyst to map out and trace the interaction of 
variables and processes over time. Hay employs a helpful analogy from photography to 
elucidate the three approaches. The first approach is compared to a single photographic 
snapshot of one moment in time; the second is compared to a couple or series of snapshots 
over time; the third compared to a panning video shot over time (Hay, 2002: 148-9).
7
 The 
problem with both the synchronic and comparative static approaches for exploring 
ideational change is that they effectively remove the object of analysis from history itself.  
 
At the centre of diachronic analysis is the necessity to explore the dilemmas and moments 
of ideational crisis that result in ideational shifts. By exploring ideational dilemmas, 
historians of ideas can analyse why individuals change their beliefs. This thesis seeks to 
examine a series of dilemmas that neoconservative intellectuals faced during the 
immediate post-Cold War environment, and in so doing develop a clearer understanding of 
why neoconservative foreign policy ideology shifted during the 1990s. The concept of 
‘dilemma’ itself can be very broad. Dilemmas can arise from a change in material 
conditions; exposure to novel philosophical arguments; exposure to a different culture; a 
                                                 
7
 For a much longer list of conceptual metaphors and analytical approaches to the study of social change 
please see Piotr Sztompka (1993) The Sociology of Social Change (Oxford, Blackwell).  
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change in the political or geopolitical environment; a change in the scientific environment; 
or a previously unnoticed contradiction in thought. The fact that the dilemma intrudes from 
the outside is the crucial factor, as ideational change cannot be brought about simply by 
the application of the logic of the pre-existing idea (Bevir, 1999: 222, 225-6). While the 
idea of a dilemma provoking ideological shifts is certainly not novel in the philosophy of 
science – there are echoes of both Kuhn and Popper here – Bevir’s concept of dilemma is 
less circumscribed, which he partly attributes to the fact he is dealing with the logic of 
individual reasoning in general rather than exclusively how scientific knowledge changes.
8
 
Thus, for philosophers of science, it is usually ‘facts’ that are treated as dilemmas, but for 
Bevir, although facts can be dilemmas, the concept is much broader, and can be “any 
understanding that requires someone to modify his existing webs of beliefs if only by 
accepting it as true.” Another difference is that dilemmas that change webs of beliefs occur 
frequently and in an evolutionary fashion, whereas the paradigm shifts of someone like 
Kuhn, are far rarer and more revolutionary (Bevir, 1999: 228-9). This is not to say that 
Bevir’s understanding of ideational change cannot encompass revolutionary changes, but 
that frequently, individuals respond to a dilemma by “hooking it on to themes found in 
their existing beliefs and adjusting the rest of their beliefs accordingly” (Bevir, 1999: 236).  
 
1.4 American Foreign Policy and Ideology 
Unsurprisingly, as with the wider debate, Macdonald (2000: 181) argues that the concept 
of ideology in relation to US foreign policy is often used as term of disparagement, 
presented as the opposite of a pragmatic realism and the pursuit of national interest which 
                                                 
8
 Please see Thomas S. Kuhn (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press) and Karl R. Popper (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, Hutchinson). 
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has, in Macdonald’s view, dominated American foreign policy.9 Indeed, Osgood (1953: 1, 
11) suggests that national interest and ideals are in conflict in the contemporary United 
States in much the same way as they were in ancient Athens, although idealism very 
infrequently overrules that self-interest. For Macdonald (2000: 181-182, 188) though, the 
national interest is not the opposite of ideology, instead he argues that this dichotomy can 
be transcended by seeing the national interest as constrained by ideology, with ideologies 
representing “blueprints” which are utilised to “move material reality in a particular 
direction”. Thus the Cold War should not be conceptualised as purely a material struggle, 
but one between two competing ideologies. Hunt (1987: 5, 7, 12) argues that George 
Kennan and William Appleman Williams’ treatment of ideology – the former dismissive 
on realist grounds, the latter economically reductionist – have been influential but should 
be transcended. For Hunt, a preferred definition of ideology, drawing heavily on the work 
of the cultural anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, should centre on the concept of ideology as 
a cultural system. This conception would take ideology seriously, but in a wider fashion 
than suggested by Williams. Hunt (1987: 16) favours a broad definition of ideology as a 
way to “elucidate complex realities and reduce them to understandable and manageable 
terms”.10 Hunt argues there is a strong connection between a broad American foreign 
policy ideology and a form of American nationalism, and this emerged in the early 
twentieth century grounded on three important themes. Firstly, that the United States’ 
desire for national greatness was very closely related to promoting liberty; Secondly, that 
attitudes to other countries and peoples were based on a form of racial hierarchy; Thirdly, 
that while revolutions abroad could be good, they could just as easily be bad (1987: 17, 
                                                 
9
 Indeed, Macdonald (2000: 185) further argues that the dominance of realism in American foreign policy 
circles has almost made the concept of ideology “invisible”.  
10
Interestingly, on the topic of ideological change, Hunt (1987: 16) argues that “permutations may occur” as 
a consequence of “changes in the cast of policy personalities”. This is the standard explanation of ideological 
change, when it is acknowledged at all, that is emphasised in discussion of neoconservatism. This thesis, 
however, takes the position it is insufficient for explaining the totality of ideological change in 
neoconservatism. 
25 
 
18). Taken together, these ideas at the core of a nationalist American foreign policy 
ideology are largely cultural and “expressions of a civic religion formulated to hold an 
ethnically, racially, regionally, and religiously diverse country together” (Hunt, 1987: 
189). 
 
The idea of civic religion is taken further by Anatol Lieven (2004: 5, 6) who describes the 
American civic religion as a form of “civic nationalism”, not to be confused with simply 
patriotism. This civic nationalism has two important strands, the first being the “American 
Creed” which is ideological, the second being the American nationalist “antithesis”, which 
is less ideological and more ethno-religious in orientation.
11
 Lieven suggests the latter 
strand is backward-looking, whereas the former strand, of which the neoconservatism of 
Irving Kristol is a prime example, attempts to be forward-looking, advancing American 
greatness on the back of the American creed. In a similar vein, H.W. Brands (1998: vii-
viii) argues that the dichotomies between realism or isolationism on the one hand, and 
idealism on the other, are overstated, and the single idea of America being a progressive 
force in global politics is all pervasive. For Brands, any differences are primarily tactical 
or operational, rather than fundamental or ideological. While the primary cleavage in US 
foreign policy making circles is between exemplarists and vindicators, both share the same 
ideology positing the United States as the primary actor in progressively shifting global 
politics to better humanity. While liberalism, conservatism, and neoconservatism are 
obvious examples of more specific ideologies, the works discussed above are instructive in 
exposing the existence of a wider form of American nationalism that also functions as 
ideology, and one that in many ways transcends the domestic ideological divide.  
 
                                                 
11
 Of course, under the broader definition of ideology favoured in this thesis, this latter conception of civic 
nationalism is also ideological. 
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1.5 IR Theory: Realism and Liberal Internationalism  
This thesis claims neoconservatism became less realist between 1989 and 2003, and as an 
aspect of that change, liberal internationalism had more of an impact on neoconservative 
foreign policy thought during these years than it had hitherto achieved, most notably in 
relation to the role of the United States in democracy promotion efforts abroad and 
interventionism more generally. Having discussed ideology in general, a more detailed 
look at both realism and liberal internationalism is now required. 
 
1.5.1 Realism 
Realism has roots in both antiquity and modernity. Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War has been seen as a classically realist text.
12
 Its emphasis on military 
power and the fact that the weaker Greek city states were seen to portray the stronger 
Athens as the oppressor and the weaker Sparta as redeemer are largely seen as an 
affirmation of the balance of power thesis, and to run contrary to bandwagoning logic 
(Thucydides, 1972: Book V, chapters 17, 84-116).
13
 In modernity, realism developed 
during the twentieth century in response to the perceived failure of liberal idealism during 
the interwar years which embraced a form of utopianism that was ill-equipped to prevent 
the Second World War. The realist approach focuses largely on the restrictions placed on 
                                                 
12
 Contrary to the prevailing narrative on Thucydides and realism, some neoconservatives have instead 
argued that the History of the Peloponnesian War emphasises core neoconservative principles, especially the 
type of virtuous society that is worth fighting for, and is actually a critique of realism, rather than a critique 
of an activist or more imperial foreign policy. Indeed, Charles (2006) argues that Pericles’ funeral oration 
champions the enlightened superiority of Athenian society over its opponents and that the “naivety of pure 
realism and the unique worth and heroic possibilities of democracy are at the core of Thucydides Histories 
and are at the root of his appeal to the neoconservatives”. Donald Kagan, the Yale classicist and progenitor 
of something resembling a neoconservative ‘dynasty’, has made the study of the Peloponnesian War his 
life’s work. See Donald Kagan (2005) The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in Savage Conflict 431-
404 BC, (London, HarperPerennial).  
13
 Waltz (1979: 127) argues the stronger power will always be seen as more of a threat to other states than 
weaker powers, and that weaker states will seek alliances with each other to protect against the stronger state, 
rather than joining with the stronger state. 
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international relations by human nature and the idea that the international system is 
anarchic with no higher authority than the state (Lawson, 2003: 9). 
 
For the realist, international relations are dominated by power, particularly military or 
‘hard’ power. Hans Morgenthau, most associated with twentieth century realism, argued 
(2006: 5) that it was a mistake for political science to focus on motives or ideological 
preference instead of “the concept of interest defined in terms of power”. In addition to a 
focus on power, realists argue that stability in international politics is crucial. The chief 
mechanism for producing stability is the balance of power, which realists argue is also a 
principle with wider application, being enshrined domestically in the United States through 
checks and balances (Morgenthau, et al., 2006: 181). 
 
A further refinement of the realist position in the form of neorealism or structural realism 
is associated particularly with Kenneth Waltz. Whereas realism as articulated by 
Morgenthau relied on a particular conception of human nature to drive its approach to IR, 
neorealism instead placed less of an emphasis on human nature, instead pointing to the 
structure of anarchy in the international system as the critical feature of international 
relations (Lawson, 2003: 80). Indeed, neorealism relies heavily on structuralism to explain 
international politics, whereas its critics have stressed that the structures of international 
politics are not universal but are the contingent products of particular historical conditions 
(Walker, 1993: 104-5). Waltz (2001: 27) does not explicitly demur from Morgenthau’s 
observations on human nature, but stresses that “the importance of human nature is 
reduced by the fact that the same nature, however defined, has to explain an infinite variety 
of human events”. Therefore, it is not human nature, but the ‘nature’ of the international 
system that is the most important feature of international politics. The world is not 
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characterised by liberal notions of interdependence but “bristling nationalisms”. Indeed, he 
argues (1979: 159) that it is logically wrong for liberals to treat the world as a single unit 
yet argue it is interdependent. 
 
 
Emphasis on maintaining and managing the system versus changing or transforming it is 
an important distinguishing mark of realism, especially in relation to how neoconservatism 
developed in the post-Cold War period. Thus for realists the preponderance of American 
power after the Cold War presents a major challenge to international peace, as the 
international system lacks the inherent stability of a bipolar system (Desch, 2001: 526). 
Thus for the United States to base its foreign policy on the universal export of its own 
liberal democratic values appears foolhardy to the realist. Values, no matter how virtuous, 
are unable to trump the structural characteristics of the international system that promote 
power balancing. Instead, the United States should focus on being a status quo power, 
pursuing limited foreign policy goals. The domestic political situation of other states 
should be relatively unimportant to the conduct of US foreign policy, as it is not the 
internal characteristics of states that determine foreign policy behaviour but the structure 
of the international system. If states are driven by power and attempting to maintain their 
position in an anarchic world, then whether a state is a liberal democracy or repressively 
authoritarian is not the determining factor in the conduct of their foreign affairs. 
 
Having established a theory of IR that places heavy emphasis on power, a pessimistic 
conception of human nature, and an anarchic international system, realists have been 
vulnerable to the charge that their approach is amoral, even immoral. It is here, given 
neoconservatism’s emphasis on morality in foreign affairs that perhaps the greatest 
contrast exists. Perhaps unsurprisingly, realists have been unprepared to accept the 
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‘amoral’ label which has frequently been applied to them. Morgenthau (2006: 6, 12) 
argues realism is not indifferent to moral claims, but the desirable and the possible should 
always be distinguished. He does not argue that morality has no place in foreign affairs, or 
that there are no “moral laws” that govern the universe; however, those moral laws should 
not be confused with a particular state’s “moral aspirations”, and moral principles should 
be “filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” rather than 
conceptualised universally and in the abstract. Amoral means in the practice of realpolitik, 
are also capable of serving moral ends. However, while neoconservatives may go too far in 
claiming to be unique standard-bearers for a values-based foreign policy, realists, seeking 
to defend the moral basis of their approach, may equally overstate the extent to which that 
morality impinges upon their strategic calculations. In addition to this, Quinn and Cox 
(2008: 1367-8) argue that realist foreign policy paradigms struggle with the fundamental 
liberal universalist thrust of US ideological history. Realism in the United States has not 
been considered part of the values-based ‘mainstream’ of US foreign policy history, 
instead endowing itself with an “insurgent tendency” with realism functioning as “a 
counterfactual worldview”.14 
 
1.5.2 Liberal Internationalism 
If realism can be summarised with reference to power and an anarchic international 
system, then liberal internationalism emphasises a more optimistic conception of human 
                                                 
14
 For an extended discussion of liberal universalism and US ideological history please see Adam Quinn and 
Michael Cox (2007) ‘For Better, For Worse: How America’s Foreign Policy Became Wedded to Liberal 
Universalism’, Global Society, 21(4), pp. 499-519. They argue (2007: 518-9) the challenge for those seeking 
to topple the liberal universalist hegemony in US foreign policymaking, is it is the only construct and stable 
ideological basis on which American statesmen have been able to engage with the world. Also see Michael 
C. Desch (2007/2008) ‘America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. 
Foreign Policy’, International Security, 32(3), pp. 7-43. Desch (2008: 8, 14) views the George W. Bush 
administration’s foreign policy as being partly based on the United States’ liberal tradition which has served 
as a “philosophical justification for intervention and hegemony”. 
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nature with interdependence the most important characteristic of the international system.
15
 
Liberal internationalism is not inattentive to the impact of power and military force on 
international politics, but argues that there are “systemic constraints on the use of force” 
and that patterns of power and interdependence “are closely related” (Keohane and Nye Jr, 
1987: 727, 730). Although both the realist and liberal internationalist emphases on 
interdependence have a foundation in utilitarian thought, there are significant areas of 
divergence. Firstly, liberal internationalism perceives military force to be merely one 
variable of international politics among many, rather than the most important. Secondly, 
liberal internationalists place an emphasis on economic incentives in determining 
international political outcomes. Thirdly, liberal internationalists while not ignoring the 
state, nonetheless place an emphasis on other groups and actors both above and below the 
state level (multinational companies, NGOs, charities, pressure groups etc.) (Keohane and 
Nye Jr, 1987: 729). Whereas realism focuses on the autonomy of states, liberal 
internationalism stresses linkages between states. Here, the international system is not 
hallmarked simply by anarchy, but states can collaborate under conditions of 
interdependence to achieve collective security goals. There is a debate over whether this is 
based on a self-interested rationality, or the role of international institutions in 
counteracting and containing the negative effects of anarchy (Lawson, 2003: 41-2).  
 
Woodrow Wilson’s legacy continues to loom large in the manner that the liberal 
internationalist conception of the international system is made manifest in the foreign 
                                                 
15
 This thesis uses ‘liberal internationalism’ rather than other definitional labels that have been used for this 
school. ‘Idealism’ while often used as a counterpart to realism, is a broader term which is not explicitly 
indicative of liberalism or the basis of those ‘ideals’. ‘Neoliberalism’ is too easily confused with the Chicago 
School free market economics ideology of the same name.  ‘Liberalism’ as a general political ideology is 
close to the meaning this thesis intends, but the addition of ‘internationalism’ to ‘liberalism’ usefully 
distinguishes it from simply the wider ideology. 
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policy of the United States.
16
 It is difficult to discuss liberal internationalism and US 
foreign policy without bringing definitional clarity to Wilsonianism. Indeed, a lack of 
definitional precision here is pointed to by the historian, Thomas Knock (2009: 30-1), who 
suggests that Wilsonianism is used imprecisely as what literary critics would call a “free-
floating signifier”, with its real meaning and crucial element strangely absent. A critical 
question in regard to the relationship between liberal internationalism and neoconservatism 
is the extent to which the Wilsonian vision that lies at the heart of American liberal 
internationalism should be primarily identified with the promotion of liberal democracy 
and interventionism abroad, or with a much wider agenda to make formal multilateral 
institutions and international law the foundation of the international system.
17
 For 
Ikenberry (2009: 19-20), the two “logics” of Wilsonianism are evident in the idea of both 
expanding and deepening the international liberal order, seen with the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan after World War Two. The former ambitiously sought to assist 
countries struggling to be free whereas the latter sought to strengthen and unite the West 
by aiding Europe financially. Do liberal internationalists primarily seek to spread liberal 
democratic values and combat totalitarian oppression in other states, or do they seek a 
deeper rule-based framework of liberal integration based on law and institutions? Smith 
(2009: 57) argues that US foreign policy failures in the Iraq War are ultimately a crisis for 
liberal internationalism. The promotion and spread of liberal democracy that were central 
to Bush’s Middle East policy are also pivotal to liberal internationalist thought.18 Thus the 
neoconservative influence on Bush has been overstated. In reality, liberal internationalists 
                                                 
16
 Please see Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight (2001) Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the Risk of 
Conflict, Killing and Catastrophe in the 21
st
 Century (New York, Public Affairs). 
17
 This is not to suggest that liberal internationalism has not continued evolving since Wilson. Indeed, the 
immediate aftermath of World War Two represents a continued refining of the liberal internationalist 
position with the creation of the United Nations, NATO, Bretton Woods etc, and liberal internationalism has 
continued to evolve since. Nonetheless, the debate over Wilson’s legacy usefully highlights the central 
tensions in liberal internationalist thought (Ikenberry, 2009: 15-8). 
18
 Although Smith (2009: 56) does prefer to use ‘neoliberalism’ rather than ‘liberal internationalism’. 
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located in the Democratic Party did the “heavy lifting” for the Bush Doctrine, and 
therefore the “fingerprints” all over the Bush Doctrine are not those of Leo Strauss or 
Theodore Roosevelt but those of Woodrow Wilson. Multilateralism, international law and 
institutions are certainly Wilsonian themes, but it is the spread of America’s liberal 
democratic values that is more integral to Wilson’s project.  
 (T. Smith, 2009: 56, 66, 74).  
 
According to Smith (2009: 67-73, 77-8), the end of the Cold War advanced three 
important liberal internationalist principles. First, democratic peace theory.
19
 Second, the 
idea that democratic change is not something that necessarily needs to evolve slowly over 
centuries, but with the right conditions and actors, can occur anywhere rapidly. Third, the 
idea of sovereignty was redefined. The ‘right’ of states to intervene in other states on the 
basis of liberal values and human rights became a ‘duty’. Thus, the liberal internationalism 
of the Cold War evolved into a form of “progressive imperialism.” The neoconservative 
Project for a New American Century (PNAC) , established in 1997, was merely reflecting 
the emphases of the Democratic Party’s Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), established in 
1989, with the only difference between the two being one of tactics with the PPI giving a 
cursory nod to multilateralism. 
 
In response to Smith’s account, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2009: 90-1) argues that he “twists 
Wilson and his legacy beyond recognition” and is guilty of conflating aggressive 
conservative adventurism with liberal internationalist concerns to build a law-based world 
order. Wilson was not interested in the fetishisation of liberal democracy per se, instead, a 
                                                 
19
 For a discussion of democratic peace theory from a number of perspectives, please see Michael E. Brown, 
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (eds.) (1996) Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press). Also see Michael W. Doyle (2005) ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, American Political Science 
Review, 99(3), pp. 463-466. 
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key emphasis of his famous fourteen points was the principle of self-determination, and 
following the unsuccessful United States intervention in Mexico, was a staunch non-
interventionist. Liberal internationalism in the twenty-first century therefore owes three 
main principles to Wilson. Firstly, the authority of states rests on their ability to provide 
for and protect their citizens. Secondly, political and social transformation is a bottom-up 
process which cannot be imposed from above or the outside. Thirdly, any decisions on the 
use of force must be made collectively rather than unilaterally (Slaughter, 2009: 110-1).
20
  
Tony Smith’s account of Wilsonian liberal internationalism is preferred in this thesis. 
Quinn and Cox (2007: 500-1) also point to “overlap” between neoconservatism and liberal 
internationalism, and emphasise that expanding liberal democracy abroad and the idea of 
the “liberal peace” has been a major feature of US foreign policy history. This goes 
beyond merely elections, but is concerned with “the impregnation of belligerent societies 
with liberal values” as a way of producing peace. They argue that the conception of 
“liberal universalism” in the United States emphasises expanding US liberal values as a 
precursor to peace, rather than necessarily arguing the case for that role to be played by 
multilateralism or international law. Slaughter’s account of liberal internationalism based 
solely on international law and multilateral institutions would leave very little scope for 
drawing any connections with neoconservatism. Nonetheless, even if the reality lies 
somewhere between Smith and Slaughter, there would seem ample scope for a conception 
of liberal internationalism that embraces both arguments. Neoconservative thought was 
                                                 
20
 This discussion between Smith and Slaughter in some ways mirrors the debate on the pages of Foreign 
Affairs between Robert Kagan, Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson. Although not a specific discussion on 
liberal internationalism, Kagan (2004: 67-68; 2005a: 171) argues it is a myth that American legitimacy 
during the Cold War rested on UN-based multilateralism, but instead was based on combating the strategic 
and ideological threat posed by the USSR combined with the structural legitimacy of bipolarity. The United 
States frequently defied international law throughout the Cold War. Tucker and Hendrickson (2004: 21-3), 
however, argue that US legitimacy was not based on ideals or moral purpose, but international law and 
consensual decision-making. 
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influenced by the aspect of liberal internationalism that emphasised the widening of liberal 
democracy abroad, but rejecting the deepening narrative. 
 
1.6 Neoconservatives on Neoconservatism  
The second half of this chapter concerns itself with a review of the literature on 
neoconservatism. While the focus will mainly be on the foreign policy aspects of 
neoconservative ideology, it will be necessary to elucidate upon neoconservatism in the 
round, including domestic aspects. Unlike some other philosophical approaches, 
neoconservatism is difficult to conceptually dichotomise between the domestic and the 
foreign, indeed, Michael Williams (2005: 328-9) suggests that this is one of its key 
strengths and will aid its longevity. Irving Kristol, widely seen as the principal 
neoconservative intellectual of the past four decades, has usefully provided his own 
definitional clarity on neoconservatism. Writing in 1983, Kristol set out eight key features 
which he argued were the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of neoconservatism, 
and are listed below in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Irving Kristol’s Eight Features of Neoconservatism (I. Kristol, 1983: 75-77) 
1 Disillusionment with contemporary liberalism. 
2 Anti-romantic (it is philosophical-political not literary-political). 
3 Philosophical roots are classical and premodern. 
4 Belief in liberal-democratic capitalism. 
5 Market economy necessary but not sufficient for a liberal society. 
6 Economic growth for social stability not material gain. 
7 Not libertarian. Conservative welfare state preferred. 
8 Family and religion as indispensable pillars of decent society. 
 
Perhaps what is most striking about Kristol’s eight points for our purposes here is that 
none are explicitly concerned with foreign policy. There are no points relating to America 
as the indispensable benevolent hegemon or the need for American unilateralism in 
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relation to the United Nations. This is not to argue that these ideas were not held by Kristol 
or other neoconservatives, but it is significant that he chose not to overtly include foreign 
policy themes in his eight foundational principles. This suggests that for neoconservatives, 
their ideological approach – although Kristol would almost certainly shun the label 
‘ideological’– to foreign policy is firmly rooted in a broader philosophical position that is 
primarily directed towards domestic concerns, namely liberal democratic capitalism, 
conservative welfarism, the family and religion. Indeed, as further evidence, in Irving 
Kristol’s 1995 collection of his essays from the previous forty-five years, out of forty-one 
chapters, less than five were written directly on foreign policy (I. Kristol, 1995b).  
 
In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Irving Kristol (2003: 24) made the 
startling claim that “there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, 
only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience”. His perspective here may be 
why foreign policy issues had not featured largely in his previous definitions of 
neoconservatism. The difference between a foreign policy ‘belief’ and foreign policy 
‘attitude’, however, would seem to be one of semantics rather than substance, for Kristol 
then proceeded to provide four foreign policy ‘attitudes’ held by neoconservatives, which 
certainly could be seen as beliefs, and indeed as foundational principles of an ideology, if a 
value-neutral definition of ideology is preferred. Firstly, patriotism is a “natural and 
healthy sentiment.” Secondly, “world government” is to be opposed as it leads to “world 
tyranny.” Thirdly, the primary role of statesmen is to differentiate between friends and 
enemies. Lastly, apart from in very “prosaic” matters such as trade, the national interest is 
not a term relating to geography or borders, but is primarily an ideological term that 
trumps material definitions (I. Kristol, 2003: 24-5). William Bennett (2000: 292) has taken 
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this fourth principle further by arguing that American nationalism is not of the “soil” but is 
primarily of political ideals. 
 
Like Kristol in 2003, Francis Fukuyama (2006: 4-5) has also condensed neoconservative 
principles down to four central ideas. Firstly, there is a need for liberal democracy. 
Secondly, human rights and the internal politics of other states matters. Thirdly, there is 
scepticism of the ability of international law and international institutions to solve security 
problems. Fourthly, social engineering “often undermines its own ends”.21 For Fukuyama, 
the central tension in neoconservative thought is between the first two principles and the 
last one. The increased neoconservative penchant for democracy promotion and 
‘interference’ in the domestic politics of other states does not sit easily with scepticism 
about the role of social engineering (Fukuyama, 2006: 114). 
 
Joshua Muravchik, the former National Chairman of the Young People’s Socialist League, 
and possibly, Irving Kristol aside, the neoconservative who has written most widely on 
neoconservatism itself, also suggests (2007: 21-2) that in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
four central neoconservative principles endured. Firstly, neoconservatives were moralists 
and admirers of American liberal values who did not hesitate in pronouncing “negative 
moral judgments” on brutal dictators of the ilk of Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. 
Secondly, neoconservatives were internationalists who did not support isolationism but 
sought to proactively tackle international security problems before they had the chance to 
grow into larger threats. Thirdly, neoconservatives argued the use of military force rather 
than diplomacy or UN intervention, had greater efficacy in confronting adversaries and 
                                                 
21
 Despite Fukuyama having now distanced himself from neoconservatism, he has been included in this 
section as he was identified with it during the period of concern to this thesis.  
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despotic regimes. Fourthly, neoconservatives supported democratic governance as a 
strategy for combating human-rights violations. For Muravchik, it is these themes that are 
central to the neoconservative approach to foreign policy, and conspiratorial notions that 
the neoconservatives represent a Likudite cabal behind the scenes, sinisterly manipulating 
American foreign policy in the interests of Israel, are to be discarded. The very fact that 
critics of neoconservatives such as Michael Lind, invoke both Leo Strauss and Trotsky as 
crucial intellectual forebears for neoconservatives despite the fact that a more disparate 
pair of thinkers would be difficult to find, is given by Muravchik as evidence of a penchant 
for anti-Semitism on the part of some of their critics, as the only thing linking Strauss and 
Trotsky would appear to be their ethnicity (Muravchik, 2003: 29-30; Lind, 2003: 10).  
 
Some neoconservatives have drawn a connection between their foreign policy positions 
and liberal internationalism. Indeed, Irwin Stelzer, provides a definition of 
neoconservatism that is essentially Wilsonianism minus faith in international institutions, 
and Max Boot has coined the phrase “Hard Wilsonianism” (Stelzer, 2004: 9; Boot, 2002c: 
A12). Adam Wolfson (2004: 216, 224), however, suggests it is a mistake to portray 
neoconservatism as just a foreign policy ideology or “Wilsonianism on steroids”. He 
contrasts neoconservatism with both libertarian and more traditional Burkean 
conservatism, and argues that the unique feature of neoconservative thought compared 
with other conservative ideologies is that it gives primacy to the political. The state and big 
government are not perceived to be the enemy of the citizens in the same way as other 
forms of conservatism would suggest. The problem with the welfare state and big 
government “has less to do with political liberty than with the specter of moral 
corruption”. This shows the relative level of comfort that neoconservatives have with ‘big’ 
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government compared with other conservatives, and is also important for introducing the 
idea of virtue.  
 
The principal adversary of neoconservatism, both domestically and in foreign policy, is not 
socialism per se, but nihilism. Firstly, nihilism is perceived to undermine liberal 
democratic virtue at home through the counter-culture’s undermining of authority and 
morality, and secondly, undermine liberal democratic virtue abroad through forms of 
realism and liberal internationalism that amorally embrace realpolitik and multilateralism 
respectively. It can be clearly seen that both Kristol and Fukuyama’s synopses of the 
central tenets of neoconservatism distinguish it from realism by its suggestion that the 
internal regimes of states matter. It is further distinguished from liberal internationalism by 
its opposition to cosmopolitan forms of global governance and multilateralism, particularly 
as embodied in the United Nations. 
 
The neoconservative emphasis on virtue is most clearly articulated by Gertrude 
Himmelfarb, the historian and wife of Irving Kristol. Although she does not explicitly 
write on foreign policy or neoconservatism, her work on the British Enlightenment and 
British cultural history is foundational to understanding the central feature of 
neoconservatism. In her 2004, The Roads to Modernity, Himmelfarb provides a 
fundamental revisionist challenge to the prevailing narrative of the Western intellectual 
tradition since the French Revolution. She claims her work is “doubly revisionist” in that 
she proposes the Enlightenment was, firstly, more British, not simply the product of 
Parisian salons, and secondly, it was more “inclusive” and not just the product of radical 
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left-leaning intellectuals.
22
 Under her schema, John Wesley and Edmund Burke, usually 
classed as conservative counter-revolutionaries, are instead portrayed as pivotal 
Enlightenment thinkers (Himmelfarb, 2004: 6). The passage below demonstrates 
Himmelfarb’s challenge to the dominant conception of the Enlightenment as primarily 
concerned with reason, rights, liberty and equality: 
 
What is conspicuously absent is virtue. Yet it was virtue, rather than reason  
that took precedence for the British, not personal virtue, but the “social 
virtues” – compassion, benevolence, sympathy – which the British 
philosophers believed, naturally, instinctively, habitually bound people to 
each other. They did not deny reason; they were by no means irrationalists. 
But they gave reason a secondary, instrumental role, rather than the primary, 
determinant one that the philosophes gave it. 
 
  (Himmelfarb, 2004: 6). 
 
 
 
The British Enlightenment’s emphasis on what she describes as the “sociology of virtue” 
was appropriated by early American political figures and combined with the American 
emphasis on the “politics of liberty” (Himmelfarb, 2004: 19, 234).23 For Himmelfarb, 
American exceptionalism rests on a conception of virtue that was firmly rooted in the 
British Enlightenment, whilst the French philosophes, with an emphasis on abstract reason 
and a strong anti-clerical streak, never adopted. The crucial aspect of Himmelfarb’s work, 
that places it firmly in the centre of neoconservative thought, is her conception of virtue as 
not restricted to the private sphere, but fundamentally wedded to the broader polity and the 
public sphere. Society itself is imbued with an ethos, a moral character, and is capable of 
acting virtuously. Indeed her analysis of Victorian Britain, points to precisely this issue, 
arguing against Marxist economic determinism and suggesting the virtues of a society are 
                                                 
22
 In addition, Himmelfarb  (2004: 13) provides a further revisionist note here by suggesting that there was a 
“British” Enlightenment, and that the Scottish nature of it has been overplayed. 
23
 Himmelfarb (2004: 7) approvingly suggests that Hegel thought the United States owed much to Britain 
and almost nothing to the French. 
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a “determining factor in their own right(.)” in relation to economic and political realities 
(Himmelfarb, 1994: 78-80).  
 
Both Irving and William Kristol have also placed an important emphasis on virtue. Irving 
Kristol’s (1996a: 312-3) advocacy of “liberal censorship” gives an indication of his 
conception of the ideal liberal democratic state. He rejects what he describes as 
“managerial” definitions of democracy in favour of a definition that places more emphasis 
on the “quality of public life”, the “character of the people”, and that democracy and self-
government only makes sense if the ‘self’ is sufficiently imbued with “republican virtue”. 
Classical liberal democratic republican society was not, for Kristol, wedded to a narrow 
form of economic libertarianism. He had no sympathies with Hayek’s suggestion that 
capitalism did not “incarnate” an idea of justice or morality.24 Instead, “there was a strong 
correlation between certain personal virtues – frugality, industry, sobriety, reliability and 
piety – and the way in which power, privilege, and property were distributed” (I. Kristol, 
1996c: 108). William Kristol (1996e: 439), deploying a similar argument to both his 
parents, links the “politics of liberty” with the “sociology of virtue” and argues that there is 
a pressing need to reinvent societal institutions “to promote virtue and foster sound 
character”.  
 
There is both a top-down and bottom-up element to neoconservative thought. Socio-
political institutions are to inculcate moral virtue in the wider citizenry, and at the same 
time, the government and societal institutions are to be a collective reflection of that virtue. 
More importantly, neoconservatives argue that the American state and social institutions 
are infused with a moral schema and should be proactive, even radical in the fostering of 
                                                 
24
 An example of this Kristol suggests would be Abraham Lincoln’s Unionist North around the period of the 
Civil War (I. Kristol, 1996c: 108). Please also see Friedrich A. von Hayek (1944) The Road to Serfdom 
(London, Routledge).  
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this virtue. This is not the incremental change of traditional conservatism on the defensive, 
but a more moralised and far-reaching programme. Perhaps the most important implication 
to be drawn from this is that through their construction of the concept of virtue, 
neoconservatives have provided the American state almost with a moralised and proactive 
‘personality’ or ‘character’. While the primary application is domestic, it is out of this 
foundation that neoconservatives have developed their foreign policy thought, and the 
chief reason why this thesis makes discussion of ‘virtue’ a central issue.25   
 
1.7 The Academy on Neoconservatism 
Peter Steinfels’ early analysis of neoconservatism during the Carter administration remains 
an important early contribution to the literature. His criticisms on the manner in which 
neoconservatism has been discussed remain valid. It has too often been viewed in terms of 
personalities and an emphasis on their motivations, especially their status as “liberal 
renegades”, rather than systematically interrogating the ideology. While Steinfels (1980: 
15-22) strongly opposed neoconservatism on various points, he nonetheless recognised it 
was a serious and intellectual form of conservatism that America had hitherto lacked, 
unlike more agrarian or aristocratic forms of conservatism. The defence of a much harder, 
more fearful form of liberalism was intrinsic to neoconservative thought, which he argued 
was, while plausible, nevertheless less than what America was capable of. The manner in 
which leading neoconservatives became “liberal renegades” and switched parties has been 
widely discussed by both Steinfels and others.
26
 The purpose of this section is not to 
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 For further neoconservative discussion on virtue please see James Q. Wilson (1996) ‘The Rediscovery of 
Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy’ in Mark Gerson (ed.) The Essential Neoconservative Reader 
(Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley), pp. 291-304. Wilson (1996: 291, 302) suggests that public policy 
problems can only be solved “if they are seen as arising out of a defect in character formation”, and that the 
traditional understanding of the political was to improve the character of the citizens. 
26
 See John Ehrman (1995) The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994 (New 
Haven, Yale University Press). Ehrman devotes a whole chapter to the split within liberalism between 1968-
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examine the history of neoconservatism as detailed by academics, but rather how the 
ideology has been conceptualised. Nonetheless, it is worth noting here that Steinfels argues 
that a series of events during the 1960s were crucial to the evolution of neoconservative 
thought.
27
 The neoconservatives perceived that liberalism had shifted to the left to the 
extent that it had abandoned the defence of traditional sources of authority and essential 
social institutions, especially the university, and had buckled under the threat posed by 
Soviet totalitarianism. According to neoconservative self-perception, it was not they that 
had shifted right, but liberalism had swung sharply to the left: 
 
 Pessimistic about human nature, sceptical about the outcome of political 
innovation, distrustful of direct democracy (the “mob”), it 
[neoconservatism] would defend the principles and practices of liberalism 
less as vehicles for betterment than as bulwarks against folly. 
   
  (Steinfels, 1980: 19) 
 
 
 
The neoconservative defence of what they argued was the classical liberal tradition rested 
on five central themes according to Steinfels. Firstly, a crisis of authority had overtaken 
the West, with traditional social institutions fundamentally losing legitimacy. Secondly, 
that crisis was predominantly cultural, and an issue of values, virtue and morality, 
stemming from a decline in religion, rise in hedonism, and the malign influence of what 
Lionel Trilling termed the “adversary culture” and the “New Class”28. The enemy of 
liberal republican virtue was nihilism. Thirdly, the American government was a victim of  
                                                                                                                                                   
1975 (pp. 33-62). Also see Jacob Heilbrunn (2008) They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons 
(New York, Doubleday). 
27
 Such tipping points included the campus occupation at Berkeley (1964); anti-Vietnam demonstrations 
(1965-66); protests and riots at Columbia (1968); street battles at the Democratic Convention in Chicago 
(1968); minority frustrations and violence throughout the 1960s (Steinfels, 1980: 44-5) 
28
 In a similar way to how the radical left viewed the military-industrial complex at the heart of what was 
wrong with America, the neoconservative conception of the New Class was based primarily upon a 
“university-government-media complex” construction of what needed changing in the United States 
(Steinfels, 1980: 57) 
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overload and had failed partly by attempting too much, which had fed back into the wider 
decline of authority. Fourthly, neoconservatives held that authority must be reasserted and 
government protected. This brought about a paradox in neoconservative thought in that the 
common man was to be venerated as a bulwark against hedonistic, nihilistic elites, and yet 
there was a strong elitist strand in neoconservative thought running concurrently with this. 
Lastly, international order depended upon stability at home. By focusing on the 
Communist threat and the Third World’s denunciation of liberal democracy, the 
neoconservatives hoped to generate patriotism and self-discipline (Steinfels, 1980: 53-
68).
29
 The direction of causality between the domestic and the foreign is difficult to 
conclusively argue one way or the other. Does neoconservatism’s construction of threats 
facing the United States stem from a desire to use foreign policy to steer domestic society 
in the direction of stability and authority, or are the perceptions of threats faced by the 
United States causing the neoconservative concern with domestic stability and traditional 
authority, or are both true? Is foreign policy merely used instrumentally to shape domestic 
virtue, or domestic virtue to shape foreign policy? Steinfels (1980: 68) favours the former 
argument over the latter, suggesting that neoconservatives have used overseas threats to 
fight domestic battles and discredit domestic ideological opponents.  
 
A slightly different but nonetheless comparable set of questions is offered by James Mann 
(2004: 368) in his analysis of Paul Wolfowitz’s career. Did Wolfowitz view American 
military power abroad simply as a tool for the furthering of the ultimate goal of the 
expansion of American liberal democratic virtues, or is the invocation of American 
republican ideals simply used instrumentally in furthering the ultimate goal of American 
power or empire. Mann suggests that Wolfowitz’s idealism often followed behind more 
                                                 
29
 Interestingly, despite the fierce anti-Communism of leading neoconservatives, many were sceptical of the 
merits of the Vietnam War as a foreign policy enterprise, but were more concerned with the domestic fall-out 
and lack of stability it had generated (Steinfels, 1980: 68) 
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“hard-nosed” estimates of America’s national interest. Some have gone yet further. Maria 
Ryan’s analysis (2007: 4, 8) of post-Cold War neoconservatism argues that idealism did 
not ‘follow behind’, but essentially functioned merely as rhetorical veneer for a 
conservative nationalism that was not significantly different from that of Donald Rumsfeld 
or Dick Cheney. For Ryan, talk of democracy promotion and human-rights almost 
functions as a rhetorical red-herring; behind the façade the neoconservatives were only 
motivated by their perception of what was needed to further American power and the 
national interest.
30
 
 
For other academic observers, however, the distinction between conservative nationalism 
of the Cheney/Rumsfeld ilk and neoconservatism is an important step in being able to 
unpack neoconservative ideology. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay  (2003: 15) both 
previously of the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution, argued that neoconservatism should 
be more accurately described as “democratic imperialism” and differed from a more hard-
line conservative nationalism, whose adherents could more accurately be referred to as 
“assertive nationalists”. While both ‘groups’ were united in support for toppling Saddam 
Hussein and the Taleban, conservative nationalists were less enthusiastic about the 
promotion of democracy and human rights and the imposition of American values 
abroad.
31
 A more conservative-realist critique came from Stefan Halper and Jonathan 
Clarke (2004: 14) who argued that Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld shared key beliefs 
on American unilateralism and exceptionalism with neoconservatives, but should be more  
                                                 
30
 The limitations of this argument are discussed in Chapter Two. Arguments of this type have been 
frequently deployed by radical critics of American foreign policy. Noam Chomsky (2004: 129) suggests that 
“lofty rhetoric is the obligatory accompaniment of virtually any resort to force and therefore carries no 
information. The rhetoric is doubly hard to take seriously in the light of the display of the contempt for 
democracy that accompanied it”. 
31
 President Obama has since appointed Daalder as the United States Permanent Representative to NATO, 
while Lindsay is a professor at the University of Texas at Austin. 
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accurately labelled “American nationalists”. While neoconservatives have taken the brunt 
of the blame for the Bush administration’s failings, it is this form of American nationalism 
that others argue has been the primary driver of foreign policy. Indeed, Steven Hurst 
(2005: 76) argues that neoconservatism’s influence on the Bush administration has been 
“marginal” and conservative nationalism was the “dominant influence” on Bush’s foreign 
policy. According to this argument, there are two broad clusters of divergence between 
neoconservatism and conservative nationalism. Firstly, neoconservatives argue that “ideas, 
values and democracy” are central to the conduct of foreign policy, whereas they would 
appear to be more marginal themes for conservative nationalists. Secondly, 
neoconservatives embrace “humanitarian intervention, peace-keeping and nation-
building”, whereas again, conservative nationalists are less enthusiastic. Despite these 
divergences, however, neoconservatives and conservative nationalists have often agreed on 
foreign policy issues, although on the basis of differing rationales. For example in the case 
of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, the former wanted to emphasise humanitarian 
factors and Serbian aggression, the latter pointed to the credibility of NATO being at stake 
(Hurst, 2005: 81-3). 
 
Given that many leading neoconservatives are Jewish, some have suggested this as an 
important driver of their foreign policy thought, and that in its coarsest form the interests 
of Washington have been subordinated to the interests of Tel Aviv. Michael Lind argues 
that neoconservatism has been influenced by a “far-right Likud strain of Zionism”, 
whereas Anne Norton has argued that for the neoconservatives, “Israel is America’s 
instructor. Israel has learned to discipline democracy” (Lind, 2003: 10; Norton, 2004: 
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208).
32
 According to Gary Dorrien (2004: 204-6), however, in an otherwise scathing 
assault on neoconservatism, the idea that the neoconservatives may be motivated by 
Jewish nationalism is “a species of prejudice” and if the neoconservatives are wrong “they 
deserved to be contended with on the basis of what they argued, not who they were”. The 
idea that neoconservatives are motivated by their Jewish identity would also seem to be 
negated by the fact that leading neoconservatives such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Michael 
Novak and Gary Schmitt are not Jewish. The only plausible way in which neoconservatism 
may be influenced by ethnicity, is Heilbrunn’s argument that the early neoconservatives 
were motivated by immigrant resentment and status anxiety towards the governing class. 
This was added to by a moralised conception of Jewish history that views “history as a 
drama of salvation and idolatry”, with neoconservatives functioning more like prophets 
than intellectuals, using ideas in a moral struggle (Heilbrunn, 2008: 13). Even this, 
however, seems to be over-stating the importance of ethnically-based intellectual traditions 
to neoconservative ideology.  
 
The emphasis placed on virtue and morality by neoconservatives has been emphasised in 
the academic literature, although perhaps not as widely as might be expected. Analysis of 
neoconservatism that conflates it with neoliberalism would seem to have misunderstood 
this fundamental aspect of neoconservative thought. For example, Akram-Lodhi (2005a: 1; 
2005b: 399) suggests that neoconservatism is “the intellectual foundation of the market-
oriented ideology that has dominated the global system” and that the neoliberal, libertarian 
think tank, the Adam Smith Institute, is neoconservative. Susan George (2008: 25, 31) also 
makes this conflation by suggesting that both neoliberals and neoconservatives are 
obsessed with cutting taxes and reducing government benefits, despite neoconservatism 
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 Norton makes the extraordinary , and frankly hard to believe claim that “Straussians” at the University of 
Chicago “told me that Arabs were dirty, they were animals, they were vermin.” (Norton, 2004: 210) 
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being relatively content with size of the government compared with neoliberals and other 
conservatives. Indeed, George makes the quite astonishing claim that “all neo-cons are 
neo-liberals”. The important differences between neoconservatism and neoliberalism hinge 
on neoconservatism’s conceptualisation of virtue. Wendy Brown (2006: 692, 698, 706-7) 
argues that neoconservatism is a “fierce, moral-political rationality” whereas neoliberalism 
is a “market-political rationality”. For Brown, the fundamental feature of neoconservatism 
distinguishing it from neoliberalism and older forms of conservatism is that it 
wholeheartedly affirms “moralized state power in the domestic and international sphere” 
where the American state sets the moral-religious compass for both domestic society and 
the rest of the world through the conduct of its foreign policy. Indeed, she further argues 
that the neoconservative governance ideal looks remarkably similar to some ecclesiastical 
authority structures, and that the state functions pastorally in relation to its “flock”.  
 
The neoconservative theme of virtue is further unpacked in an article by Michael 
Williams, which almost certainly represents the most incisive analysis of neoconservatism 
to date. He argues (2005: 308-10; 322) that IR scholars have neglected and ignored 
neoconservatism instead of engaging with it, and that virtue is integral to understanding 
neoconservatism’s approach to international relations. For Williams, although 
neoconservatism is characterised as a subset of realism, in reality, many of its 
characteristics sit in contrast with realism. Realism has the potential to corrupt the virtue of 
a government and by implication the wider polity. Nihilism is presented as the 
fundamental ailment of Western democracy, virtue is stressed as the only way to meet the 
challenge it poses, and this is the foundation of the neoconservative approach to foreign 
policy. There is a three-fold neoconservative critique of realism according to Williams. 
Firstly, the realist obsession with defining what is the ‘national interest’ reveals an 
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approach that is severed from values and morally bankrupt. Secondly, realism does not 
connect with fundamental ‘American’ values, and thus is paradoxically not realistic as it 
will always lack widespread public support. Thirdly, realism causes society to decay 
through its embrace of what is perceived to be a morally duplicitous realpolitik. Williams 
(2005: 327-8) does argue, however, that neoconservatism shares points of agreement with 
both liberalism and social constructivism, especially the belief that “ideas matter” and are 
in some way constitutive of political realities.
33
  
 
Although a significant portion of the literature analyses neoconservatism in ideological 
terms, this is not a unanimous position. Aaron Rapport (2008: 261) argues that 
neoconservatism is not an ideology, but is an explanatory theory of IR in the same way as 
constructivism and neorealism are also explanatory theories. Neoconservatism is not just 
an ideology that informs political action, but one that presents a coherent theory of how the 
international system operates. It holds to a series of propositions that “lead to generalizable 
conclusions regarding the outcomes of state interactions in the international system” and 
while similar to other IR theories “is not wholly derivative of any of them”. For Rapport, 
neoconservatism as an explanatory theory of international politics rests on a set of 
premises listed in Table 2 below: 
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 An interesting linkage, noted by Williams, between neoconservatism and social constructivism is the role 
played by Peter Berger, whose work with Peter Luckman on the social construction of reality is important for 
constructivists. Berger was also a frequent contributor to neoconservative discussion (Williams, 2005: 328). 
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Table 2: Key Premises of Neoconservatism as an Explanatory Theory of IR (Rapport, 
2008: 262-75) 
1.1 
1.2 
Human action is a function of the beliefs imposed on individuals by their social 
environment. 
Human beings have basic, biologically determinant wants and needs. 
2 Liberal democracies are capable of satisfying humanity’s most basic wants and 
needs in both the short and long term. 
3.1 
3.2 
The character of political regimes determines the political character of their 
citizens. 
The internal character of regimes is a predictor of their external behavior. 
4.1 
4.2 
Political ideologies are in constant competition with one another; at the extreme 
this conflict may take the form of existential conflict. 
The distribution of ideologies among states determine the severity of conflict 
levels, which is to say the distribution of state identities defines the character of 
the international system’s structure. 
 
 
Although according to Rapport, neoconservatism has a superficial similarity with realist 
and liberal IR theories, he argues that neoconservative IR theory shares many similarities 
with Alexander Wendt’s form of constructivism (Rapport, 2008: 261). Both 
neoconservatism and Wendt’s ‘thin’ constructivism are concerned with emphasising that 
ideas matter in international politics and are in some way constitutive of reality. Both also 
share a focus on the nation-state as the crucial feature of the international system, and the 
salience of what Wendt describes as brute material forces – geography, natural resources 
and military power, rather than “ideas all the way down” (Wendt, 1999: 20, 72, 94). 
 
Rapport’s argument remains problematic. Neoconservative authors have largely confined 
themselves to specific topical foreign policy issues rather than producing general 
theoretical contributions to IR. Maria Ryan (2007: 4) argues neoconservative strategy is 
“incomplete” and that they merely responded to events during the 1990s, rather than 
providing systematic IR theories. Joshua Micah Marshall (2003: 146) states that 
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“(n)eoconservatism never really had a well-explicated theory of foreign policy in the first 
place. It developed as an ideological movement in the context of American domestic 
politics”. While Rapport’s neoconservative premises in Table Two are largely accurate, 
these have to be teased out of the neoconservative literature on the Iraq War or the United 
Nations for example. There is nothing in the neoconservative canon that would look 
similar to Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics or Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics. A neoconservative theory of IR if such exists is scattered rather than 
found in one or two ‘authoritative texts’, and the vast bulk of neoconservative literature 
appears to be more policy-orientated or ideological than theoretical. This is not a criticism 
of neoconservatism but recognition that for the most part it has been more interested in 
providing foreign policy solutions for Washington policymakers, not theoretical paradigms 
for university seminars. These solutions are obviously underpinned by ideas, for example 
scepticism of global governance or belief in the supremacy of liberal democracy. These 
ideas, however, do not provide a systematic theory of how the international political 
system operates, but instead are ideas for how the United States should conduct itself in 
foreign policy. Neoconservatism would appear to be simultaneously less and more than an 
IR theory. While it lacks a completely systematic theory of the functioning of international 
politics, neoconservative perspectives on domestic politics, morality and human nature, 
make neoconservatism a unique ideology of the political in general, in a way that Wendt’s 
constructivist IR theory, for example, is not.
34
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 The distinction between what should be defined as ‘ideology’ and what should be defined as ‘IR theory’ is 
perhaps not as clear-cut as one might first think, and certainly contestable. For example, Behr and Heath 
(2009: 328, 345) in their analysis of realism and neo-realism, argue from a position that ideology represents 
false consciousness, that both forms are deeply rooted in the 20
th
 century historical context, and should not 
be assumed to be universal theories, but instead have developed as ideologies of national interest. Of course, 
from a starting position that ideology represents false consciousness, the distance between what is an 
ideology and what is a universal theory is necessarily greater than for one who utilises a more ‘neutral’ 
definition of ideology. 
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1.8 Defining Neoconservatism 
Given that ideologies change over time, and given the fact that such change is the very 
focus of this thesis, there are obviously inherent dangers in seeking to provide a 
fundamental and immutable definition of neoconservatism. Firstly, if, as this thesis claims, 
what neoconservatism ‘was’ in 1989 was different from what it ‘was’ in 2003, then any 
suggestion of core neoconservative themes must by necessity be fairly capacious, 
somewhat equivocal, and able to encompass a range of foreign policy perspectives within 
a broad ideological umbrella. Secondly, the lines drawn between neoconservatism and its 
ideological competitors in foreign policy circles on the Right are occasionally not as stark 
as they may first appear. John Bolton, for example, is very rarely consistently labelled as a 
member of just one foreign policy school, and has at times been described as a 
neoconservative, a realist, and a conservative nationalist.
35
 There are very few people who 
would ever be doctrinally ‘pure’ in terms of any foreign policy school or ideological ideal-
type. This presents a thorny issue for the analyst of ideological change, and is further 
problematised by the fact that not all neoconservatives use the label of ‘neoconservative’ 
to describe themselves as much as Irving Kristol did. There will therefore undoubtedly be 
readers of this thesis who will be surprised by certain omissions or inclusions. This thesis 
is not automatically deterred, however, by the reluctance of an individual to use the label 
‘neoconservative’ to describe their ideological outlook. Charles Krauthammer, for 
example, who is a key neoconservative, eschews the label. Nonetheless, it is clear from an 
examination of his work that he subscribes to all three main neoconservative pillars as 
expanded on below.  
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 Lynch argues that neoconservatism has been used ubiquitously by the left to describe anyone whose 
political opinions they find offensive, rather than giving it a precise definition. He argues that John Bolton, 
frequently described as a neoconservative instead provides policy prescriptions that are “grounded in a realist 
reading of international relations” (Lynch, 2005).  
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When considering central neoconservative themes, it cannot, by necessity, be a 
systematically watertight, scientific exercise; neoconservatives do not compose a 
monolithic group. There will be those who wholeheartedly embrace all aspects of 
neoconservatism, those who have an affinity with certain aspects without embracing the 
totality, and those who were previously content to be seen as neoconservative and have 
now significantly diverged from it. Thus while there is undoubtedly a core group of 
neoconservative intellectuals – who incidentally do not agree on every foreign policy issue 
on the table – there also exists a wider peripheral collection of sympathetic intellectuals, of 
whom John Bolton is a prime example. Although these are not doctrinally ‘pure’ 
neoconservatives, they have significantly contributed to the evolution of neoconservative 
discourse and debates in more than simply an exogenous fashion.
36
   
 
Bearing the above caveats in mind, three central pillars to neoconservative ideology 
present themselves. Firstly, there is an over-riding concern with virtue, both domestically 
and in international affairs. This thesis argues that the conception of this in relation to 
foreign policy became more expansive during the period under investigation; nonetheless, 
virtue as a moralised theme is dominant throughout. Therefore while strategic 
considerations of the national interest are certainly not absent from neoconservative 
discourse, nonetheless, these are presented and justified with reference to the need for 
America to act virtuously. This distinguishes neoconservatism from a liberal 
internationalism, whose conception of morality is tied much more closely to 
supranationalism, and both realism and conservative nationalism, which are far more 
concerned with couching policy prescriptions in a more circumscribed way in terms of the 
national interest. This neoconservative use of virtue extends to both style and substance in 
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 Please see Appendix One for table of neoconservative ‘generations’. 
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foreign policy. American virtue is not to be surrendered to what neoconservatives perceive 
to be either a nihilistic supranationalism or the morally duplicitous functioning of 
realpolitik.  
 
While neoconservatism may strike the reader as being just another strain of American 
exceptionalist ideology, their conception of virtue differs from the standard exposition of 
exceptionalism in an important regard. Under the neoconservative framework, foreign 
policy is rarely constructed in terms of America’s blood, soil or geography.37 For 
neoconservatives, the goal of the United States in its foreign policy is less about remaking 
the world in Washington’s image per se, and more about remaking the world in conformity 
to an abstract ideal, loosely based on a particularly conservative reading of basic human 
rights and liberal democratic norms. There is thus nothing essentially ‘American’ about its 
ideological make-up, although they understandably suggest it is the United States that 
currently embodies those values better than other states do. Indeed, British 
neoconservatives at the Henry Jackson Society in London argue the European Union could 
also perform a similar anti-totalitarian, hegemonic role, in addition to or in place of the 
United States (Rogers, 2006).
38
 American neoconservatives have also often pointed to the 
virtues of British imperialism in the Victorian era rather than American exceptionalism 
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 This should not though give the impression that American exceptionalism is absent from neoconservative 
thought, indeed, Seymour Martin Lipset wrote a whole book dedicated to it as a concept (American 
Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, 1997, New York, W.W.Norton). But it is strikingly different in 
tone from the more blood and soil form of American exceptionalist patriotism promoted by Patrick 
Buchanan (2004) for example.  
38
 James Rogers (2006) argues the European Union should transform itself from a “community of right” to a 
“union of might”. In a forceful conclusion and challenge to current EU practice, he suggests “global powers 
have special obligations and duties to discharge in the wider world, and are expected by their weaker partners 
to act as forces not only for international peace and security, but also as leaders on the global stage”. This 
certainly points to neoconservative thought being broader in scope and less inextricably bound to the idea of 
specifically American exceptionalism. 
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exclusively, and Sir Winston Churchill’s statesmanship is venerated as the prime example 
of how to conduct foreign policy.
39
 
 
The second central feature of neoconservative thought is that it is an ideology of the 
political that is wider than merely foreign affairs. Domestic politics and society are of 
signal importance to neoconservatives. This has important implications for this thesis. 
Firstly, the domestic regime and socio-political characteristics of foreign states matter 
because they indicate the likely foreign policy behaviour of those states. The United States 
also has a moral responsibility as a liberal hegemon to concern itself with human rights 
abuses and the promotion of democracy in foreign states.
40
 Secondly, the domestic regime 
and socio-political characteristics of the United States matters. The manner in which the 
United States conducts its foreign policy is indicative of the condition of the domestic 
society from which it came, and foreign policy plays a role inculcating certain values in 
the domestic populace. A vigorous, robust, sober, and at times martial, foreign policy for 
neoconservatives has the benefit of combating the very values at home that they have 
always argued undermined the classical liberal democratic tradition, namely nihilism, 
hedonism, and general lack of self-restraint in society. So, for neoconservatism, the 
domestic is always closely related to foreign policy, both in terms of foreign states and the 
United States itself.  
 
In addition to the emphases on virtue and domestic politics, the third central feature of 
neoconservatism is its stress on hard power and the use of military force in foreign policy 
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 Max Boot has been the leading cheerleader for the United States to recreate British imperialism. In a 
provocative article in The Weekly Standard, a month after the September 11
th
 attacks, he argued that 
“Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once 
provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets” (Boot, 2001: 28-29) 
40
 Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson’s (D-WA) campaign for the rights of Jews in the former Soviet Union to 
emigrate to Israel, culminating in the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1974) was an early example of the 
neoconservative emphasis on human rights. 
55 
 
crises. While the first two features distinguish neoconservatism from realism, this latter 
theme demonstrates the differences it has with aspects of liberal internationalist thought. 
An accompanying feature of this emphasis on hard power is a proclivity to unilateralism 
and rejection of multilateralism, especially in its United Nations guise.
41
 This is not to state 
that neoconservatives do not offer non-military solutions to various foreign policy crises 
abroad. Gregory Fossedal’s The Democratic Imperative, certainly points to a variety of 
ways in which the United States can achieve its foreign policy goals, including economic 
development, public diplomacy and sanctions (Fossedal, 1989: 88, 115, 178). Nonetheless, 
it would be churlish to deny as a central feature that neoconservatives place greater faith in 
the efficacy of military force to solve foreign policy dilemmas, compared with almost 
every other foreign policy school. A prime example of this was David Frum and Richard 
Perle (2003: 97-145) who argued at the end of 2003 that US resolve was weakening 
following the intransigence of resistance in Iraq, and were widely criticised for their 
bellicosity. They urged, among other things, the United States to support the toppling of 
the Iranian regime, threaten military action against North Korea and suggested the 
“severest consequences” for Saudi Arabia and Syria if they both continued to support 
terrorist groups.  
 
Taken together, these three central pillars of neoconservatism – an emphasis on virtue; a 
concern with the domestic socio-political environments of states; and a belief in the 
efficacy of hard power, often in a unilateral guise – present an ideology that is noticeably 
distinct from other foreign policy schools. While no one element is exclusive to 
neoconservatism, as a package they present an original, distinctive and coherent 
ideological worldview.  Nevertheless, whereas these three broad themes remain relatively 
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 Criticism of the United Nations is a long-running neoconservative theme, with an important early example, 
a speech in 1975 by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then Ambassador to the UN, denouncing the inherent anti-
Semitism of a resolution equating Zionism with racism (Moynihan, 1996: 93-99).  
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constant features of neoconservative thought during this period, it will be argued that all 
three conceptions were interpreted more expansively by neoconservatives by the start of 
the Iraq War in 2003 than they had been in 1989 when Bush and Gorbachev heralded the 
end of the Cold War in Malta.  
 
1.9 Conclusion 
As a theoretical and methodological foundation, this chapter has explored definitions of 
ideology, followed by a brief survey of relevant aspects of the study of the ‘history of 
ideas’, ideology and US foreign policy, before a discussion of realism and liberal 
internationalism. It was argued that firstly, ideology should be given a broad definition 
similar to the idea of ‘worldview’, and that a value-neutral definition is preferable to one 
implying ‘false consciousness’. Secondly, ideologies are too often analysed synchronically 
rather than diachronically. Ideologies should be seen as contingent and changeable, 
especially in response to dilemmas or crises, widely conceived, which are important in 
explaining ideational change. Thirdly, realism and liberal internationalism, share aspects of 
neoconservative thought, yet diverge in significant ways. Crucial points of discussion 
included the extent to which realism, while privileging the concept of power and the 
national interest, can purport to be a moralised theory of IR in the same way as 
neoconservatism. In relation to liberal internationalism, a significant debate is the extent to 
which it is to be identified primarily with the promotion of liberal democracy (either 
narrowly or more widely), or is a much broader theory seeking the instalment of a rules-
based, multilateral, pacific world order.  
 
An important feature in the literature on neoconservatism is the concept of virtue and the 
way in which neoconservatism is concerned with a moralised basis for the conduct of US 
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foreign policy. This thesis also makes consideration of virtue a central concern. Whether 
this is partly of instrumental value in promoting domestic virtue remains a point of 
contestation. Whatever the ultimate purpose, the fact neoconservatives argue for a 
moralised role for the United States in international affairs is significant, and functions as 
more than mere rhetorical veneer. Unlike the standard conception of realism, 
neoconservatives argue that American liberal democratic values should be driving 
American foreign policy, not strict materialist conceptions of the balance of power or the 
national interest. In this way, neoconservatism also shares aspects of constructivist 
thought, specifically that ideas do matter. Unlike liberal internationalism though, 
neoconservatives argue that moralised American power should not subject itself to the 
dubiously moral claims of multilateral order based on international law. However, like 
realism, power and the nation-state are of central concern to neoconservatism. And like 
liberal internationalism, the spread of liberal democracy on a global basis is a key concern. 
The tension between realism and liberal internationalism forms the backbone of this 
thesis’s account of neoconservative thought in the aftermath of the Cold War. While it 
would be a mistake to conflate neoconservatism with either realism or liberal 
internationalism, it argues that there is some movement in neoconservative foreign policy 
thought from the former towards the latter during the period under investigation. It is to 
those years which this thesis now turns. The next chapter begins by examining the 
development of neoconservative thought at the end of the Cold War in 1989 until President 
Clinton assumed office in 1993.  
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Chapter Two  
End of Cold War to Defense Planning Guidance (1992)  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The toppling of the Berlin Wall and the turbulent events of 1989 came as no less a surprise 
to neoconservatives than it did to American foreign policy observers of other schools. 
Much is made in the literature of a generational shift in these early post-Cold War years, 
when a second generation of neoconservative ideologues were passed the baton by their 
more cautious, pragmatic forebears. Halper and Clarke describe it as a “generational hand-
off”, arguing that between the end of the Cold War and the Bosnian crisis, “a complete 
generational transition” had occurred, a view endorsed by both Friedman and Ryan 
(Halper and Clarke, 2004: 98-99; Friedman, 2005: 230-31; Ryan, 2007: 77). However, any 
transition, if it occurred at all, was very far from being “complete”. Some second 
generation neoconservatives such as Daniel Pipes argued that the key concern for the 
United States in the Middle East was “stability” not the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, whereas some first generation neoconservatives, such as Norman Podhoretz, had 
been numbered among the fiercest critics of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy for 
not following through on its ideological rhetoric (D. Pipes, 1991: 9; Podhoretz, 1984: 59-
60).
42
 
 
This chapter examines the neoconservative response to the end of the struggle against the 
Soviet Union. It begins by discussing their assessment of the Reagan administration’s 
foreign policy, followed by looking at what they perceived to be the ramifications of the 
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 Of course, aside from the esoteric task of separating the two ‘generations’ by examining their foreign 
policy philosophies, the more mundane problem with the “generational hand-off” thesis is quite simply 
where one should draw the line. Which year does a neoconservative need to have been born by to qualify for 
‘first generation’ status? With these caveats in mind please see Appendix One which provides a table 
locating the neoconservatives discussed in this thesis within the generational debate. 
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end of the Cold War for the future of US foreign policy. Their approach to the Gulf War is 
then analysed, demonstrating fundamental differences with the policies on Iraq favoured 
by neoconservatives in the late 1990s. Some called for regime change in 1991 – although 
not an American invasion – but most neoconservatives favoured a realist form of stability 
prioritisation, a position which by 2003, had fundamentally altered. A discussion of 
Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis then follows, wherein it is argued that 
although neoconservatism appeared to be wedded to a form of realism in these years, the 
ideological underpinnings for a future shift in a more idealist direction were already being 
laid. The chapter concludes with an examination of the controversial 1992 Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG). It is argued that while this document indicated a more 
stylistically brash form of neoconservatism with unipolarism as an explicit goal, it was, 
nonetheless, still absent themes of democracy promotion and more overt humanitarian 
intervention that neoconservatives would later advocate.   
 
2.2 Reagan: A Neoconservative Assessment  
Despite Reagan’s hawkish reputation, and the fact that numerous neoconservatives 
occupied important positions within his administration, initial conclusions drawn by 
neoconservatives on Reagan, as his administration came to a close, were decidedly 
mixed.
43
 Some pointed to a fundamental shift and re-energising of American foreign 
policy, others instead argued that Reagan had not delivered on his radically conservative 
promise. One of the most glowing tributes to Reagan, and certainly emblematic of the 
stereotypical neoconservative response to Reagan’s two terms in office, came from Aaron 
Wildavsky, whose piece in The National Interest over the winter of 1988/89, titled ‘The 
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 According to Sanders (1983: 287-88), over thirty neoconservatives who had sat on the Committee on the 
Present Danger during the Carter administration were given jobs by the Reagan White House. 
Neoconservatives in the new administration included among others: Kirkpatrick, Ikle, Adelman, Novak, 
Casey, Perle, Feith, Wolfowitz, Abrams and Muravchik. 
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Triumph of Ronald Reagan’, left the reader in no doubt of his affections. Reagan stood 
alongside Franklin Roosevelt as one of the two most influential presidents of the modern 
era, having “redirected both domestic and foreign policy”, lifted “the mood of fatalism that 
had heretofore gripped American foreign policy” and made American foreign policy 
proceed “exactly as Reagan said it would” (Wildavsky, 1988-89: 3, 7-8). Other 
neoconservatives were even less restrained in their assessment of Reagan’s success. For 
Zalmay Khalilzad, who achieved later notoriety for his involvement of the drafting of the 
1992 DPG with Paul Wolfowitz, the imminent Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was a 
“watershed event”, almost certainly leading to a massive reduction in Soviet power in 
South-West Asia and a boon to anti-communist forces everywhere. In a statement 
remarkably free from caveats, Khalilzad (1988: 107-08) suggested that “American power 
was engaged in bringing about this Soviet failure…Afghanistan has shown what an 
activist, bipartisan, anti-communist American policy can accomplish against heavy odds”. 
In addition to Khalilzad’s focus on Afghanistan, Charles Krauthammer (1988: 145) 
pointed further afield to Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua as examples where Reagan had 
challenged the Soviet Union. Reagan had reinvigorated US policy with his innovation that 
the United States would challenge Soviet spheres of interest when Washington chose to do 
so. The retreat of the Soviet Union from areas of the world where it had dominated was not 
simply a product of internal party developments within the Kremlin, but categorically a 
result of “American counter-pressure”. Michael Novak (1990: 35) further argued that 
although Gorbachev agreed to the process which led to the end of the Cold War, he would 
not have done so if Reagan had not been president, with his policies of increased military 
build-up and ideological warfare contributing to the new situation. 
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Not all neoconservatives were as sanguine in relation to the conduct of Reagan’s foreign 
policy. Norman Podhoretz, long-time Editor-in-Chief of Commentary, and with 
impeccable anti-communist, neoconservative credentials, had argued (1976: 35-41) that 
both isolationism and realism were neutering American foreign policy and sapping the will 
of the United States to defend the free world against Communism. Some of his harshest 
criticisms were reserved for conservative politicians who despite their rhetorical 
bellicosity, were decidedly less inclined to favour robust policy options when in office.
44
 
Reagan had been a clear case of “mistaken identity”, and although conservatives perceived 
him to be championing the rollback of Communism around the globe, in reality he had 
“never shown the slightest inclination to pursue such an ambitious strategy.” Podhoretz 
reacted with amazement that Reagan’s critics on the Left could ever accuse him of 
pursuing a reckless foreign policy, and suggested Reagan’s approach of seeking to restore 
the military balance and negotiate with the Soviets was not substantively different from 
that of Richard Nixon. Reagan had failed to support the struggle against the Communists 
in Poland, indeed had actually “helped” the Soviets stabilise their position there, and had 
also failed to adequately strengthen the anti-communist forces in Angola and Afghanistan 
(Podhoretz, 1984: 60).  
 
A further line of criticism and key touchstone issue for neoconservatives, was arms control 
and missile defence. Frank Gaffney (1988: 43, 50, 52) echoed Podhoretz’s criticism of 
Reagan having a yawning gap between rhetoric and policy delivery. Reagan had begun a 
strategic arms reduction process which ultimately culminated in the signing of the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in July 1991, and also signed the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in December 1987, which sought to eradicate 
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 With typical Podhoretzian flair (1976: 35), he also delivered a stinging rebuke to Henry Kissinger, stating 
he “often sounds like Churchill and just as often acts like Chamberlain”. 
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conventional and nuclear, ground-launched, ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 
300-3400 miles. Reagan’s initial policy commitments had been “abandoned”, “none” of 
the arms control agreements would protect the United States and Gaffney suggested that 
Reagan on the campaign trail had balked at the idea of even talking with the Soviets at 
summits. The wider neoconservative disdain for arms control was further seen in critical 
reviews of Strobe Talbott’s The Master of the Game (New York, Random House, 1988), a 
biography of Paul Nitze. Richard Perle objected to being portrayed as the polar opposite of 
Nitze, and Donald Kagan argued that Talbott had fundamentally misread Nitze’s career, 
and accused Talbott of having an “almost religious” faith in the efficacy of arms control 
agreements (Perle, 1989: 88; D. Kagan, 1989: 71).  
 
As Reagan’s second term came to a close, and during the initial period of the Bush 
administration, neoconservatives were divided on exactly how to construct their response 
to the legacy of the Reagan administration and the seismic geopolitical shifts occurring. 
Some were happy to claim victory for the United States in its ideological battle with the 
USSR, and laud Reagan’s role in bringing about a transformed reality in international 
relations. This was not, however, a unanimous position, as other neoconservatives were 
reluctant to declare success, ever conscious that the new situation that the United States 
found itself in could be ephemeral, and that a resurgent Russia could suddenly catch 
America with its guard down.
45
 Stephen Miller suggested in the latter half of 1989 that 
“(r)eports of the death of totalitarianism…have been greatly exaggerated” and that the 
worst option for the United States to pursue was to start behaving as if the Cold War was 
over. In direct contradiction of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, discussed later in this 
chapter, Miller argued that totalitarianism “will always be with us” and that any change in 
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 Other neoconservatives neither claimed success in the Cold War nor warned of a continued Russian threat. 
Norman Podhoretz stated in June 1990, that he had stopped writing as he did not know how to conceptualise 
and think about the new reality he found himself in (Dorrien, 2004: 14).  
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Communist countries would likely take a very long time (Miller, 1989: 32). The 
neoconservative Sovietologist, Richard Pipes, also sounded a hesitant note in his analysis 
of the Soviet Union as late as 1991. While he acknowledged the Cold War “may” be over 
and the Soviet Union in danger of breaking up, nonetheless, he cautioned against the 
United States acting as if the Soviets were one less problem to deal with; argued that 
Soviet military spending was due to rise in 1991; and suggested it is unlikely “that the 
Soviet Union is beating swords into plowshares” (R. Pipes, 1991: 85-87).46 It is argued by 
both Dorrien and Ryan that neoconservatives found the end of the Cold War hard to 
stomach, due to the Soviet Union’s significance to them as an era containing an ideological 
foe to battle against (Dorrien, 2004: 14; Ryan, 2007: 63). This, however, overstates the 
role that the Soviet Union played in forming neoconservative thought, and underplays both 
the fundamentally domestic roots of neoconservatism, and the sense of triumphalism felt 
by many neoconservative supporters of Reagan.
47
  
 
Despite the lack of unanimity on whether the Reagan administration’s foreign policy had 
been successful, for the most part, neoconservatives had been generally comfortable to 
support Reagan’s approach. There was little appetite for the direct application of US 
military power to impose liberal democracy on another state by force. Instead, 
neoconservatives had mostly been content to back the Reagan Doctrine, which advocated 
the use of proxies to fight the Soviet Union, mainly in the developing world.
48
 A robust 
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 The year before this, Pipes had argued that it could not be foreseen whether the Soviet Union would 
become a modern liberal democracy; descend into chaos and civil war; or morph into a Chinese-style 
repressive state (R. Pipes, 1990: 25). 
47
 Anti-communism was a key neoconservative concern, but an anti-totalitarian perspective was considered 
the natural posture for a healthy, classically liberal, republican society. The neoconservatives were more 
concerned with ensuring the domestic vitality of that society by defending it from the radical left, which was 
their rasion d’etre rather than anti-communism per se. 
48
 For an interesting discussion of the Reagan Doctrine from a leading neoconservative see Krauthammer’s 
‘Essay: The Reagan Doctrine’ (Time, 01/04/1985). Krauthammer gives a clear synopsis of the Reagan 
Doctrine, although interestingly, and as certainly a harbinger of the future shift in neoconservative thought, 
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anti-Communism was very much the favoured neoconservative strategy in the Reagan 
years, a form of aggressive containment that it hoped would lead to a rollback of Soviet 
power rather than the crusading militarism in the name of liberal democracy with which 
neoconservatism became associated in the late 1990s and during the George W. Bush 
administration. Why were the neoconservatives content to favour a robust application of 
the Reagan Doctrine in the name of anti-Communism, when they were later to offer 
strategies that were much more ambitious? Part of the reason was the strategic, material 
situation facing the United States. The United States could not use direct American 
military power to topple significant regimes they opposed without expecting a response 
from Moscow inflicting unacceptable costs. Nonetheless, the answer partly lies also in the 
ideational. While neoconservatives had advocated an approach that emphasised human 
rights and championed liberal democracy rhetorically in the abstract since the 1970s, this 
had yet to emerge as a fundamental aspect of their foreign policy thought or a key part of 
the rationale for military action in the future.
49
 Theirs was an outlook that was moralistic, 
but very much subjugated to the higher purpose of defeating Communism; they spoke the 
language of cold warriors rather than democratic gladiators.
50
 In the material absence of 
Communism in later years, there was more opportunity for that moralism to express itself. 
However, the material decline of the Soviet Union, while necessary, is not sufficient to 
explain the totality of neoconservative change.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
overstates the more limited nature of the Reagan Doctrine by arguing it is the “first step” toward “democratic 
militance” being restored to the West (Krauthammer, 1985).  
49
 For an example of the somewhat limited emphasis placed on direct democracy promotion by 
neoconservatives during these years see Irving Kristol’s ‘Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology’ (The 
National Interest, 1,1985,  pp.6-15). Kristol argued that the American people were “content” to live liberal 
democracy rather than “propagate” it, and with typical Kristolian flourish, that they “do not feel they have to 
quicken the rhythm of the future – they are not active midwives, only confident paediatricians”. 
50
 As Kirkpatrick made clear in her seminal ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’, the overriding principle 
for the United States’ foreign policy should be to subjugate other priorities to the moral imperative of 
fighting Communism, even if that meant supporting distasteful authoritarian regimes (Kirkpatrick, 1979: 34-
45). 
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2.3 End of Cold War and the Future for American Foreign Policy 
If the only thing restraining neoconservative intellectuals from unleashing their advocacy 
of a bold programme of democratic imperialism was the material reality of the Soviet 
Union, then its shattered stranglehold on Eastern Europe and its Third World satellites, 
coupled with an imminent domestic political collapse, would surely have precipitated a 
swift and decisive shift in that direction for neoconservatism. Instead, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union provoked neoconservatives to initially adapt their robust anti-Communism 
into a form of realist neo-isolationism, urging the United States to more passively enjoy 
the fruits of its Cold War labour. This continued through to the Gulf War, when 
neoconservatives supported the limited war aims of liberating Kuwait from Saddam 
Hussein and were neither advocates of regime change nor the imposition of democracy on 
Iraq itself. There has been a tendency, with the benefit of hindsight, to read a more radical 
form of neoconservatism into these early years of the post-Cold War era, and ignore the 
fact that neoconservatives of both the first and second generation were instead urging a 
more cautious approach by the United States.  
 
Just as Jeane Kirkpatrick had penned the seminal neoconservative foreign policy text 
during the Cold War, her response to the passing of the Cold War was equally revealing, 
and in some ways a continuation of the caution displayed in ‘Dictatorships and Double 
Standards.’ Although liberal democracy remained the single best hope for seeing improved 
human rights and pacific behaviour in states, and although the United States should 
encourage its spread wherever possible, it should not, however, push for its “universal 
dominance”. The United States should also not attempt to balance power in Europe, India 
or East Asia, should not seek to manage the evolution of society in the USSR and “[i]t is 
time to give up the dubious benefits of superpower status and become again a usually 
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successful, open American republic…A normal country in a normal time” (Kirkpatrick, 
1991: 161-63, emphasis added). It was now time for the United States to focus inward on 
domestic concerns, there was no “mystical” or “transcendental” mission left for it to 
complete, and the time for American sacrifice and heroism was behind it (Kirkpatrick, 
1991: 155-56). This return to normalcy was echoed by Nathan Glazer, who, in an article 
revealingly titled ‘A Time for Modesty’, openly questioned the need for the United States 
to maintain a significant overseas military commitment.
51
 According to Glazer, it was not 
the job of the United States in this post-Cold War world to be the “policeman of the world” 
(1991: 135, 141). The role that the United States needed to play was that of exemplar, 
rather than directly interfering in the domestic affairs of other states, according to Glazer, 
who argued that this is precisely what the Founding Fathers of the United States had 
intended all along.
52
  
 
Irving Kristol’s scepticism of the idea of the United States spreading democracy around 
the globe was apparent before the Cold War ended (1985: 11). Although the American 
people were, as citizens of an enlightened liberal republic, “sensitive” to human rights 
concerns and democracy, they would not support military action abroad on these moralistic 
grounds alone, and they were satisfied to enjoy and live the American “creed” rather than 
spend their time and energy seeking its promulgation. Now with the Cold War 
disappearing, Kristol returned to these themes arguing that: 
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 This was also suggested by Irving Kristol who argued that in the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union 
there was no need for the United States to keep its military in Europe, and any future unrest in Yugoslavia 
could be sorted out by the Europeans (I. Kristol, 1991: 64). 
52
 Even during the early years of the Reagan administration Glazer had cautioned against the United States 
acting as “the world’s moral policeman”, and that in the exercise of virtue, as well as power, there was a 
need for the United States to “learn moderation” (Glazer, 1981: 38). 
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The futility of a foreign policy whose purpose is to “enhance democracy”          
abroad is apparent to most Americans, and so the end of the Cold War has 
led to a resurgence of an isolationist temper.  
 
(I. Kristol, 1991: 63). 
 
 
Kristol argued for a form of realism in foreign policy that would focus explicitly on the 
American national interest, without falling back on a brutal 19
th
 century resurgence of 
realpolitik. While he described isolationism as “nostalgic fantasy”, nonetheless, Kristol’s 
‘realpolitik-free’ realism, did not appear to be fundamentally opposed to a form of neo-
isolationism, even if nothing like the anti-Semitic, hysterical, isolationist “hemispheric 
bunker” of Pat Buchanan that had on occasion championed the rights of Nazi war 
criminals (Muravchik, 1991b: 35; Weigel, 1992: 42).
53
 Indeed, Kristol suggested (1991: 
72-73) American troops should not be involved with overseas humanitarian missions, even 
if, for example, a Pol Pot re-emerged in Cambodia to decimate the population. 
 
The immediate responses to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis from other 
neoconservatives illuminate the cautious realist/neo-isolationist neoconservative 
perspective at the closing of the Cold War.
54
 Himmelfarb (1989: 25) argued that 
Fukuyama was overly optimistic on the long-term prospects for liberal democracy, as did 
Eliot Cohen (2011). While Communism was almost certainly dead Himmelfarb made clear 
that she was “too traumatized by communism and Nazism to have any confidence in the 
eternal realities of history”. The universalisation of the liberal democratic ideal, which 
gripped neoconservatism as it ventured into the later years of the 1990s, was for 
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 George Weigel (1992: 38, 42) argues that the realism displayed by Kirkpatrick and Kristol owes more to 
the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr, than the realism of Bush, Scowcroft and Baker, which was more 
19
th
 century realpolitik in origin. He later also argued, linking realism with isolationism that realism was the 
“upmarket road” to isolationism. 
54
 Admittedly, discussing the responses to an article before the article itself, somewhat puts the cart before 
the horse, however, ‘The End of History’ is dealt with more explicitly in the section below on democracy.  
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Himmelfarb in 1989, nearer to fantasy than reality (Himmelfarb, 1989: 24-26). Irving 
Kristol (1989: 27) seemed initially caught in two minds on Fukuyama’s thesis, arguing in 
his idiosyncratic style in the space of a couple of lines that “I don’t believe a word of it” 
followed shortly by “[i]n truth it is quite persuasive”. While enjoying the boldness of 
Fukuyama’s thought, Kristol quickly resorted to his default position of the time. Any 
notion of American hegemony was surely only “temporary”; he put no stock in “waves of 
the future”; and instead of drawing from Hegel and Kojève as Fukuyama had done, went 
further back to Aristotle to argue that all forms of government were ultimately unstable, 
and this included American-style liberal democracy. He further declared it was 
“wonderful” that the US had prevailed in the Cold War, but, as a clear marker of his neo-
isolationist leanings at the time, argued that victory in the Cold War “means the enemy is 
us, not them” (I. Kristol, 1989: 28). This last statement is crucial in demonstrating that the 
priority at the end of the Cold War for Irving Kristol, the preeminent neoconservative 
intellectual, was not to raise military spending, look abroad for new monsters to destroy, or 
seek to create a liberal democratic world on the back of American unipolarism. Instead, the 
priority was a change of focus back to the domestic and social battles which were the 
original neoconservative concerns.  
 
Despite the “generational hand off” thesis, so ubiquitous in the literature, these positions 
outlined above were not without support amongst second-generation neoconservatives. 
They were not all eager to launch a global democratic crusade in the cause of unipolarism 
but often reflected the caution of the first generation. Eliot Cohen, who later became an 
original signatory to the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and an early 
advocate for regime change in Iraq, argued (1990a: 6-8, 12) that the decline of 
Communism was a plausible explanation for the decline in importance of the military in 
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the future. Although the United States needed to remain a superpower, this needed to be 
done on a significantly reduced budget with a spending floor of 4% of GNP, 20% less than 
the already low (at least by historical comparison with much of the Cold War) military 
spending figure of 5% of GNP. In echoes of Kirkpatrick’s construction, Cohen suggested 
that history after the demise of the USSR would be more “normal”, with fewer threats 
facing the United States, even if these threats would not be negligible. Despite the 
neoconservatives later essentially endorsing the democratic peace theory, Cohen argued 
that democracy did not necessarily lead to peace. And in implicit rejection of Fukuyama’s 
‘End of History’ thesis, Cohen argued that history was perhaps not linear, and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union revealed more about the “hollowness” of Marxism-Leninism, as it did 
about the march of liberal democracy. 
 
Even those second-generation neoconservatives who repudiated the cautious tone of Irving 
Kristol, Kirkpatrick et al. articulated little more than a surface-level rejection. Ben 
Wattenberg’s call for “neo-manifest destinarianism” and the promotion of liberal 
democracy looked on first reading like a dramatic new course for American foreign policy. 
In reality, however, it was little more than an argument that the US could use Hollywood 
and public diplomacy a little better to spread American values, and do more to attract 
foreign students. Such proposals were hardly evidence of advocacy of the promotion of 
liberal democracy across the Middle East down the barrel of a gun. Indeed, Wattenberg 
(1991: 113) explicitly stated that the US needed “fewer tanks and less covert intelligence”, 
replacing them with “information diplomacy”. While the tone was certainly different from 
that of Kristol, Kirkpatrick and Glazer, the actual policy – fewer tanks – looked similar. 
Likewise, Carl Gershman (1991: 40), who had been an aide to Kirkpatrick at the UN, 
argued that the promotion of democracy should be a central concern for the United States, 
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which again sounded rhetorically ambitious. Nonetheless, in terms of policy detail, 
Gershman suggested this could be done on “limited resources”, helping those countries 
that wanted to help themselves and argued that the US “cannot force others to do what 
they are not prepared or willing to do for themselves”. This was hardly the cornerstone of a 
doctrine that in due course would put American troops on the streets of Baghdad in 2003.  
 
Further evidence of the cautious approach of second-generation neoconservatives can be 
seen in Gary Schmitt’s early assessment of George H. W. Bush’s foreign policy. Schmitt 
later became the Executive Director of PNAC between 1998 and 2005, and was intimately 
associated with the less cautious form of neoconservatism that prevailed in the late 1990s. 
Writing in 1989-90, however, Schmitt (1989-90: 108, 110-111 emphasis added) argued 
that Bush’s foreign policy was appropriate for the geopolitical situation the United States 
found itself in, and echoing Nathan Glazer’s choice of words noted earlier, that “a bit of 
modesty in one’s policy-making seems quite in order.” Instead of castigating Bush’s 
cautiousness and lambasting Baker and Scowcroft for their amoral realpolitik, Schmitt 
instead suggested that they were doing an excellent job of appropriately reining in the 
euphoria which was accompanying the close of the Cold War. By being low-key and not 
pushing too hard in areas like Panama and Poland, Bush’s self-restraint was achieving 
great success for the United States. William Kristol, Gary Schmitt and Tom Donnelly – all 
key second-generation neoconservatives later intimately associated with PNAC – 
acknowledged in interviews with the author of the thesis, that at the start of the 1990s, they 
had been sympathetic to realist foreign policy paradigms (Schmitt; Donnelly; W. Kristol, 
2011). 
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Not all neoconservatives, however, welcomed the end of the Cold War by embracing a 
more cautious or isolationist position. The primary challenge to the prevailing narrative of 
caution, normalcy and withdrawal came from Charles Krauthammer. For Krauthammer 
(1991b: 9, 11-13), the material end of the Cold War had enormous ramifications for the 
conduct of American foreign policy. The Cold War victory had literally “made the world 
safe for democracy”. This was not, however, a call for the United States to take up arms to 
impose democracy in other countries. In fact Krauthammer explicitly rejected doing so, 
and argued that the regime in Communist Nicaragua without the backing of the Soviet 
Union, for example, and other such outposts of Communism, were likely to wither without 
the United States needing to do anything to ensure their downfall. Krauthammer instead 
called for the United States, using the European integration process as a model, to create a 
“unipolar world whose center is a confederated West” which would integrate North 
America, Europe and “democratic” Asia in a grand “super-sovereign West”. It should not 
be the goal of the United States to go around the world attempting to democratise the 
peripheral states one by one, but seek the unification of the West and create a democratic, 
supranational confederation. The ultimate aim for Krauthammer was to make Fukuyama’s 
‘End of History’ thesis a reality.55 The United States could not sit back passively and 
expect it to happen automatically, but should be actively engaged in making it happen, 
starting with the unification of the democratic centre: “The United States must wish and 
work for a super-sovereign West economically, culturally, politically hegemonic in the 
world”. Yet not long after penning these words, in a speech to the American Enterprise 
Institute in late 1990 which then gravitated toward the pages of Foreign Affairs, 
Krauthammer’s discussion of a unipolar super-sovereign West had been replaced by the 
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 This is, interestingly, the precise accusation that Fukuyama aimed at neoconservatives following the Iraq 
War. He endorsed Ken Jowitt’s suggestion that Bush had signed up to his End of History thesis, but 
attempted to bring it into reality by speeding up history in an activist “Leninist” style, instead of waiting 
more passively for events to transpire according to Fukuyama’s more “Marxist” social teleology (Fukuyama, 
2006: 55). 
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United States itself: “The centre of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the 
United States, attended by its Western allies” (1991a: 23-24). Krauthammer did not argue 
that this “unipolar moment” would last in perpetuity, but within a “generation or so”, 
would likely be replaced by a more multipolar system including other powers of similar 
stature to the United States. 
 
Even though Krauthammer criticised both realism and isolationism in his doctrine of 
unipolarity, there was little room for democratic expansionism. The key concern for the 
United States as the unipolar power was “stability”, except the focus for US foreign policy 
was now taken off Communism and placed instead upon rogue states and weapons of mass 
destruction. Krauthammer (1991a: 27-31) argued that the key threat to the United States 
was the “Weapon State”, of which Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a prime example. 
Krauthammer explicitly rejected the Kristol and Kirkpatrick approach of withdrawal and a 
return to normalcy, and yet his article on unipolarity in Foreign Affairs did not represent a 
fundamental challenge to the neoconservative status quo. It was still far from being what 
Ryan (2007: 78-79) argues was “the unifying touchstone of second generation 
neoconservative foreign policy”. Krauthammer’s article was hardly the rallying call for 
second generation neoconservatism but more like a mild rebuke to Kirkpatrick and Kristol 
for allowing their robust anti-Communism to slightly fade when the United States still 
faced other threats. Krauthammer’s idea was less a manifesto for second generation 
neoconservatives to wrest control of the future direction of neoconservative foreign policy 
thought, and more the case of urging neoconservatives to apply their hardline anti-
Communism to “Weapons States” who threatened the United States in a unipolar world in 
an analogous way to which the Soviet Union had done in a bipolar world. Maintaining 
geopolitical stability required the United States not to retrench and retreat, but to maintain 
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its power and posture on the global stage to counter new threats, but there was no 
unpacking of the themes of democracy promotion or humanitarian interventionism. 
 
2.4 The Gulf War 
The 1991 Gulf War offers a window into the state of neoconservative thought at the end of 
the Cold War, and gives a stark contrast with the approach later associated with 
neoconservatism in the late 1990s. Benevolent hegemony, benign imperialism and the 
forceful promotion of liberal democracy were not the hallmarks of the neoconservative 
approach to the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1. Instead, the prevailing 
neoconservative viewpoint endorsed the limited policy aims of the Bush administration of 
removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and largely stopped short of advocating regime change 
in Iraq. Neoconservatives were content to play the stability card in a very similar way to 
their more realist contemporaries, and feared the consequences of a more radical policy. 
One might well expect the neoconservatives within the administration to toe the policy 
line, yet support for the limited war aims of 1991, went wider than simply the 
neoconservatives on the federal government’s payroll.  
 
The threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had been outlined by neoconservatives in the 
years leading up to the Gulf War. Daniel Pipes (1986: 95, 99) highlighted what he 
described as the “scourge of suicide terrorism”, and argued that Iran, Iraq and Syria were 
all sponsoring suicide terrorism not so much driven by fanaticism but by state-driven 
agendas.
56
 Iraq was also a key concern for Zalmay Khalilzad. Although Khalilzad 
achieved more notoriety for his role in the drafting of the 1992 DPG, another paper which 
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 In a harbinger of what later became a central thrust of the Bush Doctrine, Pipes (1986: 96, 99) argued that 
it was futile for the United States to focus its efforts on either deterring or stopping the terrorists from 
carrying out their operations, but instead should seek to punish their state sponsors. 
74 
 
he drafted at the State Department in 1988, on reflection, proves to have been just as 
interesting. Khalilzad, then working as a senior State Department official, argued that the 
United States’ position of treating Iran as the major threat in the Middle East was 
misplaced, and instead, argued that Iraq now posed a graver menace to American interests 
and the peace and stability of the wider region (Gigot, 1990-91: 6).
57
 There was a sense 
among neoconservatives that with the ending of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the United 
States had missed an opportunity to reorientate its entire posture towards the Middle East 
(Gigot, 1990-91: 5). 
 
It was Khalilzad’s mentor, Paul Wolfowitz, who had done most to point out the threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein.
58
 Although Irving Kristol is usually ascribed the title of 
‘godfather’ of neoconservatism, Wolfowitz – who has sat directly in the upper echelons of 
the American government for much of the past four decades – has been the public face of 
neoconservatism in office. Wolfowitz was a protégé of the political theorist, Allan Bloom, 
as an undergraduate at Cornell, before moving to Chicago to complete his doctoral thesis 
under the nuclear strategist, Albert Wohlstetter.
59
 Following the completion of his research 
in Chicago, and after a short period at Yale, Wolfowitz moved to Washington in 1973, 
where he began his career working for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
(Mann, 2004: 34). In 1977, then working as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Regional Programs in the Carter Administration, he started work on the Limited 
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 As both a Muslim and ethnic Pashtun, Khalilzad certainly helps to dispel the myth that all 
neoconservatives are Jewish and thus put the interests of Tel Aviv above Washington. 
58
 For extended discussion of Paul Wolfowitz’s career please see Lewis D. Solomon (2007) Paul D. 
Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker, and Strategist (Westport, CT, Praeger Security 
International), and James Mann (2004) Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York, 
Viking). 
59
 Interestingly, Wolfowitz’s thesis arguing against the construction of nuclear powered desalination plants in 
the Middle East emphasised the threat to the region posed by nuclear weapons proliferation, and it certainly 
did not exclude Israel. However, it emphasised themes that look distinctly familiar in the wake of the Iraq 
War, for example, the difficulty with inspecting sites and the risk of clandestine use of nuclear material  
(Mann, 2004: 30). 
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Contingency Study. Wolfowitz was charged with assessing threats to the United States that 
could occur in the developing world, and began with a focus on the Persian Gulf. Although 
the study’s primary concern was with the possibility of the Soviet Union seizing the 
oilfields of the Middle East, Wolfowitz widened its scope to include discussion of whether 
Iraq also had the capacity to present the same threat, especially the potential for an Iraqi 
invasion of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The report concluded that Iraq posed a direct 
threat to other states in the region and also a more “implicit” threat causing other states “to 
accommodate themselves to Iraq without being overtly coerced.” The report recommended 
that the United States fully commit to balancing Iraqi power with increased visibility of 
US power in the region (Gordon and Trainor, 1995: 6-9, 480, ; Mann, 2004: 80; Solomon, 
2007: 25).
60
  
 
During the Reagan administration, Wolfowtiz worked as Director of Policy Planning at the 
State Department followed by a period as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, then a spell as US ambassador to Indonesia. Bush’s election victory over Dukakis 
in 1988, however, brought Wolfowitz back to the Pentagon, where he became 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy – a role he held for the entirety of Bush’s term in 
office – and Iraq loomed large once again. Solomon argues that Wolfowitz was 
instrumental in keeping the Pentagon from falling into a “myopic” focus on the USSR, and 
in the autumn of 1989, ordered a review of US defence policy in the Persian Gulf region. 
The explicit threat to be assessed this time was an armed seizure of the Saudi oilfields by a 
hostile Middle Eastern power, of which Iraq was of course the most likely candidate 
(Solomon, 2007: 27; Mann, 2004: 172-173).  
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 Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, was reportedly worried the report would leak to the Iraqi government 
and sour relations between Washington and Baghdad, with the Iraqis possibly concluding the US report was 
written at the instigation of Saudi Arabia (Mann, 2004: 82). 
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On 2 August
 
1990, when Saddam Hussein sent Iraqi forces over the border into Kuwait it 
was not as much a shock for Wolfowitz as it seemingly was for others, but an eventuality 
explored by him since at least the early days of the Carter administration.
61
 Despite 
Wolfowitz’s focus on the threat posed by Iraq, it was largely hallmarked by an emphasis 
on the impact of Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti oilfields falling into the hands of the Iraqi 
dictator. Wolfowitz was certainly not wedded to conceptions of regime change in Iraq 
itself, or indeed of Iraq being a fertile ground for planting the roots of liberal democracy, 
both of which he was later closely associated with. The most interesting question 
surrounding the conduct of the Gulf War was not the issue of whether the United States 
should use military force to remove Iraq’s military from Kuwait. Neoconservatives were 
largely united in arguing that it was an appropriate response to do so, and it could easily be 
justified on both realist and liberal grounds in addition to neoconservative concerns. Iraq 
had violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a neighbouring state, was in clear 
violation of international law, and the United Nations had approved the use of force to 
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
62
 The more interesting question concerned what the US-
led coalition should do once Iraq’s army had been ejected from Kuwait. Should the 
coalition forces push on to Baghdad and topple Hussein’s regime or essentially stop at the 
Kuwait-Iraq border and adhere to a strict interpretation of the remit of the UN Security 
Council resolutions? Discussion of the views of neoconservatives in the higher echelons of 
the Bush administration during the Gulf War centres largely on Wolfowitz himself. 
William Kristol served as Chief of Staff to Vice-President Dan Quayle, and was somewhat 
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 Incredibly, Colin Powell (1995: 461), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, suggests that as late as 1 
August 1990, the day before the invasion, General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of US Central 
Command, discounted the notion that Saddam Hussein would launch a full-scale occupation of Kuwait. 
62
 A series of UN Security resolutions were passed which related to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Among 
others, Resolution 660 called for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait (2 August 1990); Resolution 
661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq (6 August 1990); Resolution 665 authorised a naval blockade against 
Iraq (25 August 1990); Resolution 678 gave Iraq a deadline of 15 January 1991 to comply with Resolution 
660 or face “all necessary means” to enforce the resolution – the trigger for military action (29 November 
1990) (United Nations, 1990a; United Nations, 1990b; United Nations, 1990c; United Nations, 1990d).  
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at arms-length from the foreign policy making process, thus not in a position to have 
significantly contributed to the debate.
63
 Other neoconservatives such as Khalilzad were in 
more junior positions. There was, however, no recorded dissent from Bush’s decision not 
to force regime-change in Iraq from any neoconservatives in the administration. 
 
Two pivotal issues dominated the decision by Bush to keep Saddam Hussein in power at 
the conclusion of the Gulf War. Firstly, the question of the legality of forcing regime 
change on Iraq. As in the debate before the Iraq War in 2003, whether there was scope for 
such action in the UN resolutions was hotly contested, and could possibly have pulled 
apart the coalition that Bush had carefully assembled. Secondly, Bush’s national security 
team feared the wider consequences of leaving a power vacuum in Iraq, especially given 
the perceived threat from Iran ever since Khomeini’s 1979 revolution. Reflecting the 
realist approach of James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, the Bush administration ultimately 
concluded that the cause of stability in the Middle East would be damaged if the United 
States removed Saddam from power.
64
  
 
For Wolfowitz, and neoconservatives outside the administration such as Richard Perle, the 
only real issue of contention once the war had begun was the precise timing of the 
ceasefire, and then after the war whether more could have been done to prevent Saddam 
attacking the insurgency he faced. According to Mann (2004: 190), “(n)o one in the first 
Bush administration was seeking to remake the political institutions of the Middle East”. 
Wolfowitz did not advocate the use of military force to topple Saddam Hussein until as 
late as 1997 (Solomon, 2007: 69). In the early stages of the Gulf War planning, Wolfowitz 
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 Somewhat mischievously, Jacob Weisberg (1990) writing in the New Republic, referred to William Kristol 
as “Dan Quayle’s brain” 
64
 For a detailed discussion of the decision making process during the Gulf War please see Colin L. Powell 
(1995) A Soldier’s Way (London, Hutchinson); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft (1998) A World 
Transformed (New York, Alfred A. Knopf).  
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and his civilian aide, and fellow neoconservative, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby had favoured a 
plan drawn up by Henry Rowen, a scholar at the Hoover Institution, which called for the 
United States military to take up a position in Western Iraq. This plan was not, however, a 
precursor to regime change, but a ploy to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait to defend 
Baghdad. The plan, labelled Operation Scorpion, also favoured by Secretary of Defense, 
Dick Cheney, was ultimately discarded in favour of Schwarzkopf’s full frontal assault 
(Mann, 2004: 186-188). Wolfowtiz’s central contention during the war was that Powell 
had pushed too strongly to call a ceasefire after just 100 hours of the ground war, leaving 
parts of the Iraqi army intact, and was equally displeased that the United States did nothing 
to prevent Saddam Hussein from using helicopters to attack his domestic opponents. For 
Powell, however, as he readily admitted, leaving Saddam Hussein with enough power to 
balance the Iranian threat was a central consideration (Powell, 1995: 531).
65
 These were 
relatively minor points of disagreement between Powell and Wolfowitz, compared to the 
overarching agreement that Saddam Hussein should not be toppled. Writing three years 
later, Wolfowitz (1994c: 87) maintained that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was the 
correct decision, and for the United States forces to have occupied the whole of Iraq and 
forced regime change would have been deeply problematic. Indeed, Wolfowitz compared 
the situation with MacArthur in the Korean War after the stunning victory at Inchon, and 
argued that even after an emphatic victory and removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, an 
American occupation of Iraq would have been entirely different, just as it had been in 
Korea. In a further revealing historical comparison, Wolfowitz downplayed bringing 
democracy to Germany after the Second World War, and argued that what was important 
was reversing Hitler’s European conquests.  
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 Powell’s account in his memoirs of these days (1995: 527-531) is somewhat contradictory, claiming within 
the space of just four pages, firstly, that the United States would have “loved” to have seen Saddam 
overthrown, and then stating that the success of revolts against Hussein was not an American goal, and that a 
strong Iraq was needed to threaten Iran. 
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Wolfowitz’s position on the Gulf War is an illuminating microcosm of the state of 
neoconservatism during the very early years of the post-Cold War period. On the one hand 
he favoured bold military strategy, opposed the reluctance of the realists to fully destroy 
the Iraqi army when it had the opportunity, and argued that the United States could have 
done more to prevent human rights abuses by the Iraqi dictator against Kurdish and Shia 
opposition. Yet on the other, he concurred with the argument that removing Saddam 
Hussein from power would leave an unstable vacuum at the heart of the Middle East, and 
he at no point raised the possibility of regime change in Iraq. Wolfowitz’s position reveals 
a hybrid form of neoconservatism that continued to be distinct from realism, yet remained 
a long way from advocating the more radical policy prescriptions it espoused in the later 
years of the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.  
 
Outside the administration, and unencumbered by the necessity to support the 
administration’s policies, neoconservatives also showed a reluctance to press for regime 
change in Iraq. Daniel Pipes (1991: 9-10) argued “[t]he overriding American interest in the 
Gulf is stability”, and other priorities such as democracy, low oil prices, human rights were 
secondary to the wider cause of stability in the region. Indeed, far from arguing that the 
United States should remove Saddam from power, Pipes suggested that President Bush 
should announce explicitly that the US would not be seeking to topple the Iraqi regime. If 
the United States were to launch an extended military occupation of Iraq, it would be “one 
of the great disasters in American foreign policy” with American troops subject to “suicide 
attackers, car bombers, and other acts of terrorism”. Fred Barnes, who later became 
Executive Editor of the neoconservative house journal, the Weekly Standard, was another 
admirer (1991: 44, 46) of Bush’s conduct of the Gulf War in 1991. Peaceful containment 
would never have succeeded in removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Bush had restored 
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American prestige and strengthened the US bargaining position vis-à-vis a host of other 
states. Bush had not gone “intervention crazy” but chosen to play the role of “broker” 
rather than “boss”. Barnes offered no criticism, only an indifferent “maybe”. Again, this is 
hardly the neoconservatism of the popular imagination in the early years of the twenty-first 
century.  
 
Support for Bush’s Gulf War policy was also found among the first generation of 
neoconservatives. Norman Podhoretz (1990: 21) argued that a war to liberate Kuwait was 
essential to prevent valuable resources from falling into Saddam Hussein’s hands and to 
discourage other states from reckless aggression against other states. Podhoretz later spent 
part of the Gulf War in Israel, and recounted a conversation he had with an Israeli official, 
which sheds yet more light on the prevailing neoconservative viewpoint at the time. The 
Israeli official claimed in conversation with Podhoretz that it was complete folly for the 
United States to leave Saddam Hussein in power at the conclusion of the Gulf War, and 
suggested that the United States needed to fully occupy Iraq, just as with Germany in 
1945, and launch a similar project to the Marshall Plan allowing democracy to spread 
across the Middle East. Podhoretz, however, clearly showed his opposition to such an 
ambitious strategy : “(w)ith this he loses me, I see no chance that the United States today 
will either wish or be able to do such a thing” (Podhoretz, 1991a: 23). There was 
absolutely no suggestion from Podhoretz that Bush had erred in leaving Saddam Hussein 
in power. Instead, Podhoretz argued that liberating Kuwait was enough to restore 
American confidence and prestige (Podhoretz, 1991a: 20-21).
66
 This was also the position 
taken by Irving Kristol. For Kristol, Bush’s decision to leave Saddam Hussein in power 
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 In a colourful aside, but again instructive as a comparison with how neoconservatives later came to assess 
Bush’s conduct of the Gulf War, Podhoretz recounts blowing kisses to the television set in his room at the 
King David Hotel, when Bush appeared on CNN promising to liberate Kuwait and smash Iraq’s military 
capabilities (Podhoretz, 1991a: 20). 
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was correct, and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East was emphatically not a 
key national interest for the United States. Indeed, he later stated that “no civilized person 
in his right mind wants to govern Iraq”, and even that it was not in the interest of the 
United States to always combat aggression in a general sense (Kristol quoted in Dorrien, 
2004; Vaisse, 2009). Jeane Kirkpatrick had an even more limited vision of the United 
States’ role in the crisis in the Gulf. Indeed, writing later in the summer of 1991, John 
Judis argues that although she did ultimately back the Bush administration’s Gulf War 
policy, early in the crisis, she had “equivocated” on the use of force (Judis, 1991). In 
November 1990, Kirkpatrick (1990a) suggested that there were alternatives between 
appeasement and a full scale ground assault, and that if ground troops were needed at all 
they should be Egyptian, Saudi or other Arab forces, rather than American troops, with the 
US role restricted to aerial campaigns. What is clear from Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, and 
Kristol, is that all three supported the Bush administration’s limited war aims, with no 
suggestion that the United States should have even considered topping Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, let alone introduced liberal democracy to Iraq.  
 
Other neoconservatives went out of their way to agree with the realist perspective, 
espoused by Powell, Baker and Scowcroft, that toppling Saddam would destabilise the 
Middle East rather than increase the prospects for peace. Cohen (1990b: 22-27) argued that 
the stated objectives of the Gulf War were to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait and achieve 
the wider security of the Gulf region, whereas the other possible unstated objectives of 
destroying Iraq’s weapons and removing Hussein from power had the potential to 
destabilise the Middle East by removing Iran’s “traditional foe”. Bush, unlike Reagan, 
failed to grasp the “politics of passion”, nonetheless, Bush was a “decisive” war leader and 
understood the imperative of secrecy. In addition, Colin Powell, later to assume the role of 
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neoconservative villain, was described as “solid and politically savvy”. Writing before the 
war began; Cohen offered three potential strategies for the United States military to follow 
during the conflict.
67
 Even with three possible strategies, however, the idea of regime 
change in Iraq itself, and the United States sending its military into Baghdad to impose 
democracy, did not feature in Cohen’s list.  
 
Richard Perle, who has earned something of a reputation as the most bellicose of 
neoconservatives also did not criticise Bush’s decision to refrain from imposing regime 
change on Baghdad in 1991. Perle (1991: emphasis added) stated that there were 
“compelling reasons” to remove the Iraqi dictator from power due to his human rights 
abuses and support for terrorism. Nonetheless, for the United States to actually invade 
Iraq, “could prove costly, and would probably be unnecessary”. Perle was content to play 
the long game in the hope that tough United Nations sanctions would eventually build up 
enough pressure to lead Iraqis to overthrow Saddam. The idea that military action by the 
United States was “unnecessary” certainly did not become a dominant motif during the 
1990s. In interviews before the Iraq War in 2003, both Richard Perle and William Kristol 
were questioned for the PBS programme, Frontline, in which they passed comment on the 
state of their thought at the close of the Gulf War in 1991. Kristol (Frontline, 2003a) 
confirmed that although he did not publicly articulate his views on the end of the war in 
1991, he now argued that it was not a mistake, and indeed was “defensible” to finish the 
war after just 100 hours of conflict on the ground. It was the later decision to not support 
the Iraqi rebellion against Saddam’s regime, which he suggested was more problematic, 
especially for Wolfowitz. This was also emphasised by Richard Perle (Frontline, 2003b), 
who suggested that the main reason why he did not push for the United States to topple 
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 The three possible strategies that Cohen (1990b: 25-26) emphasised were: 1) Siege and military blockade; 
2) Victory through air power; 3) “Normandy Revisited” – Kuwait liberated after an extensive air campaign. 
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Saddam Hussein in 1991, was that most people simply expected the regime to be toppled 
by internal forces within Iraq. However, as noted earlier, Wolfowitz still supported the 
decision to leave Saddam Hussein in power as late as 1994 on the basis of stability, and 
despite his suggestion that the United States could have done more to prevent Saddam 
Hussein’s crushing of domestic insurrections; these very rebellions could have left Iraq 
‘unstable’. 
 
Although the majority of neoconservatives supported the central thrust of the Bush 
administration’s policies during the Gulf War, there was early dissent, most notably from 
Joshua Muravchik and Charles Krauthammer. Muravchik (1991c) suggested in April 1991, 
that the only way for the United States to successfully withdraw from the Gulf War was to 
“ouster” Saddam Hussein. Muravchik also raised the tentative possibility of democracy in 
Iraq, but suggested even though democracy was too much of a hope for Iraq, that “there 
are degrees of unfreedom (sic) less brutal, more humane than the Baath regime”. 
Nonetheless, Muravchik’s suggestion was far from a radical construction, and indeed 
argued that a balance of power, a central feature of realist thought, would be the best 
outcome for the Middle East along the lines of pre-First World War Europe. The United 
States would not be aggressively toppling another regime but merely aiding a domestic 
uprising against a tyrannical regime as it had done on numerous occasions in the past. 
Krauthammer (1991d) also called for Saddam Hussein to be toppled, and argued that the 
Bush administration was “squandering a unique opportunity” and that leaving a weakened 
Saddam Hussein in power was “a gross political misjudgement”.68 Nonetheless, as with 
Muravchik, Krauthammer did not favour a ground assault on Baghdad by US forces, but 
merely the United States aid the domestic insurrection against Saddam Hussein 
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 Later in 1991, Krauthammer (1991g), despairing of Bush’s decision not to press for Saddam Hussein’s 
removal at the conclusion of the Gulf War, stated that the United States should seek to assassinate him. 
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(Krauthammer, 1991f).
69
 His most revealing comment, however, came a week after the 
bombing of Iraq had begun in January 1991, when he argued that while the United States 
should seek to eliminate Saddam Hussein, beyond that “Iraq’s internal politics are not our 
concern.” The United States should seek the unconditional surrender of the Iraqi army, but 
emphatically not attempt to establish “a MacArthur regency in Baghdad” (Krauthammer, 
1991c, emphasis added).     
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, neoconservatives broadly supported President 
Bush’s approach to the conflict. Post hoc criticism of Bush’s limited approach during the 
second half of the 1990s should not obfuscate the fact that neoconservatives largely 
supported how the Gulf War was executed. Most neoconservatives, aside from relatively 
minor disagreements concerning the exact timing of the ceasefire and lack of support for 
Saddam’s domestic opponents, were content to lend their support to the Bush 
administration’s conduct of the Gulf War; satisfied with the outcome of the war; and 
viewed the military victory as a sign of America’s rehabilitation after the debacle of 
Vietnam. Even those such as Krauthammer and Muravchik who wanted Saddam Hussein 
removed from power, had a relatively limited aim with doing so, and certainly were not 
calling for the United States to impose democracy on Iraq. In 1991, there was very little 
appetite among the neoconservatives for a wide-ranging, ambitious policy of regime 
change and democratisation in Iraq. 
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 Although Krauthammer (1991d) did advocate greater democracy and pluralism in the Middle East, it was 
advocated in a general way, rather than as a specific democratisation project in Iraq imposed at the barrel of 
an American gun 
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2.5 Democracy and the End of History 
The Gulf War revealed neoconservatives as still wedded to their dominant Cold War anti-
totalitarian posture, and far from embracing the themes of democratic imperialism or 
“Wilsoniansm with teeth”, with which they would be later associated (Mearsheimer, 
2005). This next section takes a step back from the historical events of the early post-Cold 
War period to consider Francis Fukuyama’s seminal ‘End of History’ thesis, described 
disparagingly by Tony Smith (2007: 49-50) as the only original, theoretical, 
neoconservative contribution to the post-Cold War debate on the democratic peace. It is 
argued that Fukuyama’s thesis laid the intellectual foundation and some of the ideological 
groundwork for a more expansive form of neoconservatism in the later years of the 1990s. 
Although, as discussed earlier, specific aspects of his thesis were criticised by 
neoconservatives for being utopian and ahistorical, Fukuyama’s work provided an 
important theoretical narrative by pushing the idea of democracy into a more central 
position in neoconservative discourse. Neoconservatives had always been passionate 
defenders of American liberal democracy and regularly quoted Tocqueville. Yet by the end 
of 1990s, their relationship to the idea of liberal democracy had shifted from the abstract to 
one where its promotion abroad became central to the foreign policy agenda and mission 
of the United States. Fukuyama’s work has been widely singled out – usually for 
opprobrium – as a key contribution to the triumphalism of the early post-Cold War period. 
However, this thesis argues that Fukuyama’s ideas did not just impact Western political 
discourse at the end of the Cold War in a general sense, but played a role in establishing a 
philosophical foundation for a later shift in neoconservative thought, although Fukuyama 
(2006: 55), as an ex-neoconservative, would later accuse the George W. Bush 
administration of misappropriating his work.  
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Fukuyama, like Paul Wolfowitz, had studied as an undergraduate at Cornell under Allan 
Bloom, before writing his PhD thesis at Harvard under the neoconservative, Harvey 
Mansfield, and Samuel Huntington. Following the completion of his PhD, Fukuyama spent 
two periods of time during the 1980s working for the Policy Planning Staff at the State 
Department, where he worked for Wolfowitz, in between spells working in the Political 
Science Department of the RAND Corporation (Solomon, 2007: 43).
70
 Fukuyama’s ‘End 
of History’ thesis appeared as a short article in the National Interest in the summer of 
1989, before an extended version in the form of a full-length book appeared in 1992: The 
End of History and the Last Man (New York, Free Press). Fukuyama’s work was more 
philosophical with a discussion of the entire scope of human history, than direct policy 
prescription. Undoubtedly, the tumultuous geopolitical events of the 1980s and the ending 
of the Cold War would have influenced Fukuyama’s thought and enabled his ideas to gain 
a more sympathetic reading than they might have done twenty-five years earlier. 
Nonetheless, there is nothing in his work that suggests it could not have been written at the 
height of the Cold War. His argument on the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy was 
based more upon a philosophical construction and wide-ranging discussion of human 
nature, than on thawing relations at the Cold War’s end.71 
 
At the centre of Fukuyama’s thought is a reading of Hegel via the Russian-born 
philosopher, later French statesman, Alexandre Kojève, which rejects the excessive 
material determinism of both Marxism and neoliberal economics. Instead “it is the ideal 
that will govern the material world in the long run” (1989: 4). For Fukuyama, ideas such 
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 For further detail, James Mann has provided an interesting account of the relationship between Wolfowitz 
and Fukuyama (Mann, 2004: 22-26; 74-75) 
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 This is not to suggest that actual contemporary geopolitical events were of no interest to Fukuyama, or 
suggest he did not write about them. Indeed, Fukuyama (1989: 3; 1992: xiii) makes clear reference to the 
spread of democracy in various states over the previous years. Nonetheless, these events are not used as the 
basis for his argument, which he instead grounds in a more abstract defence of the ability of liberal 
democracy to satisfy human nature. 
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as liberal democracy can achieve ascendancy, and ultimately triumph in the ideational 
sphere, vanquishing ideological opponents, even before such a ‘victory’ is made manifest 
materially. While this opens up Fukuyama to the charge that his thesis is tautological, 
nonetheless, it is much more difficult to point to recent ‘real-world’ in some way to 
‘disprove’ Fukuyama’s thesis. Indeed he explicitly stated that events, such as the 1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre, cannot be used to disprove his thesis as his argument is not 
that liberal democracy triumphed in 1989 or 1992 in practice, but that it has triumphed in 
the realm of ideas. While liberal democracy is not currently universally victorious in 
practice, and there will still be “discontinuities in historical development”, this should not 
cloud the overall picture as the liberal democratic idea has emerged victorious (1992: xii, 
45). 
 
The reason that liberal democratic capitalism as an idea represents the final stage in the 
evolution of human society, according to Fukuyama, is twofold. Firstly, modern natural 
science has a homogenizing logic to it. All countries seeking to be wealthy modern states 
simply have to follow a path broadly leading in a capitalist direction to bring wealth to 
their citizens. Secondly, capitalism is, however, only a necessary but not sufficient 
explanation and the other half of the explanation lies in there being a fundamental need for 
recognition rooted in human nature, that ultimately only liberal democracy fulfils (1992: 
91, 177). According to Fukuyama it is only when capitalism is combined with liberal 
democracy that the end of history is reached. American and French democracy developed 
before industrialization, and therefore cannot really be understood as a development 
related to economic efficiency. Instead, liberal democracy does not arise from “Economic 
Man” but from “a specifically “Democratic Man” that desires and shapes democracy even 
as he is shaped by it” (1992: 135). It is here that Fukuyama leans most heavily on Hegel, 
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arguing that Marx’s economically and materially determinist account of history is flawed, 
and instead the “struggle for recognition” is the fundamental shaper of human history. 
Hegel’s dialectical view of history suggested that regimes are replaced by more successful 
ones if essential contradictions remain in the existing regime. For Fukuyama, liberal 
democratic capitalism, with its ability to provide economic efficiency and wealth 
combined with its ability to ‘recognise’ its citizens, brings into question whether any 
fundamental contradictions remain which could possibly lead to the liberal democratic idea 
ever being trumped (1992: 136). Fukuyama’s thought here sits firmly within orthodox 
neoconservatism, which has always been more concerned with the social and the political 
over the economic. Support for capitalism has always played second fiddle to more social 
or political concerns, perhaps best exemplified in the title of Irving Kristol’s 1978 book, 
Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York, Basic).  
 
Hegel’s version of liberalism is “nobler” than that of Hobbes or Locke, according to 
Fukuyama, as man is more free and public-spirited, less materialist, and not driven simply 
by economic needs but by a desire to have their moral status as human beings recognised 
by other men (1989: 18; 1992: 145-50). The liberalism of Hobbes or Locke on its own, 
leaves open the question of why civic democratic life occurs at all, as the population would 
find it difficult to transcend the over-arching impulse to self-preservation. Fukuyama here 
refers to this idea of the need for recognition as thymos, a Greek word at the root of the 
noble virtues of morality and self-sacrifice, yet also at the root of less noble attributes 
including a lust for power, wealth and status (1992: 170-189).
72
 Democracy is not 
primarily concerned with economics, but has developed and been driven by the need for 
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 Fukuyama (1992: 187) also makes the distinction between megalothymia – a desire to be recognised as 
superior to others, and isothymia – a desire to be recognised as the equal of others. According to Fukuyama, 
Madison saw US-style liberal democracy as the best way to channel thymos in “a benign way to indulge 
man’s natural pride”. 
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human beings to be recognised as moral actors. For Fukuyama, it is the only socio-political 
system that provides human beings with the recognition that they require.
73
 It is this 
thymotic dimension and the need for recognition when combined with capitalist economics 
that provides the basis for the end of history. Thus, for Fukuyama, the final state at the end 
of history is an amalgam of Locke and Hegel: 
 
The universal and homogeneous state that appears at the end of history can 
thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and 
recognition...The human historical process that leads up to it has been driven 
forward equally by the progressive unfolding of modern natural science and 
by the struggle for recognition. 
   
 (1992: 204) 
 
 
Having established these two pillars of liberal democracy, and stated why liberal 
democracy represents the final stage of human socio-political evolution, Fukuyama then 
turns to a more practical consideration of how democracy itself comes about in a society, 
and it is here that clear arguments are made that resurface among other neoconservative 
intellectuals in the latter half of the 1990s and the run up to the Iraq War in 2003. For 
Fukuyama, although liberal democracy represents the end of history, there is no suggestion 
that it simply automatically and spontaneously occurs in a given society at a given time. 
Instead  
 
Democracy can never enter through the back door; at a certain point, it must  
arise out of a deliberate political decision to establish democracy...Stable     
liberal democracy cannot come into being without the existence of wise and 
effective statesmen who understand the art of politics and are able to convert 
the underlying inclinations of peoples into durable political institutions. 
  
  (1992: 220, emphasis added) 
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 Interestingly, Fukuyama in both his article and book, suggests that parts of the Islamic world are the only 
areas of the world where there is still a fundamental challenge to the liberal democratic model, although he 
suggests the importance and relevance of this is curtailed by the fact this alternative theocratic model has 
very limited appeal outside of certain Islamic states (1989: 14; 1992: 211-12). 
90 
 
According to this, democracy is not simply something that arises organically from the 
bottom up, but has a significant top down element to it, with “wise statesmen” able to play 
a crucial role in bringing about stable liberal democracy. In 1991, some neoconservatives 
pressed for the United States to merely play a supporting role to a ‘bottom up’ Iraqi 
insurrection against Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Gulf War. By 2003, however, 
this had evolved into a much more ‘top down’ approach with ‘wise’ American statesman 
playing the role of midwives to Iraqi democracy, leading to the introduction of new 
political institutions and democratic elections.  
 
Fukuyama provided a further contribution to the evolution of the neoconservative 
perspective on liberal democracy with his reflections on culture. He argued that it was a 
mistake to say that there were certain cultural thresholds that must be met before a society 
was able to make the transition to democracy. He provided the example of India, which 
has a very different political culture from most other democracies, and the examples of 
German and Japanese authoritarian states being quickly turned into democracies after the 
Second World War. Indeed, every democracy in existence had at some point been an 
authoritarian state (1992: 221-22). Fukuyama’s themes re-emerged in the run-up to the 
2003 Iraq War, especially the suggestion that liberal democracies did not simply emerge 
out of the ether, but needed to be willed into being by wise statesmen and the idea that 
there were no cultural barriers that posed a fundamental challenge to the successful birth of 
democracy in a state.
74
  
 
Fukuyama (1992: 252) also went on the offensive against realism in foreign affairs. While 
realism had been “appropriate” for the Cold War as the world had operated according to its 
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 A further theme with relevance for later neoconservative thought that Fukuyama touches on (1992: 236) 
but does not extensively develop, is the idea that Islamic fundamentalism “bears a more than superficial 
resemblance to European fascism”.  
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premises, nonetheless, in the post-Cold War world, realism had become “reductionist” and 
a “theoretical framework beyond its appointed time”. States were not simply motivated by 
self-preservation but by thymos and the need for recognition just as individuals did. States 
did not simply pursue power but sought various different ends and were motivated also by 
the concept of “legitimacy” (1992: 257). Realists were also wrong to suggest that the 
domestic political regimes of states did not significantly influence their foreign policy 
behaviour. The domestic politics of other states mattered, according to Fukuyama, because 
liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. He here fully endorsed Michael 
Doyle’s democratic peace thesis (Fukuyama, 1992: 262-263; M. Doyle, 1986: 1151-52).  
Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ therefore contained a number of key themes which would 
eventually come into ascendancy in neoconservatism in this period. Firstly, the idea that 
liberal democracy was the ultimate end-point of human socio-political development, even 
if it was not yet realised in the ‘real world’. Secondly, liberal democracy was not 
something that developed automatically in a ‘bottom up’ fashion in states but needed wise 
statesman to decide to bring it into reality. Thirdly, there were no impassable cultural 
barriers that could prevent a state becoming democratic. Fourthly, realism was a doctrine 
for a bipolar Cold War, and not a suitable paradigm for the post-Cold War period. Lastly, 
the domestic politics of states mattered as it affected their foreign policy behaviour, 
especially as liberal democracies did not go to war with each other.  
 
Yet, despite Fukuyama’s argument that liberal democracy had ultimately triumphed in the 
realm of ideas, he was not particularly enthusiastic at such an outcome. Drawing heavily 
on Nietzsche, who argued that human greatness was only possible in aristocratic societies, 
Fukuyama contended that liberal democracies produced citizens obsessed with toleration 
and the personal health and safety of the body, rather than virtuous citizens who tend to 
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value questions of morality above those of tolerance. In aristocracies, there were 
possibilities in the moral sphere that are not possible in liberal democracies where “(m)en 
with modern educations are content to sit at home congratulating themselves on their 
broadmindedness and lack of fanaticism” (1992: 307). Thus Fukuyama’s view of liberal 
democracy is somewhat paradoxical. It is the final end-point of human socio-political 
evolution and triumphs due to its ability to provide economic wealth and provide the 
recognition its citizens crave. Yet it simultaneously produces societies that are hallmarked 
by dullness, with little outlet for virtue, moral excellence and struggle for a just cause. 
Indeed, he partly attributes the cause of the First World War to the fact that liberal 
democratic life in Western Europe had bored a generation of European men, and it was a 
rebellion against a century of bourgeois peace (1992: 329-331).
75
 
 
It is this paradox that critics of the neoconservatives have drawn upon to suggest that their 
support for liberal democracy is merely rhetorical or tactical, and that deep down they are 
actually committed elitists, with little passion for the politics of liberal democracy (Norton, 
2004: 95-96, 120; Ryan, 2007; Lind, 2003: 10-13). It is here that the links between Leo 
Strauss and neoconservatism are frequently drawn. Norton (2004: 120) suggests that 
Strauss’s idea of natural right is not an argument for the extension and promotion of 
democracy but the limiting of democracy.
76
 Indeed, the idea of natural right, according to 
Norton, is presented as an alternative to the democratic “consent of the governed”. 
However, as Fukuyama has argued, the links between Strauss and neoconservatism have 
been wildly overstated. While some neoconservatives, such as Irving Kristol have drawn 
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 Of course, strictly speaking, the nineteenth century had not been entirely peaceful after the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815 – the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars for example – yet there had not been a continent-
wide conflagration.  
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 For an exploration of the idea of natural right see Leo Strauss (1953) Natural Right and History (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press). Contrary to Norton, the primary thrust of Strauss’s argument is to neither 
defend or attack liberal democracy as an idea, but an assault on relativism and nihilism (Strauss, 1953: 1-8) 
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inspiration from Strauss’s writings, many such as Robert Kagan have not. Strauss’s 
emphasis on the importance of political regimes and his attacks on relativism and nihilism 
certainly have been reflected in neoconservative thought, but the idea that Strauss was 
anti-democratic and that the neoconservatives were inspired to invade Iraq on the basis of 
his writing seems misplaced. Indeed, Murray (2005: 20) suggests that “Strauss’s oeuvre is 
no invader’s handbook”.  
 
Even though Fukuyama explores the potential downsides to liberal democracy, it is a 
significant overstatement to suggest that this means neoconservatives were anti-democratic 
and elitist. Fukuyama (1992: 313) argues that it is possible to be fully within the 
“Christian-liberal” tradition, “believe” in democracy and reject Nietzsche’s morality, while 
still appreciating Nietzsche’s insights on the pitfalls of liberal democracy. For example, 
Fukuyama (1992: 337) argues that liberal principles threaten notions of patriotism, which 
can potentially imperil the survival of a political community. Nonetheless, he argues that 
liberal democracy satisfies the three essential needs of man – reason, desire and thymos – 
better than any other political system in history. His reflections on Nietzche’s aristocratic 
leanings and elitism are therefore best seen as caveats rather than a fundamental challenge 
to his overall embrace of liberal democracy. Fukuyama’s answer to the fact that liberal 
democracies can atrophy, degenerate and succumb to opponents, is that liberal 
democracies that fight occasional wars are far healthier and more robust societies than 
those that live in Kant’s perpetual peace (1992: 329). This is yet another theme from 
Fukuyama that reappears in neoconservative discourse in the later years of the 1990s and 
into the George W. Bush administration: the idea that fighting just wars overseas is a 
contributor to the strength and vitality of the American polity back home.  
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If Fukuyama’s work focused on liberal democracy from a more abstract, philosophical 
perspective, the other two book-length, neoconservative studies of liberal democracy in 
this period were more directly policy-orientated. Gregory Fossedal’s The Democratic 
Imperative; Exporting the American Revolution (New York, New Republic/Basic), 
published in 1989, and Joshua Muravchik’s, 1991 book, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling 
America’s Destiny (Washington DC, AEI), both sought to place democracy promotion 
centrally in the foreign policy agenda of the United States. These two books have not been 
widely read but are worthy of further study as examples of early post-Cold War 
neoconservative linkage of democracy promotion and US foreign policy. Fossedal, like 
many neoconservatives, had previously written editorials for the Wall Street Journal in the 
mid 1980s, before taking up a research fellow position at the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford, where he wrote The Democratic Imperative. Muravchik, who had previously 
been National Chairman of the Young People’s Socialist League, had then followed a 
similar left to right journey as many of the early neoconservatives, ending up as a resident 
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he penned Exporting 
Democracy.
77
  
 
In large parts of the book, Fossedal points to examples in American history where the 
promotion of democracy by the United States has been successful, including post-World 
War Two experiences in Germany and Japan through to the Philippines in the mid-1980s 
(1989: 16, 33). In a direct repudiation of orthodox realism, Fossedal suggests that it is not 
geopolitik that is the pivot for history and international relations but ideopolitik. To 
understand the conduct of American foreign policy is not a matter of coming to terms with 
the technology, geography, resources of the United States, but to understand its ideological 
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 Gary Dorrien (2004: 80-81, 114-123) discusses the contributions of both Gregory Fossedal and Joshua 
Muravchik to neoconservative thought. 
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foundation, to understand liberal democracy itself. (1989: 36). What he sought was not a 
fetishization of democracy itself per se, which he suggested was simply a process. Rather, 
the goal for the United States in the conduct of its foreign policy was, as the framers had 
suggested, to secure the rights of mankind. Fossedal argued that these human rights were 
to be found on the pages of Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Jefferson, Mill and lastly Strauss. 
These were the rights that, in a clear linkage to Strauss’ conception of natural right, “flow 
from nature and from “Nature’s God” itself” (1989: 218). Fossedal’s democratic vision 
was not limited to the American polity, but rooted in a universal conception of human 
rights. The United States should be actively involved in spreading liberal democracy itself 
as it was the democratic process which offered the best chance of fostering these rights in 
other states.  
 
Joshua Muravchik’s Exporting Democracy, bears a remarkable resemblance to many of 
the themes of Fossedal’s work highlighted earlier. As with both Fukuyama and Fossedal, 
Muravchik began by explicitly rejecting realism as a doctrine to guide US foreign policy. 
Interpreting the end of the Cold War, he argued that the United States did not win because 
of its superior technology, munitions or diplomatic skill. Instead it won the Cold War 
“almost without trying” as it was the very potency of the idea of liberal democracy on 
which the United States is founded that ultimately brought about the collapse of 
Communism as it could not compete at the ideological level, and the “élan of democracy 
provided the context for communism’s terminal crisis” (1991a: 1, 4). The potency of 
democracy, according to Muravchik, lay not in the fact that it was a natural state of human 
affairs, but that it met an innate human need to be treated with dignity. This of course bore 
a close similarity to Fukuyama’s idea of thymos and the need for recognition.  
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For Muravchik, there were three primary reasons why the United States should be 
interested in spreading democracy abroad. Firstly, out of sheer empathy for fellow human 
beings. Secondly, the more democratic the rest of the world was, the more likely the 
United States would face a benign international political environment. Thirdly, the more 
democratic the rest of the world was the less likely there would be conflict and war in 
general. As with Fukuyama, Muravchik in this third point endorsed the democratic peace 
thesis. The consent of the people needed to begin a war is difficult to achieve, and also, the 
“ethics” of democracy are conducive to peace rather than conflict (1991a: 8-9). For 
Muravchik, the historical record in Germany, Japan, and India proved that democracy 
could indeed be “transplanted” to distant and differing cultures and not just survive but put 
down roots and prosper.
78
  
 
In terms of the precise strategies that the United States should use to foster democracy, the 
options available were very similar to those provided by Fossedal. The US could use 
covert action by its intelligence services to fund and support foreign groups that are 
sympathetic to democratic ideals. It could also support guerrillas fighting against non-
democratic governments, along the lines of the Reagan Doctrine, although Muravchik 
cautioned that this was maybe more effective as a tool for strengthening US security rather 
than explicitly aiding the spread of liberal democracy (1991a: 125-144). Other options 
included direct broadcasting to plant the seeds of democracy in foreign states and the use 
and expansion of educational exchange programmes to expose foreign students to liberal 
democratic values, although Muravchik cautioned against the idea that they would all 
automatically become democrats (1991a: 189-197). He also pointed to the examples of 
South Korea and Taiwan to show that economic development and progress could lead to 
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 Muravchik claimed that the idea that democracy could technically be “exported” was a straw man, and that 
the United States instead could “influence” other countries to make them more democratic. Bizarrely though,  
this straw man appeared on the front cover of his book: Exporting Democracy (1991a: 81). 
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greater levels of democratisation, which the United States could also support. Nonetheless, 
he suggested that the exact relationship between economic and political development 
remained “indeterminate” and warned against expecting economic growth to always lead 
to democracy (1991a: 188). 
 
An interesting feature of both Fossedal and Muravchik’s work on democracy is that both 
argue that the ultimate aim of American foreign policy is to create a democratic world in 
which the United States is eventually transcended by other democratic states. Muravchik 
argues that American decline is a good thing, if it finds itself being lowered to just one 
country among many thriving democracies. Indeed, not just a good thing, but “our greatest 
triumph” (1991a: 11). In a similar vein, Fossedal suggests that his advocacy of liberal 
democracy does not rest on the fact that it is a peculiarly American value, but because it is 
a universal value. Therefore the expansion of democratic space in global political life is to 
be welcomed and in an extraordinary phrase considering how neoconservatism is often 
perceived, “the decline of American material hegemony should be a primary goal of 
American foreign policy” (1989: 240, emphasis added). This seems to be a significant 
challenge to the central thrust of Ryan’s argument (2007) that neoconservatives were 
focused solely on maintaining American unipolarity, with talk of democracy or human 
rights only functioning as rhetorical flourish. Neoconservative intellectuals argued that the 
success of placing democracy promotion at the heart of US foreign policy would be 
measured by the extent to which the United States was overtaken by other democracies. 
This is hardly evidence of an argument for a Pax Americana ad infinitum, even allowing 
for a certain amount of rhetorical hyperbole.  
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Yet reading Fossedal and Muravchik on democracy, with the benefit of two decades of 
hindsight, one is struck by the fact that despite their undoubted challenge to the more semi-
realist form of neoconservatism that had hitherto been in the ascendancy, and the reality 
that they had brought democracy promotion into a much more central position in 
neoconservative thought, it remained a very cautious approach. At times in Muravchik’s 
1991 book, he came close to advocating the use of direct American military power to bring 
democracy to another state, but always seemed reticent to fully follow through with his 
argument. So, for example, he explicitly ruled out attacking other states to impose 
democracy, and yet added the caveat that there should nonetheless be no “blanket 
prohibition” against doing so (1991a: 117). Elsewhere, he praised the power of American 
coercion in bringing about democratic change, and yet he argued that it was never the 
direct purpose of any particular conflict, and was never an act of initiating an aggressive 
war for the purpose of democracy’s imposition (1991a: 82, 91). Therefore, their various 
foreign policy prescriptions for promoting democracy discussed earlier, all seem somewhat 
limited and restrained compared with later neoconservative arguments, and there is no 
argument deployed to advocate that American troops should be directly involved with 
bringing democracy to another country. Fossedal and Muravchik undoubtedly lay some of 
the intellectual foundations for later more radical and expansive neoconservative work to 
build upon, and placed the idea of democracy promotion more centrally in neoconservative 
foreign policy discourse. Yet simultaneously, their writing is evidence of the fact that 
neoconservatism in these very early post-Cold War years still held to a relatively limited 
and cautious approach. Democracy promotion had started to feature more prominently in 
their work, and yet the role the United States had to play in such promotion was certainly 
restrained, with the most radical suggestion being a continuation of the Reagan Doctrine of 
supporting various guerrilla groups in their struggle against anti-democratic regimes.  
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2.6 Defense Planning Guidance (1992) 
The philosophical reflections on democracy of Fukuyama coupled with the direct policy 
prescriptions of Fossedal and Muravchik were evidence of the groundwork being laid for a 
shift in neoconservative thought to place democracy promotion more centrally in the 
neoconservative vista. The controversy over the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) at the 
Pentagon in 1992 represented a further staging post in the evolution of neoconservative 
thought. Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, had requested that Wolfowtiz, then 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, draft a policy paper setting out the overall strategic 
situation which the United States faced in the post-Cold War world. Although it took the 
form of a standard Defense Planning Guidance which was drawn up every two years as a 
matter of practice, its argument appeared to be anything but run of the mill. Indeed, when 
it was leaked to the New York Times it created a furore and public relations fiasco that 
eventually led to a redrafting (Dorrien, 2004: 38-43; Mann, 2004: 209-215; Tyler, 
1992a).
79
 The 1992 DPG was widely described as the Wolfowitz Plan despite the fact that 
Zalmay Khalilzad had a more active role in drafting the paper. It attracted controversy due 
to its unabashed championing of American unipolarity, the decline of the Cold War’s 
system of bipolarity, and its policy goals to prevent rival challengers to American military 
supremacy.
80
  
 
According to the initial reporting of the DPG in the New York Times, the document sought 
to promote the concept of “benevolent domination by one power”, and repudiated the 
existing international collective security arrangements of the Cold War. Instead of 
collective action through the United Nations, the paper openly speculated that ad hoc 
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 Unfortunately, the second part of the document is still classified, so we are still somewhat reliant on the 
reporting of the leaked document by the New York Times and interviews with the relevant individuals.  
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coalitions of the willing were a more preferable way of dealing with certain crises as they 
arose. The 46-page document made the case for the United States to actively prevent and 
persuade other states to not pursue a greater role in world affairs and thereby challenge 
American dominance. The paper opposed, for example, any joint European security efforts 
outside of the confines of NATO. It also provided justification for the Bush 
administration’s ‘Base Force’ proposal of a 1.6 million member military in the next five 
years. Looking to the future, the report flagged up the potential threat posed by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially if those weapons fell into the 
hands of hostile, authoritarian regimes, and also advocated a global anti-missile system 
(Tyler, 1992a; 1992b). 
 
Commentators and academics have both made much of this 1992 document. According to 
Ryan (2007: 96), the DPG documents were “the defining documents of second generation 
neoconservatism”. For Mann (2004: 214-215) the DPG shaped the rest of the 1990s, and 
even after the Democrats took back the White House in January 1993, the DPG was never 
directly repudiated, but they merely added their own themes of globalization, open markets 
and democracy to it. Halper and Clarke (2004: 146) argued that the National Security 
Strategy of the Bush administration in 1992 had its intellectual roots in and reflected the 
“strategic world-view” of the 1992 DPG. And yet, despite the radical and revolutionary 
label that has been attached to the document, and despite the controversy generated by it at 
the time, there are considerable question marks over whether this really was evidence of a 
radical shift for both US foreign policy and neoconservative thought.
81
 Rather than 
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 Indeed, commenting a few years later in an interview, Wolfowitz claimed that he was baffled by the 
amount of controversy the document had generated, and argued that it was simply an explanation as to why 
the United States needed to maintain troop deployments overseas, rather than bring them all home now that 
the Cold War had finished (Mann, 2004: 213-214) And writing at the time, Krauthammer (1992) also argued 
that the DPG was not terribly novel, and contained many elements which Cheney had already publicly 
announced. 
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announcing a new fundamental alteration in policy, it was more a case of needing to justify 
maintaining a Cold War ‘posture’ in the post-Cold War world, to maintain high levels of 
defence spending and military power to deal with the perceived threats of the post-Cold 
War world just as the United States had done during the Cold War. While the language of 
the document was more strident and explicit regarding the United States’ position vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world than before, the actual substance of the document was not nearly as 
far-reaching or novel as has been stated. Indeed, the very fact that the document was never 
explicitly repudiated by the Clinton administration when it took office is also suggestive of 
the fact that it was not substantively as radical or controversial as it had appeared to some 
at the time. The controversy was a question more of style than of substance, with the 
language and style of the DPG proving more provocative than the actual detail of the 
policy content, especially to the European allies of the United States. This is not to argue 
that style was unimportant, but it should not eclipse the fact that the DPG was more an 
exercise in continuity and maintaining the status quo as a radical departure from 
orthodoxy. 
 
Leaving aside the question of how radical the policy document appeared to a wider 
audience, for the evolution of neoconservative thought at least, it revealed a 
neoconservatism in transition, but still well short of the ideological position in which it 
found itself in by the turn of the millennium. The DPG showed neoconservatives had taken 
steps away from the cautious realism and calls for modesty that had heralded its approach 
during the waning years of the Cold War. And yet there was little discussion of the idea 
that the United States should be using its military power for democracy promotion and 
human rights, and scant evidence of the national interest being framed in ideological rather 
than material terms. With the benefit of hindsight, foreign policy analysts have perhaps 
102 
 
read too much into the 1992 DPG. It is difficult to see how the 2003 Iraq War 
automatically flows from its pages. Rather than being a defining document for a new 
unabashed form of neoconservatism, it is better seen as an example of how 
neoconservatives were gradually shedding their Cold War ‘semi-realist’ inclinations. It 
was an assertion of American primacy unencumbered by the Soviet Union, yet not an 
embrace of a more expansive vision or mission for American foreign policy they later 
adopted. Indeed, one could say it was less the case that the neoconservatives had 
fundamentally altered their foreign policy ideology and more that the end of the Cold War 
had so dramatically altered the geopolitical status quo that now simply maintaining a Cold 
War military ‘posture’ in the post-Cold War world appeared as more radical and novel 
than it first appeared. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The early post-Cold War period revealed that neoconservatism from the vantage point of 
the early twenty-first century looked surprisingly cautious, with much ideological distance 
still to travel. The initial response to the ending of the Cold War demonstrated that many 
neoconservatives preferred a neo-isolationist, semi-realist foreign policy for the United 
States; to passively enjoy the fruits of its Cold War victory, focusing more on domestic 
problems. Meanwhile, the Gulf War had confirmed that while neoconservatives still held 
to a robust form of anti-totalitarianism, there was little appetite for a radical policy of 
regime change and the imposition of democracy on Iraq. Indeed, many neoconservatives 
seemed in thrall to realist conceptions of stability and the balance of power in the Middle 
East. Yet, even in these early years, there was evidence of a nascent ideological shift. 
Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ had laid a philosophical foundation for neoconservatism’s 
evolution by framing the post-Cold War period as the triumph of the liberal democratic 
103 
 
idea. Fossedal and Muravchik had begun to explore precisely how the United States could 
turn the idea of liberal democracy into a reality on the ground overseas through the 
conduct of its foreign policy, even if at this stage they were reluctant to link it to the direct 
use of American military force. The collapse of the Soviet Union had also put the United 
States in a less constrained geopolitical position. The 1992 DPG revealed a 
neoconservatism that was more bold and assertive, at least stylistically, even if the actual 
substance of the document was perhaps less radical than it first appeared. American 
unipolarity was indeed being championed, even if the question of what do with that 
unipolarity was still largely at the embryonic stage, and thus not fully addressed. 
Nonetheless, with Clinton defeating Bush in the 1992 presidential election, a whole series 
of foreign policy crises arose on the foreign policy horizon that would more emphatically 
reposition neoconservatism in a more idealist location, and see neoconservatives advocate 
far more radical foreign policy prescriptions than had hitherto been proposed. 
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Chapter 3  
Clinton I: Somalia to Bosnia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Breaking a twelve year Republican grip on the White House, the election of Bill Clinton to 
the presidency was in some respects an unanticipated outcome. In the warm afterglow of a 
crushing victory in the Gulf War a little over eighteen months previous, President Bush 
enjoyed public approval ratings that could be labelled stratospheric without resorting to 
hyperbole.
82
 Yet, following economic trouble, and with the conservative vote 
haemorrhaging to the well funded campaign of Ross Perot, the 1992 presidential election 
saw Bush defeated by the young governor from Arkansas, 22 years his junior. Having 
occupied few positions in the Bush administration, Clinton’s arrival in office completed 
the distancing of neoconservatives from executive power. The rest of the 1990s witnessed 
neoconservatives in opposition, critiquing the conduct of American foreign policy, and 
building an alternative foreign policy platform. This would serve the function of policy 
advocacy aimed at President Clinton, in addition to shaping congressional Republican 
foreign policy approaches with a view to informing the next Republican president. 
 
Clinton’s two terms in office saw a series of foreign policy crises in countries whose 
names are now synonymous with the events that defined Clinton’s foreign policy legacy – 
Somalia; Haiti; Bosnia; Kosovo; Iraq – in addition to the overarching strategies of 
democratic enlargement and assertive multilateralism. At each stage, in their house 
journals and op-ed columns, neoconservatives wrestled with what was occurring, 
occasionally supporting, more frequently dissenting. This chapter largely discusses the 
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(Gallup, 1991; 2001). 
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period of Clinton’s first term, examining how neoconservative responses to the events of 
those years demonstrate the evolution of their thought away from the more cautious, semi-
isolationist approach in the immediacy of the Cold War’s conclusion, to a radical foreign 
policy platform that supposedly would be “picked off the shelf” by President Bush after 
the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 4). It begins by 
focusing on their initial reaction to Clinton’s election victory in November 1992, followed 
by discussion of the democratic peace theory and the administration’s doctrines of 
democratic enlargement and assertive multilateralism. Specific foreign policy crises in 
Somalia (1992-4), Haiti (1994-5) and Bosnia (1992-95) are then dealt with in turn, 
explicitly analysing the neoconservative critique. Particular attention is drawn to the 
importance ascribed to humanitarian concerns and democracy promotion relative to 
conceptions of American power and a narrower view of the national interest. The chapter 
concludes with an extended discussion of the relationship between neoconservatism and 
the Christian Right and social conservatism more widely. The culture wars of the 1990s 
saw a greater degree of convergence between social conservatives and neoconservatives in 
the domestic political arena, and also a significant alliance on foreign affairs, sharing a 
greater proclivity for humanitarian interventionism.  
 
3.2 Reaction to Clinton’s Victory 
Neoconservative intellectuals had decisively shifted into the Republican Party with Ronald 
Reagan’s defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980. It was not a surprise, therefore, when the 
prevailing attitude in 1992 was to support President Bush in his election battle with Bill 
Clinton. During Bush’s four years in office, the United States had won the Cold War, 
defeated Saddam Hussein’s Iraq on the battlefield, and looked set to dominate a post-Cold 
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War era of peace and prosperity.
83
 Clinton on the other hand, was an unproven entity who 
had cut his political teeth working on the 1972 presidential campaign of George 
McGovern; the embodiment for the neoconservatives of everything that was wrong with 
counterculture American liberalism.
84
 For Gertrude Himmelfarb (1994: 71), the “New 
Class”, the academic-media complex, was now firmly ensconced in the corridors of power 
bent on denigrating bourgeois values and the puritan ethic. Despite 57% of Americans 
voting for conservative candidates in 1992 (Bush and Perot), and the fact that many more 
Americans self-described themselves as conservatives than liberals, William Kristol (1993: 
33-36) argued that following Clinton’s victory an all-pervasive liberalism had invaded the 
“key institutions of society.” The defeat of the Soviet Union had left American liberalism 
with no ideological competitor to its left and it was now free to run amok, with the 
potential to push “feminism, environmentalism, or multiculturalism” to “destructive 
extremes”. Many neoconservatives were also deeply wary about the personnel of the 
Clinton administration. The only difference for Elliott Abrams between the people that 
Clinton would appoint and those that Dukakis would have appointed had he won in 1988, 
was that those same people were now four years older. Norman Podhoretz drew a similar 
comparison, but with Carter instead of Dukakis (Barnes, 1992: 14). Any neoconservative 
who was tempted to back Clinton was not a genuine neoconservative according to William 
Kristol, indeed, going so far as to label them “pseudo-neocon” (Kristol quoted in Barnes, 
1992: 14). 
 
                                                 
83
 For the neoconservative argument that the United States had actually contributed to winning the Cold War, 
rather than simply the Soviet Union losing it see Joshua Muravchik (1994) ‘How the Cold War Really 
Ended’ Commentary, 98(5) pp. 40-45.  
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 For a fascinating insight into Clinton’s time spent working in Texas for the McGovern campaign please 
see David Maraniss (1995) First in His Class: A Biography of Bill Clinton (New York, Simon and Schuster) 
pp. 265-286.  
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If these perspectives were the expected neoconservative reaction to Clinton’s ascent to 
power, they were not shared with unanimity by neoconservatives. Far from criticising 
Clinton’s victory, Joshua Muravchik had campaigned for it. Although Bill Clinton had 
worked on McGovern’s campaign, and his wife Hillary was widely seen as something of a 
radical, he was considered politically moderate. Indeed, according to Dumbrell (2009: 7), 
Clinton was a “militant man of the centre”. Firstly, Clinton had distinguished himself in 
the campaign from certain liberal orthodoxies on race, crime and welfare. Secondly, he 
had campaigned to the right of Bush on foreign policy, urging tougher action on China, 
Serbia and Cuba, and criticising his opponent for “coddling” dictators. Thirdly, and from 
today’s perspective somewhat peculiarly, his selection of Al Gore as his running mate was 
seen as a relatively conservative choice, especially given Gore’s backing for military 
action undertaken by Bush during the Gulf War and his support for Israel (Dumbrell, 2009: 
14). Today, Gore’s environmental activism, Nobel Prize, and election battle with Bush in 
2000 have resulted in him becoming something of a liberal icon. Back then, however, 
Gore’s endorsement had adorned the dust jacket of Gregory Fossedal’s Democratic 
Imperative, and his wife Tipper had led a campaign against obscenity in popular music 
which had endeared her to many conservatives. In addition to these points, Clinton had 
accepted the chairmanship of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) in New Orleans 
in March 1990, attracted by their emphases on welfare reform and economic growth 
(Clinton, 2004). The DLC was established to push for more centrist, moderate policies, in 
opposition to the more radical policy platform on which both McGovern and Mondale ran 
in 1972 and 1984 (Muravchik, 1992a: 22; 1993a: 19). The DLC was also closely affiliated 
with the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI). Formed in 1989, the PPI was in many ways a 
forerunner of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) of the late 1990s. Indeed, 
Tony Smith suggests that there was a “virtual convergence of opinion” between the PPI 
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and PNAC (T. Smith, 2009: 77). Further to the ideological affinity with the policies of the 
Clinton campaign, some neoconservatives such as Joshua Muravchik had been actively 
courted by the campaign, with the distinct possibility of actually joining the administration 
in some capacity if Clinton won the election.
85
  
 
The brief flirtation with Clinton by neoconservatives like Muravchik, however, was to 
subside very quickly. Indeed, Muravchik argues that it started as early as the interregnum 
between Clinton’s election win and his inauguration. Two appointments at the State 
Department in particular began to distance Clinton from his few neoconservative admirers. 
The selection of Warren Christopher as Secretary of State and Clifton Wharton as his 
deputy were problematic. Christopher had been relatively anonymous on foreign affairs 
since the end of the Carter administration, and the fact that he had been deputy to Cyrus 
Vance in that administration was hardly a good foundation for a Clinton-neoconservative 
rapprochement. Wharton was even less well known in foreign policy circles. Although 
Woolsey’s appointment to head up the CIA was welcomed, and Aspin at the Pentagon was 
not significantly criticised, the State Department appointments had raised doubts among 
the neoconservatives who had backed Clinton in the election campaign (Muravchik, 
1993b: 16-17). 
 
Within months of Clinton’s inauguration, however, there was not merely disagreement 
with Clinton’s choice of personnel, but his approach to foreign policy. Central concerns 
included slashing the Pentagon’s budget by $120 billion instead of the $60 billion he 
campaigned on; a move in defence planning from being able to fight two major regional 
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 Among others, Edward Luttwak, James Woolsey, Paul Nitze and Joshua Muravchik signed an 
advertisement that appeared in the New York Times endorsing Clinton’s campaign (Rosenfeld, 1992).  
Writing a few months after taking office, Muravchik (1993b: 17) expressed his personal disappointment in 
being passed over for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights, 
following what he claimed to be a systematic campaign by some on the Left against his appointment. 
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wars to one and a half; and outsourcing the Bosnian crisis to the United Nations and the 
Europeans despite campaigning hard on the issue and criticising Bush’s approach 
(Muravchik, 1993b: 19-20). The quotation below by Muravchik clearly encapsulates 
neoconservative feeling toward Clinton very early in his presidency, and this by the 
neoconservative who was on balance most sympathetic to his foreign policy: 
 
Much that Clinton has done since the election gives the impression that the  
inner compass that was forged in the McGovern campaign, and perhaps in                
his marriage to Hillary, pulls him to the Left until the force of public 
opprobrium deflects him back towards the Center. If that is so, we may be in 
for three-and-a-half more years of zigs and zags. 
  
 (Muravchik, 1993b: 22) 
 
Most neoconservatives were set against Clinton’s presidency from the very beginning, and 
the few that were not, had joined their colleagues in united opposition well before even the 
first year of the administration had finished (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 84). 
 
3.3 Democratic Peace Theory and the Clinton Administration 
Before examining the neoconservative response to the Clinton administration in detail, it 
will be useful to first examine the ideological roots of the doctrines which informed 
Clinton’s approach, focusing on democratic peace theory, democratic enlargement, and 
assertive multilateralism. The doctrine of ‘democratic enlargement’, elucidated most 
forcefully by National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, posited that American security 
was best enhanced by abandoning the Cold War posture of containment in favour of 
expanding the global sphere of market democracy.
86
 This rested on four main objectives: 
strengthen existing market democracies; consolidate new market democracies; contain 
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 Dumbrell (2009: 17) argues that Lake’s beliefs fused a cautious nature which developed post-Vietnam, 
with a firm belief in humanitarianism and the promotion of democracy.  
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aggressor states; and encourage these states to shift in the direction of market democracies 
(Travis, 1998: 256). Clinton’s democratic enlargement philosophy rested on democratic 
peace theory which, although classically elucidated by Immanuel Kant, had in more recent 
years been most influentially outlined by Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett. Doyle argued 
that even though liberal democratic states regularly resorted to war against non-
democracies, their behaviour was pacific with regard to fellow democracies. The fact that 
the United States was able to peacefully replace the United Kingdom as the global 
hegemon was offered as an example of the democratic peace in action.
87
 
 
In seeking to further understand Doyle’s democratic peace theory, Bruce Russett (1996) 
provided an answer as to why democracies did not go to war with each other. He argued 
that democracy played an independent explanatory role beyond other variables such as 
stability, wealth, and economic growth. Russett suggested that two things were crucial: 
democratic norms and democratic structures. In democracies, a central norm is that 
domestic disputes can be resolved through dialogue and the democratic process without 
recourse to violence. Thus the foreign policy behaviour of democracies is pacific toward 
one another since they reflect this domestic norm in their inter-state relationships. 
Structurally, in democracies broad popular support is needed for wars, and therefore they 
are rare occurrences, and democratic societies recognise that other democracies are 
similarly constrained.
88
 Nonetheless those same democratic norms and structures said to 
prevent war between democracies are the very same things which inform foreign policy 
decision making for democracies when faced with threats from non-democratic states. 
Therefore, these can “prod those states into war with illiberal states.” It is only when a 
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 Of course, the two world wars which also played a major part on British decline and the American 
ascendancy were hardly peaceful in their own right, but for Doyle the fact the US and UK did not fight each 
other is significant (M. Doyle, 1996: 29). 
88
 It is of course very difficult at times to analytically separate cultural norms and structural factors when 
considering democratic peace theory (Russett, 1996: 103). 
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liberal democracy views the other state as also being a liberal democracy that war is not 
seen as not as an option (Owen, 1996: 117, 131).
89
 
 
Democratic peace theory, as espoused above by Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett, 
performed much of the intellectual heavy lifting for Clinton’s democratic enlargement 
vision. On occasion, Clinton’s rhetoric perfectly aligned with the central features of Doyle 
and Russett’s arguments: 
 
Democratic nations do not go to war with one another. They don’t sponsor      
terrorism or threaten one another with weapons of mass destruction. 
Precisely because they are more likely to respect civil liberties, property 
rights, and the rule of law within their own borders, democracies provide the 
best foundations on which to build international order. Democracies make 
more reliable partners in diplomacy and trade, and in protecting the global 
environment, something we must do more of in the years ahead...Our task 
then is to stand up for democracy as it remakes the world. 
 
(Clinton, 1993, emphasis added). 
 
Although it is clear that democracy promotion was far from being a completely novel 
theme in US foreign policy, there was at the very least rhetorically, movement towards it 
by the Clinton White House.
90
 Indeed, Cox (2000: 226) argues that there was no other idea 
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 There have been numerous academic critiques of democratic peace theory, and space constrains a fuller 
discussion. Christopher Layne (1996: 159, 190, 198) argues that realism remains a better indicator of likely 
state behaviour rather than democratic peace theory, that democratic peace theory relies on correlation not 
causation, and that the logic of the democratic peace “inevitably pushes the United States to adopt an 
interventionist strategic posture” in regard to non-democracies. For David Spiro (1996: 240-241, 261), apart 
from a brief period of time during World War One, the fact that democracies do not go to war with each 
other is “not statistically significant” and is largely a result of the structural conditions of the Cold War. 
According to Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1996: 303, 332), states that are in the process of 
democratization can be belligerent as old elites can use nationalism in a vie for power in a democracy. For 
the United States to seek to tilt China and Russia toward democracy is “like spinning a roulette wheel, where 
many of the potential outcomes are likely to be undesirable”. 
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 Indeed, Karin von Hippel (2000: 1) suggests that the United States has been engaging in democracy 
promotion since the middle of the nineteenth century and ‘Manifest Destiny’. Other scholars suggested, 
pointing less far back in the historical record, that there was in fact far greater continuity between George H. 
W. Bush and Bill Clinton on democracy promotion than has often been assumed. Carothers (1995: 15) 
argues that the Bush that Clinton attacked in the 1992 campaign was an earlier incarnation of the president, 
and that by 1992 Bush himself had also seen the need for the US to acknowledge the importance of 
democracy. Michael Cox (2000: 220) points out that there was much more similarities between Bush and 
Clinton in this area than either of them cared to admit and Tony Smith (2000: 95) also suggests that President 
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coming out of the academy which had as much influence over the direction of the 
American government’s policy as democratic peace theory. Clinton had campaigned in 
1992 attacking President Bush for being weak on democracy promotion, especially in 
relation to Haiti and China, and now in power, sought to place a much greater emphasis on 
it (Carothers, 1995: 14; Brinkley, 1997: 111-112). 
 
Clinton’s advocacy of democracy promotion was not rooted in some misty-eyed, 
sentimental attachment to the idea of democracy itself, but very much grounded in the idea 
that it enhanced US national security. Clinton’s critics accused him of embracing a utopian 
Wilsonianism, yet, he was far more interested in serving the American national interest 
and improving American security than burning with democratic missionary zeal (Cox, 
2000: 221). For Clinton, democracy was seen as: the best form of government for 
stabilising the former Communist states of Eastern Europe; an important factor in why 
states rejected international belligerence; the political “gold standard” for the new 
millennium as non-democrats had a large legitimacy deficit; and important for the US to 
promote as it reflected US values and linked the domestic with the foreign, a key Clinton 
concern (Cox, 2000: 225-227). Whereas in the Cold War, democratization was seen as a 
part of the containment policy with regard to the Soviet Union and international 
communism, with Clinton, democratization was now seen as a strategy for a more general 
international peace and security (von Hippel, 2000: 94).  
 
The relationship between market capitalism and Clinton’s democratic enlargement 
doctrine is contested, and here a key point of difference between neoconservative 
perspectives on democracy promotion and the Clinton approach can be observed. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Bush had favoured democracy for the former Communist states of Eastern Europe far more strongly than he 
is given credit for. 
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Although supporters of the free market, neoconservatives have tended not to emphasise 
this as much as more libertarian conservatives have done. Democracy promotion for the 
neoconservatives was bound up in a discourse that emphasised American national interest 
and a moral mission much more than a market economy per se. For Clinton, however, the 
idea of the market economy was intrinsic to the overall democratic enlargement project, a 
fact that was not lost on his neoconservative observers (Khalilzad, 1995: 10). The 
neoconservative approach to democracy promotion was partly rooted in a larger political 
theory of the virtue of liberal democracy and the role of the United States in promoting it. 
The emphasis from the Clinton administration, however, was “a developed political 
economy about the relationship between democracy and democracy promotion on the one 
hand, and the market and global capitalism on the other” (Cox, 2000: 235).  
 
The emphasis on the market in combination with democracy promotion was most clearly 
seen with the Clinton administration’s approach to Russia, on which Clinton focused the 
his foreign policy on during the first few months after taking office. Of the initial $1.6 
billion originally proposed by Clinton in aid for Russia, only $48 million was set aside for 
democracy promotion efforts (Marsden, 2005: 50). In the policy hierarchy with regards to 
Russia, American economic and national security interests came ahead of any notion of 
promoting democracy. It was a much bigger priority for the United States to develop a 
market economy in Russia than a fully functioning liberal democracy (Marsden, 2005: 55, 
67, 124).
91
 Clinton’s critics suggest that whenever there was a conflict between markets 
and promoting democracy, Clinton would always opt for promoting markets. Using the 
precise accusation levelled by critics of neoconservatism, Marsden (2005: 129) argues that 
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 Clinton also felt it was more important to keep Boris Yeltsin in power than push too hard for democracy, 
as Yeltsin was perceived to be the only person capable of pushing through the market reforms necessary for 
Russia, and was the best chance of bringing the stability necessary for liberal democracy in the long-term 
(Marsden, 2005: 125). 
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“[d]emocracy promotion was little more than rhetoric, a good idea but of secondary 
importance to achieving US objectives of greater power and prosperity”. 
 
If democratic enlargement had potential for substantial cross-over appeal to 
neoconservatives, assertive multilateralism was unlikely to prove so attractive, or at least 
not the ‘multilateralism’ part. Originally labelled by Madeleine Albright during her tenure 
as US Ambassador to the UN (1993-97), assertive multilateralism had the Gulf War as a 
significant precedent: a US-led, UN authorised, multilateral intervention to uphold 
international law and punish an aggressor state. At the centre of this new doctrine, 
Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13) detailed the precise US role in foreign 
peacekeeping operations, even allowing US troops to operate under UN command if the 
president thought it was appropriate (Gellman, 1993; R. J. Smith and Preston, 1993).
92
 In 
many ways, it was a doctrine designed to appeal to a broad range of diverse American 
perspectives. To conservatives, in the process of penning their ‘Contract with America’ 
with its call for limited government, it promised a degree of American withdrawal as it 
anticipated a significant amount of burden-sharing with allies. To liberals, it endorsed a 
multilateral, UN-based and international-law based world order. To liberal interventionists, 
the word “assertive” had certain appeal. In some ways, assertive multilateralism was a 
slippery enough construct which could be interpreted to offend as few interested 
constituencies as possible and garner a wide base of support (Sterling-Folker, 1998: 278). 
The difficulty with assertive multilateralism, aside from provoking long-term 
neoconservative grievances against the United Nations, was that it was inherently 
contradictory, with impulses to intervention and assertion, at the same time as passing the 
baton to allies. It may have played well for Clinton the candidate in 1992, but for Clinton 
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 Opposition to Clinton’s policy in Congress and wider public opinion eventually led the directive to be 
redrafted and released as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25).  
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the president in 1993, the fundamental problem was that the implicitly presumed 
international coalition ready to assist in UN operations and interventions for American 
foreign policy objectives, such as those in Bosnia, simply did not exist (Sterling-Folker, 
1998: 279). 
 
3.4 American Interventionism in Clinton’s First Term 
The foreign policy crises President Clinton faced in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia were far 
from sudden, unforeseen events that simply materialised out of the ether to challenge or 
derail his presidency. All three were inherited from the Bush administration, had featured 
in the 1992 presidential campaign, and would provide the backdrop for Clinton’s foreign 
policy approach in his first term, helping define the basis on which neoconservatism 
continued to evolve through these years.
93
  
 
3.4.1 Somalia 
The UN and US intervention in Somalia was significant for the fact that there was little in 
the way of noteworthy geopolitical, strategic or economic justifications for the use of 
military force. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary General, was keen to use Somalia 
as a test case for how the UN could intervene in a failed state for solely humanitarian 
reasons. President Bush, having just lost the election to Clinton, was unencumbered by the 
constraint of impressing the American electorate when he launched Operation Restore 
Hope in December 1992. The operation involved sending 25,000 American troops to 
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 The focus in this section will not be on the minutiae of these foreign policy situations, or a day-by-day 
account of the actual historical record. Instead, the analysis will take a step back from this to provide a 
broader consideration of the neoconservative foreign policy vision during these somewhat turbulent foreign 
policy events. For an excellent detailed discussion of the American interventions in Somalia, Haiti and 
Bosnia please see Karin von Hippel (2000) Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold 
War World (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). For an interesting discussion of Clinton’s foreign 
policy more broadly see John Dumbrell (2009) Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000 
(Abingdon, Routledge). 
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Somalia to support the UN mission with the primary aim of protecting humanitarian food 
relief following the toppling of the government of President Siad Barre and an ensuing 
civil war between various rebel factions. What began as a purely humanitarian mission 
quickly escalated following the murder of 24 Pakistani troops by General Mohamed Farah 
Aidid’s rebel group in June 1993. American forces were then drawn into a mission to 
capture Aidid, leading to the death of 18 US Army Rangers in Mogadishu in October 
1993. Following the sight of the bodies of US soldiers being dragged through the streets on 
CNN, US public opinion quickly turned against American involvement in Somalia, and 
Clinton promised a withdrawal of all US forces by March 1994 (von Hippel, 2000: 58-
61).
94
  
 
The neoconservative response to Bush and Clinton’s efforts in Somalia was largely 
critical, mainly on quite similar grounds to the realist critique that it did not serve the 
national interest (Krauthammer, 1999c: 6).
95
 There were certainly no clarion calls for 
nation-building and imposing democracy in Mogadishu. Patrick Glynn, a neoconservative 
scholar at AEI, strongly opposed the American intervention in Somalia, and suggested 
Clinton had failed to jettison Colin Powell’s military philosophy of American 
interventions being guided by what was “doable” instead of being led by a clear 
articulation of the national interest. This Powellite doctrine, described as “naked 
machtpolitik” informed Bush’s original decision to intervene in Somalia but not Bosnia, on 
the mistaken grounds that the former was achievable whereas the latter could have proved 
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 Some scholars have however suggested that President Clinton misread public opinion, and there was 
actually support for escalation of the conflict, even though there was indignation at the deaths of the US 
troops. 71% of Americans still supported US involvement in peacekeeping missions shortly after the US 
Army Ranger deaths in Mogadishu. See Steven Kull, I.M. Destlet & Clay Ramsay (1997) The Foreign 
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 As will be seen later in this chapter, Charles Krauthammer (1999c: 6) did not find the American national 
interest to be present in any of President Clinton’s foreign policy interventions, including Bosnia, Somalia 
and Haiti. 
117 
 
much more problematic (Glynn, 1993: 17, emphasis in the original). Aside from settling 
scores with their conservative foreign policy rivals, such as Powell, Somalia was an 
opportunity for neoconservatives to critique Clinton’s notion of assertive multilateralism. 
Clinton was accused of serving the vision of the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, and 
again, not paying enough attention to the American national interest. For Muravchik, 
although Cheney, Powell and Bush had all supported the sending of troops to Somalia in 
December 1992, their aim was for American forces to be used in a limited way, merely to 
help deliver humanitarian aid. Clinton had allowed the mission for the deployed troops to 
escalate because he was in fundamental agreement with Boutros-Ghali’s vision for UN 
multilateral peacekeeping missions which chimed with his administration’s doctrine of 
assertive multilateralism. The American intervention had little to do with the American 
national interest, and there was simply no notion of US troops being sent there as an act of 
self-defence by the United States. The US needed to be “wary” of risking the lives of 
American soldiers in situations not related to self-defence, as “an implicit premise of our 
national polity is to value ourselves before others and...the burdens are not equally shared 
among us” (Muravchik, 1993c: 20-21),.  
 
The twin critique of assertive multilateralism and of interventionism not in the national 
interest was picked up by Wolfowitz (1994a: 29-32).
96
 In a wide-ranging assessment of 
Clinton’s first year in office in Foreign Affairs, he accused the White House of always 
attempting to shift responsibility for action to the United Nations or European partners 
instead of leading from the front. Although he praised Clinton for his policy on economic 
integration with NAFTA, on Somalia “Clinton tried to improve on a modest success and 
ended with a sizable fiasco.” Clinton’s policy had not just cost the lives of American 
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 Having left the Pentagon after Clinton’s victory, Wolfowitz returned to academia less than three months 
later, where he was appointed Dean at Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International 
Studies (SAIS) in Washington (Mann, 2004: 227).  
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soldiers, but had damaged the image of the United States on the world stage and its ability 
to lead in the future. Somalia was of “little importance” to American security, and Clinton 
had paid a heavy price in a peripheral arena. Yet even in some of these damning 
neoconservative verdicts of Clinton’s failure in Somalia, there were nonetheless 
indications that distinguished them from those of other more realist or isolationist inclined 
conservatives, and evidence of a nascent shift in neoconservative thinking. Wolfowitz had 
been scathing of Clinton’s approach in Somalia, and yet found space to commend Clinton 
for not choosing an isolationist path. Clinton had damaged the interests of the United 
States by appearing weak in a peripheral area of the world but: 
 
The mistake in Somalia was not the original decision to intervene. The 
initial success of Operation Restore Hope demonstrated that the United 
States had the means to save tens of thousands of innocent lives at almost no 
risk to American forces; to have done nothing would have placed the United 
States in the position of people who witness a murder that they could 
prevent simply by picking up the phone. 
  
 (Wolfowitz, 1994a: 32, emphasis added) 
 
This echoed Wolfowitz’s ideas at the end of the Gulf War, when he voiced his concerns 
that the United States could have done more at little risk to its own forces, to prevent 
Saddam Hussein using helicopters to brutally suppress Shiite opposition. The difference 
here of course, and what makes Wolfowitz’s paragraph above more noteworthy, was that 
Somalia was considered a peripheral state compared with a core concern like Iraq. 
Wolfowitz was arguing that it was legitimate for the United States to use its own military 
to provide humanitarian assistance in a state that was not central to the US national 
interest. Of course, favouring the use of US troops to provide humanitarian assistance and 
stabilization was not the same as advocacy of using military force in a frontline combat 
capacity or a nation-building project. It was evidence, however, that Wolfowitz envisioned 
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a US foreign policy that went beyond merely a narrow national interest, in a way that was 
distinctive from realism or isolationism. 
 
William Kristol and Robert Kagan’s 1996 Foreign Affairs article, ‘Toward a Neo-
Reaganite Foreign Policy’, has been widely seen as one of the defining neoconservative 
texts of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Gary Dorrien argues it represented something of a 
neoconservative “manifesto” (Dorrien, 2004: 125; W. Kristol and Kagan, 1996). A piece 
that Kagan penned in September 1994 for Commentary: ‘The Case for Global Actvism’, 
however, was arguably just as significant, although undoubtedly Commentary’s smaller 
readership base limited its impact.
97
 Kagan’s article is important as it represented a 
fundamental challenge to how the neoconservatives had hitherto conceptualised their 
foreign policy approach.
98
   
 
According to Kagan’s argument, the end of the Cold War had liberated the United States 
from the restraints of a bipolar world order. It was thus now free to pursue a foreign policy 
that was consistent with both its “material needs and philosophical predilections” (R. 
Kagan, 1994: 40, emphasis added). It was not appropriate for the world’s remaining 
superpower to focus simply on core geopolitical arenas or vital interests. Instead, reflecting 
both the American national interest and humanitarian and liberal democratic ideals, the US 
needed to have a much wider foreign policy vision. When the United States had focused 
on building a “decent” world order instead of narrow national interest, he argued that 
American “vital” interests were almost ‘automatically’ looked after. It was only when the 
US exclusively focused on those “vital” interests that the greater threats to American 
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among others.  
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survival emerged.
99
 Framing American foreign policy in a wider, more ideological fashion 
also had the benefit of strong public support. Pointing to both Bosnia and Somalia, Kagan 
suggested that US public opinion was not pressing for withdrawal and passivity from the 
White House, but was more critical of “half-hearted policies and weak and incompetent 
execution.” The public supported the use of force beyond merely narrowly defined 
material interests (1994: 42-44). Drawing on familiar material from the 1930s, Kagan 
argued the Second World War was partly caused by Western failure to respond to acts of 
aggression against people in the periphery, including Abyssinia and Manchuria. In a 
startling list of issues that should provoke an American response as potential threats to 
world order, he included: aggression; political illegitimacy; genocide; mass starvation; 
nuclear proliferation; and violations of international agreements. If it was impossible to 
judge conclusively whether Serbian aggression in Bosnia in the 1990s would be the 
equivalent of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1930s, or whether a civil war in 
Somalia or cancelled elections in Latin America could trigger a wider conflagration, then it 
behoved the United States to not simply focus on a few limited core national security 
arenas. Kagan’s argument was aimed not just at President Clinton, but at the Republican 
Party which he argued was being blown off course; vacillating between isolationism and 
realism under the spell of Gingrich’s argument that the US was overextended, and thus 
was “teetering on the edge of historical transformation”. 
 
The response to Kagan’s article from his fellow neoconservatives was decidedly mixed. 
Elliott Abrams (1994) was concerned that Kagan’s argument would swing the pendulum 
back too far the other way, from not being interventionist at all, to being too interventionist 
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 For historical inspiration, Kagan (1994: 41) pointed to the example of Theodore Roosevelt who he argued 
“first grafted principled ends to the exercise of power” and that, controversially, Woodrow Wilson had 
merely followed Theodore Roosevelt’s theme in his conduct of US foreign policy in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
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in places where the US national interest was not involved. Francis Fukuyama (1994) 
argued that it was difficult to be excited about US intervention in Somalia or Bosnia or 
other ethnic conflicts and that the US should only send its sons to be killed for strategic 
countries like Poland rather than on the streets of Kigali or Sarajevo. However, there was 
not simply criticism of Kagan from other neoconservatives, but also areas of agreement 
which hinted at a shift in neoconservative thinking. Fukuyama found aspects of Kagan’s 
argument “appealing” and admitted that he was “not a hard-core realist” with a narrow 
view of the national interest. It was important that the United States did not shrink from 
using its power and building a world order that only “a dominant great power can 
provide”. Wolfowitz and Muravchik both agreed with Kagan’s argument that there should 
not be such a binary distinction between what represents a core national interest and a 
peripheral one. Historically, certain geographical areas such as the Sudetenland in 1938 
which appeared peripheral at the time, would with hindsight have benefitted from being 
seen of core significance (Muravchik, 1994b; Wolfowitz, 1994b). Muravchik argued, 
though, that Kagan was wrong to view threats to the wider peace such as Bosnia and North 
Korea as analogous to more limited ‘domestic’ catastrophes such as Haiti and Somalia. A 
fundamental agreement between Kagan and Wolfowitz appeared to be that the United 
States could not afford to rest on a narrow realist interpretation of the national interest. For 
Wolfowitz, although the US could not avoid being selective in its foreign policy choices, 
the United States should nonetheless not rely on a “Metternichan calculation” but be 
guided by “an idealistic basis for international action.” As the Cold War had left the 
United States without a superpower competitor, “there appears to be so little power 
opposing us that there are possibilities of getting involved almost everywhere”.  
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3.4.2 Haiti 
The UN and US intervention in Somalia had challenged the traditional norm of non-
intervention in another state on the grounds of humanitarianism. The situation in Haiti, 
where the UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, provided a deeper 
challenge to the norm of non-intervention on the grounds of upholding democracy (von 
Hippel, 2000: 92).
100
 Under pressure from President Bush, in December 1990, after 
decades of human rights abuses and tyrannical rule by Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier and 
his son Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’, democratic elections had taken place in Haiti. The result 
gave the populist Roman Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide – an exponent of radical 
liberation theology – an overwhelming victory, securing 67% of the vote, and thus became 
Haiti’s first democratically elected president. Yet, in September 1991, Aristide was 
toppled in a coup led by Aristide’s Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General 
Raoul Cedras, and Aristide escaped into exile. Two years later, in July 1993, Cedras and 
Aristide signed the Governors Island Accord which specified that Aristide would return to 
power in October 1993 and Cedras’s junta would be granted amnesty. Yet by May 1994, 
the agreement had still not been put into action, and sanctions were imposed. These 
followed Madeleine Albright’s request that the UN Security Council pass a resolution to 
restore Aristide to power – which it duly did on 31 July 1994. A multinational force of 27 
countries began their intervention on 19 September 1994, and Aristide arrived back in 
Haiti on 15 October 1994 aboard a United States military plane. The multinational force 
remained under a Chapter VII mandate for six months which turned into a Chapter VI 
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 UN Security Council Resolution 940, passed on 31 July 1994, approved the creation of a multinational 
force to remove Haiti’s military leadership, restore the elected President, and create a “secure and stable 
environment” (United Nations, 1994). 
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mandate peacekeeping operation under the authority of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 
which eventually withdrew in June 1996 (von Hippel, 2000: 92-105).
101
  
 
Unlike the Somalia intervention, where there were signs of some support from Wolfowitz, 
Kagan and Muravchik, Clinton’s policy in Haiti faced more opposition by 
neoconservatives. Charles Krauthammer (1994b), continuing his hostility to US 
interventionism in the absence of a clear national interest, argued that whereas Somalia 
was an “afterthought” from the Bush administration, Haiti had become Clinton’s “model”. 
The problem with the intervention in Haiti was that “altruism is a sentiment, not a 
strategy.” In a clear rebuff not just to Clinton but also to the new direction for 
neoconservatism being tentatively charted by Wolfowitz, Muravchik, and Kagan, he 
argued in a paraphrase of Lord Palmerston’s oft-quoted dictum: “America has no 
permanent sentiments, only permanent interests.” If the United States had no interests in 
Haiti, and was only motivated by altruism, it had no business involving itself in its internal 
affairs. Of course, for the Clinton administration, a new assertive multilateralism, and 
international-law based world order was in itself a key national interest for the United 
States. Krauthammer (1994a) unsurprisingly dissented from this. His scepticism on both 
the Haitian and Somalian interventions was also backed by Jeane Kirkpatrick (1994: 33) 
who suggested both missions were dangerous, expensive, and emphatically not in the US 
national interest. Wolfowitz (1994a) counselled Clinton not to make the same mistakes in 
Haiti that he made in Somalia, and allow US troops to get sucked into a difficult conflict. 
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 Former President Jimmy Carter played a significant diplomatic role in his capacity as a private citizen to 
negotiate a peaceful end to the junta’s rule, although undoubtedly the imminent arrival of the multinational 
force was also significant. Some controversy ensued when both Colin Powell and Jimmy Carter referred to 
Cedras as “a man of honor” after Clinton had described him as a “murderer” (von Hippel, 2000: 103-104). 
For Carter’s reflections on this period please see Jimmy Carter (2007) Beyond the White House: Waging 
Peace, Fighting Disease, Building Hope (New York, Simon and Schuster), especially pp. 37-53. 
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Joshua Muravchik (1993c: 21-23) pointed out that the situation in Haiti was an issue of 
democracy, and that democracy was a “humanitarian concern” as a lack of democracy was 
a direct affront to human rights. A denial of democracy could also have implications for 
American security, as more democracies meant the US was safer. This was further 
evidence of the developing neoconservative endorsement of the democratic peace thesis. 
The “threshold” for the use of American force to “spread democracy” was lower compared 
to other issues; a lack of democracy made the United States less safe, in a way that other 
humanitarian concerns did not. Muravchik suggested that although Aristide was an 
unsavoury character, he had been legitimately elected, and it was in the US interest to see 
democracy succeed in Haiti. He stopped short, though, of endorsing US force to reinstate 
Aristide, stating instead that the US should “muddle through” and seek a negotiated 
solution. Writing a year later, Muravchik’s views on Haiti had hardened against the 
intervention. In an attack on Senator John Kerry’s (D-MA) support for the use of military 
force to restore Aristide, he articulated a common neoconservative critique of 
interventionists on the Left: that they only supported US interventionism when it was 
stripped of any notion of invoking the American national interest. In 1993, Muravchik 
argued that the democratic wishes of the Haitian people needed to be respected, but now 
(1994a: 51-52) Aristide was described as “fiercely anti-American” and that while it was 
true that Aristide was democratically elected, he was nonetheless not a democrat himself. 
While a year before, he advised the US to “muddle through” when a non-democrat wins an 
election, now the advice was that the US should not be supporting non-democrats, even 
when they won elections, especially when combined with the fact that no American lives 
or interests were present.
102
 The logic for intervention in Cuba for Muravchik was a 
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 For a discussion of the brutal human rights record of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, including allegations of 
support for Osama Bin Laden, please see Lynn Garrison (2000) Voodoo Politics; the Clinton/Gore 
Destruction of Haiti (Los Angeles, Leprechaun) and Lynn Garrison (2004) Aristide; The Death of a Nation 
(Los Angeles: Leprechaun).  
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stronger one than intervention in Haiti. Cuba’s regime was no more democratic or peaceful 
than Haiti’s, and generated considerably more refugees for the United States. The fact that 
Haiti was considered a greater priority for intervention than Cuba was the result of 
pressure from the Democratic Congressional Black Caucus (Muravchik, 1995a: 38).  
 
The neoconservatives had concluded for the most part that Haiti did not represent an 
essential national interest for the United States. Muravchik had left the door open for 
military intervention in principle in such a situation, but Aristide, although democratically 
elected was considered to be both too anti-American and anti-democratic. Elliott Abrams 
(1996: 86-87) , however, in contrast to the other neoconservatives argued that the 
Caribbean was an area of special interest for the United States, and that the Monroe 
Doctrine still held. Migration and the drugs trade had obvious impacts on the United 
States, but for Abrams, both democracy and human rights were also important. Failed 
states were “far less acceptable in our front-yard.” The best thing that the island nations of 
the Caribbean could do for the stability of the region was to rely on the United States as 
the guarantor of prosperity and security. The threshold for US intervention in the 
Caribbean was therefore lower than it would be for equivalent abuses of democracy and 
human rights in regions of the world that were more removed from the United States.   
 
3.4.3 Bosnia 
The 1992-1995 Bosnian War claimed the lives of over 100,000 people, left 1.8 million 
people displaced, and became the defining foreign policy crisis of President Clinton’s first 
term in office.
103
 As with the crises in Somalia and Haiti, the Bosnian conflict straddled the 
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(New York, Council for Foreign Relations); and Alastair Finlan (2004) The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-
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Bush and Clinton administrations. The collapse of Yugoslavia had led to four separate 
Balkan wars, but it was the Bosnian War that proved to be the most bloody and 
intransigent conflict of the four. Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power in 1987 had stirred up 
nationalist Serbian grievances that with the turmoil at the end of the Cold War provoked a 
corresponding nationalist sentiment in the other republics that constituted Yugoslavia. 
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991, leading to the First 
Balkan War between Serbia and Slovenia which lasted ten days, followed by the Second 
and Third Balkan Wars between Serbia and Croatia. The Bosnian Parliament declared 
independence on 3 March 1992 after a referendum of the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina – 
boycotted by the Bosnian Serb population – resulting in a 99% vote in favour of 
independence. The war this triggered saw both Croat and Serb forces laying claim to 
Bosnian territory. The Croat-Bosniak war ended in February 1994, but the war between the 
Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and the Bosnian Serbs continued into 1995, when ethnic 
cleansing in eastern Bosnia by Bosnian Serbs culminated in a series of massacres in 
Markale, Tuzla, and, most notoriously, the genocide at Srebrenica.
104
 These atrocities 
against the civilian population finally provoked widespread NATO airstrikes against 
Bosnian Serb forces, eventually culminating in the Dayton Peace Agreement being signed 
in Paris on 14 December 1995 (von Hippel, 2000: 127-140).  
 
The three and a half year conflict that Dayton brought to an end, provoked fundamental 
debates in the US foreign policy community over: the role of NATO; the geopolitical 
                                                                                                                                                   
criticism of the Conservative Party’s conduct during the war please see Brendan Simms (2001) Unfinest 
Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London, Allen Lane/Penguin). Simms, President of the Henry 
Jackson Society, argues the crisis represented the deepest nadir in British foreign policy since Suez, as the 
UK attempted, at times alone, to stifle both the attempts by the US and NATO to aid the Bosnians (2001: 2, 
5).  
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 The International Court of Justice ruled that, overall, the Bosnian War was not an act of genocide against 
the Bosniaks by the Serbs per se, but may have constituted a crime against humanity. The Court concluded, 
however, that the specific events that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995, where more than 8,000 Bosniak 
males were murdered did meet the criteria for genocide (Simons, 2007).  
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importance of Europe relative to other regions of the post-Cold War world; the role of the 
United Nations in preventing conflict; the legitimacy of humanitarian interventionism; the 
international norm of non-intervention and by extension of the basis of the Westphalian 
state system itself. As with the cases of Somalia and Haiti, the neoconservative response to 
events in Bosnia revealed a range of opinion from those who argued that Bosnia was not a 
core US national interest and therefore should be left to the Europeans to sort out, to those 
who argued the US had both moral and strategic interests to meet in ending the Bosnian 
conflict. In its totality, however, the debate over the war in Bosnia represents another step 
in the evolution of 1990s neoconservatism, as a limited, neo-isolationist/realist vision 
retrenched in favour of a more activist approach with American power being used in 
service of more ambitious ideological and material goals. While some still held to a non-
interventionist form of neo-isolationism in the name of a narrow national interest, other 
neoconservatives increasingly argued for American intervention of some form, justified 
not solely on ‘realist’ grounds such as the need to maintain NATO and American power, 
but to uphold humanitarian and liberal democratic norms. 
 
In one of the earliest extended attempts by a neoconservative to engage with the Bosnian 
issue, Joshua Muravchik (1992b: 30-31) presented an overview of the foreign policy 
debate on Bosnia. The war had transformed the foreign policy landscape of the United 
States. Whereas before, liberals had usually been more divided on questions of the use of 
US military force, on Bosnia, they had now “virtually been unanimous in hawkishness.” 
Instead, it was conservatives of all political stripes, who were now divided over whether 
the use of the American military to intervene in Bosnia was required. The frequently 
repeated claim in the literature on neoconservatism alleging a generational change in 
foreign policy views is once again not a dividing line. Jeane Kirkpatrick and Norman 
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Podhoretz, both of the first-generation, were supporters of at least some form of US action 
in Bosnia, whereas some second-generation neoconservatives, who were supposed to have 
more radical views, such as Charles Krauthammer and Elliott Abrams, urged the United 
States to focus its foreign policy on more central, narrow national interests.
105
  
 
Abrams, like Krauthammer, had championed American leadership and unipolarity to 
uphold the international order, and had stated the distinction between the core and 
periphery was blurred in the post-Cold War world. Yet he argued (1992: 62) that Europe 
should not dominate American foreign policy thinking as much as it once did, and it was 
simply not in the interest of the US to devote too much time and resources to areas like 
Bosnia or Armenia, as they were “not matters seriously affecting the security of the United 
States”.106 The war in Bosnia provoked a fiercer response from Krauthammer (1995b: 15-
17) who suggested that it was not in America’s interest to be sending peacekeepers as they 
ended up simply being “targets.” The appropriate role for American power was only to be 
used when regional balances of power or the global order were profoundly threatened, not 
to be wasted on civil wars of “marginal importance.” The biggest threat to NATO was 
intervening militarily in an arena of limited significance, not staying out of such conflicts. 
 
For other neoconservatives, however, the situation in Bosnia did merit an American 
response. The claim from President Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, the United 
States “did not have a dog in that fight” was strongly opposed by Perle and Muravchik as 
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unlikely bedfellows (Abrams, 1992: 56-62). 
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an example of amoral realism (Muravchik, 2007: 21). The question was what shape that 
American response should take. Should the United States be content to merely impose 
sanctions on Serbia; lift the embargo and arm the Bosniaks; use air strikes against Serbian 
military positions; or insert American forces as ground troops? An answer appeared in a 
letter to President Clinton, published on 2 September 1993 in the Wall Street Journal. The 
headline signatories were Margaret Thatcher and Reagan’s Secretary of State, George 
Shultz, yet beneath their names were a number of key neoconservatives including Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, Frank Gaffney, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. The 
letter explicitly supported Clinton’s favoured approach of “lift and strike”: a combination 
of lifting the embargo on military aid and arms exports to Bosnia, with the use of air 
strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, and a much stricter enforcement of the no-fly zone over 
Bosnia. The rationale for this action was twofold. Firstly, if the Western nations did not act 
in the face of Milosevic’s brazen aggression, they would be looked on with contempt by 
other states elsewhere which would weaken their power. Secondly, there were wider 
geopolitical implications and threats to European security in not acting, including the risk 
of Serbian aggression being replicated in former republics of the Soviet Union in particular 
(Thatcher, et al., 1993). 
 
When Warren Christopher was unsuccessful in his attempt in 1993 to persuade Clinton’s 
European allies to support ‘lift and strike’, neoconservatives argued that the president, and 
by extension the United States, had been shown to be weak by being unable to convince 
the Europeans of what they perceived to be the right course of action. Wolfowitz (1994a: 
31; R. Kagan, 1995a: 20) was highly critical arguing that Clinton had criticised Bush’s 
policy on Bosnia, and yet had not managed to effectively alter the status quo, “leaving the 
situation unchanged except for the appearance of American weakness and inability to 
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lead”.107 The neoconservatives who favoured American action on Bosnia were not, 
however, in favour of going beyond ‘lift and strike’, at least not pre-Dayton. Insertion of 
US ground troops was considered too risky, relative to the benefit to the national interest 
of being successful, and they worried that Clinton was prone to excessive 
“experimentalism” in the deployment of troops abroad (Wolfowitz, 1994a: 32). Frank 
Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy suggested that Clinton’s decision to replace 23,000 
mainly British and French peacekeepers with 25,000 American troops was a mistake, and 
that the United States should concentrate on using airpower to punish the Serb force in 
both Bosnia and Serbia combined with lifting the arms embargo and arming the Bosniak 
government (Center For Security Policy, 1994). Khalilzad (1994: A1) was also a keen 
supporter of arming the Bosniaks as a way of saving the lives of Bosniak civilians and 
American ground troops, as the troops would be superfluous to requirements in the event 
of the lifting of an arms embargo. By the time of the Dayton Accord, however, Wolfowitz 
(1995) supported both the lifting of the arms embargo and the use of American 
peacekeepers. 
 
Following on from the rationale for the use of American military force offered in the 
September 1993 letter to the Wall Street Journal, a further issue of importance remained 
the need to maintain the integrity of NATO.
108
 Bosnia could not be separated from the 
wider issue of European security and the Western alliance, of which NATO was the 
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 Not all neoconservatives agreed with the dominant perspective that intervention was needed in Bosnia to 
protect the viability of NATO. Krauthammer argues that withdrawing from the issue of Bosnia entirely 
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(I. Kristol, 1995a). 
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integral institution. Bush’s attempts to marginalise Bosnia as a peripheral issue denied this 
important fact (R. Kagan, 1995b: 27-28). The inability of the United States and its allies to 
effectively deal with the Bosnian question raised significant doubts over the long-term 
future of NATO-led security. There was also the risk of damaging delicate relations with 
Muslim states, who could take offence at American intransigence in the face of Serbian 
Orthodox Christian soldiers killing Bosniak Muslim civilians. These both appeared to be 
important aspects of the neoconservative justification for military action in Bosnia. 
(Wolfowitz, 1994a: 33; Khalilzad, 1995: 24; Muravchik, 1995a: 37-40; The Weekly 
Standard, 1995a: 7; 1995b: 7-9). 
 
The likely damage to NATO and impact on American unipolarity is the primary factor 
why Ryan (2007: 125) argues that the neoconservatives were interested in using military 
force in Bosnia. She states that there was nothing to fundamentally distinguish them from 
other conservative foreign policy schools, and that talk of virtue, morality, democracy and 
humanitarian concerns did not develop beyond a rhetorical fig leaf. Yet this narrative is 
challenged by the record in three ways. Firstly, Clinton’s first term saw the bulk of the 
Republican Party embrace Gingrich’s Contract with America, which embodied a defined 
shift in the direction of non-interventionism and a scaling back of American interests 
abroad. The neoconservatives appeared to be travelling in exactly the opposite direction. 
Secondly, also discussed later, the 1990s witnessed an upsurge in neoconservative writing 
on morality, religion, values, and virtue, which Bacevich (1995: 35) argues could not be 
confined simply to the cultural sphere in which this work was taking place but was bound 
to influence their foreign policy views. It seems implausible that in a general intellectual 
climate that was in many ways dominated with discussion of morality, that it did not play 
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an important part in their foreign policy calculus.
109
 Thirdly, while Ryan is correct to 
suggest that democracy promotion did not loom large in the neoconservative discourse on 
Bosnia – that would come later – there was though a concern with wider humanitarian 
issues in Bosnia that went beyond a mere token rhetorical gesture. This is not to say that 
this was the primary motivator for the neoconservatives, but it was an important ingredient 
in the strategic mix.
110
 The fact that humanitarian justifications for US intervention in 
Bosnia did not appear in isolation from other themes of American power and the wider 
strategic situation in Europe does not provide justifiable grounds for seeing the 
humanitarian factors as little more than rhetorical window dressing.   
 
At the start of the crisis, Jeane Kirkpatrick (Larry King Live, 1992) argued that the United 
States could not sit back and watch a humanitarian disaster unfold in Bosnia. An early 
Weekly Standard editorial (1995a: 7) proclaimed that the US would be a “niggardly 
power” if it did nothing to prevent “horrifying bloodshed” in the Balkans. The Center for 
Security Policy (1993) argued that without the use of force from NATO and the US, 
thousands of innocent civilians would die, and Sarajevo “will be effectively, if not 
literally, burnt to the ground while the West fiddles”. George Weigel (1995: 42) penned a 
wide-ranging essay on the universality of human rights in Commentary that was largely 
absent national interest themes. In it, he suggested that European parliamentarians had 
failed to meet the challenge to human rights posed by Serbia in Bosnia in the early 1990s, 
which he described as “a pusillanimity unseen since the days of Neville Chamberlain”. 
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Eliot Cohen (1994: 22; 2011) saw the Bosnian intervention as primarily a humanitarian 
endeavour with any notion of the strategic benefit to the US only possibly being realised in 
the long–term, though he was concerned about the overextension of the America military 
overseas in Clinton’s numerous deployments, nonetheless. As noted earlier, Kagan (1994: 
40-43) argued that genocide, mass starvation and political legitimacy were not things that 
the United States could ignore, as they were threats to world order in and of themselves, 
and the US should seek to form a world order that was not just consistent with its narrow 
material needs, but congruent with its broadly liberal democratic philosophical 
underpinnings. For Muravchik (1992b: 34, emphasis added; 1993c: 22) Serbian aggression 
in Bosnia threatened European stability and international order, but there was also a clear 
humanitarian basis for action. The Bosnian Serb forces had perpetrated a “terrible crime” 
and “at some extreme point, humanitarian abuses in themselves do warrant intervention”, 
even in the complete absence of direct American interests, although the threshold for 
risking American lives should be high.  
 
The US interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia were important in revealing a 
neoconservatism in transition in the post-Cold War world. Gone were the calls for a return 
to normalcy and neo-isolationist realism. While some neoconservatives such as Charles 
Krauthammer had abandoned it in favour of an American unipolarity with a narrow set of 
national interests, others such as Joshua Muravchik and Robert Kagan had begun to 
articulate a strategic and ideological rationale for American interventionism, and a more 
activist US foreign policy. This was still a long way from ‘imposing democracy down the 
barrel of a gun’, but the direction of travel had been established. 
 
 
134 
 
3.5 Ideological Bedfellows? Neoconservatism and the Christian Right 
The tendency in the literature to treat neoconservatism in an isolated foreign policy 
‘bubble’, neglects the fact that many leading neoconservatives wrote widely on social and 
domestic issues. Indeed, few wrote exclusively on foreign policy.
111
 Thus the relationship 
between the neoconservatives and social conservatives of the Christian Right has been left 
relatively unexplored by the academy.  Although both have drawn frequent fire from a 
similar range of critics on both the Left and Right, these attacks have tended to focus on 
one or the other, rather than an exploration of the ideological affinity between the two 
groups. This is somewhat surprising given that both neoconservatives and religious 
conservatives rose to prominence as political movements largely in reaction to the same 
1960s counterculture. Yet the prevailing narrative states that neoconservatives were from a 
secular Jewish background, not particularly interested in the same moral issues as that of 
social conservatives, and as agnostics and atheists, were only interested in the instrumental 
value of religion as a stabilising force in society. Indeed, according to this account, the 
attraction of Leo Strauss’s work was that it provided an intellectual foundation for their 
social conservatism, without the need for theological justification (Dorrien, 2004: 132). 
Stuart Croft (2009: 122) argues that religious conservatives should be treated in a separate 
foreign policy category from neoconservatives as the former were interested in moral 
issues of conscience like abortion, whereas the latter were not.
112
 Yet this perspective on 
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not morality, democracy and human rights (Williams, 2005: 325, 328; Ryan, 2007: 8, 17). Neoconservatives 
themselves have also been critical of the critique exemplified by Ryan, instead suggesting the idea that states 
are only motivated by power is a “prejudice of our time”, and that cynical dismissals of other motivations 
such as morality or honour are “naive” (D. Kagan, 1998: 1, 7).  
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 Interestingly, Croft (2009: 125) also suggests that what separates religious conservatives from both 
neoconservatives and realists is that the former argue that military force should only be used in the “service 
of peace and not merely in their national interest”. This, however, seems to indicate excessive difference 
between neoconservatism and the Christian Right than can be justified. Certainly many neoconservatives 
make very similar arguments to this.  
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neoconservatism and the Christian Right is problematic in two regards. Firstly, it 
downplays excessively the extent to which religion played a role in the earlier 
development of neoconservatism, and secondly, it ignores a noticeable upturn in 
neoconservative interest in questions of morality and religion throughout the 1990s. 
Indeed, the permeation of a moralistic, religious discourse in neoconservative circles in the 
1990s is “a development of signal importance” that could not simply be confined to 
discussion of domestic policy but would likely infuse their discussion of foreign policy 
(Bacevich, 1995: 35). 
 
Religion has never been completely insignificant to the development of neoconservatism. 
Neoconservatives in the 1970s and early 1980s did not consist solely of secular Jews, but 
drew many Roman Catholics to their ranks including Patrick Moynihan, William Bennett, 
Michael Novak, Richard John Neuhaus and George Weigel. Novak and Neuhaus had both 
written lengthy studies in relation to religion and politics in the early 1980s. Novak, an 
AEI scholar, in The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (1982, New York, Simon and 
Schuster) had made a philosophical defence of democratic capitalism as a political system 
which made frequent recourse to conceptions of morality. Neuhaus, firstly as a Lutheran 
minister than later becoming a Roman Catholic priest in New York, had warned in The 
Naked Public Square (1984, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans) against an encroaching secularism 
that threatened to delegitimize religious contributions in the public square.
113
 Yet, in the 
1990s, discussion of religion and morality became more widespread in neoconservative 
discourse. This was clearly apparent in a symposium for Commentary in November 1995. 
In a discussion of “The National Prospect” facing the United States, nearly all of the 
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 For a critique of Novak, Neuhaus and Weigel from a Roman Catholic perspective please see Thomas R. 
Rourke (1997) A Conscience as Large as the World: Yves R. Simon Versus the Catholic Neoconservatives 
(Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield). Rourke (1997: 69, 258) argues that they are wrong to suggest that 
liberal democratic capitalism is most conducive to realising the common good. Instead it has “endemic moral 
problems” with a “tendency to mold the moral-cultural system into its own image and likeness”. 
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neoconservative contributors framed their remarks with reference to religion, culture and 
morality.
114
  
 
Elliott Abrams (1995: 24) argued that religion remained a potent force in American 
politics and that the 1990s was witnessing a religiously-inspired counterrevolution to the 
1960s counterculture. The 1994 GOP election landslide was taken by Richard Pipes to 
mean that the counterrevolution and “revulsion” against liberal values was alive and well 
(1995: 96). Irving Kristol (1995c: 74) cautioned that the culture war over religion and 
morality was only at the beginning and that due to the prevailing culture being a form of 
“hedonistic paganism” the battle over culture was set to continue. Despite previously being 
somewhat coy on his own religious views, Kristol also used the opportunity to state that he 
had religious leanings toward a form of Judaism known as Modern Orthodoxy. For Midge 
Decter, Podhoretz’s wife, the end of the Cold War meant that the fundamental issue of 
American political life, the fight against moral nihilism, could now be fought without it 
being “masked” by the struggle against Communism. Moral responsibility and the need for 
personal virtue was the key to improving the national prospect (Decter, 1995: 46; H. 
Mansfield, 1995: 85). Decter’s construction was almost the precise opposite of Ryan’s 
argument: instead of the neoconservatives using a moral discourse to disguise their 
advocacy of American power, Decter’s argument hinted that their strong anti-Communism 
had obscured their primary concern for morality and virtue.  
 
Even neoconservatives who tended to focus more exclusively on foreign policy – Joshua 
Muravchik, Robert Kagan and Eliot Cohen – also commented on the culture war and 
morality. Muravchik pointed to an erosion of moral values, the problems of rampant 
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 It was this symposium, Bacevich (1995: 34-35) suggests, that was the clearest indication of a shift in 
neoconservative thought, and evidence of a widespread embrace of religion 
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illegitimacy and high rate of divorce, and Kagan suggested that “vital issues” were at stake 
in the culture war. He suggested that there was a link between the domestic and the 
foreign, although he warned against neoconservatives neglecting foreign policy to solely 
write on culture, religion and morality (R. Kagan, 1995c: 68-69; Muravchik, 1995b: 86). 
Eliot Cohen (1995: 43-44) warned that the family needed to be shielded from the 
liberalism of the state, and that a “revival in religious awareness” needed to be nurtured. 
This was not solely for the benefit of the United States but the whole world, for “[i]f the 
United States really is corrupt, decadent and disintegrating, it will not long exercise 
international leadership or use its tremendous power to shape international relations for the 
good”. It is clear that for the neoconservatives of the mid-1990s, the United States was 
facing a moral “emergency” which had implications for the conduct of its foreign policy. 
Neoconservatives argued that the US needed to be ‘re-moralised’, and Michael Novak 
(1995: 90) suggested – connecting with a burgeoning expansionist discourse – that 
American liberal democracy was emphatically “not an idea for Americans only”, but had 
universal appeal. 
 
If anyone embodied the neoconservative rapprochement with religion it was William 
Bennett. Perhaps more than other neoconservatives, he has bridged the gap between the 
Christian Right and neoconservatives, having written extensively on religion, morality and 
foreign policy. Like many of the original neoconservatives, he began his career on the 
Left, only to switch to the Republican Party like Jeane Kirkpatrick had done in the early 
1980s. Bennett was appointed Secretary of Education for Reagan’s second term, and 
crucially, with reference to how neoconservatism would evolve in the 1990s, William 
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Kristol became his chief of Staff.
115
 In 1997, Bennett became one of the founder 
signatories to the Statement of Principles for Kristol and Kagan’s Project for the New 
American Century, discussed in detail later (Project for the New American Century, 1997). 
Bennett’s speech to the 1992 Republican Convention, in which he repeated Plato’s 
statement that the most important political issue facing a society was how to raise its 
children, was later described by fellow neoconservative David Brooks, as the most 
important moment of the Convention.
116
 This was followed late the next year by the 
publication of The Book of Virtues (1993, New York, Simon and Schuster) which 
proceeded to top the New York Times non-fiction bestsellers list in January 1994 and 
remained in the top ten for almost an entire year. The book, an 800-page anthology of 
moral tales from various sources of the Western canon including Greek mythology and the 
Bible, had the explicit aim of inculcating moral virtue into American people, especially 
children. Bennett’s goal (1993: 12) was to inspire adults and then children in turn to take 
the idea of morality seriously and to “anchor our children in their culture, its history and 
traditions”. The neoconservatives had always been comfortable talking about virtue and 
the perils of nihilism, but Bennett seemed to articulate these themes more explicitly, 
provoking a widespread discussion of these issues in neoconservative circles as well as 
wider American society. Moreover, he did so in a way that was more unapologetically 
religious in tone. In the Commentary symposium in November 1995, he had written that it 
was time for the United States to “remember God”, that the American middle and upper 
classes had been “de-moralized” which had not just damaged American society but US 
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 Kristol and Bennett remained close throughout this period, and Kristol made a serious attempt in 1994 to 
persuade Bennett to run for the Republican presidential nomination against Dole. After Bennett declined, 
Kristol then pushed for Dole to pick Bennett as his running mate in 1996, but again Bennett opted not to put 
his name forward (Easton, 2000: 338-341). 
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 Perhaps not as great an achievement as it may at first seem given both Bush and Quayle’s palpable 
inability to provide rhetorical fireworks.  
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foreign policy. As for Eliot Cohen, for Bennett moral and religious decline at home was 
harming the United States abroad and its sense of historical national mission. 
This new religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought during these years was not strictly 
circumscribed to general discussions of morality and virtue. As well as writing more on 
religion and issues of morality, neoconservatives of both the first and second generation 
were themselves becoming more religious (Abrams, 2011; W. Kristol, 2011). Irving 
Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb attended synagogue, despite earlier claiming “no 
passionate attachment to Judaism”; William Kristol attended temple services with his 
family, as did Elliott Abrams who started a kosher home, and both families were active in 
their congregations (Friedman, 2005: 231; I. Kristol, 1995b: 4). David Brooks, and his 
wife who converted to Judaism following their marriage, also started to attend temple 
services, and Brooks (2003) commented, in words that other neoconservatives would seem 
to echo, that he was “a recovering secularist”.117 Norman Podhoretz’s interest in religion 
seems to have also been piqued during these years. His book on the Jewish prophets of the 
Hebrew Bible was the result of several years of study, and was certainly remarkably 
different in tone from all his other published monographs, with Isaiah, Ezekiel and 
Jeremiah among others being interpreted and presented through a neoconservative lens 
(Podhoretz, 2002c). 
 
As neoconservatives appeared to be increasingly sympathetic to religion, there was an 
accompanying warming of relations between neoconservatives and the Christian Right. 
This was most clearly manifest on the numerous occasions when Jewish neoconservatives 
went into print defending the Christian Right from attack from liberal political 
commentators and Jewish groups which had accused socially conservative Christians of 
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 In an interesting aside, Brooks (2003) also argues that the foreign policy community in general has been 
blind to the impact of religious thought on the conduct of international relations, being “at least two decades 
behind” scholars who discuss the impact of religion on domestic political life. 
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being anti-Semitic or viewing them as a threat to ‘Jewishness’. Irving Kristol, Norman 
Podhoretz, Elliott Abrams and David Brooks, all openly called for an increased religiosity 
in American life and wrote pieces defending the Christian Right, particularly on the anti-
Semitism charge, with Podhoretz (1995b: 27-32; 2000: 213) even going so far as 
defending Pat Robertson against the Anti-Defamation League. For Irving Kristol (1994b: 
39), the imperative for Western civilization was now to “breathe new life into the older, 
now largely comatose, religious orthodoxies” and Brooks (1999b) approvingly noting that 
the Moral Majority created by Paul Weyrich and Jerry Falwell had built the very 
institutions that had thrust conservatism centre stage in American politics.
118
 And this new 
religiosity was not to be restricted to a form of civic religion. Abrams (1997: 67, 84-85, 
135), arguing as a practicing Jew, suggested that it was essential that Judaism as a religion 
with a theological belief in God should be the centre of Jewish life, and that there was 
common cause to be had with Christian evangelicals. For the neoconservatives in their 
defence of the Christian Right, the attacks on religious conservatives from liberal critics 
were less a matter of their religion, than of their conservatism. They duly noted that the 
Left were not critical of religious conservatives when they marched with Martin Luther 
King Jr, opposed the Vietnam War, or when Roman Catholic groups opposed US nuclear 
weapons policy in the 1980s (Abrams, 1997: 71-72; Abrams, 2011; Podhoretz, 1995b: 31). 
 
In addition to defending the Christian Right in print, neoconservatives developed strong 
personal links with leading figures on the Christian Right. Gary Bauer, a leading religious 
conservative who later became a candidate for the GOP presidential nomination in 2000, 
struck an important “alliance and friendship” with William Kristol, and their families 
regularly holidayed together (Friedman, 2005: 232; Schmitt, 2011).  Bauer would 
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 In typical Kristolian fashion, Irving Kristol (1994a: 20) suggested that the Jews of America had absolutely 
nothing to fear from the Christian Right because Christians “appear to be more interested in marrying Jews 
than in persecuting them”. 
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occasionally write for Kristol’s Weekly Standard and became one of the original 
signatories to PNAC’s Statement of Principles in 1997 (Bauer, 1996b; 1998; Project for 
the New American Century, 1997).
119
 Ralph Reed, the Executive Director of the Christian 
Coalition also developed links with neoconservatives. Reed’s appearance in 1995 in front 
of both the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC) won him neoconservative admirers for the fact he was attempting to 
build bridges between Evangelicals and the Jewish community, and he was seen as a 
moderating force on the more extreme wing of the Christian Right (Friedman, 2005: 219-
220; Abrams, 1997: 84-85; 2011). Reed was also close with William Kristol, having 
developed a friendship following a skirmish over federal funding of the arts in 1990, when 
Kristol, as Vice President Quayle’s Chief of Staff, had brokered a deal. Reed and Kristol 
had met to discuss political strategy and the future of the conservative movement over 
lunch a few weeks after Clinton’s election victory in 1992 (Easton, 2000: 250).  
 
The Christian Right, according to Marsden (2008: 3-4), represents sixty million Americans 
(approximately one in five of the total population) and consists of conservative 
evangelicals and conservative Roman Catholics, largely excluding the mainline Protestant 
denominations that tend to be both more politically and theologically liberal.
120
 The 
Christian Right largely abandoned the Democratic Party toward the end of the Carter 
administration, disillusioned by Carter’s lack of interest in the social issues which were of 
central concern to them including school prayer and abortion. This was made all the more 
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 Bauer had effectively written a Christian Right manifesto in 1996, in his book Our Hopes, Our Dreams: A 
Vision for America (Colorado Springs, Focus on the Family), which called for a return to traditional morality 
in discussion of education, pornography, abortion and family values. David Brooks (1999a, 1999b) also 
wrote approvingly of Gary Bauer’s efforts to “meld patriotic sentiment with Biblical morality”. 
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 There are a number of terms that seem to be used as labels when discussing the Christian Right, including 
‘social conservatives’ and the ‘Religious Right’. As Marsden (2008: 5) suggests, the term ‘Christian Right’ is 
preferable as it is more precise than the other terms as ‘social conservatives’ encompasses non-religious 
conservatives and ‘Religious Right’ includes religious conservatives that are not strictly ‘Christian’. 
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bitter due to Carter campaigning in 1976 as a self-professed evangelical. Marsden (2008: 
2-31) argues that 12 key evangelical political organisations were formed during the four 
years of the Carter presidency that continue to influence public policy to this day. The 
most important of these was Rev. Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, formed in 1979, which 
was then followed by Rev. Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition of America in 1987, within 
which Ralph Reed would become very influential.
121
  
 
The Christian Right is a diverse network of different churches, denominations, and interest 
groups, yet Croft (2009: 122-125) suggests that they are united around four foreign policy 
concerns in addition to their more well-known positions on issues of conscience such as 
abortion, gay marriage, school prayer and declining morality in society. Firstly, support for 
global Christian solidarity. The United States should not prioritise strategic alliances with 
states like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Uzbekistan if those states persecute Christians. 
Secondly, there is strong support for Israel largely based on an eschatological belief of 
historical events that must take place in Israel before the second-coming of Christ. Thirdly, 
there is support for global social justice: the United States must not ignore the poor, 
disabled, unborn, sick and oppressed abroad. Fourthly, there is concern for environmental 
security, based on a theological position regarding the role that humanity must play as 
“stewards” of God’s created order. Crucially for the relationship between neoconservatives 
and the Christian Right, leading evangelicals have endorsed the democratic peace thesis 
and wholeheartedly support efforts by the United States to promote democracy overseas, 
on the basis that it leads to a more peaceful world, improves the conditions of persecuted 
Christians in authoritarian states, as well as instrumentally opening up countries that are 
currently ‘closed’ to evangelistic efforts. Marsden (2008: 89-112) goes as far as to suggest 
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 Marsden (2008: 247) cautions against ascribing too much influence to the Christian Right in influencing 
US foreign policy, and that they are better seen as “supporters” rather than “shapers” of it, and are “riding” 
the bandwagon rather than “steering” it. 
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that for the Christian Right, democracy promotion and promoting the gospel have become 
virtually “indivisible and interchangeable concepts”. For neoconservatism itself in these 
years becoming increasingly sympathetic to religious concerns and interested in issues of 
using American power to promote liberal democracy abroad, important ideological 
synergies between the two groups were clearly emerging.  
 
This was also apparent in domestic politics. Leading neoconservatives did not spend their 
time solely agitating for war in Kosovo or Iraq, but became sympathetic to many of the 
same social issues that animated the Christian Right. Norman Podhoretz (1997: 34) and 
William Bennett (1999) both called for a greater degree of censorship, especially of 
sexually explicit media content which was deemed to be corrupting society’s virtue and 
public morality, and David Brooks (2000) argued that a liberal elite had “domesticated lust 
by enshrouding it in high-mindedness”.122 William Kristol used his position as editor of 
the Weekly Standard to press the case for a number of key concerns for the Christian 
Right. According to Kristol (1997a; 1997b) the GOP needed to use the courts to oppose 
Clinton on a range of social issues including abortion, gay rights, crime and assisted 
suicide, and argued that the “American idea” was inconsistent with “racial preferences, 
abortion on demand, appeasement of China, judicial usurpation...”. It is very clear from 
this last quotation how social issues of morality and foreign policy issues such as Clinton’s 
supposed appeasement of China were intricately linked and bound together in a certain 
idea of what “America” actually meant. Foreign policy was not the only arena in which the 
neoconservatives battled, but merely one front in what they saw as a more general war 
against liberalism for the soul of the American republic. The specific issue of abortion 
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 Bennett (1997) also went on the attack against homosexuality, another concern of the Christian Right, 
arguing that “promiscuity, disease, and death shadow and stalk much of the homosexual community” and 
that wherever homosexuality was present, pederasty was never far behind. He concluded an article in 
Kristol’s Weekly Standard by arguing that “Homosexuality should not be socially validated, for reasons 
rooted in custom, tradition, natural law and teleology, morality and faith”.  
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was, as it was for the Christian Right, of crucial importance for William Kristol (1998a), 
who argued that the Republican Party needed to attack Clinton on his refusal to ban 
partial-birth abortion. The 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision held the “key” to a 
whole range of moral issues of conscience including assisted suicide, gay rights, cloning 
and the status of the family. It was “the centrepiece of the modern expansion of judicial 
power” and “its repeal is crucial to reviving republican self-government”. Kristol (2000b) 
would also later urge George W. Bush to make the issue of abortion a central feature of his 
2000 campaign against Gore, and argue that a Bush victory in the presidential election 
offered a real opportunity to overturn Roe.  
 
The 1998 Lewinsky scandal offered further evidence of the warming relations between 
neoconservatives and the Christian Right. Prominent neoconservatives lined up to lambast 
President Clinton’s conduct, in addition to viewing it as symptomatic of a moral malaise 
which had gripped the United States domestically with clear ramifications for the conduct 
of its foreign policy. Bennett’s The Death of Outrage (1998, New York, Free Press) was a 
typically uncompromising evisceration of Clinton. Clinton’s behaviour embodied the main 
moral hazard that the United States faced now it did not look at the totalitarian threats of 
Nazism and Communism. The chief threat to American liberal democracy now came from 
“within”, from “decadence, cynicism and boredom” (Bennett, 1998: 130). Many 
neoconservatives condemned Clinton, calling for his impeachment and resignation, 
including William Kristol who campaigned with the slogan “Al Gore for President” (W. 
Kristol, 1998b; 1998c; 1998d; Krauthammer, 1999a; Abrams, 1999).
123
 For the 
neoconservatives and the Christian Right, Clinton’s conduct had revealed the United States 
at its worst: nihilistic, lacking in personal honour, and uninterested in foreign policy except 
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charge for Clinton’s impeachment in 1998, having previously been reluctant to pursue the various sex 
scandals that seemed to hover over Clinton’s career. 
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when cynically using it to cover moral failure. In light of this, it is not difficult to see how 
notions of a sober, highly moralised, activist foreign policy in which the United States 
would pursue almost a moral ‘mission’ by vanquishing tyrants and exporting liberal 
democratic virtues abroad gained increased traction with neoconservatives. The goal to 
restore American honour through foreign policy redemption which in turn would bring a 
new degree of moral seriousness to American domestic life was an attractive proposition 
for neoconservatives during the latter half of Clinton’s second term. 
 
The neoconservatives and the Christian Right would be tapping into a potentially rich 
political vein with this approach. The sociologist, Seymour Martin Lipset, who had been 
numbered among the early neoconservatives in the 1960s before drifting away, argues 
(1996: 20, 63, 65) that Americans are essentially “utopian moralists who press hard to 
institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and 
practices.” This morality for Lipset is essentially Protestant-inspired, and “determined the 
American style in foreign relations...support for war is as moralistic as resistance to it”. In 
many ways, the links between the Christian Right and neoconservatives that developed 
during the 1990s should not have been unexpected. There were clear ideological affinities 
that had existed for many years, and it was Rev. Billy Graham who had stoked the fires of 
anti-Communism in the 1950s even before the neoconservatives had done so (Berger, 
1997: 54). Yet by the 1990s, the Christian Right, especially under Ralph Reed’s leadership 
of the Christian Coalition, had moderated their more extreme elements, were increasingly 
politically savvy, and certainly interested in applying their moralised domestic approach to 
foreign policy (Easton, 2000: 213-221; Wolfson, 1995: 47). Neoconservatives had become 
more interested in religion and the domestic issues of conscience that motivated the 
Christian Right, enabling crucial bridges to be built between the two groups, and giving 
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succour to notions of benevolent American hegemony. As an example of how far 
neoconservatives had progressed, Kristol would comment shortly before the 2000 
presidential election that the idea of American liberty rested on morality, which in turn 
rested on religion. The Bible was not just something to be devoured for “empty rhetoric” 
or a “public-policy position paper”, rather it was something which should inform the 
whole of the “practice of public life” (Bottum and Kristol, 2000) 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The Clinton administration failed to live up to neoconservative expectations in the first 
term, especially those including Muravchik who had supported Clinton’s election 
campaign. Despite some campaigning against the George H. W. Bush administration’s 
realism in foreign affairs, neoconservatives accused Clinton of adopting a very similar 
approach when in office, especially when it came to US relations with China. Although 
neoconservatives began showing their sympathies with democratic peace theory, they were 
critical of the manner of the Clinton administration’s appropriation of the idea. They were 
especially critical of a lack of delivery in relation to its doctrine of democratic 
enlargement, and considered assertive multilateralism dangerously naive and utopian. 
Although on occasion supportive of President Clinton, neoconservatives tended to be 
sharply critical of many of Clinton’s foreign policy appointments. Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher in particular, with his ill-fated attempt to garner European support for 
‘lift and strike’ in Bosnia, was singled out for neoconservative opprobrium. 
 
Clinton’s first term in office coincided with a series of foreign policy crises that saw 
neoconservatives move further away from the more realist-isolationist paradigm that 
hallmarked their response to the end of the Cold War. They offered limited support with 
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caveats for President Clinton’s interventions in Somalia and Haiti and followed this with 
bolder advocacy and support for a ‘lift and strike’ policy in Bosnia to lift the arms 
embargo and deploy US airpower. This was still some distance from ordering US tanks 
into Belgrade to topple Milosevic’s regime, yet, the range of arguments deployed in the 
Bosnia debate showed a greater degree of willingness to use American hard power on what 
was still largely a humanitarian cause, than had hitherto been seen. Realist arguments 
concerning the threat to NATO of inaction in Bosnia were also used by neoconservatives 
but humanitarian arguments predominated. Indeed, this was precisely why at this stage, 
Krauthammer still demurred from the emerging neoconservative consensus.   
 
These developments in neoconservative foreign policy during these years took place 
within a wider political framework than simply foreign affairs. Neoconservatism as an 
ideology of the political more generally also evolved through the 1990s. The 1995 
symposium in Commentary was important in highlighting the emerging social 
conservatism of many neoconservatives. Additionally, Elliott Abrams and William Kristol, 
in particular, went to some length to bring about a rapprochement between 
neoconservatives and religious and social conservatives. This was not restricted to 
neoconservatives resorting simply to support an instrumental use of religion as a force for 
societal stability, but an alliance emerged in support of domestic social conservative 
concerns on abortion and family breakdown, in addition to supporting an increased role for 
democracy promotion efforts, and the encouragement of political and religious freedoms 
overseas. Neoconservatives were not simply becoming more interested in the social benefit 
of religion, but were themselves increasingly religious and energised by the same social, 
political and foreign issues as leading figures on the Christian Right. This is not, of course, 
to argue that every neoconservative became more religious in these years or that their 
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foreign policy philosophy flowed unadulterated from their theology. There was, however, 
a keen interest in socially conservative and religious hot-button issues and this continued 
through Clinton’s second term and into George W. Bush’s administration, where the 
neoconservative-Christian Right alliance was an important source of support for Bush’s 
foreign policy.  
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Chapter 4  
Clinton II: The Weekly Standard to Kosovo and Iraq 
 
4.1 Introduction 
If the foreign policy crises of Clinton’s first term in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia 
demonstrated a nascent shift for neoconservatism away from its immediate post-Cold War 
moorings, the events of Clinton’s second term showed neoconservatives decisively 
charting a new course in their foreign policy approach. Arguments in favour of regime 
change in Belgrade and Baghdad during Clinton’s second term differed substantially from 
their earlier more limited constructions during the Gulf War and the Bosnian War. Regime 
change and the promotion of liberal democracy replaces stability and self-defence as the 
dominant neoconservative leitmotifs of the period, and in so doing, partly prepared the 
groundwork for George W. Bush’s foreign policy agenda after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
 
The development of this burgeoning neoconservative discourse was first widely 
acknowledged in discussion of Kagan and Kristol’s 1996 Foreign Affairs article. There 
were important institutional developments during these years, however, which provided 
additional momentum to these ideas, giving support to neoconservative thought which 
previously relied on the relatively infrequently published Commentary or the National 
Interest. This chapter begins by examining the founding of the Weekly Standard and the 
Project for the New American Century and argues that both were important vehicles for 
distributing neoconservative foreign policy views in Washington. This is discussed within 
the wider context of relations between neoconservatives and the congressional Republican 
Party. An important feature of the evolution of neoconservative thought during the 1990s 
was the increasingly critical line it took with Republicans in Congress, especially the 
isolationist tone of Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America’ and the party’s preference for 
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Pentagon budget cuts and close commercial ties with China over human rights, democratic 
reform and the defence of the status of Taiwan. Despite these disagreements, the chapter 
also focuses on areas of alliance between neoconservatives and congressional Republicans 
surrounding the development of a system of national missile defence and the establishment 
of the ‘Rumsfeld Commission’. It also explores neoconservative arguments in favour of 
the expansion of NATO, not simply as a defensive measure against outside threats, but as a 
symbol of the expansion of liberal democracy. Neoconservatives also suggested that the 
types of missions that NATO undertook should be expanded, with an increased 
expeditionary role for NATO forces outside of Europe. 
 
The latter sections of the chapter provide analysis of the neoconservative positions on 
Kosovo and Iraq. These two foreign policy crises are pivotal for revealing the extent to 
which a neoconservative discourse privileging the aggressive promotion of liberal 
democratic and humanitarian norms through the use of hard US power and regime change 
had replaced arguments for caution, stability and limited self-interest. In Kosovo, the 
conflict between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) led 
neoconservatives to push Clinton to back full-scale US military involvement including the 
use of ground troops to force Serbian forces out of Kosovo, and then seek to topple 
Milosevic’s regime in Belgrade, again with the use of US military power. The contrast 
with their approach to the Bosnian crisis is illuminating, as they had previously not sought 
the introduction of US ground forces in the Balkans or the destruction of the Serbian 
regime. Neoconservative arguments on Kosovo mirrored their developing strategy for Iraq. 
Saddam Hussein’s regime was now not to be retained as a bulwark against Iranian power 
or as a force for stability; rather, the US needed to bring about regime change in Baghdad, 
and seek the creation of a liberal democratic regime. The plans at this stage during 
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Clinton’s second term favoured the use of American military power to create a safe haven 
within Iraq for a functioning Iraqi opposition and provisional government to develop, 
which would in turn seek to depose Saddam Hussein. The Wolfowitz Plan, as this became 
known, was still some way from the full-scale US invasion of Iraq of 2003 – this was not a 
call for US forces to invade Baghdad – but it showed that neoconservatives were 
committed to more revolutionary themes of regime-change and the imposition of liberal 
democracy in place of autocracy, even if it was still somewhat at arms-length. 
 
 
4.2 From the ‘Project for the Republican Future’ to the ‘Project for the 
New American Century’ 
 
If the relationship between the Christian Right and neoconservatives during the Clinton 
years increasingly resembled a meeting of like minds, the relationship between 
neoconservatives and the Republican Party – especially its elected representatives in the 
House and Senate – was altogether more enigmatic. As the neoconservatives gradually 
defined the US national interest more widely, with concurrent calls for increased defence 
spending and interventionism in South-East Europe and the Middle East, the Republican 
Party in Washington seemed to be headed in an opposing direction: emphasising tax and 
spending cuts and limited government. Between 1993 and 2000, neoconservatives often 
found themselves attacking their own party’s foreign policy positions as much as they 
were President Clinton’s. Neoconservatives were able to form important alliances with 
members of Congress on the need for National Missile Defense (NMD), the rejection of 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the need for a tougher line on Iraq. This 
was aided by new-found influence from the founding of the Weekly Standard (1995) and 
the Project for the New American Century (1997). Yet, they simultaneously struggled to 
persuade on the need for increased Pentagon funding, and military action in the former 
Yugoslavia, as significant sections of the GOP remained loyal to both a libertarian 
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ideology stressing limited government and the neo-isolationism espoused by Pat 
Buchanan. It was not until 2000, when it became clear that the leading contenders for the 
Republican nomination, Bush and McCain were both somewhat sympathetic to the foreign 
policy direction advocated by the neoconservatives, that neoconservatism ceased to 
operate as an ‘outsider’ ideology, and played a more central role in shaping the direction of 
the GOP’s foreign policy platform.  
 
In November 1993, William Kristol created the Project for the Republican Future, funded 
by $1.3 million from a variety of conservative foundations and investors. The ‘Project’ 
essentially involved Kristol and two assistants sending political strategy and policy advice 
memos by fax to leading Republican politicians and interested media observers. The 
method bypassed the GOP party machine and political advisors completely, and went 
uncensored and unsolicited into the offices of key conservative politicians on Capitol Hill, 
bringing Kristol important influence with the party’s hierarchy, including Newt Gingrich 
and Bob Dole. Indeed, Kristol has been credited with playing a central role in stiffening 
the resolve of the GOP against Clinton’s healthcare plan which was defeated in 1994 
(Easton, 2000: 270-283). According to Norman Podhoretz (1995a: 50), Kristol had 
become the de facto “intellectual leader” of the Republican Party. Kristol’s rise to 
prominence within the GOP was evidence of what Podhoretz declared as the end of 
neoconservatism, and he penned a eulogy to the movement. Neoconservatism had now, he 
argued, fallen into line behind Newt Gingrich, and there ceased to be any meaningful 
differences between neoconservatives and other conservatives, with the exception of 
having a less restrictive view of immigration. Interestingly, as late as March 1996, he 
could still argue that “only a tiny handful” of the neoconservatives supported “expansive 
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Wilsonian interventionism” and that realism now had the “upper hand in the 
neoconservative community” (Podhoretz, 1996: 19, 24).124 
 
The defining document of mid-1990s Gingrichian conservatism – the Contract with 
America – was credited with delivering the Republican Party its landslide election victory 
in the 1994 midterm elections (Republican Members of the House of Representatives, 
1994b). The GOP took control of the Senate, and achieved a majority in the House for the 
first time since 1954, with Tom Foley (D-WA), the first incumbent Speaker to lose his seat 
since the nineteenth century.
125
 The ‘Contract’ was a radical document, firstly, it was the 
first time since the First World War that a congressional election had been fought at a 
national level on a tight policy platform, and secondly, the content of the document itself 
was seen as a radical change to the status quo, promising a shrinkage in the size of the 
federal government, lower taxes, welfare reform and a return to traditional moral values. 
Much that was in the ‘Contract’ appealed to neoconservatives, who certainly favoured 
welfare reform and lower taxes, combined with emphasis on traditional moral values 
including tougher laws on child pornography. Yet the overriding ‘flavour’ of the document 
was undoubtedly fiscally libertarian. Neoconservatives, while supporting the central tenets 
of free market capitalism, nonetheless, had always tended to do so with significantly less 
gusto than other conservatives (I. Kristol, 1978). As such, while the message of low taxes 
and limited government was backed by neoconservatives, it was issues of culture, society, 
morality and foreign policy that truly animated them. William Kristol, shortly after the 
1994 election victory, articulated his concerns about the links between the Republican 
Party and big business, arguing that the Republicans needed to avoid being seen to be 
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 Only three years later, Podhoretz (1999: 29) changed his mind, discussing distinct neoconservative 
positions on foreign policy and the range of intellectuals who held those positions. 
125
 There is some evidence to suggest that the actual impact of the ‘Contract’ was less than claimed, with a 
majority of voters claiming never to have even heard of it (Easton, 2000: 288). 
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legislating for special interests in the business community (Easton, 2000: 296). This would 
be a theme that neoconservatives would return to during Clinton’s second term, as they 
castigated both the president and the Republican Party hierarchy for appeasing China for 
the sake of commercial interest. 
 
The ‘Contract’ largely considered matters of domestic policy, taxes and welfare, yet there 
was some consideration of foreign affairs. Point Six of the ‘Contract’ concerned foreign 
policy, where there was a pledge to introduce a bill to the floor of the House titled ‘The 
National Security Restoration Act.’ It promised to reverse the “downward spiral of defense 
spending”; seek to develop a system of national missile defence; and reemphasised the 
commitment to NATO, all of which the neoconservatives favoured. Yet, there were also 
problematic sections for the neoconservatives. It suggested US military personnel should 
only be under US command and control when on multilateral operations, and it also called 
for deployment of US military overseas to be tightly restricted to only missions that were 
in the national interest of the US (Republican Members of the House of Representatives, 
1994a). This latter clause implied criticism of Clinton’s efforts in Somalia and Haiti, and 
hinted at a warning against US military deployment in the former Yugoslavia. In a period 
when neoconservatives were expanding their conception of the national interest, and 
increasingly advocating interventionism abroad, congressional Republicans seemed to be 
more interested in limiting US military deployments overseas, and clinging to a much 
more limited conception of the national interest. Robert Kagan described the Republican 
Party’s foreign policy approach for the two years before their 1994 landslide as “disparate 
and half-formed” and argued that following their election victory, these mistaken attitudes 
were now evolving into law, with the GOP rejecting Reagan’s foreign policy legacy. John 
McCain (R-AZ), who just four years later would be lauded by the neoconservatives for his 
155 
 
interventionist stance on Kosovo was condemned, along with his fellow senators Gregg 
(R-NH) and Coats (R-IN), as the leaders of a neo-isolationist, realist trend in the 
Republican Party that opposed US military action in Bosnia. Whereas Clinton seemed to 
be sympathetic to the need for at least some form of military action abroad, the 
Republicans had retreated warning of “swamps, sand traps, neo-colonialism and ‘another 
Vietnam.’”126 Kagan further argued that the Republican Congress had only supported 
missile defence rhetorically but in practice had reduced spending on it, and that they were 
further damaging American interests abroad by cutting the budget for foreign aid.
127
 In a 
pithy statement, Kagan commented that “the party looking to limit things has found a 
doctrine which makes of limits a virtue.” Neoconservatives argued that the anti-
government zeal of the 1994 election victory was harming the United States’ foreign 
policy (R. Kagan, 1995a: 19-20, 23-25; Muravchik, 1997a: 33).
128
 
 
For neoconservatives such as Muravchik and Kagan, the assertive, interventionist foreign 
policy they advocated for the United States needed high levels of defence spending, which 
ran directly counter to Gingrich’s ‘Contract’ philosophy of tax and spending cuts. 
Although the Republicans in Congress had added to the Pentagon’s budget, it was not 
enough to reverse the decline in budget projected by Clinton in his first budget, which took 
a further $127 billion away from the Department of Defense over five years, on top of 
what President Bush had already cut (Muravchik and Kaplan, 1996: 44). The 1990s was 
set to be a decade of record-breaking prosperity for the United States, yet it was spending 
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 The Democrats during Clinton’s first term were described by Podhoretz as “positively bloodthirsty” in 
foreign policy when compared with the Republican Party (Podhoretz, 1999: 25). 
127
 Muravchik (1996b) would later use a Weekly Standard article to highlight the benefits of foreign aid being 
sent to Indonesia, where it aided human rights and also funded Indonesian economists to come and study in 
the United States. 
128
 Kagan (1995a: 21) suggested the ‘Contract With America’ had fundamentally misjudged the mood of the 
American people who in fact supported US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, the Haitian 
intervention, and favoured much tougher US action on Bosnia. A January 1995 opinion poll in the Los 
Angeles Times found 57% support for US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. 
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less each year on defence, which would not be aided by Republican tax cuts (Muravchik, 
1996a: 36-43). Despite this, the Republican revolution in 1994 was still fundamentally 
viewed as a positive outcome for most neoconservatives, but they suggested that if it 
remained obsessed with limiting the role of government it posed dangers to US domestic 
society and foreign policy. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with rolling back the 
state as long as this was also combined with a broader revivification of American civic 
life, an activist foreign policy, and a sense of America’s role in the world (W. Kristol, 
1995e; 1999b; Brooks, 1997b).  
 
An important step in the evolution of neoconservatism came in 1995, when the 
conservative media magnate, Rupert Murdoch, agreed to fund an idea developed by 
William Kristol, David Brooks and John Podhoretz for a new conservative magazine. The 
Weekly Standard was designed to be a neoconservative equivalent of the New Republic. It 
has played a central role in dispersing neoconservative ideas on both domestic and foreign 
policy to key Washington insiders, and acted as a forum for internal policy debate among 
neoconservatives (Easton, 2000: 372; Heilbrunn, 2008: 213-218).
129
 Less high-brow in 
tone when compared to other neoconservative magazines such as Commentary and the 
Public Interest which published longer pieces less frequently, the Weekly Standard, with a 
weekly circulation of just 60,000 brought Kristol and the other neoconservatives a greater 
level of influence among elite Republicans.
130
 Kristol became the editor; a position he 
holds to this day. The crucial development for the magazine with regards the evolution of 
                                                 
129
 Fred Barnes, one of the leading political journalists in the US at the time, who wrote for the New 
Republic, was headhunted by the Weekly Standard and became the new executive editor (Easton, 2000: 372). 
With the arrival of the Weekly Standard, and as a symptom of the direction neoconservatism was taking, 
from the mid-1990s onwards, it was noticeable that the number of neoconservative contributions to the 
National Interest declined, having previously been quite prolific. 
130
 Virtually all the leading neoconservatives have written articles for the Weekly Standard including William 
Kristol; Robert Kagan; Elliott Abrams; David Brooks; Michael Ledeen; Irving Kristol; Norman Podhoretz; 
William Bennett; Joshua Muravchik; Eliot Cohen; Max Boot; Paul Wolfowitz; Zalmay Khalilzad; Charles 
Krauthammer; Gary Schmitt; Thomas Donnelly and Gertrude Himmelfarb. Of all the prominent 
neoconservatives discussed here, only Jeane Kirkpatrick has not written for the magazine.    
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foreign policy ideas was Robert Kagan’s appointment as contributing editor. Kagan had 
worked under Elliott Abrams at the State Department during the Reagan administration, 
and then as speechwriter to Secretary of State George Shultz. According to Heilbrunn 
(2008: 214-217) and confirmed in the author’s interviews with leading neoconservatives 
(Schmitt, 2011; Donnelly, 2011; W. Kristol, 2011), before Kagan’s arrival at the Weekly 
Standard, Kristol followed the somewhat cautious, semi-isolationist, “cramped view of the 
national interest” that his father had articulated at the end of the Cold War.131 Following 
Kagan’s arrival at the Weekly Standard, Kristol increasingly wrote on issues of foreign 
policy, often in tandem with Kagan, and his ideas gravitated towards Kagan’s. The 
relationship, which harnessed Kagan’s developing themes of American hegemony and 
democracy promotion to Kristol’s Washington connections and publishing power, would 
play a pivotal role in the development of neoconservatism during Clinton’s second term.132 
 
Much to the chagrin of the Republican Party hierarchy, the Weekly Standard was 
determined to be an independent neoconservative voice, rather than sycophantically 
towing the party line. Indeed, Kristol (1996d) spent some time writing off Bob Dole’s 
election chances, and urging the party not to tie its fortunes too closely with what he 
perceived, correctly as it turned out, to be a losing ticket.
133
 Nowhere was this 
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 This was evidenced by Kristol supporting Colin Powell for the GOP nomination throughout 1995. This 
despite Powell and his realism becoming something of a bête noir for the neoconservatives in Clinton’s 
second term and into George W. Bush’s administration. William Kristol’s ‘President Powell?’ in September 
1995 and Kagan’s ‘The Problem with Powell’ in July 2000, both in the Weekly Standard, provide an 
excellent demonstration of the shift that occurred in the latter half of the 1990s. Kristol used the first edition 
of his new magazine to openly talk up a potential Powell presidency, yet by 2000, Kagan had castigated 
Powell’s approach, arguing that “(t)he problem with Powell is his political and strategic judgment” (W. 
Kristol, 1995d; R. Kagan, 2000g). In the space of just five years, the Weekly Standard’s line had gone from 
touting Powell as being of presidential timber, to openly questioning his suitability to serve as George W. 
Bush’s Secretary of State. Donald Kagan had also strongly criticised Colin Powell’s approach during the 
Gulf War (D. Kagan, 1995: 41-45). 
132
 Heilbrunn (2008: 216-217) states that Robert Kagan was “an idealist, a crusader” who was determined to 
defeat realists like Fareed Zakaria and chart a different course for the Republican party’s approach to foreign 
affairs. 
133
 Unsurprisingly, Senator Dole was not on the best of terms with Kristol, who had spent a lot of time in 
1994 trying to get Bennett to stand, then tried with Colin Powell in 1995. By 1996, although expecting some 
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independence from the party more on display, than on issues of foreign policy. The 
neoconservative contributors to the Weekly Standard began to construct a foreign policy 
platform that was as much in conflict with their own party’s foreign policy positions as 
President Clinton’s. Ideas of benevolent hegemony, democracy promotion, and the use of 
American power to promote the US national interest and human rights, which had begun to 
emerge in the early 1990s, now began to solidify and to be stated with fewer caveats. The 
Weekly Standard offered an ideal outlet to disseminate their foreign policy approach to a 
wider audience of interested Washington observers; all potential allies in helping their 
foreign policy ideas become reality.  
 
Despite Kristol and Kagan’s frequent joint contributions in the Weekly Standard and op-ed 
columns in the New York Times, their most significant article, and the seminal 1990s 
neoconservative text, was the 1996 article ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’ in 
Foreign Affairs.
134
 They argued (1996: 19, 23, 27, 32) that the United States needed to 
return to embrace the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan, and emphatically reject both the 
liberal internationalism of Bill Clinton and the realism of Henry Kissinger that still gripped 
the Republican Party. The United States should instead pursue “benevolent global 
hegemony” as the “the only reliable defence against a breakdown of peace and 
international order”. They suggested that it was no coincidence that the two most 
successful Republican presidents of the twentieth century – Theodore Roosevelt and 
Ronald Reagan – were also the most comfortable in pursuing such a mission for the United 
States. Their critics suggest that “hegemony” was the ultimate goal for the 
neoconservatives and the end in itself (Ryan, 2007). But Kristol and Kagan’s article 
                                                                                                                                                   
sort of party loyalty, Kristol had written off his chances quite openly. Nina Easton (2000: 341) states that 
whenever Kristol’s name was mentioned at Dole’s campaign headquarters “it was attached to a choice 
epithet”  . 
134
 Heilbrunn (2008: 221) argues the article was “the foundation for the new neoconservative crusade”. This 
was the moment when the new direction neoconservatism was heading became public. 
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pointed to a variety of moral goals that American hegemony was intended to serve, and 
indeed, argued it was a mistake to suggest morality and American power were mutually 
exclusive when they were instead “almost always in harmony.” This entwining of US 
national interest and morality required the United States to be involved in “actively 
promoting American principles of governance abroad” to include promoting a respect for 
basic human rights and liberties, free market economics, and the very idea of democracy 
itself. Podhoretz (1999: 29) would later argue that the suggestion that the United States 
should do “everything” in its power to spread democracy, was the neoconservatives’ “main 
political idea”. Aside from democracy promotion, the American hegemonic order had 
other important principles, namely that there should be no genocide, no acts of aggression 
by one state against another, and no major widespread serious human rights violations. If 
the United States was prepared to tolerate these things, doubts would be raised in rogue 
states about the willingness of the United States to maintain both its principles and its 
hegemony (R. Kagan, 1996a: 30). 
 
There was also a fundamentally domestic moral goal to be served too. By placing 
humanitarian interests at the heart of American foreign policy, this would have the knock-
on effect of re-moralising domestic American society. Indeed, they even claimed it was 
impossible to achieve the domestic re-moralisation of US society that the neoconservatives 
and the Christian Right advocated without pursuing a morally-orientated agenda abroad: 
“The remoralization of America at home ultimately requires the remoralization of 
American foreign policy” (W. Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 31, emphasis added). For the 
neoconservatives, the counterculture of the 1960s could not be unravelled and domestic 
society imbued with traditional moral virtue, without a concomitant repudiation of what it 
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saw as amoral realism and nihilistic liberalism at the international level.
135
 It was also not 
enough to be a passive, neo-isolationist, shining “city on a hill”. This was lacking in virtue 
and “a policy of cowardice and dishonour” (W. Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 31).136 The 
relationship between foreign policy morality and domestic morality was not, though, 
simply uni-directional. Kagan (1996a: 26) argued that the foreign policy of the state should 
reflect the moral impulses of the domestic citizenry. This of course leads to something of a 
paradox in neoconservative thought. US foreign policy also needed to be more moral to 
promote domestic morality. Neoconservatives described domestic society as nihilistic and 
decadent; yet foreign policy was supposed to reflect domestic society. Despite this 
paradox, the linking of domestic renewal and an activist foreign policy remained a 
constant theme. David Brooks (1997a) trumpeted a return to a “national greatness” 
discourse in the United States, approvingly noting Tocqueville’s observation that the 
domestic citizenry would “slide into domestic mediocrity if its citizens are not inspired by 
some larger national goal.” There was a danger to US liberal democracy if its foreign 
policy was simply a matter of commerce and self-interest instead of a national mission to 
“advance civilization itself”.137 
 
Many of the same arguments used by Kristol and Kagan in Foreign Affairs featured in 
Muravchik’s 1996 book, The Imperative of American Leadership (Washington DC, AEI 
Press). Acknowledging that his thesis was out of step with the call for limited government 
so much in vogue with congressional Republicans, Muravchik argued that the United 
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 Kagan (1997b: 26) would later argue that there could be no domestic renewal of American society if the 
United States clung to a foreign policy of cynicism, despair and lack of confidence in the idea of liberal 
democracy. 
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 The concept of honour was closely related to their moral arguments, and features prominently in 
neoconservative discourse (R. Kagan, 1996a: 26; D. Kagan, 1997: 42). 
137
 Brooks suggested that the dominance of postmodernism in the academy and society had intellectually 
damaged ideas of progress and order, and stripped the United States  of its role “as the vanguard of 
civilization” (Brooks, 1997b). 
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States needed to be the world leader, and “more than” simply the world’s policeman. This 
was heady stuff, considering that the dominant view at the time in the Republican Party 
balked even at the idea of ‘world policeman’ status. As with Kristol and Kagan, he 
suggested that the differences between what was the moral thing for the US to do in 
foreign policy and what was in its interest were overstated, and that the history of US 
foreign policy was “laced with idealism” (Muravchik, 1996a: 1, 22-33, 159). The purpose 
of US pre-eminence in the global system was not merely power in and of itself, but power 
and US leadership for a purpose. Muravchik argued that there had been a clear case for the 
United States to intervene militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and that 
Clinton had refused permission for administration officials to describe it as genocide so 
that he would not be forced to intervene. He also noted approvingly Winston Churchill’s 
advice to David Lloyd-George in 1918, that the United Kingdom should use military force 
to impose democracy on Russia and crush the nascent Communist revolution.  
 
The criteria for the use of American force abroad contained in the Weinberger Doctrine 
and a similar list drawn up by Warren Christopher, were too narrow, and once again, 
lacking in moral clarity. Muravchik (1996a: 153-181) argued that the Roman Catholic 
doctrine of ‘just war’ and the moral criteria for such an undertaking needed to be given 
greater weight in consideration of when force should be used. The US was justified in 
using force abroad for self-defence, and also, like Kristol and Kagan, where its interests 
and values combined.
138
 The US should not intervene militarily on the basis of values 
alone, except for cases of genocide, where one ethnic group is slaughtering another, and 
the US had a responsibility to protect in such a situation. On democracy, Muravchik again 
endorsed the democratic peace thesis, yet he stopped short of stating that military force 
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 Francis Fukuyama (2000: 26) argues this construction, which was typical of the arguments used in the 
latter half of the 1990s by neoconservatives, is problematic as there is too much ambiguity, with the precise 
mix of interest and values never adequately stated. 
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was justified to impose democracy on a state in the absence of other factors, as it could not 
be justified under international law. On the surface this looked like a similar argument to 
that made in his previous book in 1991, yet, his thinking had shifted. If the US was drawn 
into a military intervention, then once US troops were present on the ground it should be 
America’s policy to attempt to democratize the country in which it was intervening, in a 
similar fashion to Japan and Germany after the Second World War, instead of trying to 
simply stabilise the situation via non-democratic means. Democracy was a universal value, 
and the West could easily export its goods, technology and entertainment, so why not its 
political system? For Muravchik, the United States should not go to war to impose 
democracy, yet if the US went to war on another basis, the US should also attempt to 
impose democracy at the end of the conflict. Considering the neoconservatives nearly 
always had an array of suggestions of conflicts the US should enter into for ‘other 
reasons’, these conflicts would de facto likely become seen as at least partly being wars for 
democracy’s imposition, even if other rationales were used to justify the initial use of 
force. The idea that democracy promotion should be the new polestar of American foreign 
policy was also taken up by neoconservative AEI scholar, Michael Ledeen (1996b: 148). 
He argued that the US should insist that its authoritarian allies across Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia allow democratic elections, and that the US should simultaneously seek to 
weaken and force regime change on its enemies and support the “democratic forces 
seeking to defeat them.” The United States was “the most revolutionary force on earth” 
and needed to be on a mission to spread democracy and fight tyranny (Ledeen, 2000: 36-
37). Heilbrunn (2008: 219) referred to Ledeen’s views as “neoconservatism on steroids”. 
 
On the topic of democracy, Robert Kagan (1997c: 23-26) repudiated the seminal 
neoconservative text of the Cold War. He argued that Jeane Kirkpatrick’s ‘Dictatorships 
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and Double Standards’ was now a text for the neoconservatives’ critics on the 
internationalist Left and the isolationist Right, who favoured US inaction when faced with 
authoritarian regimes. The bright optimism of Francis Fukuyama had been roundly 
rejected by the academy, in favour of the pessimism of Paul Kennedy, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Robert D. Kaplan, and Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ which 
posited democracy as only a Western value. Although Clinton had begun well with his 
doctrine of democratic enlargement, his second term had seen him falter, and both the 
White House and Republican Congress prioritised commerce in Nigeria, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia, China and Indonesia, over humanitarian concerns and pressure for democratic 
reform. The consensus in Washington was now that democracy was not suitable for the 
former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, China, and the Islamic world. Kagan noted similar 
arguments had been used about Russia, but that the 1990s had witnessed a dramatic change 
and the “generally pacifying effect of democracy.” In words which would resonate during 
the first term of George W. Bush’s administration, Kagan argued that the US should be 
doing much more to support “democratic voices” in the Middle East, and holding 
authoritarian states there to much higher standards of democracy, even if it risked short 
term instability. 
 
1997 proved to be a critical year in the evolution of neoconservatism. The nascent ideas of 
American hegemony for the purpose of promoting US interests and values, which had 
appeared on the pages of Commentary and the Weekly Standard, were given a new outlet 
with the founding of the Project for the New American Century. PNAC has assumed a fair 
degree of notoriety among neoconservatism’s critics as an example of the hubris that 
enveloped their thinking during Clinton’s second term (Chernus, 2006: 49). Heilbrunn 
(2008; 217-218) described PNAC as “essentially a front organization to champion the 
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democratic crusade and, specifically, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.” Co-founded by 
William Kristol and Robert Kagan, it used many of the same tactics Kristol had honed at 
the Project for the Republican Future. It relied on sending faxes to key Washington 
insiders and important media outlets, thus providing neoconservatism with a wider 
audience. PNAC was located in the same building on Washington’s 17th Street NW that 
housed AEI and the Weekly Standard. The proximity of location was certainly not 
coincidental, as many of the neoconservative signatories to PNAC’s ‘Statement of 
Principles’ were also AEI scholars and Weekly Standard contributors. PNAC was 
described as “an essential element” of the “defense establishment to be”, and many of the 
signatories went on to take up prominent positions within George W. Bush’s 
administration (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 103-105). PNAC’s original list of signatories 
was not exclusively neoconservative, but featured prominent conservative politicians 
including Gary Bauer, Jeb Bush, Steve Forbes, Dick Cheney, Dan Quayle and Donald 
Rumsfeld.
139
 At the centre of the document (Project for the New American Century, 1997) 
was a clarion call for “American global leadership” in opposition to Clintonian 
incoherence and the failure of Republican politicians on Capitol Hill to offer their own 
strategic vision. The United States had to play the pivotal role in maintaining global peace 
and security, and on that basis, the ‘Statement’ urged four main points. Firstly, the US 
must ramp up defence spending to meet its global responsibilities and to effectively 
modernise. Secondly, ties with democratic allies must be strengthened, and regimes that 
are hostile to both US interests and values must be challenged. Thirdly, the US should do 
all it can to promote political and economic liberties abroad. Fourthly, the US needed to 
stop being in denial about its unique role and the situation it found itself in, and come to 
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 The neoconservatives who signed the ‘Statement of Principles’ among others included Elliott Abrams, 
William Bennett, Eliot Cohen, Midge Decter, Frank Gaffney, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis 
Libby, Norman Podhoretz, George Weigel and Paul Wolfowitz (Project for the New American Century, 
1997). 
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terms with the fact that it had to preserve and extend world order that was beneficial to 
American principles and interests. It was on the basis of these four points that PNAC and 
neoconservatives more widely responded to the foreign policy events of Clinton’s second 
term. From these four points flowed four particular issues that dominated neoconservative 
discourse during these years. Firstly, a range of relatively technical fiscal and strategic 
concerns relating to defence, including the Pentagon’s budget, National Missile Defence 
(NMD) and the expansion of NATO; secondly, how the United States should respond to 
the growing threat from China; thirdly, the endgame in the former Yugoslavia, and how to 
counter Serbian aggression in Kosovo; lastly, removal of the threat posed by Iraq through 
support for the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad. 
 
4.3 The Defence Budget, NMD, and NATO Expansion 
The size of the Penatgon’s budget has been a long-running neoconservative concern 
stretching back to the Carter administration. Whether it was defeating Communism in the 
early 1980s or maintaining American hegemony in the late 1990s, the neoconservatives 
were unanimous in arguing that it could not be done without significant increases in the 
percentage of US GDP devoted to defence. Kristol and Kagan (1996: 23) argued that the 
US needed to spend somewhere in the region of $60 to $80 billion more on defence than 
the approximately $260 billion it was then spending. The end of the Cold War had raised 
the number of overseas military interventions that the United States was involved in, yet 
there had not been a concomitant increase in the resources devoted to these operations. 
Eliot Cohen (1997) stated that both Clinton and Gingrich’s Republicans had been 
complicit in this level of underfunding and it had wide bipartisan appeal, noting Gingrich’s 
promise to turn the Pentagon into a ‘Triangle.’ At the end of the Cold War, the military 
had employed 2.1 million people in the US, which had declined to 1.4 million people by 
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1997. On military hardware, Cohen pointed to the fact that General David Shalikashvili the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had argued that the US military needed $60 billion per 
annum simply to modernise equipment, whereas current spending levels on this were 
below $40 billion. In 1990, Cohen had suggested that the US needed to revert to a more 
“normal” posture after the Cold War and reduce spending, but now he argued for a 
spending increase and a fresh strategy for the new American role of “global hegemon.” 
The US needed to sustain the Pax Americana, for which its military had become a global 
“constabulary” force. The case for increased defence spending was taken up frequently by 
PNAC’s executive director and AEI scholar, Gary Schmitt, who argued in a series of 
articles that the Pentagon’s budget was far too low. The Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) in May 1997 and the National Defense Panel (NDP) in December 1997 had both 
failed to see the strategic need for significant increases in funding. By 2002, US defence 
spending would stand at just 2.7% of GDP compared with the 6-9% range during much of 
the Cold War (Schmitt, 1998b). The defence establishment and the Clinton administration 
had clearly failed to cast the strategic vision which would necessitate the required higher 
levels of defence spending. Instead of spending increases for the period 1991-2001, the 
army would be reduced from 18 to 9 divisions, the navy reduced from 546 ships to around 
300, and the air force from 36 fighter wings to 18.
140
 US defence spending needed to rise 
to at least around 3.5% of GDP to provide a further $40 to $60 billion per annum to the 
Pentagon’s budget (Schmitt, 1998a: 52, 56). Although Clinton had made some 
improvements to the budget in his second term, these were largely “an illusion” as only $4 
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 Even the relatively modest, at least by neoconservative standards, Base Force proposals had required 12 
army divisions, 456 ships, and 28 wings (Schmitt, 1998a). 
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billion of the heralded $12 billion increase was effectively ‘new money’, and there was 
still an overall real-terms decline (Schmitt, 1999a).
141
 
 
The neoconservative calls for increased military spending culminated in the 2000 PNAC 
document ‘Rebuilding America’s Defences’. It sought to offer a comprehensive 
assessment of where the Pentagon should prioritise its resources, and differed from both 
the QDR and NDP which had assumed a flat or shrinking budget. The report compared the 
post-Cold War strategic environment to the Cold War, and made the case for the type of 
military that was needed for the new landscape the US faced. Whereas the Cold War was 
bipolar with the main aim being to “deter Soviet expansionism”, the post-Cold War period 
was unipolar, and the main strategic goal for the US was to “secure and expand zones of 
democratic peace; deter the rise of new great-power competition; defend key regimes; 
exploit transformation of war” (Project for the New American Century, 2000: 2). The US 
military faced four important missions: firstly, to defend the homeland, especially from 
WMD; secondly, to update the concept of being able to fight two major regional wars, so it 
had enough force to fight “multiple” large scale wars; thirdly, to perform “constabulary 
duties” and preserve the peace in key regions short of fighting a major war, for example in 
the Balkans, patrolling the no-fly zone in Iraq and maintaining “presence” in East Asia; 
fourthly, to transform the armed forces and exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) (Project for the New American Century, 2000: 5-6). To accomplish these goals, 
the Army’s budget needed to rise from $70 billion to $90-95 billion and the Air Force 
needed to maintain 18-19 active wings plus eight in reserve. The Navy required a new 
forward base in South-East Asia and the Marine Corps to be provided with a forward 
basing of a second Marine Expeditionary Unit in East Asia. The US should maintain its 
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 For FY2000 alone, Schmitt (1999a) argued there was a budget deficit at the Pentagon, with the army 
underfunded by $2.5 billion, the navy and air force combined by $3 billion, and the marine corps by $0.9 
billion. 
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military presence in Europe, but its overall posture needed to be more Asia-Pacific in 
focus. Aircraft carrier presence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf was to be 
reduced in favour of increased presence in the Pacific, where two-thirds of the carrier 
groups should be based. In addition to these terrestrial concerns, the paper called for global 
missile defences for the United States and its allies, and full military control of space and 
cyberspace (Project for the New American Century, 2000: 16, 20, 23, 31, 39, 47, 51). This 
change in posture was largely a response to a perceived rising threat from China, discussed 
in detail below. 
 
The protection of the US homeland from missile attack through developing a system of 
missile defence has been a central feature of Republican foreign policy since Reagan 
advocated SDI in March 1983. Unlike other planks of the radical foreign policy platform 
that neoconservatives developed during Clinton’s second term, missile defence had real 
crossover appeal with other Republican foreign policy factions, and enabled 
neoconservatives to build important bridges with erstwhile foreign policy opponents on the 
Right. For the neo-isolationist Right led by Pat Buchanan, missile defence was the 
opportunity to defensively protect the homeland without the need for the US to involve 
itself in potentially messy foreign interventions. For the libertarian Right, missile defence 
reduced the need for foreign interventionism which was more costly in the long run. For 
the neoconservatives, missile defence offered the opportunity to defend the homeland, but 
more importantly, argued Robert Kagan (1998a: 307, 311) it gave the US confidence to be 
able to pursue an activist foreign policy, secure in the knowledge that it was safe from 
missile attack and was “the essential foundation for the next phase of American global 
activism.” NMD would guarantee American freedom of action abroad, and prevent a threat 
of ballistic missile attack constraining US foreign policy. 
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An important step in building support for NMD across the Republican Party and more 
widely came in 1998 with the founding of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile 
Threat to the United States, more colloquially known after its chairman as the Rumsfeld 
Commission.
142
 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95-19 in November 1995 had stated 
that no country other than the declared nuclear powers would develop ballistic missile 
capability to threaten the 48 contiguous states of the US or Canada within the next fifteen 
years (Director of Central Intelligence, 1995).
143
 In crucial opposition to the NIE, James 
Woolsey, the former director of the CIA and neoconservative ally, in testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that the intelligence assessment was flawed 
as it ignored Alaska and Hawaii, the overseas bases of the US military and key allies. It 
also failed to appropriately consider the possibility of “technically feasible” threats or 
alternative future scenarios. The US needed theatre missile defence (Navy Upper Tier and 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – THAAD) and to develop a system of national 
missile defence by pushing for greater flexibility within the current ABM treaty (Woolsey, 
1998: 337-342).  
 
From the neoconservative perspective, the NIE was flawed as it underestimated the 
ballistic missile threat to the United States just as the intelligence community had done in 
the past. The strategic environment faced by the US was altered by the fact that many more 
states had the potential capacity to manufacture ballistic missiles and WMD (R. Kagan and 
Schmitt, 1998: 21).
144
 The Rumsfeld Commission was created by Congress in 1997 to 
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 The Rumsfeld Commission featured experts drawn from both the GOP and Democratic parties, including 
Paul Wolfowitz and liberal hawk, former CIA Director, James Woolsey, who was close to the 
neoconservatives, but was considered to be liberal on social and domestic policy issues (Commission to 
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 1998).  
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 It also explicitly downplayed the ballistic missile threat from Iran and Iraq, and argued that states that 
already had ballistic missile capability would not sell them to states that did not yet possess them (Director of 
Central Intelligence, 1995). 
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 Maria Ryan argues that the attempt by neoconservatives to offer a different assessment of the intelligence 
mirrored that of the neoconservatives in 1976 involved with Team B, tasked with providing an alternative 
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answer and investigate such concerns. It began hearing evidence early in 1998 and 
reported back to Congress in July of the same year with the unanimous backing from all 
the appointees to the commission, including Dr. Richard Garwin, a registered Democrat 
and a staunch opponent of missile defence, although he did back short-range boost-phase 
defences (Mann, 2004: 241). The commission, which focused on all 50 states, rather than 
the contiguous 48, considerably diverged from the original NIE. Instead of 15 years, it 
reported that in addition to any potential existing threat from China and Russia, North 
Korea and Iran could launch a ballistic missile attack on the United States within just five 
years of choosing to do so, and Iraq could do so within ten years.
145
 Significantly, the 
report argued that for some of those years, the United States could be unaware that a 
decision to develop ballistic missiles had been taken. Not content with simply disagreeing 
with the original NIE’s findings it also suggested that the ability of the US to collect 
intelligence was eroding, and that there needed to be a thorough review of intelligence 
practices (Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 1998). 
North Korean ballistic missile tests within weeks of the report further served to emphasise 
these points. 
 
By endorsing neoconservative concern regarding the missile threat the US faced, the 
Rumsfeld Commission’s report significantly strengthened the neoconservatives’ hand, and 
further increased their demand for NMD. Although the commission’s report did not 
prescribe NMD as the solution to the threat – it had been told to specifically avoid doing so 
– the clear implication was that the US needed to take the threat more seriously. For 
neoconservatives, this meant either NMD needed to be developed or multilateral arms 
                                                                                                                                                   
assessment of the Soviet Union’s military capabilities. Significantly Wolfowitz was part of both Team B and 
the Rumsfeld Commission (Ryan, 2004; Mann, 2004: 240-242). 
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 These were of course the same three countries that George W. Bush (2002a) would refer to in his ‘Axis of 
Evil’ State of the Union speech after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
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control agreements strengthened. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they favoured the former over 
the latter (Gaffney, 1998: 24; R. Kagan, 1998a: 307; R. Kagan, 2000d; Schmitt, 1998d; R. 
Kagan and Kristol, 1999j; Kirkpatrick, 2000: 34; Krauthammer, 1999b). The 
neoconservative perspective on the UN and multilateralism more generally is well known. 
They were unlikely to place the United States at the mercy of a multilateral arms control 
agreement if a working NMD system could be achieved.
146
 When the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) was strongly rejected by the Senate in October 1999, finishing well 
short of the two-thirds majority for ratification, neoconservatives congratulated the Senate 
for its stand, arguing that it was the Senate’s “finest hour” and the most “courageous” 
action since authorising the Gulf War. Arms control agreements were for “utopian 
fantasists of the arms control theocracy” who sought to restrict the United States’ freedom 
of action, but would ultimately let America’s enemies off the hook (R. Kagan and Kristol, 
1999j). Global order depended on the security of the United States, and its security could 
not be outsourced to the United Nations, but depended on NMD: American hard power. 
And as Kagan had suggested, this was not merely a defensive measure for the 
neoconservatives as conceived in the past, but functioned like a psychological shot in the 
arm: to give the United States the confidence it needed to pursue an unconstrained, activist 
foreign policy. 
 
If the debate over NMD revealed glimpses of neoconservatism’s evolution during 
Clinton’s second term, the issue of NATO expansion offered further clues. In the autumn 
of 1997, the Senate held a series of hearings regarding expanding NATO eastwards into 
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 Charles Krauthammer (1995a) argued that UN multilateralism is “irrelevant” and that global peace and 
stability can only come about through either US hegemony or a realist balance of power. George H. W. 
Bush’s and Clinton’s talk of new world orders and multilateral based peace was “nonsense, dangerous 
nonsense, as dangerous as the nonsense that followed the first two great wars of this century”. Muravchik 
(1996c: 54) concurred adding that the only time the UN had embarked on multilateral intervention in Korea 
and Kuwait, it would have happened anyway unilaterally by the US if the UN did not exist. 
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the former Soviet satellites of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Despite initial 
ambivalence from Clinton and earlier support from leading Republicans for the idea, by 
the latter half of 1997, Muravchik (1997b: 40-44) argued that the situation had reversed 
somewhat, with Clinton now making all the running on the issue, with the Republican 
Party attempting to apply the brake. 14 GOP senators had written to Clinton with questions 
indicating they were far from comfortable with the proposal. For Muravchik, NATO’s 
expansion was essential for ensuring future Bosnian-type crises did not materialise by 
tying the countries of Eastern Europe into a Western, US-led security alliance. Allaying 
Republican fears of the cost being prohibitive, he argued that the new member countries 
would need to contribute to the alliance and not just free ride under the American security 
umbrella. For neoconservatives, the European Union was never likely to be able to replace 
NATO as a security organisation, and if NATO did not expand eastwards and the US 
retreated back across the Atlantic, the void would likely be filled by Russia or a 
strengthened Germany, which was not in the interests of either the United States or the 
former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe (W. Kristol, 1997c). NATO was a major 
building block of world order, ensuring cooperation and collective action against security 
threats. Joining NATO was inherently in the interests of the three new countries, and it was 
the security interest of the US to have as many partners in NATO as it could get. Russia 
would not be threatened by such an undertaking, but instead the move would help Russia 
more easily join the democratic world by realising the futility of any future imperialist 
notions (Schmitt, 1997a; 1997b).  
 
What is striking about the neoconservative arguments relating to NATO’s expansion is 
that they do not primarily centre on NATO being a defensive pact for either Eastern 
Europe or the United States as it would be interpreted under realist doctrine, or even 
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according to the arguments that neoconservatives themselves made earlier in the 1990s 
regarding NATO and Bosnia. While that defensive point is certainly made, the primary 
purpose of NATO for the neoconservatives had become much wider (W. Kristol, 1997c). 
Quoting former British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, Muravchik (1997b: 45) argued that 
NATO was more than a defence pact and the protection of territory, but was almost a 
spiritual organisation charged with the goal of protecting Western ideals more generally, 
including political liberty and the rule of law. NATO was a “community of nations” held 
together by their values and ideals as much as their defensive security interests (Schmitt, 
1997a). On this basis, NATO’s expansion made perfect sense, allowing fellow 
democracies which shared the same values to join that ‘community.’ In addition to 
allowing new members to join, there needed to be “a greater emphasis on democracy” in 
NATO, and an expanded range of missions for it to take part in, of which Kosovo, 
discussed later, was a perfect example. Although France in particular feared American 
“hyperpower”, the neoconservatives argued that they had nothing to fear because 
redefining NATO’s mission would “contribute to European empowerment by establishing 
the principle of fighting for common ideals” (Muravchik, 1997b: 45; Muravchik, 1999a: 
32). Their position on NATO expansion was far from being purely altruistic: the United 
States clearly benefited from a prosperous, stable Europe. Nonetheless, they argued that 
the Europeans themselves had even more to gain from NATO’s expansion, and from 
agreeing to become partners in a more activist mission for NATO. 
 
4.4 China 
 
During Clinton’s second term, the neoconservative positions on the Kosovo intervention 
and Iraq received most attention, obscuring the fact they were equally prolific in their 
discussion of China. The charge against Clinton and the Republicans in Congress was that 
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they had prioritised commercial interest with the PRC and the need to maintain strong 
trading links with China by granting ‘Most Favored Nation’ (MFN) status, instead of 
favouring humanitarian concerns and the strategic interest of the US. During the 1996 
presidential election, Robert Kagan (1996b) accused Clinton of being “the spiritual godson 
of Henry Kissinger” and standing “shoulder to shoulder” with Dole on a flawed China 
policy. Clinton and Dole were charged with wilting in the face of pressure from the US 
business community, who had prioritised a Chinese “gold rush” that was not just running 
against America’s national strategic interest but ran counter “to the basic liberties of more 
than a billion people living beneath the yoke.”147 After the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
China revealed itself to be the key opponent of US liberal values in the world, a fact 
attested by its human rights abuse, aggression in the South China Sea and dubious arms 
sales to other unsavoury regimes. Neoconservative concerns with China can be categorised 
into three distinct areas. Firstly, the abuse of the human rights of its domestic population; 
secondly, the threat it posed by providing material support to rogue states; and thirdly the 
direct threat it posed to Taiwan and the wider East Asian region.  
 
Humanitarian concerns centred on political liberties and the lack of liberal democracy in 
China, in addition to the explicit human rights abuses directed at the Chinese population, 
especially relating to religious freedom, where neoconservative concerns closely linked 
with their allies in the Christian Right. Neoconservatives took issue with the idea that 
democracy was inevitable in China, and that all that the US needed to do was engage in 
trade, and eventually political, economic, and religious freedom would follow. Trading 
with China alone would not lead to political reform. Neoconservatives argued that their 
unease for the Chinese population was based on America’s liberal universalist creed, and 
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 Kagan and Kristol (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999a) would also later claim that the Republican Party seems 
“to love commerce more  than it loathes Chinese communism”. 
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the spread of democracy was aided best when the US threw its “weight behind our beliefs” 
(R. Kagan, 1997a). Although there was wide consensus in Washington that China’s MFN 
status needed to be retained – indeed it was made permanent in 2000 – neoconservatives 
argued that the American people more widely did not support appeasing the Chinese 
regime given its egregious human rights record. Only 29% of Americans supported 
Chinese MFN status being renewed in a 1999 opinion poll (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999e). 
Since Tiananmen, the Chinese regime had cracked down and persecuted religious 
minorities including the Falun Gong sect, as well as Christians in non-state controlled 
churches, and Tibetan Buddhists. Rather than reducing as Americans traded with China in 
the late 1990s, neoconservatives argued that there was clear evidence that the number of 
human rights abuses were increasing substantially. Falun Gong members were being 
brutally killed; Protestant and Catholic groups had suffered “severe harassment”; and 
dozens of leading democratic activists including Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai and Qin 
Yangmin had been given long prison sentences (R. Kagan, 1999b). As US engagement 
with China had increased, Chinese economic power had also increased yet political reform 
had decreased (Schmitt, 1999c). This was the exact opposite of what Clinton’s policy of 
engagement was supposed to be achieving, argued the neoconservatives. The Chinese 
regime showed no signs of being more amenable to reform (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999a; 
1999e; 2000a; R. Kagan, 2000e; 2000i).
148
 Instead of Clinton’s engagement, and “excuses” 
for Chinese abuses like forced abortion and religious persecution, the United States should 
consider economic sanctions to reflect “moral disapproval” of their regime, in addition to 
the threat they posed to the US (Abrams, 1998; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1998c).
149
 Linkage 
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 Kagan (2000a) argued Clinton in the end did not even deny that human rights violations were on the 
increase in China, with James Rubin, the State Department’s chief spokesman openly admitting such 
deterioration. 
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 Abrams (1998) argued that sanctions should have been extended to a range of countries including Burma, 
China, Iran, Iraq and Libya. Even if only symbolic, that symbolism was important to demonstrate “civilized 
outrage”. 
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needed to be revived on a similar basis as the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1974) had done 
during the Cold War with the issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Western 
trade with China needed to be on the basis of increased freedoms for the Chinese people. 
The policy of engagement through trade with China betrayed America’s democratic 
revolution (Ledeen, 1996a; 1997; R. Kagan, 1996b). 
 
Aside from the domestic human rights abuses and the lack of liberal democracy, 
neoconservatives accused China of threatening US interests by stealing technology and 
exporting advanced nuclear and ballistic missile technology to other states, especially 
Pakistan and Iran, which threatened peace in the Middle East and South Asia.
150
 China had 
sold nuclear technology to Pakistan which in turn led to an Indian nuclear test response in 
1998 which had severely destabilised the South Asia region (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1998c).  
In January 1999, President Clinton, despite this, claimed that China was a reliable nuclear 
partner, yet within a few weeks of that statement, China had sold specific chemicals to Iran 
that were crucial in developing their nuclear weapons regime. China had showed no 
interest in improving human rights within its borders and appeared to have no qualms 
about selling US security and nuclear secrets for “immediate...commercial advantage” 
(Schmitt, 1999b). 
 
On the question of Taiwan, the neoconservatives fused arguments of defending liberal 
democratic values with the hard realities of American national security interests. The 
situation that the US faced in Taiwan had been radically altered by two important factors. 
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 In June 1998, the House of Representative’s Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China was created to investigate Chinese 
espionage in the United States. Its report, known after its chairman as the Cox Report, argued that China had 
stolen sensitive material relating to seven different US thermonuclear warheads, and also information 
regarding MIRV technology had also fallen into their hands (The United States House of Representatives 
Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic 
Committee, 1999).  
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Firstly, the end of the Cold War reduced the need for the United States to appease China to 
deal with the bigger threat from the USSR. Secondly, the death of the authoritarian 
Taiwanese president, Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1988 had led to the introduction of democratic 
elections. These two changes led neoconservatives to argue that “the need for ambiguity 
has disappeared” and that Clinton should give his full backing to Taiwanese democracy 
(R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999h). Yet according to neoconservatives, Clinton had both 
resuscitated and extended Nixon’s China policy, refused to give backing to Taiwanese 
independence, offer it a seat at the UN, or argue for a “two Chinas” policy (Waldron, 
1998: 15). Clinton’s policy on China was tantamount to and “virtually indistinguishable” 
from appeasement of Beijing (W. Kristol, 1997a). Clinton was failing in his duty to fully 
support a fellow liberal democratic nation and in doing so was also harming US strategic 
interests in the region. The US needed to build much stronger ties with Taiwan, South 
Korea and Japan, as those three democracies were “our true strategic partners” for helping 
to project US power and values into the wider East Asia region. Missile defence was not 
just something for the American homeland, but those three countries needed to be placed 
under its missile shield umbrella (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999a; 1999e). Neoconservatives 
openly speculated about the likelihood that Beijing was plotting a full-scale invasion of 
Taiwan. Indeed, Kagan (2000b) devoted an entire column in the New York Times 
describing exactly how China would be able to invade Taiwan before any American carrier 
group could do anything about it. For the neoconservatives, Taiwan represented a strategic 
piece of territory that needed to be defended by the US to hem China in and stop it being 
able to effectively ‘escape’ into the Pacific. Taiwan also represented as a nation, the 
“genuine universality of American political ideals.” The democratic transformation that 
had occurred there in the previous decade had been the first peaceful democratic transfer 
of power in over 5,000 years of Chinese history, and the US needed to defend Taiwan as it 
178 
 
proved democracy was not just a Western value and ‘Asian’ values were not inimical to its 
spread (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2000). A PNAC statement on Taiwan, argued that the US 
was obligated to unambiguously defend Taiwan, support the Taiwan Relations Act , and 
do all it could to deter Chinese aggression toward Taiwan and its outlying islands. 
Clinton’s ‘One China’ policy was “dangerous” and directly contradicted America’s moral 
and strategic interests (Project for the New American Century, 1999b; R. Kagan and 
Kristol, 1999h; 1999i). 
 
Neoconservatives had argued that Clinton’s engagement policy to China was foolish, 
unrealistic and betrayed American values and strategic interest for short-term commercial 
gain. It was made even more imprudent by the fact that China considered the US to be its 
principal adversary.
151
 Neoconservatives did not advocate starting another Cold War 
against China, although the upshot of their policy proposals could have had that effect. 
Their policy prescriptions for the US, instead, centred on a combination of engagement 
with and containment of Beijing, coupled with recognition of Taiwanese independence 
(Waldron, 1998).
152
 The US needed to complete a number of policies in this regard 
including: firstly, to revoke China’s MFN status; secondly, provide much stronger 
condemnation of Chinese human rights violations; thirdly, allow arms exports to Taiwan 
to defend itself; fourthly, ban the import of Chinese goods produced by forced labour; 
fifthly, introduce a missile defence system in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan; sixthly, 
apply economic sanctions to China in response to providing Pakistan with nuclear 
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 A 1993 report by senior Chinese military strategists argued the United States should be considered by 
China to be the “international archenemy”; the US was always given the role of ‘enemy’ during Chinese 
military exercises, and the Chinese government regularly whipped up anti-American hysteria, especially 
following the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. All these were given by Kagan (1999e) as 
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 Khaililzad’s (2000: 32) favoured policy was one of “congagement”. The US should still seek to trade with 
China, but be far more strident about its human rights abuses. Cohen (2000: 25) argued China was a problem 
that required a “sophisticated blend” of containment and accommodation. 
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weapons technology (R. Kagan, 1996b; Ledeen, 1996a; Abrams, 1998; Schmitt, 1998c; 
1999c; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999a; 1999e; Schmitt and Donnelly, 2000). The US needed 
to “hold the line” with China, and push for “political change in Beijing” (R. Kagan, 
1997a). Even the neoconservatives who did not yet support the idea of democracy 
promotion being central to US foreign policy, nonetheless, shared the enthusiasm for 
containing rather than engaging China (Krauthammer, 2000: 35). 
 
4.5 Kosovo 
The conflict in Kosovo during Clinton’s second term provides an excellent case study in 
the evolution of neoconservative thought. Although not perfectly analogous, the similarity 
between the situation the United States faced in Kosovo in 1998-1999 and that which it 
had faced previously in Bosnia, allows for comparisons and contrasts to be drawn. A 
largely Muslim population of a former Yugoslavian province was once again demanding 
self-determination accompanied by Serbian aggression with the threat of genocide and 
wider regional instability.
153
 Whereas in Bosnia, neoconservatives had mostly argued for a 
‘lift and strike’ policy to allow arms to reach the Bosniaks accompanied by airstrikes at 
Bosnian Serb positions, in Kosovo a far bolder policy was favoured. They urged the US to 
authorise NATO airstrikes against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia itself and 
the insertion of NATO ground troops to force Serbian troops out of Kosovo, with the 
ultimate aim of bringing about Kosovo’s independence and a liberal democratic revolution 
in Belgrade and Pristina. 
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 For an excellent detailed discussion of the Kosovo War and the historical background to the conflict 
please see Tim Judah (2002) Kosovo; War and Revenge, 2
nd
 Rev Ed. (New Haven, Yale University Press) 
and Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon (2000) Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo 
(Washington DC, Brookings Institution).  
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The Dayton Agreement which brought about the end of the Bosnian conflict in 1995 was 
largely welcomed by the neoconservatives for bringing the war to a conclusion. Paul 
Wolfowitz (1998a: 102) paid testament to the “pushiness” of Richard Holbrooke in 
agreeing a pact to end the suffering, when compared to the “passivity” of both Bush and 
Clinton. The actual substance of the agreement, however, was more problematic. 
Wolfowitz argued that the document was “flawed” and the product of a “flawed policy”.154 
By agreeing to a multi-ethnic future for Bosnia, the peace was established, but at the 
expense of rewarding the aggression the Bosnian Serbs had shown as they were permitted 
to retain many of their military gains (Muravchik, 1999b: 21). Donald and Fredrick Kagan 
(2000: 417-419) also suggested that a central failure of Dayton had been the absence of 
discussion of the question of Kosovo, thus merely postponing that problem for a future 
date. 
 
Kosovo had largely avoided being drawn into the wider conflagration during Clinton’s 
first term, but starting in 1996, and increasingly into 1997, levels of violence in Kosovo 
steadily increased. Murders and assassinations were conducted by both the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) directed against Serbs living in Kosovo, and by Serbian police 
and security forces against the ethnic Albanian population.
155
 By 1998, Serbian violence 
toward the KLA had significantly intensified, and the KLA was functioning more like an 
armed guerrilla movement than a small-scale terrorist organisation, with the aim of 
securing independence for Kosovo. The Serbian military crackdown on the KLA 
culminated in a massacre at Račak in January 1999, where 45 Albanians were killed by 
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 Holbrooke’s refusal to shake the hand of Ratko Mladic, the Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army, 
during the negotiations, when a string of European diplomats had no qualms about doing so, brought special 
mention from Wolfowitz. It appealed to the neoconservatives’ traditional conceptions of honour. Holbrooke, 
unlike many in the Clinton administration understood the need to right the moral wrong of US policy, and 
reassert American leadership in Europe (Wolfowitz, 1998a: 102). 
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 The British Foreign Office website published a full and detailed timeline of precise incidents of violence 
in Kosovo by all sides up to June 1999 (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1999). 
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Serbian troops, triggering wider calls for NATO military action (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1999). This occurred despite a brief ceasefire at the end of 1998 
brokered by the US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill and Richard Holbrooke. 
 
As with President Bush after the Gulf War and President Clinton on China, 
neoconservatives were critical of Clinton for essentially subscribing to the ‘inevitability 
thesis’ – that Milosevic would simply one day be deposed as a matter of course – thus 
“excusing himself” of the need for action (R. Kagan, 1997b). When the level of violence 
increased in Kosovo during 1998, and significantly well before the Račak massacre, 
neoconservatives called for swift and decisive US military action. PNAC drafted an open 
letter to President Clinton in September 1998, placed as an advert in the New York Times, 
signed by many of the leading neoconservatives including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott 
Abrams and Paul Wolfowitz, in addition to other conservatives including John Bolton and 
Richard Armitage, and liberal hawks including Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY).
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The letter “written out of deep concern for the plight of the ethnic Albanian population of 
Kosovo” argued that the US could not just let “carnage” occur as it had in Bosnia, and that 
there could be no peace in the Balkans while Milosevic remained in power in Belgrade. 
The “pact with the devil” had outlived its usefulness, and the US must commit to do all it 
could to support Milosevic’s replacement with a democratic regime. The letter called for 
the US to take five steps: firstly, address the humanitarian crisis and force Serbia to end its 
violence against the population in Kosovo with “massive Western pressure”; secondly, 
increase funding to the democratic opposition in Serbia; thirdly, tighten sanctions against 
Milosevic; fourthly, cease all diplomatic bargaining with Milosevic; lastly, support a trial 
for Milosevic in The Hague as a war criminal (Project for the New American Century, 
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 The letter was also endorsed by the International Crisis Group, Balkan Action Council and the Coalition 
for International Justice (Project for the New American Century, 1998c). 
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1998c). The neoconservative tone was even less restrained away from the formal PNAC 
letter, where there was little need to maintain a wider bipartisan consensus. Schmitt 
(1998e) argued that the US needed to use direct military force to drive Serbian forces from 
Kosovo, and that this should not be purely defensive, but rather should keep going to 
destroy the Serbian military machine and undermine Milosevic’s regime. From the very 
earliest neoconservative contributions to the Kosovo debate, it was clear that their aims in 
Kosovo were far more ambitious than they had been in Bosnia. Regime change in 
Belgrade became a constant theme. 
 
Following the Račak massacre, PNAC produced another letter to Clinton in the New York 
Times. This time, the signatories were drawn from an even wider pool, including Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Bob Dole and Caspar Weinberger. The letter argued that Milosevic represented 
an obvious humanitarian threat to the people of Kosovo and the wider stability of the 
region. It called on NATO airpower to be used to force the Serbians from Kosovo to allow 
the insertion of NATO ground troops and to restore self-government to Kosovo within a 
democratic federal framework. Only US power could stop Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing 
and maintain the credibility of both NATO and the US (Project for the New American 
Century, 1999a). The spectre of genocide and ethnic cleansing in particular drew a sharp 
response from the neoconservatives, with Kagan (1999d) arguing that the United States 
had “an abiding moral interest” in preventing it (E. A. Cohen, 2000: 24). Indeed, 
Heilbrunn (2008: 10-13) argues that due to the influence of Jewish thought on 
neoconservatism, the shadow of the holocaust has always loomed large in their foreign 
policy thought. Coupled with their humanitarian concerns, the credibility of the US within 
NATO was also an important motivation for pressing for military action. Kagan (1999c) 
suggested the damage to NATO of inaction would be “irreparable”. Ryan (2007: 319) 
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argues that this was the main reason why neoconservatives advocated the policies they did 
in both Kosovo and Iraq; only being motivated by maintaining American power.
157
 
Certainly, Ryan is correct to suggest that this made an important contribution to the 
neoconservatives’ calculus. William Kristol (1999a) argued that if NATO failed to defeat 
Milosevic in Kosovo, it would be “the end of NATO as an effective alliance” and that 
NATO needed to be seen to be defending peace and liberal order, especially on its 
doorstep. Yet, to view US and NATO prestige as the overriding motivation, and ignore the 
numerous humanitarian arguments made, as Ryan (2007) does, is excessively one-sided. 
Jeane Kirkpatrick (The Washington Times, 1999) who had just a decade earlier called for a 
return to ‘normality’, and was reluctant to even support the Gulf War, now urged US 
action in Kosovo, arguing that what was occurring on the ground was “the closest thing to 
genocide” since “Pol Pot’s ‘killing fields’” and “Hitler’s gas ovens at Auschwitz”. 
 
As with China and the need for increased defence spending, neoconservatives were 
scathing in their criticism of congressional Republicans who opposed President Clinton 
and US military action in Kosovo. Kagan (1999d) accused them of taking the “Neville 
Chamberlain” line on Kosovo, expressing little more than” indifference” to ethnic 
cleansing. He maintained that although the United States would undoubtedly survive if it 
simply ignored the Yugoslavian conflicts, thousands of people of the Balkans would not 
(R. Kagan and Abramowitz, 1997). The accusation from the neoconservatives was that the 
Republicans in Congress were too keen to play party politics with national security, and 
unnecessarily oppose Clinton, instead of offering their own systematic foreign policy 
vision (The Weekly Standard, 1998a). This culminated in the spring of 1999, when NATO 
began its air campaign on 22 March targeting strategic Serbian positions in Kosovo, and 
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 Francis Fukuyama (2000: 26) offers the exact opposite interpretation of neoconservatism during this 
period, arguing that often, the neoconservatives were too ambitious, and the policies they advocated only had 
a very thin veil of national interest attached. 
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within Serbia and Belgrade itself, following the collapse of the Rambouillet Conference. 
This had somewhat surprised some neoconservatives who had argued as late as 1 
February, that Clinton only seemed to offer the threat of force, and seemed hesitant to 
actually use airpower, let alone ground troops (R. Kagan, 1999c). The response from the 
GOP to the bombing campaign, with the notable exceptions of a few including Senators 
McCain and Dole, appalled the neoconservatives. When Republican senators voted 38-16 
against the use of NATO airstrikes in Kosovo, Kagan and Kristol (1999b) stated that it was 
now “hard to tell” whether the GOP was now the party of Reagan or Buchanan. Their 
actions had, in their view almost unbelievably, made Bill Clinton look like a great moral 
leader even when mired in the Lewinsky scandal.
158
 80% of the Republicans in the House 
had opposed a US peacekeeping force for Kosovo and 70% of those in the Senate had 
opposed the bombing campaign. They called on the GOP to renounce Buchanan’s foreign 
policy views, as his perspective threatened to poison Republican foreign policy in the same 
way that Eisenhower’s failure to censure McCarthy had damaged the cause of anti-
communism during the Cold War (W. Kristol, 1999b; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999d). 
 
Kosovo was significant for the prominence it brought to John McCain. With calls for 
strong military action and ground troops, the neoconservatives argued he was now 
effectively leading public opinion on the issue even more than Clinton was (R. Kagan and 
Kristol, 1999c). By April 1999, the neoconservative goals for the Kosovo campaign had 
evolved to the point where liberating Kosovo from Serbian troops, and the insertion of 
American ground troops, was the minimum requirement for the US. There could now be 
no negotiation with Milosevic and emphatically no return to the status quo ante. 
Montenegro and Kosovo should be granted the right to break away from the Serbian state, 
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 Kagan (2000c) also argued the GOP’s Buchanan-inspired neo-isolationism had made “Clinton and Gore 
look like Harry Truman and Dean Acheson”. 
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war criminals should be captured, and Milosevic driven from power. This could be done 
through US material support for Serbian democratic forces, but significantly, Kagan and 
Kristol (1999c) argued that the possibility of US troops marching on Belgrade should 
“remain an option”. 
 
Not every neoconservative, however, fully backed US action in Kosovo. Muravchik was 
concerned that the war violated international law – admittedly not a typical 
neoconservative concern – and Kosovo was not a separate legal entity like Bosnia had 
become. He was also concerned that there were not atrocities on a large scale until after 
the NATO bombing campaign began, a fact also noted by Krauthammer, who would not 
significantly share Kagan and Kristol’s expansive vision for neoconservatism until after 
9/11 (Muravchik, 1999b: 17-18; Krauthammer, 1999c: 5).
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 Muravchik, however, was the 
only neoconservative who was less hawkish on Kosovo than he had been on Bosnia. 
Krauthammer and Muravchik aside, the neoconservatives seemed united on the idea that 
the Kosovo conflict was both in the strategic interest of the US as it needed to maintain 
NATO’s credibility and stabilise South-East Europe, and was also a demonstration of 
American humanitarian and liberal democratic values (Podhoretz, 1999: 30-31). Although 
Podhoretz recognised Muravchik’s concerns as valid, he nonetheless was happy to receive 
the Wilsonian epithet, as it was the goal of the US “to make the world safe for 
democracy”. He approved of the emerging international norm of humanitarian intervention 
and the principle that sovereignty should not be an excuse for dictators to hide behind. 
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 According to Krauthammer (1999c: 5-7) the humanitarian catastrophe started when NATO’s bombing 
campaign began, mainly because the US “eschewed overwhelming force” and was “feckless and tentative”, 
not using meaningful force against Serbian infrastructure until the 41
st
 day of the campaign. The American 
national interest was nowhere to be seen in Kosovo. 
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The final strand of neoconservative justification of the war in Kosovo centred on the 
global impact of US policy in the Balkans. Kosovo was not viewed as an isolated crisis by 
the neoconservatives. Authoritarian leaders in Beijing, Baghdad, Tehran and Pyongyang 
were perceived to be closely monitoring how Clinton dealt with Milosevic. Policy failures 
by the US in Kosovo would have far reaching ramifications in other theatres. Kagan 
(2000e; 2000i) argued that the world’s most powerful dictatorial regimes in Iran, North 
Korea, China, Iraq and North Korea worked as closely together as the world’s democratic 
states did. They would make no attempt to make moves to abide by liberal democratic 
norms if the US was seen to be letting Milosevic openly flout those norms. The US needed 
to shape the geopolitical situation in Kosovo, or its failure to do so in effect meant that 
Milosevic was doing so instead. And if Milosevic succeeded in Kosovo, why would 
Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-Il, and Jiang Zemin not think that they could equally succeed 
even in the face of American pressure? Kosovo was a crucial test case for the 
neoconservatives in demonstrating the United States’ determination to confront tyranny 
and send a sharp warning to the world’s dictators. If the United States could bring about 
Milosevic’s demise, it would show that the US was prepared to defend both its values and 
its interests, and the triumph of democracy in Serbia would “rank as the most important 
international event of the post-Cold War era” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999c; 1999f; 
2000b).  
 
The links between the world’s dictatorships was an obvious concern for the 
neoconservatives. They argued that there was evidence that Milosevic’s regime had 
received material support from both China and Iraq, as well as having close contact with 
the Libyan regime (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999g). It was however, less the material 
support that Milosevic received from Baghdad that concerned them, and more their 
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assessment that the Serbian regime had been emboldened in its confrontation with the 
West by American political weakness in Iraq. For Milosevic had observed that Saddam 
Hussein could defy American power on a number of occasions and survive in power  
(Muravchik, 1999b: 21; D. Kagan and Kagan, 2000: 419).
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4.6 Iraq 
 
The neoconservative response to the end of the Gulf War in 1991 had been supportive of 
President Bush. American force had been used to drive Saddam Hussein’s military out of 
Kuwait, and Iraq had been contained. While, as discussed earlier, there was minor dissent 
to the effect that the US should have gone on to topple Saddam’s regime, the majority of 
the neoconservatives supported President Bush’s decision to finish the conflict when he 
did. They either were confident that Saddam Hussein was needed as a bulwark against 
Iranian power, or with ironic echoes of the ‘inevitability’ charge that they would level at 
Clinton, that Saddam’s downfall by domestic opposition was now a certainty. Yet a series 
of defiant gestures by Saddam’s regime throughout the 1990s combined with the new 
direction that neoconservatism was taking, culminated in neoconservative calls for regime 
change to mirror their advocacy of that policy in Serbia, and in doing so lay the intellectual 
foundations for the 2003 Iraq War.    
 
Saddam Hussein’s defiance of the containment regime during the 1990s has been well 
documented. In addition to sporadic compliance with the United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) tasked with monitoring and inspecting Iraqi weapons sites, a 
series of events led neoconservative views on Iraq to solidify, and question whether Iraq 
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 Donald and Frederick Kagan (2000: 365, 387) also argued that Saddam in turn had learned lessons from 
Clinton’s handling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, where in 1994, instead of resorting to 
punitive measures, Clinton had attempted to bribe the regime in Pyongyang with light water reactors. 
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could be indefinitely contained without regime change. In 1993, George H. W. Bush was 
targeted in an Iraqi assassination plot when in Kuwait. In October 1994, Iraq deployed 
large sections of its army to the Kuwaiti border, threatening another conflict. In August 
1996, Iraq launched a military campaign in Kurdistan against the city of Irbil in direct 
contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 688. Donald and Frederick Kagan 
(2000: 387-395) argued that Iraq, disarmed and feeling aggrieved after the Gulf War 
appeared to be behaving as revisionist Germany post-Versailles.  
 
The 1996 operation in Irbil particularly concerned neoconservatives, both for what it 
revealed about the Iraqi regime and the limited American response. Clinton ordered cruise 
missile attacks on a range of radar and anti-aircraft targets in southern Iraq, despite the 
Iraqi aggression taking place in the north of the country. They argued that this was a token 
gesture that had done nothing to directly target the actual geographical location of where 
Saddam’s force had been deployed (Ledeen, 1996c; D. Kagan and Kagan, 2000: 390). The 
1996 military action was also significant for the fact that it confirmed that the United 
States’ clandestine attempts to subvert the Iraqi regime through covert funding of the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC) in Kurdistan had failed, as members of the Iraqi National 
Congress, including, key neoconservative ally Ahmed Chalabi, were evacuated out of Iraq. 
Wolfowitz, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee described the 
debacle as Clinton’s “Bay of Pigs,” with key allies of the US abandoned in their attempt to 
undermine Saddam Hussein (Wolfowitz, 1996; Ledeen, 1996c). Khailizad (1996) also 
stated, in echoes of the debate before the 2003 invasion, that there was evidence that Iraq 
was sponsoring terrorism and it was increasingly necessary for the United States to explore 
policy options aimed at facilitating regime change in states that sponsored terrorism that 
threatened US interests. 
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Toward the end of 1997, and after yet another obstruction of United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) in October, neoconservatives began to openly demand that the 
US support a policy of regime change in Iraq for the first time. AEI’s David Wurmser was 
the first to break ranks on the front page of the Wall Street Journal, calling for the United 
State to foment a widespread insurrection, resurrect the INC, and abandon the idea of a 
coup or being able to continue to contain Saddam (Wurmser, 1997).
161
 Wurmser’s column 
appeared on the same day as the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1137, which 
called for Saddam to cooperate with UNSCOM inspectors and condemned violations of 
previous resolutions. It was the third Security Council resolution of 1997, after resolutions 
1115 and 1134, which had made the same points (United Nations, 1997a; 1997b; 1997c). 
A month after Wurmser’s column, Wolfowitz and Khalilzad (1997) added their voices to 
advocate regime change from the pages of the Weekly Standard. They argued that Iraq 
would continue to not comply with UNSCOM and that Saddam’s non-compliance would 
effectively mean that WMD would not be found. This would lead to an increase in 
international pressure to drop weapons inspections, sanctions, and the policy of 
containment completely. Their six-point plan for US policy in Iraq largely formed the 
basis for neoconservative Iraq policy during Clinton’s second term. Firstly, the US needed 
to coordinate strategy with states in the region which Iraq threatened including Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia (Khalilzad, 1997). Secondly, the US needed to revive the Iraqi opposition 
which would entail not just CIA manipulation of exile groups, but supporting a broad-
based provisional government, and remove sanctions to those areas of Iraq not controlled 
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 Wurmser directed the AEI’s Middle East Program, and was considered very close to Richard Perle. 
Indeed one reason why Perle had a relatively scant written record during these years, was that, according to 
Wurmser’s wife, her husband was “Perle’s pen” and that “Perle was too busy making money to write” 
(Meyrav Wurmser in Heilbrunn, 2008: 224). Wurmser, Perle and Douglas Feith had also worked closely 
providing foreign policy advice to Binyamin Netanyahu in 1996 in a document titled ‘A Clean Break: A 
New Strategy for Securing the Realm’, which was seen as suggesting a radical departure for Israel from the 
Oslo peace process, including fighting Hezbollah and Syrian targets in Lebanon and working to destabilise 
Middle Eastern threats including Iraq (Martin, 2005: 48-50; Heilbrunn, 2008: 224). 
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by Saddam Hussein. Thirdly, Saddam Hussein needed to be delegitimised internationally 
by indicting him as a war criminal. Fourthly, forces opposed to Saddam should be armed 
and trained. Fifthly, Radio Free Iraq, defunct since 1996, needed to be restored. Lastly, the 
United States needed to militarily protect Iraqi military units defecting to the provisional 
government. At this stage, the plan did not call for American ground troops, but military 
support, including air support, for Iraqi opposition groups (Wolfowitz and Khalilzad, 
1997). 
 
An interesting feature of neoconservative arguments used for regime change in Iraq was 
that they seemed to be less about Saddam Hussein breaking specific UN resolutions or 
defying UNSCOM, but more the effect of these things seemed to have on the wider 
international community. Instead of leading to increased calls for Iraqi compliance, the 
neoconservatives noted the opposite was occurring. Sanctions were seen to be harming the 
Iraqi people, Saddam Hussein was seen as less of a threat, and therefore the containment 
architecture built to keep Saddam “in a box” was deemed to be falling apart. Thus, the 
neoconservative arguments for regime change need to be framed within the wider 
landscape of their belief that containment could not be maintained indefinitely. Military 
action needed to take place before Saddam was completely free and able to develop 
weapons programmes which would ultimately make his ouster virtually impossible 
(Wurmser, 1997; Wolfowitz and Khalilzad, 1997; R. Kagan and Kristol, 1998b; Project for 
the New American Century, 1998a).  
 
Neoconservative arguments for regime change in Iraq built steadily into 1998, and an 
apparent bandwagoning effect for Saddam’s removal developed. This was aided by 
neoconservative ‘institutional’ support for the policy, when at the end of January 1998, 
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PNAC published a letter addressed to President Clinton. It stated that US policy toward 
Iraq was failing, containment was collapsing, and it was likely that soon, the US would be 
unable to ensure that Saddam Hussein’s regime was not producing WMD. The only 
solution for the US was to seek to remove Saddam’s regime from power as the sole 
method to guarantee the safety of US troops in the Gulf, its allies in the region and the 
global supply of oil (Project for the New American Century, 1998a). Kagan and Kristol 
(1998a) followed up the PNAC letter in the New York Times and argued that the only way 
Iraq would ever be compliant with UNSCOM was if the regime was removed from power. 
Taking Khalilzad’s and Wolfowitz’s ideas even further, they suggested that the US needed 
to use ground troops to force Saddam Hussein from power, and that the greater risk to 
wider instability in the Middle East was if his regime remained in power rather than its 
removal.
162
 Even Krauthammer (1998) who had hitherto been the most reluctant of the 
neoconservatives to advocate the use of US military force during Clinton’s time in office, 
was supportive of the campaign to remove Saddam. The Iraqi dictator represented more of 
a direct threat to the US national interest than Aidid, Cedras or Milosevic had done. As a 
foretaste of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s 2003 ‘shock and awe’ strategy, Krauthammer 
argued that the US needed a massive and prolonged air campaign in Iraq targeting the 
secret police, Republican Guard, army, and presidential palaces; not a piecemeal approach 
but a sustained attack against the pillars of Saddam’s power. 
 
The February 1998 agreement brokered in Baghdad by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
did nothing to assuage neoconservative fears regarding Iraq. Kagan and Kristol (1998b) 
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 They suggested (1998a) the troops necessary for such a task included four heavy divisions and two 
airborne divisions, all of which were currently available to be deployed. Kagan (1998b) attempting to goad 
Clinton to action, argued that Saddam Hussein was now potentially in a stronger position than Hitler in 1936, 
because he had the advantage of categorically knowing what the United States was not prepared to do. 
Saddam Hussein’s removal was essential for a more benign Middle East, but Clinton only offered token 
cruise missile strikes.  
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argued that Annan had now subtly adopted the position of Saddam Hussein’s “advocate” 
against the United States. Iraq was now permitted to sell more of its oil, sanctions had been 
weakened, and even though weapons inspections were allowed to continue, the Iraqi 
regime had been given four months without inspections to conceal any WMD, and they 
had been very difficult to find even before those four months due to Iraqi intransigence. 
The consequence of Annan’s diplomatic manoeuvrings for US policy were highlighted in a 
second PNAC letter in May 1998, this time addressed to the Republican leadership on 
Capitol Hill, Speaker Newt Gingrich and Majority Leader Trent Lott (Project for the New 
American Century, 1998b). The letter argued Annan’s diplomacy had set the United States 
on a course, whereby in a year’s time, Saddam Hussein would be effectively liberated 
from the containment regime. Rejecting the efficacy of the UNSCOM inspections as 
“Potemkin Village” in style, US policy on Iraq was described in the letter as a 
“capitulation to Saddam.” Clinton had failed to rise to the challenge of the January 1998 
PNAC letter. It now fell to the Republicans in Congress to press for regime change in Iraq; 
support a provisional government in areas of Iraq outside of the regime’s control; indict 
Saddam Hussein as a war criminal; and “establish a peaceful and democratic Iraq in its 
place” (Project for the New American Century, 1998b, emphasis added). There was no 
support for installing an authoritarian strongman instead of Saddam’s regime, to ‘balance’ 
the power of Iran. The letter backed the use of US power to depose Saddam Hussein and 
introduce democracy to Iraq.  
 
The lobbying of Gingrich and Lott combined with Iraq’s continued lack of full compliance 
with UNSCOM over the summer of 1998, delivered the desired result for PNAC.
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 On 29 
September, a bill was introduced into the House to make regime change in Iraq the official 
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August 1998, Iraq decided once again to cease compliance with UNSCOM, and demanded the 
oil embargo be lifted and UNSCOM itself relocated to Vienna or Geneva (Borger and Tran, 1998). 
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policy of the United States. After passing the House with an emphatic, bipartisan 360-38 
vote, it proceeded to the Senate, where it passed with unanimous consent with no 
amendments, and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 was signed by President Clinton on 31 
October. The act authorised $100 million in military assistance to Iraqi opposition groups 
seeking to topple the Baathist regime (Library of Congress, 1998). Two weeks before the 
bill was introduced in the House, Wolfowitz delivered an important statement to the House 
National Security Committee Hearings on Iraq. Highly critical of President Clinton’s 
approach, which he described as “a muddle of confusion and pretence”, he argued that the 
United States needed to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam’s “tyrannical grasp” and 
remove a terrible threat to Iraq’s neighbouring states in the Middle East. Again, eschewing 
the direct need for US ground troops to invade Baghdad, Wolfowitz offered a plan for Iraq, 
that would later be endorsed by both Robert Kagan and a Weekly Standard editorial (R. 
Kagan, 1998c; The Weekly Standard, 1998b). Wolfowitz’s idea was for the United States 
to use its airpower to create a liberated zone in the south of Iraq just like the one in the 
north. US military protection of this region would allow a provisional government to 
operate and begin to build legitimacy and function as an alternative to Saddam’s regime. 
The provisional government would also be given direct control of Iraq’s largest oilfield 
under international supervision, and would effectively become a “safe area” for units in 
Saddam’s Hussein army to defect to.  Crucially, Wolfowitz (1998b), argued that such a 
scheme could never get off the ground through multilateral channels at the UN, but needed 
direct hard military power from the US. American power would be used to create 
conditions conducive to allowing the Iraqi people the opportunity to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in a broad based uprising. 
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Just weeks after signing the Iraq Liberation Act, in December 1998 Clinton authorised 
Operation Desert Fox in response to continued non-compliance from Iraq with UNSCOM. 
It consisted of a four day cruise missile and bombing campaign by the US and UK aimed 
at various sites in Iraq including suspected WMD research facilities and air defence 
batteries. Half a billion dollars of missiles were used in the four day assault, yet Kagan 
(1999a) again accused Clinton of tokenism. Indeed, he argued that damage had been done, 
because now the three permanent members of the UN Security Council, who did not take 
part in the attack, were openly calling for sanctions on Iraq to be lifted and for UNSCOM 
to be abolished. Containment was collapsing and it was Clinton and not Saddam Hussein 
who increasingly looked like he was now trapped “in the box”. With sanctions likely to be 
lifted and UNSCOM inspections terminated, Iraq would likely rapidly rearm and become a 
serious threat once again (D. Kagan and Kagan, 2000: 397-398). 
 
The neoconservative position on Iraq that had developed over 1997-98 was summarised in 
a 1999 book by Wurmser, the title of which – Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat 
Saddam Hussein (Washington DC: AEI) – left the prospective reader in no doubt of the 
argument contained within. The text eschewed justifying regime change in Iraq purely on 
the basis of US national interest. Instead, in the typical neoconservative construction, US 
policy needed to be motivated by American ideas in addition to “geostrategic 
considerations” (Wurmser, 1999: 8). The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime was less 
about the precise threat he represented to both his own people and the wider region, than 
about challenging its “underlying ideas”:  
...the problem is not restricted to the monstrosity of Saddam’s character.               
Rather it is the inherent threat and violence of tyrannical government itself...           
Not the tyrant alone, but tyranny itself must be challenged. 
  
(Wurmser, 1999: 8). 
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The arguments used by Wurmser (1999: 11, 116) included a range of humanitarian and 
strategic factors, and pointed to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to Iraqi civilians, 
neighbouring states and US interests. Yet the overriding impression on examining 
Wurmser’s Iraq policy is that it was about much more than simply Iraq. As an early sign of 
what Mearsheimer would later argue was the neoconservatives adopting domino theory in 
reverse, the toppling of Saddam Hussein would signal that despotism in the Middle East 
would no longer be tolerated by the United States (Wurmser, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2005). 
The US assumption that the Middle East was “exotic” and somehow immune from the 
influences of Western liberal democratic thought was flawed, as Perle also agreed in the 
foreword (Perle in Wurmser, and Wurmser, 1999: xiv, 132; Perle, 2011). The way to a 
more stable Middle East – which was in the US national interest – was to embrace the 
politics of democratic liberty and reject “totalitarian tyranny” and “evil” in all its guises. 
Even more ambitiously, and echoing Gertrude Himmelfarb’s arguments relating to the 
French and Anglo-American enlightenments, Iraq represented a golden opportunity to 
assert the supremacy of the American Revolution over global affairs, with its concern for 
liberal democratic virtue and “sweep away the two-hundred-year-old Zeitgist of the French 
Revolution” (Wurmser, 1999: 131, 137). The neoconservative construction of the Cold 
War had posited it as primarily an ideological conflict between the US and USSR. With 
the Soviet Union’s demise, the United States’ victory over communism needed to be 
extended from Eastern Europe to other regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, 
where equally tyrannical regimes existed like Baathist Iraq which threatened America’s 
ideals and interests (Perle in Wurmser, 1999: xiv).  
 
Neoconservatives were not just aided in their expansive vision for US foreign policy by 
some congressional allies in the GOP, but formed alliances with hawkish Democrats, 
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equally keen on using American power abroad to promote democracy, human rights and 
the national interest. Some Democrats were signatories to PNAC documents. Congressman 
Stephen Solarz (D-NY), who had cosponsored the act which authorised the Gulf War in 
1991, signed both PNAC letters to Clinton on Kosovo. Zbigniew Brzezinski had signed 
the second PNAC letter to Clinton on Kosovo. James Woolsey signed the letters to 
Clinton, Gingrich and Lott on Iraq, the second letter on Kosovo, and the statement on 
Taiwan (Project for the New American Century, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1999b; 1999a). 
Solarz and Wolfowitz (1999: 160-161) penned a joint letter to Foreign Affairs in the spring 
of 1999 arguing that the campaign to remove Saddam from power was bipartisan and 
supported by the vast majority of the House and Senate, including Solarz and key 
Democratic senators including John Kerry (D-MA), Robert Kerrey (D-NE) and Joseph 
Lieberman (D-CT). Lieberman, even after becoming Al Gore’s running mate, was 
considered a key neoconservative ally. Kagan (2000h) argued that Lieberman thought 
Clinton’s foreign policy to be “feckless, inept and immoral”; was critical of how little of 
the $100 million promised in the Iraq Liberation Act actually reached the Iraqi opposition; 
thought the Bosniaks should have been supplied with arms; and that Clinton was too slow 
to send troops to East Timor.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
By the time of the 2000 presidential campaign, it had become clear that neoconservatism at 
the start of the new millennium had undergone significant change during Bill Clinton’s 
eight years in office (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 102). Although marginally favouring the 
former over the latter, both McCain and Bush were claimed as ‘Reaganites’ and 
Lieberman’s appearance on the Democratic ticket pleased them after his criticisms of 
Clinton’s foreign policy (R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999k). Neoconservatives who had begun 
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the 1990s calling for a return to normality and supporting the limited war aims of George 
H. W. Bush in the 1991 Gulf War, concluded the decade by arguing for massively 
increased defence spending, confrontation with anti-democratic China and radical regime 
change in Belgrade and Baghdad with the imposition of liberal democracy to replace 
tyranny. Paul Wolfowitz, for example, fully supported the main thrust of the George H. W. 
Bush administration’s approach to the Gulf War and Iraq, but from 1997 onwards, 
favoured a much more radical policy of regime change, and developed a plan to use 
American hard power to create a safe haven within Iraq itself with the ultimate aim of 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
 
The neoconservative response to the intervening crises in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 
during Clinton’s first term revealed a neoconservatism in transition. They certainly became 
more interested in foreign interventions that were not simply reflections of a narrow 
national interest, for example ‘lift and strike’ in Bosnia, yet they did not press for radical 
regime change and democracy’s imposition like they did in Clinton’s second term in an 
analogous situation in Kosovo. This shift was not simply one of generational change. 
Norman Podhoretz and Jeane Kirkpatrick were enthusiastic supporters of the new direction 
that neoconservatism was taking, whereas some ‘younger’ neoconservatives like Charles 
Krauthammer were still resistant to a foreign policy that put democracy and human rights 
centre stage. 
 
As the past two chapters have demonstrated, as the years passed since the end of the Cold 
War, the lack of systemic bipolar restraint in the form of the Soviet Union had essentially 
freed up US foreign policy to pursue a more radical agenda. This agenda was aided by an 
increasingly religious turn in neoconservative thought and a close alliance with the 
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Christian Right which shared many of the neoconservatives’ foreign policy objectives 
regarding American power and its utility for promoting political, economic and religious 
freedoms. This ‘religious turn’ coming soon after Fukuyama’s ideas concerning the 
ultimate triumph of liberal democracy suggested a less pragmatic, more ‘ideological’ 
future for neoconservatism. The institutional developments were also of significance. The 
establishment of both the Weekly Standard and PNAC, in 1995 and 1997 respectively, 
gave the neoconservatives a more regular platform for foreign policy debate and the 
opportunity to influence their colleagues and build a collective sense of identity than 
Commentary had provided, in addition to giving a much higher profile to their ideas 
amongst key Washington policy-makers.  
 
The future for neoconservatism as indeed for US foreign policy more widely, now rested 
on the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. Although most neoconservatives 
supported McCain during the Republican primaries, his defeat to Bush did not unduly 
dishearten them. Wolfowitz had been a long-standing advisor to the Bush campaign and in 
November 1999, Kagan and Kristol (1999k) described George W. Bush’s speech in the 
Reagan Library as the strongest articulation of American global leadership since the end of 
the Cold War. The prospect of Bush in the White House therefore offered potentially a 
tremendous opportunity to put their ideas of American hegemony in the service of global 
order, democracy and human rights into action.  
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Chapter 5  
Dawn of the New American Century 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The neoconservative origin of the Bush Doctrine has been frequently asserted, with an 
emphasis on the link back to the 1992 DPG and the close proximity of neoconservative 
intellectuals to the policy-making process itself. Indeed, Tony Smith (2007: 15-16) 
suggests that Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2005, was the 
“primary agent” in President Bush’s “conversion” to the liberal internationalist cause. The 
drawing of a link between the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism was not restricted to 
observers, but also claimed by neoconservatives themselves. In late 2005, the worsening 
security situation on the ground in Iraq seemed to offer every encouragement to 
neoconservatives to disassociate themselves from the Bush Doctrine. Yet, a symposium in 
Commentary revealed that leading neoconservatives remained strong supporters of Bush’s 
foreign policy.
164
 William Kristol (2005: 43) argued that he had spent the latter half of the 
1990s “advocating something more or less like the Bush Doctrine avant la lettre” and now 
had spent four years defending the actual doctrine itself. Kristol’s formulation is 
informative, as it elucidated the dominant interpretation of neoconservatism during these 
years. They had spent the second half of the 1990s advocating an increasingly ambitious 
foreign policy agenda based on US power and the promotion of liberal democracy and 
humanitarian interests. Yet, they were outsiders with little access to the Clinton 
administration until Bush’s arrival in the White House in 2001 offered them opportunity to 
put their nascent ideas into action. 
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 This is not to say they were uncritical of the post-war situation in Iraq. Robert Kagan (2005b: 43) repeated 
the frequently heard accusation that there were simply not enough American troops on the ground in Iraq. 
Perle (2005: 53) made the point that there had been tactical mistakes in Iraq and strategic ones in the failure 
to confront Syria and Iran. Daniel Pipes (2005: 54-55) argued there had been a failure of public diplomacy, 
and that the timeframe for elections in Iraq had been too hasty.  
200 
 
The narrative described above, however, obfuscates two important factors in the 
development of neoconservatism in the lead up to the Iraq War. Firstly, before the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, many neoconservatives were far from avid supporters of President Bush’s 
foreign policy approach, carrying on from their somewhat tepid backing of then-Governor 
Bush during the presidential election campaign. Secondly, it was not until after 9/11 that 
some neoconservatives, most notably Charles Krauthammer, and to a certain extent, Paul 
Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, embraced the more radical direction that had been charted 
by William Kristol and Robert Kagan in their 1996 Foreign Affairs article (Perle, 2011). In 
this respect, it was not the advent of President Bush to the presidency that was the crucial 
event for neoconservatism during these years, but 9/11. The terrorist attacks had effects in 
both directions. For President Bush, having spent the previous eight months following a 
more unilateralist version of his father’s realism, the destruction of the World Trade Center 
made him more receptive to the neoconservatives’ overtures.165 For the neoconservatives, 
9/11 was significant as the final unifying staging post in the evolution that had begun in 
the 1990s. It had brought in previous sceptics like Krauthammer,  and led other 
neoconservatives such as Wolfowitz to contemplate much more direct uses of hard US 
military power to achieve their goals.  It was also significant for bringing neoconservatives 
to focus on the threat posed by Islamist terrorism, when previously they had been more 
focused on the threats posed from traditional state actors.
166
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 The foreign policy views of President Bush are not the direct focus of this thesis. There is, nonetheless an 
extremely interesting debate surrounding the relationship between Bush and Wolfowitz in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11. At the 15 September meeting at Camp David to discuss the US response, two precisely 
opposite accounts of what happened have emerged. The first suggests that during a break in proceedings, 
Andrew Card, the White House Chief of Staff, took the opportunity to tell Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz that the 
Pentagon needed to speak with one voice, meaning that Bush felt that Wolfowitz who had spoken earlier, 
should quieten down. The second interpretation states that over coffee, Wolfowitz expounded to Bush on the 
need to tackle Iraq, and Bush told Wolfowitz that he would appreciate it if he was more vocal in the general 
discussion (Keller, 2002).  
166
 This is not to argue that neoconservatives had not written on terrorism before 9/11. Daniel Pipes, for 
example, had frequently written on the subject. It had usually though been discussed in the context of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, and not explicitly and systematically elucidated with reference to the nexus between 
terrorists, state sponsors and weapons of mass destruction in the construction of the Bush Doctrine. Kagan 
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This chapter begins by examining neoconservatism during the latter stages of the 2000 
presidential election campaign. It considers the neoconservative assessment of George W. 
Bush’s likely foreign policy approach, before discussing their critique of Bush’s foreign 
policy in the months before 9/11. The lack of significant budget increase for the Pentagon 
and the accusation of weakness over Bush’s handling of the Hainan Island incident 
emerged as two central points of contention between the White House and 
neoconservatives during the first few months of 2001. The remainder of the chapter 
centres on the aftermath of 9/11, reflecting on the neoconservative response to the attacks, 
and their foreign policy prescriptions for Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond. It is argued that 
the centrality of Iraq to the narrative of neoconservatism’s evolution during the entire post-
Cold War period is particularly illuminating, and is a useful prism for analysing 
neoconservatism more generally. The neoconservative position on Iraq had gone through 
four phases. From not favouring regime change in the 1991 Gulf War, it eventually 
favoured Iraqi-led regime change in the late 1990s, then supported the idea of US-led 
regime change after the 9/11 attacks, and ended by backing a position where the idea of 
simple regime change in Iraq had been transcended by a wider transformative agenda for 
the Middle East. Despite accusations from their critics on both the Left and Right that they 
were wide-eyed idealists on some form of crusade, for the most part, consideration of the 
national interest was still important. It was, however, increasingly entwined with a 
moralised discourse, with the promotion of liberal democracy more centrally located in 
neoconservative discussion than it had hitherto been. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
and Kristol’s edited collection of largely neoconservative essays in 2000, Present Dangers (San Francisco, 
Encounter), for example, included no chapter that specifically analysed the threat posed by terrorism. 
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5.2 2000 Presidential Election  
Considering that President Bush’s first term in office is widely considered to be heavily 
influenced by neoconservative thought, it is perhaps surprising to find that many 
neoconservatives were less than enthusiastic Bush supporters during his primary electoral 
battles with Senator McCain for the Republican nomination in 2000. This lack of ardour 
for Bush continued into the general election campaign against Vice-President Gore, and 
persevered into the first few months of his presidency. This was not a unanimous position 
as some neoconservatives worked on the Bush campaign, and conspiracy theorists and 
bloggers frequently produced lists of the neoconservatives who swelled the Bush 
administration’s ranks from the very beginning. Yet, it is undeniable that during the 2000 
campaign, Bush the candidate left many neoconservatives cold. The level of indifference 
toward Bush reached the point at which Robert Kagan (2000j) claimed that he could not 
notice any discernible differences on foreign policy between Gore and Bush, except on 
support for foreign interventionism, where Gore was actually closer to the neoconservative 
position than Bush.  
 
At the end of 1999, the Weekly Standard made it clear that both Bush and McCain, the 
frontrunners for the GOP nomination, were suitable improvements on President Clinton 
(R. Kagan and Kristol, 1999k). Yet, it was clear from McCain’s performance in the debate 
over Kosovo and Bush’s links to his father’s realism that the sympathies of the 
neoconservatives at the Weekly Standard lay with the senator from Arizona rather than the 
Texan governor.
167
 McCain was praised for providing strong opposition to Buchanan’s 
isolationism; reinvigorating the idea of American citizenship; and ‘remoralizing’ US 
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 McCain had travelled a similar foreign policy journey to neoconservatives during the 1990s. Along with 
Senators Gregg (R-NH) and Coats (R-IN), McCain had led congressional Republicans in opposing US 
military action in Bosnia, yet by the late 1990s was numbered among the most hawkish and interventionist 
members of Congress (R. Kagan, 1995a: 20; Judis, 2006). 
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politics where “honorable behavior on behalf of a great nation” would be a central theme 
(W. Kristol, 1999b; Brooks and Kristol, 2000).
168
 McCain was, however, chastised, as 
were Bush and Gore, for failing to embrace a significant spending increase for the 
Pentagon, when there was bipartisan support and pressure from senior military figures to 
increase the budget (W. Kristol, 2000a). After Bush defeated McCain for the nomination, 
neoconservative support from the Weekly Standard, waxed and waned depending upon 
Bush’s speeches and policy positions. In June, he was praised for making missile defence a 
“central plank” of the Republican Party’s foreign policy platform and embracing the 
findings of the Rumsfeld Commission (R. Kagan, 2000f). Yet, in October, Bush was 
criticised for hinting at a swift US withdrawal from the Balkans while Milosevic still held 
on to power and the US mission remained unfinished (W. Kristol, 2000c).
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Despite the criticisms of Bush from the neoconservatives’ house journal, other 
neoconservatives worked directly for the Bush election campaign. Wolfowitz was drafted 
into the Bush campaign as early as the autumn of 1998, when he became Bush’s principal 
foreign policy advisor alongside Condoleezza Rice. At the beginning of 1999, a wider 
foreign policy team was drawn up for Bush by Wolfowitz and Rice, which included 
another neoconservative, Richard Perle, alongside other more realist Republican foreign 
policy experts including Richard Armitage and Robert Zoellick (Mann, 2004: 251-252).
170
 
In the summer of 1999, Wolfowitz (quoted in Heilbrunn, 2008: 230) reportedly 
commented that Bush was “another Scoop Jackson”. But for the bulk of the general 
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 John Judis (2006) has highlighted the historical links between John McCain and neoconservative thought. 
McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign emphasised similar themes to those he had emphasised in his 
campaign for the nomination in 2000. 
169
 Condoleezza Rice (2000: 45-62) would also have tempered neoconservative enthusiasm for Bush with its 
sceptical tone regarding the US role in nation-building and interventionism abroad. Rice advised Bush on 
foreign policy and was widely regarded as a protégé of Brent Scowcroft. 
170
 Perle claimed that George W. Bush differed from his father in that he was not experienced in foreign 
affairs, but had an ability to get to the heart of a matter and did not get “mesmerized” by Washington “policy 
talk” (Heilbrunn, 2008: 230). 
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election campaign in 2000, Bush’s foreign policy positions did not owe much to the 
neoconservative former senator from Washington. Bush’s campaign was largely absent the 
expansive themes that hallmarked the emerging neoconservative worldview; indicative of 
both the fact that neoconservatives were only one part of Bush’s foreign policy advisory 
group, and that Wolfowitz, for example, still retained a pre-9/11 paradigm for Iraq. The 
first presidential debate between Bush and Gore was notable for Bush declaring “I don’t 
want to be the world’s policeman” and his disapproval of a nation-building agenda for US 
troops (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000).  
 
The week before the election, Kagan and Kristol released Present Dangers: Crisis and 
Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco, Encounter); a 
collection of essays by mostly neoconservative authors on a variety of state-specific and 
thematic threats. Although the book did not break significant new ground, it distilled in 
one volume the neoconservative foreign policy worldview that had developed during 
Clinton’s second term. The book developed themes including regime change, morality in 
foreign policy, the threat from China and Russia, and the need for a new hard-edged 
American internationalism. It is striking, however, for the fact that even in late 2000, less 
than three years from military action in Iraq, the idea of using US military power to 
directly remove Saddam Hussein from power was still not advocated. Kagan and Kristol 
(2000c: 20) wrote of the need to pursue variations of the Reagan Doctrine approach of 
aiding rebel groups and supporting dissidents in combination with economic sanctions as a 
way of forcing regime change in rogue states that presented threats to the US. Perle (2000: 
99-110; 2011) castigated Clinton for not doing more to support the Iraqi opposition and 
not attempting to foment a rebellion inside Iraq. He argued that a lethal insurgency with 
US backing would succeed given the fact that most Iraqis opposed the regime. He did not, 
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however, argue for a ground invasion of Iraq with American troops. Wolfowitz (2000: 
320-321) argued that it was essential to view human rights as an important tool of 
American foreign policy. Utilising the example of the Philippines in the 1980s, in which 
he was closely involved, it was better to have a healthy functioning democracy without US 
military bases, than a closer military relationship with no liberal democracy. It should not 
be the goal, however for the US to impose democracy, and there were limitations of using 
the military to nation-build. Instead of using force, the US “must proceed by interaction 
and indirection not imposition”. More philosophically, and in a further articulation of the 
need for a more moral foreign policy discussed in the previous chapter, William Bennett 
(2000: 300-301) called for a moralised approach to foreign policy. Once again linking the 
personal morality of President Clinton to wider foreign policy issues, he speculated that 
Clinton’s moral failings with Monica Lewinsky had led Republicans in Congress to doubt 
his moral leadership and therefore oppose his interventions in Kosovo when they might 
have otherwise supported him. Bennett argued that the United States needed to develop a 
“principled internationalism” that held “universal truths” in high regard.  
 
In December 2000, the protracted legal battle over the Florida recount finally concluded in 
Bush’s favour with the Supreme Court’s landmark 5-4 decision. If they believed that 
Bush’s election victory heralded the second-coming of Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson’s foreign 
policy philosophy, the president’s Cabinet appointments quickly brought the 
neoconservatives a different perspective. Most discussions of neoconservatism provide an 
obligatory list of neoconservative appointments to the new Bush administration, as 
evidence of some sort of neoconservative take-over of the American government (Dorrien, 
2004: 142-143). Yet, the startling fact is that such lists of the more junior positions betray 
the fact that none of the three top-level foreign policy jobs were filled by a 
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neoconservative, and that George Tenet, a Democrat, was allowed to continue as Director 
of the CIA. Even more interesting, given the fact that Dick Cheney was often portrayed as 
being the key neoconservative ally at the top of the administration, the vice-president-elect 
was given a central role by Bush in selecting the top level appointments to the 
administration (Mann, 2004: 261; Dorrien, 2004: 142). Neoconservative disappointment at 
Powell’s nomination as Secretary of State was further exacerbated by the fact that 
Wolfowitz, having advised Bush for two years in the run-up to the election, was not given 
a more senior position than Deputy Secretary of Defense. It had been widely hoped that he 
would land the top job at the Pentagon rather than just becoming Rumsfeld’s number two, 
with Richard Perle also seen as a potential candidate for the Secretary of Defense 
nomination (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 116).
171
  
 
This is not to disparage the positions leading neoconservatives filled within the Bush 
administration. Douglas Feith was appointed number three at the Pentagon, as Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy; Richard Perle, declined Feith’s job and was appointed in 
an advisory capacity as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee; 
Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby became Cheney’s Chief of Staff; and Elliott Abrams became Senior 
Director for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African Affairs on the National 
Security Council. The significance, however, of these appointments has been overstated. 
At no other point in American history would the foreign policy of the United States ever 
have been described as being controlled by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and a handful 
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 Halper and Clarke (2004: 119) interpret Wolfowitz’s appointment as Deputy Secretary of Defense as 
evidence of Cheney’s influence and that it “foreshadowed the emerging neo-conservative network”.  Such an 
interpretation, however, relies on a good deal of hindsight. Wolfowitz’s appointment instead indicated that 
the high-water mark for neoconservative influence in this period did not reach Cabinet level. The jobs the 
neoconservatives received were “at best, second-tier positions” and certainly not as Dorrien suggests an 
“extraordinary harvest of appointments” (Heilbrunn, 2008: 230; Dorrien, 2004: 143).  
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of ideologically sympathetic colleagues scattered in more junior positions in the 
administration.
172
  
 
5.3 The Road to 9/11 
5.3.1 The Case Against Bush: Pentagon Budget and China  
The neoconservative critique of the early months of the Bush administration coalesced 
around two issues that were also raised during Clinton’s second term. A new activist phase 
for American foreign policy required an urgent increase of the Pentagon’s budget, which 
they argued had effectively withered on the vine for the eight years of the Clinton 
administration. In addition to raising the defence budget, neoconservatives urged President 
Bush to demonstrate stronger leadership with China, which had emerged as a likely 
strategic competitor to the US, and a threat to US interests and values. There was little in 
the form of a honeymoon period for President Bush in his relationship with the 
neoconservatives.
173
 Scepticism of Bush’s foreign policy agenda, which lay somewhat 
dormant during the legal battle over the election result, did not take long to resurface.  
 
Criticisms of the administration began the day after Bush’s inauguration and continued 
sporadically until the 9/11 attacks, and occasionally after. The catalyst for the early 
opprobrium proved to be the low level of funding for the Pentagon, a frequent 
neoconservative point of disagreement with President Clinton. On 21 January, Gary 
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 Conspiracy theories abound surrounding neoconservatism and the conduct of American foreign policy. 
The classic example remains the BBC documentary series The Power of Nightmares (2004). It argued 
neoconservatism and Islamist terror were two sides of the same coin, and neoconservatives deliberately 
manufactured fear to raise support for their foreign policy ideas. Given the fact that many neoconservatives 
are Jewish, and the enduring historical potency of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, it seems to this author, 
there is ample scope for critiquing neoconservative thought without recourse to anything that smacks of the 
conspiratorial. Max Boot (2004: 45-52) and David Brooks (2004: 41-42) have both given a vigorous defence 
against the charge that a neoconservative cabal were involved in a Zionist plot that placed the interests of 
Israel above the US. 
173
 Despite William Kristol’s Weekly Standard being required reading among administration staff, Kristol 
had called the election for Al Gore on election night, and in doing so ensured he was somewhat persona non 
grata at the White House (Tanenhaus, 2003). 
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Schmitt, PNAC’s Executive Director, in a joint piece with Thomas Donnelly, a colleague 
at AEI and PNAC (2001a), urged Bush to request an immediate $18 billion increase for 
the Pentagon. Continuing their lionisation of President Reagan, which began with their 
1996 Foreign Affairs article, Kagan and Kristol (2001a) argued on 22 January that Bush 
seemed more like an “Eisenhower” than a “Reagan”. Bush offered too much continuity 
with Clinton’s foreign policy agenda. Bush should instead end the engagement policy with 
reference to China; work to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime; push for the introduction of 
a missile defence system; and offer a vastly increased budget for the Pentagon, above the 
proposed $4.5 billion increase currently on the table.
174
 
 
Throughout 2001, the constant refrain from neoconservatives was one of under-funding at 
the Pentagon. The precise level of spending increase advocated by neoconservatives 
varied. Robert Kagan (2001c) wrote that the outgoing Clinton defence officials argued that 
there was a $60 billion shortfall in the Department of Defense’s budget. Schmitt and 
Donnelly (2001c; 2001d) estimated that due to the pace of modernisation slowing during 
the Clinton years, an upwards increase of almost $100 billion would be needed. This was 
necessary to restore the ability of the United States to fight two medium-sized wars 
concurrently, in addition to prepare for a possible Chinese strike on Taiwan, which was not 
currently suitably catered for in the budget. This was not the neoconservatism that had 
greeted the close of the Cold War with calls for retreat and consolidation. The 
neoconservatives recognised that their expansive foreign policy vision could not be 
accomplished on a shoestring budget. They feared that in largely accepting the Pentagon 
budget recommendations it inherited from the Clinton administration, President Bush had 
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 A week earlier, Kagan (2001a) argued that during his first six years in office, Clinton had effectively cut 
$160 billion from the Pentagon’s budget, with the chickens now coming “home to roost” on President Bush’s 
watch.  
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chosen to privilege a tax cutting agenda over issues of national security and American 
greatness (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001b; 2001c).  
 
Astonishingly, neoconservative disquiet with the lack of significant increase in defence 
spending was not restricted to those outside the administration. In testimony before the 
House Budget Committee in July 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, argued 
that Bush’s current budget was insufficient for meeting the needs of the twenty-first 
century. Instead of the $4.4 billion increase in real terms, he stated that a further $18.4 
billion on top of that was needed to boost spending to $328.9 billion. The current level of 
around 3% of GDP being spent on defence, should be raised to around 3.5%, still 
relatively low by historical standards which averaged around 8% (House Committee on the 
Budget, 2001).
175
 Other neoconservatives argued that even this increase suggested by 
Wolfowitz before the committee was much lower than the extra $35 billion that Rumsfeld 
had petitioned Bush for. After Congress had discussed the increase, it was also likely to be 
even lower than the amount stated by Wolfowitz (W. Kristol and Schmitt, 2001). 
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were both urged to resign by Kagan and Kristol (2001f) to 
highlight the fact that Bush only approved $18 billion compared with the $35 billion that 
Rumsfeld had requested from the president. 
 
On 1 April, a Chinese interceptor fighter jet collided with a US Navy surveillance plane 
carrying 24 US military personnel over the South China Sea. The collision killed the 
Chinese pilot and severely damaged the American plane, causing it to make an emergency 
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 Wolfowitz also made a comparison with the situation in 1950, when General Omar Bradley requested an 
extra $18 billion from President Truman, which Truman did not fully grant. The United States then found 
itself at war in Korea just six months later, with the Pentagon requiring an extra $48 billion. Wolfowitz 
argued it was more prudential to make the investment earlier, as this would help deter threats, and posited 
that higher defence spending by Truman would possibly have meant Acheson could have defined Korea 
within the US defence perimeter, thus preventing the war from occurring (House Committee on the Budget, 
2001).  
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landing on the island of Hainan, where the American crew were held captive for eleven 
days.
176
 The incident proved to be the first major foreign policy crisis for the Bush 
administration. The week before the collision, Robert Kagan (2001d) had urged President 
Bush to show democratic leadership on the issue of Taiwan and stand up to threats from 
China that warned the US not to recognise the Taiwanese state. With an American crew 
held hostage on Hainan Island, neoconservatives pressed Bush hard on the issue as an 
opportunity to deliver the strong leadership they had advocated, and stand up to Beijing. 
This was the first major test case for President Bush to prove himself as an ‘Eisenhower’ 
or a ‘Reagan’ in the eyes of the neoconservatives. They argued that the incident was not 
the result of a maverick Chinese pilot, but a result of Beijing’s policy of sending fighter 
jets near to American planes as a deliberate act of hostility. President Bush was urged to 
recall the US ambassador from Beijing in response to the kidnapping (Schmitt and 
Donnelly, 2001b). Although Bush initially showed strong opposition, Kagan and Kristol 
(2001d) argued that Colin Powell diluted the American position by expressing regret over 
the “accident”. The American government eventually agreed to give compensation to 
China for the loss of their pilot and to gain the return of the US crew, although it was not 
as large an amount as Beijing requested. Krauthammer (2001d), reflecting his slightly less 
bullish approach to foreign policy, disagreed with other neoconservatives, arguing that 
Bush should be congratulated for bringing the hostages back home, and that the US could 
extract a price from the Chinese government at a future date of its choosing, for example, 
preventing the Olympic Games from being held in Beijing in 2008. The implication of this 
approach, however, was that at that moment, the United States had not yet extracted its 
‘punishment’ from China for its behaviour. Krauthammer’s endorsement of Bush was 
partly an act of faith that Bush was playing the long game. David Brooks (2001a) 
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 For a fascinating account of the incident from the perspective of the American pilot please see Shane 
Osborn (2001) Born to Fly: The Untold Story of the Downed American Reconnaissance Plane (New York, 
Broadway).  
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remained unconvinced. The ‘spy plane’ crisis had exposed the fault-lines in the US foreign 
policy landscape. According to Brooks, Bush was supported by the bulk of the GOP’s 
east-coast, realist establishment “that looks back to events like the Congress of Vienna as 
paradigms of foreign policymaking.” Accusations once again surfaced of the Republican 
Party putting its faith in commerce rather than raising questions of human rights and 
democracy. 
 
The idea that Bush initially showed hawkish tendencies before Colin Powell and the State 
Department bureaucracy watered down his approach developed into a frequent 
neoconservative trope throughout Bush’s first term, especially in their analysis of China. 
When Bush declared on 25 April that he would commit the US to the defence of Taiwan in 
the event of a PRC attack, neoconservatives were quick to note their approval, and argued 
that the US ‘One China’ policy was starting to collapse. The ending of the Cold War had 
removed the strategic need for the US to back the lesser of two evils and the era of 
“strategic ambiguity” was coming to an end (R. Kagan, 2001e). But support quickly 
evaporated when they alleged that Bush was undermined by officials in both the State 
Department and White House, who almost acted like Bush had misspoken. Powell, Rice 
and Rumsfeld were silent on the matter and did not go on the record to support Bush’s 
position, with only Cheney supporting Bush’s statement publicly (R. Kagan and Kristol, 
2001e). The relationship of the US to Taiwan was a key concern for neoconservatives keen 
to improve both the strategic position of the US in the region, and to strengthen the forces 
of liberal democracy in the countries adjacent to China. At the same time as China held 
captive the crew of the Lockheed EP-3E, debate raged around what defence technology 
was appropriate for sale by the US to Taiwan. The government in Taipei was particularly 
interested in acquiring Aegis-equipped destroyers as central components of a naval-based 
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missile defence system, considered vital to protect Taiwan from the rising number of PRC 
short-range missiles aimed in its direction. Despite neoconservative lobbying on behalf of 
Taiwan, the Bush administration refused to sell Aegis to Taiwan in an attempt to placate 
Beijing. Instead of the missile defence system that Taiwan argued it needed, the Bush 
administration agreed to sell eight diesel-powered submarines (R. Kagan and Kristol, 
2001e).
177
 
 
The neoconservative goal for China was for the US to push for democratic change in 
Beijing to mirror what had occurred in Taipei. Instead, the Bush administration favoured 
keeping Taiwan at arm’s length, and to avoid anything that might destabilise commercial 
relationships with China. William Kristol (2001b) argued that a “project worthy of a great 
power” would be to see a “peaceful transformation” to democracy in China predicated on a 
foreign policy of “military strength, political boldness and moral clarity”. A highly 
moralised critique permeated neoconservative discourse on Bush’s China policy in 2001. 
Moral clarity, for example, meant that Secretary Powell should not have been impressed 
when China released a few token US citizens accused of spying, when other US citizens 
remained imprisoned by the regime, alongside “democracy activists, Falun Gong 
members, Tibetan Buddhists and Christians still being held, tortured and sometimes 
murdered” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001g). Neoconservatives were certainly not urging 
deployment of the 101
st
 Airborne Division into Beijing on behalf of their cause, but they 
differed from what they saw as Bush’s approach which emphasised stability and 
commercial interests as sacrosanct. The neoconservative strategy favoured dropping the 
‘One China’ policy and forging much closer US ties with the democracies that circled 
China, particularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This would take the form of the 
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would likely never make their way to Taiwan as, bizarrely, the US did not actually build them (R. Kagan and 
Kristol, 2001d, 2001e). 
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exploration of a free trade pact with Taiwan, enhancing direct public diplomacy efforts in 
China, and creating some form of new regional security architecture; a NATO for East 
Asia (Schmitt, 2001a; W. Kristol, 2001i). 
 
5.3.2 The Case for Bush: Missile Defence, Unilateralism, and Religion 
Despite the question marks over the Pentagon budget and administration policy on China, 
the neoconservative perspective on Bush’s nascent foreign policy was not all 
unsympathetic. Strong support for Bush’s missile defence policy was evidenced alongside 
support for a perceived unilateral turn in American foreign policy. Missile defence had 
been an important concern for neoconservatives throughout the late 1990s. They had 
praised Bush’s presidential campaign for placing a strong emphasis on the necessity for 
developing NMD, and now in power, supported the administration’s attempt to make the 
policy a reality. The link between missile defence and unilateralism was clearly seen in the 
neoconservative calls to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty. Again, the impact of the decline 
of bipolarity in the international system on neoconservative thought was obvious. 
Krauthammer (2001a; 2001f) argued that Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the 
ABM Treaty were both relics of the bipolar system. A multilateral world order was 
“inherently less stable” than a unipolar one in which the US effectively kept the peace as 
the “world’s foremost anti-proliferator” and “balancer of last resort everywhere.” For the 
US to function in this capacity, it needed a comprehensive system of missile defence, as it 
was as important as airpower had been to the twentieth century.
178
 Krauthammer (2001f) 
also implicitly endorsed Francis Fukuyama’s End of History thesis in his discussion of the 
impact of the end of the Cold War. The demise of the USSR had not just created a unipolar 
world but represented the death of the “last great existential threat...to the liberal idea”. 
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 Krauthammer (2001f) actually coined this the ‘Bush Doctrine’, a year before notions of pre-emption and 
democracy promotion became more commonly referred to as this. 
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In July 2001, the day after informing the House Budget Committee that the Pentagon 
needed more funding, Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Forces Committee (2001b) that 
the ABM Treaty had essentially left the US homeland defenceless against missile attack. 
Pointing to the fact that 28 countries had some form of ballistic missile capability, he 
argued for the abrogation of the ABM treaty and for an “aggressive exploration of key 
technologies” to begin to give precedence to US security over a treaty which he argued had 
cost the US a decade of post-Cold War technological innovation. Given that Rumsfeld had 
been a key advocate of NMD during the Clinton administration, Robert Kagan (2001b; 
2001f) identified him as the key figure to push missile defence to centre stage. Kagan 
argued that Rumsfeld had made the Europeans appreciate that Bush was serious on missile 
defence, but the problem was that Colin Powell and possibly Condoleezza Rice were 
sceptical of the efficacy of such a plan. In addition, numerous Democrats lined up in 
opposition, including Richard Holbrooke, Joe Biden and Tom Daschle; and 43 Democrats 
in the Senate also opposed John Bolton’s appointment as Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security.
179
 Abrogation of the ABM treaty was important for 
neoconservatives to develop a system of missile defence, in addition to being symbolic of 
the fact that the United States would not rely on “a web of parchment accords” for its 
security but its own military strength (Schmitt, 2001b). 
 
Unsurprisingly, given his earlier association with the idea of unipolarity, Krauthammer 
(2001e; 2001c) was a keen supporter for a wider unilateralism in US foreign policy, and 
especially scathing toward European opposition to Bush, describing European nations as 
states that had “spent the better part of the last 500 years raping and pillaging vast swaths 
of the globe”. In addition to it constraining US freedom of action, he argued that a 
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 Bolton, like Rumsfeld, is best considered a conservative nationalist ally of neoconservatism. Bolton is a 
strict national-interest conservative and argues that humanitarian issues, promoting liberal democracy, and 
the nature of foreign regimes are of little importance for the conduct of US foreign policy (Lynch, 2005). 
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convincing case had been made by Douglas Feith that, the US was legally freed from the 
ABM Treaty with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
180
 Neoconservatives did not argue that 
the US should maintain its current number of nuclear weapons, indeed they explicitly 
called for a reduction in nuclear weapons. It was, however, to be done on American terms, 
and not subject to multilateral arms control agreements that did little to monitor or punish 
states with malign intentions (Krauthammer, 2001g). Yet, in their support for various 
unilateral action, whether on the ABM Treaty, Kyoto or the International Criminal Court, 
neoconservatives cautioned against justifying unilateralism solely on the grounds of 
narrow national interest. They were critical of Bush for reaching for “small-minded 
America First arguments” instead of arguments of the wider damage to other countries of 
such policies (Gedmin and Schmitt, 2001). Often, neoconservatives were not against 
multilateralism per se, as Krauthammer often appeared, but were against specific 
multilateral treaties, and the United Nations in particular given their argument that the UN 
treated democracies and dictatorships alike. As we have seen earlier, neoconservatives 
were strong supporters of multilateralism in its NATO guise and were keen on exporting 
such a model for East Asian democracies.
181
 
 
The eight months before the 9/11 terrorist attacks should not be viewed as a period of 
significant ideological evolution for neoconservatism. The agenda had largely been set 
during Clinton’s second term, and in evaluating President Bush against it, the 
administration had often been found wanting. American benevolent hegemony in the 
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 Coupled with the rejection of the ABM Treaty, the administration’s refusal to push the Senate to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol on global warming was also held up by Krauthammer as an important step in protecting US 
interests, as the treaty excluded China and India. 
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 Even the phrase ‘coalition of the willing’ which has come to be associated with neoconservative thinking 
on the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, has been criticised by neoconservatives as a far from ideal situation, 
and that multilateral interventions through NATO were preferable (R. Kagan and Asmus, 2002; W. Kristol, 
2003c). Robert Kagan (2001h; 2001i) has also argued that to rhetorically favour unilateralism could be 
damaging as the US needed strategic alliances to retain its pre-eminence, although such alliances should 
always be preceded by American “unilateral determination to act”. 
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service of the national interest and ambitious universal ideals continued to be emphasised 
although there remained a reticence to use direct hard military power, even with Iraq. An 
example of how far neoconservatism had travelled since Kirkpatrick’s ‘Dictatorships and 
Double Standards’ article had advocated that the US support friendly autocracies in 1979, 
came in a Washington Post op-ed in June 2001. Kirkpatrick in a joint article with Richard 
Holbrooke (2001), appealed to President Bush and NATO for greater action in the 
Balkans. NATO needed to finish the job it had started, to maintain security, and to protect 
human rights and build democratic institutions. NATO had kept peace and stability in the 
Balkans and now needed to continue to do so and stop instability spreading to Macedonia. 
This was extraordinary, firstly, for the fact that Kirkpatrick wrote a joint piece with 
Holbrooke at all; and secondly, for the reality that ten years earlier, when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, she initially argued that the US should not use military force against Saddam 
Hussein in what was arguably a much clearer breach of American security interests.
182
 
 
Neoconservatives, in this period, continued to articulate a highly moralised discourse, with 
clear links to issues that motivated their allies in the Christian Right, and supported Bush’s 
domestic agenda. William Kristol argued that the goal for President Bush should not 
simply have been to ape Reagan’s achievements in cutting taxes or a strong foreign policy: 
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 By contrast, Krauthammer (2001c) remained at this time exceedingly critical of US action in the Balkans 
and argued it remained a prime example of the follies of American interventionism in peripheral areas of the 
world. 
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Tax cuts are good, and missile defense is important – but they are 
traditional, Reagan-era agenda items. If this president is to have a distinctive 
legacy, it’s likely to be that he brought an end to decades of government 
hostility to religion and inaugurated a neo-Tocquevillian era in which 
religion and liberty,pluralism and faith are no longer at odds...And the 
administration needs to begin explaining to the American people its broader 
intention to re-link liberty to morality, rights to faith. 
 
  (W. Kristol, 2001a: emphasis added) 
 
This excerpt is crucial for understanding the state of neoconservatism at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. Foreign affairs were only a part of a broader political ideology 
that was seeking to reverse what it saw as four decades of social liberalism that had 
alienated notions of freedom from morality and religious faith. While Kristol directed his 
comments to domestic politics, the ramifications for US foreign policy were clear. The 
neoconservatives were not seeking to just re-link liberty to morality, but liberty and 
morality to the US national interest and its foreign policy. Even the more national-interest 
based neoconservatives such as Krauthammer (2001b) were calling for a greater influence 
of religious discourse in the public square. He described it as a “great day” when Joe 
Lieberman was nominated as the Democratic Party’s candidate for vice-president in 2000 
due to his unabashed discussion of his faith, and came to a vigorous defence of John 
Ashcroft, Bush’s nominee for Attorney General, when he was criticised on account of his 
religious views. According to Krauthammer (2001b), “the American experiment has 
always recognized its source in the transcendent”. 
 
Neoconservative support for the Christian Right manifested itself not simply in the realm 
of the abstract or esoteric, but in actual support for policies that energised religious 
conservatives. Elliott Abrams (2001) took up the case of Sudan, where the government in 
Khartoum had been bombing largely Christian targets in the south of the country. Abrams 
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argued that the US should support a strict sanctions framework against the regime, and that 
if it failed, that Washington should support the opposition and force regime change, or 
divide the country in two. He drew parallels with the British Empire ending the slave trade 
in the nineteenth century as an example of what the US should be using its unrivalled 
power to emulate, when 10% of the British naval budget was used solely to prohibit the 
slave trade from operating.
183
 In the two years between Bush’s inauguration and the Iraq 
War, William Kristol authored at least ten separate articles in the Weekly Standard arguing 
for the banning of cloning and embryonic stem-cell research, in addition to co-editing a 
book on the subject in 2002 with Eric Cohen (W. Kristol, 2001c; 2001h; 2002d; 2002e; 
2002i; 2002k; E. Cohen and Kristol, 2001a; 2001b; 2002; Bottum and Kristol, 2001)
184
 At 
first glance, it may seem that there are few links between Kristol’s support for a ban on 
cloning and embryonic experimentation on the one hand, and support for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq on the other. Kristol, however, argued after 9/11 that Osama bin 
Laden and Michael West, the President of Advanced Cell Technology both represented 
significant threats to the United States. Terrorism and stem-cell research were both “grave 
threats to a dignified human future.” The extract below from an article he co-authored with 
Eric Cohen is worth quoting at length as possibly the best example of how Kristol’s 
approach to foreign affairs fused neoconservatism’s foreign policy vision with traditional 
social conservative concerns. 
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 The enduring status of William Wilberforce’s campaign to abolish the slave trade, as perhaps the leading 
example of faith-based conservative political action, meant Abrams argument was particularly potent for 
generating foreign policy synergies with the Christian Right. Please see John Piper (2007) Amazing Grace in 
the Life of William Wilberforce (Wheaton, IL, Crossway) and Eric Metaxas (2007) Amazing Grace: William 
Wilberforce and the Heroic Campaign to End Slavery (New York, HarperCollins).   
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 For the edited collection of essays please see William Kristol and Eric Cohen (eds.) (2002) The Future is 
Now: America Confronts the New Genetics (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield).  
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Perhaps it is significant that the genetic challenge and the challenge of   
terrorism seem to have arrived together. For both require us to confront 
fundamental questions about life and death, good and evil, civilization and 
barbarism. The new genetics leads us to expect an indefinite extension of 
life, to believe that medical science may one day smooth the jagged edges of 
our morality. Terrorism confronts us with the permanent fragility of life, and 
with the destruction that modern technology, in the hands of evildoers, can 
unleash upon its creators. 
 
  (E. Cohen and Kristol, 2001b). 
 
 
 
First generation neoconservatives also embraced a similar construction. In perhaps the 
only theological commentary on the Hebrew Bible to link a discussion of the minor 
prophets with Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler, Norman Podhoretz (2002c: 
326-359) argued that a passage in the book of Jeremiah was the “the greatest warning 
against appeasement ever made.” He further stated that moral and spiritual laws governing 
the earth were as binding as the laws of physics on the natural world, and attacked what he 
perceived to be the prevailing antinomianism and relativism of Western society since the 
1960s. Again, as Kristol did in the passage quoted above, he linked domestic moral 
concerns with foreign policy and argued that the Western embrace of a new form of 
Paganism was leading the US to become vulnerable from outside threats. 
 
5.4 The Road to Iraq 
5.4.1 Post-9/11: Afghanistan and the War on Terror 
Written the week before Al Qaeda’s assault on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, 
but not published in the Weekly Standard until after the terrorist attacks, David Brooks’ 
‘Farewell to Greatness’ (2001b) is illuminating as to the state of neoconservatism at this 
pivotal moment in American history. Discussing US foreign policy through the prism of 
popular entertainment, Brooks bemoaned the fact that Star Trek and Gilligan’s Island had 
been replaced by the Simpsons and the X-Files as popular programmes that had caught 
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something of the zeitgeist. Captain Kirk’s intergalactic mission to depose tyrants and 
create liberal democracy, despite the restrictions of the multilateral ‘Prime Directive’, had 
captured the imagination of Americans during their Cold War battle with the Soviet Union. 
But by the 1990s, in the Simpsons and the X-Files, the American mission had been buried 
under a tide of multicultural globalisation and government conspiracy. These shifts in 
popular culture pointed to an America that had lost confidence in its ability to project its 
power and values overseas, and now felt threatened by outside forces. The terrorist attacks 
out of the clear blue sky on that late summer morning in 2001 were therefore significant in 
two ways. The American public now felt threatened like they had not been since the Cold 
War, and instead of being passive, were looking for leadership to avenge the victims of the 
terrorist attacks. There was wider public support for a more bellicose foreign policy from 
the American government, than there had been pre-9/11, and almost certainly a greater 
tolerance for American battlefield casualties. Secondly, the threat to the US from radical 
Islamist terrorism was all too apparent. The potential cost to the US of not embracing the 
ambitious foreign policy agenda that they had charted in the second half of the 1990s, now 
reduced the threshold for the use of direct hard military power to achieve their goals. 
Confronting rogue states, promoting liberal democracy and human rights, and raising 
military spending to protect the national interest had all been significant weapons in the 
neoconservative armoury pre-9/11. How much harder would neoconservatives press for 
these policies to be pursued now that it had been catastrophically proven that the US faced 
a significant threat from terrorists and their state sponsors? 
 
In the pre-9/11 era, the bulk of neoconservative foreign policy analysis was focused on the 
threat to the US posed from China, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The threat from terrorism 
directly to the US homeland was not a major feature of their articles and essays, nor was 
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an in-depth discussion of the Taliban in Afghanistan often proffered. In Present Dangers 
at the end of 2000, Afghanistan was barely mentioned as representing a threat to the US; 
Al Qaeda did not feature in the index; and Osama bin Laden was only discussed as a 
secondary feature of the chapter on Iran (Gerecht, 2000: 136-137).
185
 Reuel Marc Gerecht 
– a former CIA officer who headed up PNAC’s Middle East Initiative – penned the few 
neoconservative articles in the Weekly Standard pre-9/11 that explicitly dealt with the 
threat posed by Islamist terror to the United States.  In March 2001, he argued (2001a) that 
the US had been slow to comprehend the international dimension to what was occurring in 
Afghanistan and that it was in the US interest to “put Mr. Bin Laden out of business”. By 
July, (2001c) in reference to bin Laden, he suggested that the “Saudi militant is 
unquestionably going to come at us again”, although he argued that he would most likely 
strike against US interests in the Third World. He further warned that Al Qaeda was 
learning to fight alongside Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and terrorist sleeper cells were 
almost certainly part of bin Laden’s plans against the US. Bin Laden was set on defeating 
the forces of secular, liberal democracy in the Middle East, and in a prophetic warning 
Gerecht argued that the “Taliban chieftain Mullah Omar ought to discover that dead 
Americans mean cruise missiles coming through his bedroom window and cluster bombs 
all over his frontline troops”. Daniel Pipes (2001) also wrote on bin Laden and the terrorist 
threat before 9/11, although often his main focus was on what the US should do with 
reference to Palestinian terrorism against Israeli citizens. After a long list of terrorist 
attacks, Pipes stated that Islamism now represented a serious “global threat” and the US 
needed to devote more resources to combating it. By the end of May 2001, Pipes, in the 
Wall Street Journal, argued that bin Laden had terrorist sleeper cells in at least six 
American cities. In perhaps one of the earliest examples of what later became part of the 
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threat posed by terrorists to the American homeland was not a major theme in any of the major foreign 
policy schools across the political spectrum.   
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Bush Doctrine, he further argued that the US needed to embrace a military strategy rather 
than a law enforcement paradigm, and explicitly target regimes that harboured terrorists 
that threatened the US, not just the terrorists themselves (Emerson and Pipes, 2001). 
 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the threat from Al Qaeda was not primarily 
conceptualised as a threat from Islam on the West, but through the neoconservative trope 
of an assault on morality. Islam was not the enemy per se, it was nihilism. This had echoes 
of earlier neoconservative opposition to the 1960s counterculture, Soviet totalitarianism, 
and relativist social liberalism during the culture wars of the 1990s. Neoconservatives 
wrote of their fears of Al Qaeda acquiring weapons of mass destruction, as “nihilism will 
soon be armed with the ultimate weapons of annihilation...the nihilist will have the means 
to match his ends” (Krauthammer, 2001l: emphasis added). Neoconservatives were 
obviously far from alone in expressing that the acts of terrorism of 9/11 were immoral. 
They were, however, more comfortable in using a moralised discourse with reference to 
the war on terror and frequently using terms such as “good” and “evil”. The war on terror 
was not solely conceptualised as a traditional battle over resources or more tangible 
national interests, but as a far more ideological, moral struggle for the survival of Western 
“civilization” (Krauthammer, 2001l). Podhoretz (2001) wrote of the “soul” of the US 
being at stake, that there needed to be a “new birth” in American confidence, and the US 
needed to avoid both the “moral and intellectual confusion” of being in alliance with 
unsavoury regimes. Brooks (2001c; 2001d: emphasis added) argued that the US needed to 
explicitly conceptualise the use of force in its foreign policy in “moral terms” and that 
“good people must exercise power over destructive people.” This contrasted with the 
radical Left which neoconservatives perceived to always be arguing that virtue resided 
with the powerless against the powerful. He also praised President Bush’s performance a 
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month after 9/11 for producing “every idea” as “infused with moral purpose”. The 
American people wanted Bush to be Rudi Giuliani “on a global scale”.  
 
On 12 September, the Washington Post published Robert Kagan’s immediate response 
(2001h) to the terrorist attacks.
186
 He expressed the need for the US to confront terrorism 
with “moral clarity and courage”. This moral clarity, however, was not to be directed 
solely at the terrorist perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, but the governments that supported 
them. The US needed to prepare for war against one or more such regimes (Krauthammer, 
2001h). The case for doing so could not be oversimplified, argued Krauthammer (2001i), 
as there had almost never been such a clear case of good and evil. It was not a time for 
“agonized relativism” but for “clarity”. He stated that those who searched for greyness and 
shades of wrongdoing instead of the stark black and white, good and evil, were to use 
Lance Morrow’s phrase, “too philosophical for decent company”. Post-9/11, Krauthammer 
moved much closer toward William Kristol’s and Robert Kagan’s foreign policy approach. 
Whereas before he had been highly critical of nation-building, ten days after 9/11, he 
claimed (2001i; 2001m) that the US had saved Bosnia and Kosovo from Serbian 
aggression, then later that he now supported nation-building in “places that count”. He still 
occasionally objected to what he described as a “liberationist” rationale for action in 
Afghanistan. After 9/11, however, and as became even clearer with Iraq, he undoubtedly 
shifted to a position where he justified the use of US power abroad on the grounds of 
promoting liberal democracy and humanitarian causes, and explicitly advocated 
democratic peace theory (Krauthammer, 2001k; 2002a; 2002c). The argument that 9/11 
changed everything for the neoconservatives by rallying them to the nation-building and 
democratization cause is almost certainly an overstatement (Balint, 2010: 186). It was, 
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 Kagan’s column actually first appeared on the Washington Post website on the afternoon of September 11 
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however, somewhat closer to the truth for Krauthammer, and to a lesser extent Wolfowitz 
and Perle, than other neoconservatives. 
 
On 20 September, President Bush addressed a special joint session of Congress demanding 
that the Taliban break all ties to Al Qaeda and hand over terrorists to the United States or 
face the consequences (G. W. Bush, 2001). The same day, PNAC published a letter in 
support, written to the president and signed by a panoply of neoconservatives including 
first generation neoconservatives such as Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, Donald Kagan, and 
sympathetic liberal internationalists including Martin Peretz, the editor of the New 
Republic, and Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY). The letter called for five foreign 
policy measures in response to the terrorist atrocities: capture or kill bin Laden, destroy Al 
Qaeda and give military assistance to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan; use military force 
to support the Iraqi opposition to topple Saddam Hussein even without a link between Iraq 
and 9/11; demand Iran and Syria cut links with Hezbollah and threaten retaliation if they 
did not; support Israel as an ally in the war against terrorism; and introduce a large defence 
spending increase (Project for the New American Century, 2001). This was the first such 
letter or statement signed by a group of leading neoconservative intellectuals that PNAC 
had produced for over two years.  
 
The two months between the collapse of the World Trade Center and the abandonment of 
Kabul by the Taliban regime on 12 November was a period of heated debate over the most 
appropriate response from the US. There were wider arguments surrounding how far the 
war on terror should be broadened and what countries should also be considered targets, 
most notably Iraq. There were also more strategic and tactical issues to be resolved with 
Afghanistan. How much should the US rely on airpower versus ground troops? What 
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would be the role of Special Forces versus more conventional army battalions? What was 
the status of the Northern Alliance, and how far should the United States be seen to be in 
alliance with it? What was the favoured post-war outcome: a sympathetic strongman or 
liberal democracy?
187
 From the very first days of the Afghanistan campaign, 
neoconservative tensions with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld were apparent.
188
 
Neoconservative opposition to Colin Powell is well known, and William Kristol (2001d) 
argued in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that Powell was trying to undermine Bush by 
drawing a distinction between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Equally importantly, however, 
was the divergence between neoconservatives and Secretary Rumsfeld and the Pentagon 
more broadly after 9/11 (Feith, 2011; W. Kristol, 2011). Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon 
with plans for a particular interpretation of the pre-existing Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA). The Rumsfeld Doctrine expressed the Secretary of Defence’s proclivity for a 
leaner army, with more emphasis on technology and utilisation of special forces. At the 
same time as Rumsfeld articulated this, neoconservatives were pulling exactly the opposite 
way. Nations could not be built on a foundation of night-vision goggles, hi-tech precision 
bombing, and low numbers of troops. William Kristol (2001f) argued that novelty in 
warfare had been overstated, and a traditional commitment of a large number of ground 
troops may be needed to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban (F. W. Kagan, 2002).
189
 To 
make possible the widespread use of ground troops in the war on terror, neoconservatives 
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 A strange feature of the popular impression of Rumsfeld is that he is usually considered a 
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for overwhelming force than the light military footprint of the Rumsfeld Doctrine. 
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continued to make calls for increased spending for the Department of Defense (R. Kagan 
and Kristol, 2001h; Donnelly, 2001). During the first few weeks of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, heavy reliance was placed on aerial bombing against Taliban and Al Qaeda 
targets. Their initial intransigence, however, in the face of American airpower led to early 
doubts about the initial strategy pursued by the Bush administration, and increased 
neoconservative calls for the swift introduction of US ground forces to quickly expel the 
Taliban from Kabul. At the end of October, William Kristol (2001g) argued that President 
Bush had unnecessarily restricted US operations to bombing campaigns alone, and that 
these would not suffice to bring about the desired outcome. Even by the middle of 
November, with the Taliban fleeing Kabul, neoconservatives called for more US ground 
troops. The US needed to insert the Tenth Mountain Division and two Marine infantry 
battalions into Afghanistan to mark “the beginning of our involvement in Afghanistan” 
and needed to be involved with “[s]ecuring the country, creating a state” (Schmitt and 
Donnelly, 2001f). Although neoconservatives were not supporters of Rumsfeld’s light 
footprint approach, they at least appreciated his more aggressive posture on Afghanistan 
compared with Powell and Haass at the State Department. Foggy Bottom’s softly, softly, 
‘build-a-coalition’ approach was making it less likely that the US could quickly depose the 
Taliban. The US needed to make a “major deployment of American ground troops” to 
“make Afghanistan a terrorist-free zone” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001l). The military was 
also heavily criticised, especially General Tommy Franks, who they viewed as more 
interested in the exit strategy for Afghanistan than defeating the Taliban and liberating 
Afghanistan (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001m; E. A. Cohen, 2011).
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 The relationship between the top military brass and neoconservatives was often strained. An oft-quoted 
example of this was General Franks’ assessment of Douglas Feith: “I have to deal with the f****** stupidest 
guy on the face of the earth almost every day” (Franks quoted in Woodward, 2004: 281). A more subtle, and 
certainly more highbrow, example was Eliot Cohen’s 2002, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and 
Leadership in Wartime (New York, Free Press). Cohen’s thesis stated that the best civilian political leaders 
involved themselves in military decision making, and did not delegate all decisions to the military (E. A. 
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Exit strategies were not the priority for neoconservatives in Afghanistan. Nation-building 
was instead their central focus. The US needed to topple terrorist-supporting regimes like 
the Taliban in Afghanistan then provide long-term security to “allow nation-building to 
proceed in those countries where terrorists once found haven” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 
2002b). Max Boot (2001) argued that what Afghanistan needed was not simply a large US 
invasion force but “the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-
confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets”. Boot, a Russian émigré and at 32, the 
youngest member of the neoconservative foreign policy establishment, stated that the 
problem of Afghanistan was the United States’ precipitous pull-out after 1989. He argued 
from the examples of Bosnia, East Timor, Cambodia and Kosovo that Afghanistan could 
effectively become a de facto “ward” of the international community under US leadership. 
The goal in Afghanistan was not simply to topple the Taliban and Al Qaeda and cut-and-
run but “feed the hungry, tend the sick, and impose the rule of law”. Other 
neoconservatives warned of the dangers of the “pseudo-realpolitik contempt for nation-
building” which had been seen previously in sections of the Republican Party (W. Kristol, 
2001f).  
 
From the very first few days after 9/11, however, the neoconservative focus had turned 
toward military action against Iraq. The War in Afghanistan was portrayed as analogous to 
the North African Campaign during World War Two (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2001k). 
Fighting Rommel’s Panzer divisions in the Libyan deserts was all well and good, but it 
was never going to be the decisive blow in defeating Hitler’s Third Reich. Kagan and 
Kristol argued that the United States was now involved in a “clash of civilizations”, which 
would require the application of American power across Central Asia and the Middle East 
                                                                                                                                                   
Cohen, 2002: 14). Regardless of the truth of Cohen’s thesis, it was hardly likely to endear neoconservatives 
to the uniformed top brass at the Pentagon. According to reports, Supreme Command, was read by President 
Bush in the summer of 2002 (Weisman, 2002). 
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and beyond just the opening salvo in Afghanistan. Neoconservatives identified Iraq as the 
next step in the campaign after Afghanistan; the country in which the nexus between 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and an authoritarian state was most evident. Iraq 
represented an ideal test-case for the neoconservatives to prove their argument that 
American interests and ideals were not mutually exclusive. Toppling Saddam Hussein 
would remove a threat to the national security of the US and the states of the Middle East, 
in addition to giving the US the opportunity to bring democracy and human rights to the 
heart of the Arab world. 
 
5.4.2 Post-9/11: Iraq and the War on Terror  
Regime change in Iraq along the lines of the Wolfowitz Plan had been supported since it 
was developed during Clinton’s second term. The seven and a half month period of the 
Bush administration before the September 11 attacks did not witness any significant 
alteration to this position, only the occasional re-stating of it. In March, Kagan and Kristol 
(2001c) accused Bush of following Clinton’s “feckless approach to Iraq”, and embracing 
containment instead of regime-change. Powell’s recent announcement of dropping most 
sanctions on Iraq in favour of ‘smart’ sanctions was described as “a retreat”. Then in May, 
Reuel Marc Gerecht (2001b), again explicitly restated the Wolfowitz Plan for establishing 
protected zones in Iraq from which Chalabi and the Iraqi opposition, under a US security 
umbrella, could attempt to overthrow the Baathist regime.
191
 A combination of ideological 
and material factors since the end of the Cold War had brought the neoconservatives to the 
verge of advocating direct US military force to bring about regime change in Iraq. The art 
of the counterfactual does not sit easily within political science, yet, without the September 
11 terrorist attacks as the final piece in the ‘jigsaw’ of the evolution of post-Cold War 
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 Gerecht (2001b) argued that 50,000 troops or two divisions of the US army would be needed to help 
topple Saddam Hussein, but at no point did he suggest they would march on Baghdad, only that they would 
support the Iraqis to liberate themselves. 
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neoconservatism, it is a matter of some conjecture whether neoconservatives would have 
deviated from continuing to advocate the Wolfowitz Plan during Bush’s first term.  
 
Within a few months of 9/11, neoconservatives had concluded Saddam Hussein’s regime 
could no longer be tolerated. The US could not afford to wait and rely on the Iraqi 
opposition forces to secure its policy goals in Iraq. For many neoconservatives, it was less 
a case of months, and more one of weeks or days. Paul Wolfowitz had stated on the record 
at his nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Forces Committee (2001a) in February 
that he had “never” supported a US invasion in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. This was 
technically true in respect that he had not called for US troops to literally fight their way to 
Saddam Hussein’s presidential palace in Baghdad, but he had favoured US support for the 
Iraqi opposition to do precisely that. According to reports, however, at the very first senior 
level meeting of the Bush administration after 9/11 at Camp David, Wolfowitz made the 
case for expanding the war on terror to encompass removing Saddam Hussein from power 
(Woodward, 2002: 83-86).
192
 Given that Saddam Hussein had proven links to Islamist 
terrorists, it was illogical argued Wolfowitz, to circumscribe the use of US military force 
to Afghanistan. The logic of removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan also meant 
Saddam Hussein should be removed from power. Wolfowitz’s opening gambit in the 
Laurel Lodge at Camp David was followed five days later by PNAC’s letter to President 
Bush.  The letter, even after 9/11, still backed the more limited Wolfowitz Plan rather than 
a more ambitious US invasion of Baghdad. It was significant, however, for linking 
Saddam Hussein to terrorism. The letter argued that even if Saddam Hussein’s fingerprints 
were not directly on the 9/11 attacks, the US needed to remove him from power with the 
help of Iraqi opposition due to his more general sponsorship of Islamist terror. 
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 Emphasis has been placed on the Camp David meeting on 15 September, but Wolfowitz had also in 
hinted at a much wider campaign than simply Afghanistan in a series of media briefings over the previous 
two days (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001; Mann, 2004: 300-301). 
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Neoconservatives were understandably keen to search for any evidence that would directly 
tie Saddam Hussein to 9/11.
193
 Their case for removing Saddam, however, rested on a 
wider calculus of terrorism and state sponsorship than simply 9/11. PNAC’s letter quoted 
Colin Powell’s observation that Saddam Hussein was “one of the leading terrorists on the 
face of the Earth” (Project for the New American Century, 2001). If 9/11 had shown what 
terrorists were capable of when backed by a barely functioning state in Afghanistan, the 
potential threat posed by the nexus between terrorism and a more modern state with a 
history of using weapons of mass destruction like Iraq was even greater. 
 
By the end of September and into October, neoconservatives began to conceive of regime 
change in Iraq as a direct result of a full-scale American invasion that went beyond merely 
supporting the Iraqi opposition. It was argued that bin Laden and Al Qaeda should be the 
first target, but the “larger campaign must also go after Saddam Hussein...to preempt and 
strike first.” The US could easily defeat Saddam Hussein’s regime, and then the bigger 
challenge would be occupying Iraq after the war and maintaining a constabulary force 
there (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2001e). Kagan and Kristol (2001i) argued that the Iraqi 
opposition should be backed by the US to topple Saddam, and that it was illogical if Iraq 
did not share the same fate as Afghanistan, especially given the regime’s WMD history. 
They crucially now added, however, that regime change must occur “if necessary, by using 
American military force”. The type of military force required to remove Saddam Hussein’s 
regime from power would be a large number of ground troops “killing our enemies until 
they surrender” (W. Kristol, 2001e).  
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 Among the most controversial examples is that of the AEI researcher, Laurie Mylroie (2001) who 
attempted to draw connections between Saddam Hussein and the 1993 World Trade Center Attack, the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, the attacks of September 11, and various anthrax attacks in the US shortly after 
September 11. Justin Vaïsse (2010: 262-263) argues Mylroie had “an increasing weakness for conspiracy 
theory”. Neoconservatives also repeated the accusation that Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks 
had met Iraqi intelligence agents in Prague in April 2001, although this was later disputed as a case of 
mistaken identity involving other individuals of the same name (W. Kristol, 2001g).  
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Not one of the neoconservatives conceptualised the appropriate American response to 9/11 
as being restricted to military action in Afghanistan. Krauthammer (2001j) published a 
road map for the war on terrorism at the end of September. Stage one involved destroying 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; stage two, a concerted effort by the US to 
persuade Syria to cut all links to terrorist groups; the goal of stage three was to press for 
regime change in Iran and Iraq. He argued that change was possible from within in the 
former, but increasingly unlikely to occur in such a fashion in the latter. Regime change 
would need to be provided by outside forces to topple the “most dangerous terrorist regime 
in the world”.  For Eliot Cohen (2001a) the 9/11 attacks had instituted World War IV – the 
Cold War was World War III – and the war on terrorism was a war on militant Islam.194 
The West was accused of consistently failing to understand the ideological roots of 
conflict. Afghanistan would prove that the US could crush Al Qaeda and the United States 
then needed to “mobilize in earnest” and target other regimes that sponsored terrorism, 
most notably Iraq. Iraq had links to Al Qaeda, a proven record of WMD usage, and had 
attempted to assassinate a former US president in Kuwait. It was now time for the US to 
make up for a wasted decade of flying cruise missiles into empty buildings. In addition to 
the action being necessary, Cohen further argued that it would be easy for the US to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power. Iraq’s defence budget was 0.5% that of the US, and 
its army one third of the size it had been in 1991 when the US-led allied effort had 
obliterated the Iraqi army with much less technologically advanced weaponry than was 
now in its possession. Cohen (2001b) argued that a large ground force would still, 
nonetheless, need to be used, but not of the same size as Operation Desert Storm in 1991. 
Cohen’s assessment of the relative ease with which the Baathist regime in Iraq could be 
toppled by American power was particularly important given his status as a leading 
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 Norman Podhoretz (2002a: 27) has become more associated with the idea of the war on terror being 
World War IV, but he attributed the idea to Cohen. 
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academic authority on military history and strategy. As an example of Cohen’s standing 
among neoconservatives, on the dust jacket of Cohen’s Supreme Command, William 
Kristol wrote that if he could only advise President Bush to read one book, that would be 
it. 
 
The distinctiveness of the neoconservative position on Iraq was not simply predicated on 
the idea that the US needed to preemptively combat terrorists, their state sponsors and the 
WMD threat. Indeed, such a construction could be made firmly on the grounds of a strict, 
limited parsing of the national interest, and from well within the realist school. Henry 
Kissinger, for example, the arch-proponent of the realpolitik that many neoconservatives 
found objectionable, has continued to back the Iraq War on such grounds, and the need to 
humiliate radical Islam (Woodward, 2006: 408-409; Krauthammer, 2002d; W. Kristol, 
2002l).
195
 The neoconservative case for an American invasion of Iraq, however, made 
consistent appeals to the need for American foreign policy to promote liberal democratic 
norms in Iraq. Justification for this was based on humanitarian solidarity with victims of a 
brutal totalitarian dictatorship coupled with the transformative power of liberal democracy. 
US power could be used to topple Saddam Hussein and in doing so, help create a new, 
more pacific order in the Middle East which would be more sympathetic to American 
interests.  
 
5.4.3 Transformative Liberal Democracy and Human Rights 
Following the Bush administration’s ham-fisted attempts to manage the aftermath of the 
Iraq War, some neoconservatives have attempted to downplay any suggestion that their 
rationale for the US invasion was anything other than an expression of the national 
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 Kissinger often supported President Bush throughout his two terms, even with his liberationist rhetoric, 
which he viewed as important for generating public support to combat America’s enemies and play 
traditional power politics (Woodward, 2006: 409). 
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security interests of the United States.
196
 Perle (2005: 53; 2011) argues that at no point in 
the run-up to the Iraq War did neoconservatives state that democracy could be imposed on 
Iraq by military means, and it is a caricature to suggest that the Bush Doctrine involved a 
democratic crusade. Douglas Feith (2008: 234; 2011) has made the case that neither 
President Bush nor the neoconservatives advocated the Iraq War on grounds of spreading 
liberal democracy. Two points are pertinent in regard to this. If the Bush administration’s 
effort in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 was the advert for imposing democracy on a rogue 
state, it was perhaps understandable, that some neoconservatives later sought to distance 
themselves from it. Secondly, the dichotomy that Feith raises in his memoirs between 
going to war to impose democracy, and going to war to defeat an enemy for reasons of 
national security and then attempting to make that country democratic, is not nearly as 
stark as he has presented (Feith, 2008: 234). To advocate regime change, it is somewhat 
illogical to conclude that the one advocating the policy has not considered what type of 
regime will replace the outgoing one, and thus in doing so forms part of the logic for the 
argument to change the regime in the first place. Liberal democracy was not some sort of 
afterthought for the neoconservatives after Saddam Hussein had been toppled, but an 
intrinsic factor in the calculus to use military force to topple the regime. Neoconservatives 
spent the eighteen months between the attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq War making the case 
for the United States military to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and replace 
it with a liberal democratic regime which would both improve the lives of Iraqi citizens 
and trigger a wider democratic transformation across the Middle East. This was, of course, 
framed with reference to the national security of the United States. This should not detract 
from the fact, however, that their emphases on humanitarian causes, liberal democracy and 
American power were novel, distinguished them from other schools of foreign policy, and 
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 Ironically, this has numbered neoconservatives alongside their more radical critics on the Left who have 
argued that neoconservatism has never been really concerned with humanitarian issues and the promotion of 
liberal democratic norms.  
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were the culmination of ideas which had evolved from much more realist premises at the 
end of the Cold War.  
 
The issue of Iraq was seldom treated by neoconservatives in isolation. Saddam Hussein’s 
regime was not presented as one circumscribed threat to US national security. It was, 
instead, always framed after 9/11 as either one front in the wider war on terrorism – as the 
next stage after Afghanistan – or was framed as the crucial first step in a wider democratic 
transformation of the Middle East. Unsurprisingly, given their instrumental role in the 
evolution of neoconservative thought during Clinton’s second term, Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol (2001k) were the first neoconservatives to explore the potential 
transformative effects of liberal democracy in the Middle East after 9/11. At the end of 
October, they argued that the United States should have stopped propping up moderate 
dictatorships in the Arab world a long time ago, and that the US needed to push for 
democratic change in the Middle East just as it had attempted to do in other regions of the 
world. The significance of the ending of the Cold War was highlighted as it “lowered the 
risk of promoting reform.”197 The US had missed a crucial moment in history over the 
previous decade when the demise of the USSR meant that it could have more forcefully 
pushed for democratic change. It was time to abandon the “tiptoe through the tulips” 
approach of the State Department. Removing Saddam Hussein, according to Eliot Cohen 
(2001b), offered the United States the opportunity to remove a “monster” and to replace 
his regime with a more “moderate influence on the region”. What Cohen hoped for 
however, was not simply a moderating influence on the Middle East, but for regime 
change in Iraq to “begin a transformation of the Middle East that could provide many 
                                                 
197
 The significance of the end of the Cold War cannot be overstated. Max Boot (2002a) argued the central 
Cold War policies of deterrence and containment were not the policies of choice for the United States, but 
necessitated by the strength of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR meant the logic of that necessity 
had been shattered. 
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benefits to the populations of an unfree region” and “make us infinitely more secure at 
home.” Cohen’s construction is significant for viewing regime-change in Baghdad as an 
important step for improving human conditions in Iraq and the wider region, which would 
have spill-over effects in making the US safer. American security was effectively being 
presented as in a symbiotic relationship with the populations of the Middle East. The freer 
the Arab people became; the safer the American people were. The root cause of terrorism 
for neoconservatives was autocracy and tyranny where the grievances of the people went 
unaddressed, leading to rage and fanaticism among sections of the population. It was only 
in democracies that people learned to compromise and embrace moderation. 
Neoconservatives concluded 2001 arguing that the US needed to pursue a strategy of 
fomenting political change in the Middle East through a combination of military and non-
military measures with the clear principle in mind that “the more terror-loving tyrannies 
the United States can topple the better.” This would be better for the populations of the 
tyrannies that were toppled and the populations in other states who would be emboldened 
and inspired to press for democratic change (Muravchik, 2001; 2011).  
 
With such an ambitious agenda for the United States, the need for decisive action rather 
than multilateral inaction was a frequent neoconservative trope. Whether the US acted 
unilaterally or not was not the defining issue, indeed, it was compared to having the same 
relevance as whether a pitcher in baseball was right or left handed (Brooks, 2001e). 
Neoconservatives were keen on the multilateralism inherent in NATO but were extremely 
concerned about a US-led, Arab-based coalition to prosecute the war on terror and topple 
Saddam Hussein. Kagan and Kristol (2001j) described such an attempt as “a coalition of 
the wicked”. Podhoretz (2002a) warned Bush about getting too close to morally dubious 
regimes in his quest to meet other objectives. The grand strategy for US foreign policy 
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should, instead, be a wider transformation of the Middle East, not allying the US to 
regimes that were only marginally less morally bankrupt than Saddam Hussein’s. 
Podhoretz’s transformation over the previous decade had been extraordinary. From 
praising Bush and Baker’s caution in the 1991 Gulf War, Podhoretz now found himself in 
the vanguard of neoconservatives calling for radical change to the status quo in the Middle 
East. The war on terror could not be won while Saddam Hussein remained in power in 
Baghdad. Although he cautioned that the US could not create fully-fledged capitalist 
democracies in the Arab world overnight, he nonetheless argued that it was not outlandish 
to expect “huge changes” in the Middle East and that “the long-delayed reform and 
modernization of Islam” was now near at hand. Podhoretz maintained that centuries of 
slow, piecemeal social reform was not needed for democracy to take root, but instead 
could happen much more quickly like in Japan and Eastern Europe. The US military could 
be needed to directly topple up to seven regimes in the Muslim world, beginning with 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
If the transformation of Middle Eastern tyrannies into democracies was not incentive 
enough for President Bush to consider removing Saddam Hussein from power, 
neoconservatives argued that even wider issues were at stake. It was suggested that what 
the United States chose to do in Iraq would “shape the contours of the emerging world 
order, perhaps for decades to come.” What was at stake was whether the twenty-first 
century world order would be favourable to the principles of liberal democracy or would 
continue to be a world where “tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international 
security hostage” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002a). Kagan, and liberal scholar, Ronald 
Asmus (2002, emphasis added) argued that the US needed to “shape a world where 
terrorists find no haven and where democratic people can flourish.” The task for this 
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American generation was analogous to that of the 1940s generation that saved liberal 
democracy during the Second World War. The US needed to pursue a policy of 
“enlightened self-interest” with the primary goal of promoting democracy throughout the 
Arab world as an “antidote to radical Islam”.  
 
The fact that Kagan co-wrote with a liberal internationalist like Asmus, who had served as 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs during Clinton’s second term, 
was significant, as had been the Holbrooke-Kirkpatrick article on the Balkans the previous 
year. The neoconservatives had certainly not written forty page articles on democratic 
peace theory for the American Political Science Review, or sparred with Doyle or Russett 
at academic conferences. Yet, although Doyle did not generally appear in the footnotes of 
Commentary or the Weekly Standard, rarely did neoconservatives venture into print in 
discussion of what US policy should be toward Iraq and the Middle East, without at least 
implicit endorsement of democratic peace theory. In addition to co-writing interventionist 
pieces with leading liberal scholars and practitioners like Asmus and Holbrooke, other 
linkages emerged. PNAC’s letters to President Bush on the war on terrorism, the defence 
budget, and Iraq, were all signed by leading liberal advocates of a muscular American 
foreign policy and the democratic peace.
198
 These individuals were not peripheral figures 
in the foreign policy-making circles of the Democratic Party. Neoconservatives built 
alliances with leading liberal interventionists to pressure President Bush to pursue a 
transformative agenda for the Middle East that was partly predicated on democratic peace 
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 Recognised liberal internationalist signatories included Martin Peretz, Editor of the New Republic; 
Stephen J. Solarz, Democratic Congressman from New York; R. James Woolsey, Director of the CIA, 1993-
1995; Ivo H. Daalder, Brookings Institution; Peter Galbraith, US Ambassador to Croatia, 1993-1998; Martin 
Indyk, US Ambassador to Israel, 1995-1997, 2000-2001; Will Marshall, President of the Progressive Policy 
Institute (PPI); Dennis Ross, President Clinton’s Middle East Envoy; Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy, 1994-2001; Philip Gordon, Brookings Institution; Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings 
Institution (Project for the New American Century, 2001; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). 
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theory which had largely been developed on the Left.
199
 Tony Smith (2007: 50, 91, 95, 
110, 180) has been scathing in his criticism of post-Cold War liberal internationalism. He 
accused the neo-Wilsonians on the Left of giving the neoconservatives “a loaded gun”, and 
that Doyle and Russett gave the Bush Doctrine a “strong intellectual undergirding” which 
it may have otherwise lacked. Smith argues that apart from Fukuyama, all the intellectual 
heavy-lifting for the neoconservative agenda during Bush’s first term did not originate on 
the Right. Liberals had spent the 1990s arguing that regimes that violated human rights 
were illegitimate; that democratic countries were more peaceable; and that democracy 
should not be limited to the West but had universal appeal. He further maintained that 
many of the policy positions taken up by PNAC had aped those produced by the PPI. 
Smith’s analysis, however, almost certainly overstates the extent to which 
neoconservatives were passive recipients of liberal ideas. Indeed, Gertrude Himmelfarb’s 
(2004) account of the Enlightenment questions whether liberal democracy as an idea itself 
should be seen as flowing from liberal Parisian salons rather than more conservative 
British, especially Scottish, sources. Nonetheless, although overstated, Smith’s analysis is 
helpful for drawing out intellectual synergies between neoconservatives and liberal 
internationalists during the post-Cold War period, and how the “first cousins” came 
together to produce the Bush Doctrine (Smith, 2007: 164). 
 
5.4.4 State of the Union to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Neoconservative advocacy of regime change for Iraq and democratic transformation across 
the Middle East largely predated the adoption of these policies by the Bush administration. 
President Bush’s State of the Union address at the end of January 2002 gained notoriety 
                                                 
199
 This is not to argue that there are, in addition, more conservative origins of the idea of the democratic 
peace, for example, Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’. And some would argue there is an almost 
common sense quality to the idea of the democratic peace. Kagan (2005b: 42) suggests that lack of 
democracy has always been seen by the US as a source of aggression. 
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for the use of the phrase, “axis of evil”, in reference to regimes like North Korea, Iran, 
Iraq, and their terrorist allies.
200
 The speech is significant, however, as much for what it did 
not say as for what it did. Although Bush argued, as previously, that the US would regard 
state sponsors of terrorism and terrorists themselves as legitimate targets, there was no 
mention of the promotion of liberal democracy or grand themes of Middle East 
transformation. Indeed, the word ‘democracy’ did not feature once in the entire speech (G. 
W. Bush, 2002a). Neoconservatives, however, applauded the speech for its moral clarity 
and robust approach to preemption in the face of threats faced by the United States, and 
continued to press the president to pursue a transformative agenda for the Middle East. 
William Kristol (2002a) argued that the speech was important for shifting the threat from 
terrorists to the regimes that sponsored them. The United States was “at war with tyranny 
in general”, especially “dangerously hostile tyrannies”. The United States was now 
required to pursue an agenda of promoting political liberty and justice across the Islamic 
world. Despite the word ‘democracy’ not appearing in the State of the Union address, 
some neoconservatives effectively acted as if it were there already. Immediately after the 
speech, promoting liberal democratic principles abroad was now seen by some as a central 
feature of the Bush Doctrine and the only path to peace was for US power and political 
principles to be asserted abroad (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2002). The State of the Union was 
viewed by neoconservatives as being the most important shift in American foreign policy 
since Reagan ridded the United States of its policy of détente in favour of confrontation 
with the evil empire of the USSR. The war on terror had been transformed into a war to 
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 There is some debate over who in the White House actually originally coined the ‘axis of evil’ phrase. 
Bush’s neoconservative speechwriter, David Frum, has been widely credited with its creation. It has been 
criticised as “rhetorically self-indulgent” and a case of “unschooled speechwriters imposing policy 
conundrums” (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 139).  Some of the criticism seems unfounded. Bush’s critics seem 
to suggest he was simplistically presenting North Korea, Iran and Iraq in some sort of organised alliance, but 
the actual text of the speech reveals these states were given as examples of just some of the states that 
threatened the US. The text does not indicate these three were on some sort of exclusive ‘hit list’ that Bush 
was now rhetorically-bound to invade (G. W. Bush, 2002a).  
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uproot “dangerous tyrannies” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002c). The neoconservative requests 
to boost the Pentagon’s budget were now finally being heeded by the administration 
whereas before 9/11 it had turned a deaf ear to them. The announcement of a $38 billion 
increase plus a $10 billion war reserve was taken as a sign that the president was serious 
about matching his lofty rhetoric with action. In the immediate aftermath of the State of 
the Union, Kagan and Kristol (2002a) wrote that US forces may be needed in East Asia, 
Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. This was a war to “defend Western 
civilization” and victory would entail US forces toppling enemy regimes and terrorists, and 
allowing “nation-building to proceed in those countries where terrorists once found 
haven”. Removing Saddam Hussein from power had the potential to transform the Middle 
East by isolating Iran, intimidating Syria to change its behaviour, removing Saudi Arabia’s 
political leverage over the Middle East, and making the Palestinians more amenable to 
negotiation (W. Kristol, 2002b). 
 
More realist-inclined neoconservatives, like Charles Krauthammer, were also now 
increasingly sympathetic to the course charted by Kristol and Kagan. Krauthammer 
(2002a) took up the theme that the US had missed a golden opportunity to mould the 
Middle East in the early 1990s when it “bestrode...like a colossus.” If the US had invaded 
Iraq in 1991, it could have been the “first example of an Arab democracy, spreading its 
influence and planting seeds in neighboring dictatorships.” He warned that the United 
States should not miss the opportunity again. This, remember, from the neoconservative 
who had been most resistant to notions of basing US foreign policy on notions of 
democracy promotion and humanitarian interests. Indeed, Krauthammer (2002c) went so 
far as explicitly endorsing the theory of the liberal democratic peace in his discussion of 
the Israel-Palestine issue. He argued that democracy coming to the Palestinian territories 
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was crucial for the prospects of long-term peace and that while there is “never any 
guarantee of peace...democracy comes close.” He stated that the Bush Doctrine’s push for 
peace through democracy in the Middle East should not exclude Palestine. It is striking, 
looking at neoconservative thought in the months between 9/11 and the Iraq War, how 
little disagreement there was. Neoconservatives agreed that US national security required 
the elimination of radical Islamist terrorists and their state sponsors. And that the interests 
of peace, prosperity and human dignity in the Middle East and the wider world, were best 
served in the long-term by liberal democracy replacing tyrannical dictatorship in Baghdad 
which would serve as an attractive model for other states of the Middle East to embrace 
political liberalisation. Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and Osama bin 
Laden’s suicide terrorists were not the root problem per se. The threat to the US and the 
threat to the peace and security of the Middle East was identified as a political culture of 
“tyranny, violence, fanaticism, bigotry, and fantasy.” The solution was a combination of 
hard and soft power to bring about nothing less than a political transformation of the 
Middle East (Muravchik, 2002a).  
 
An interesting test case for the neoconservative commitment to the cause of liberal 
democratic transformation of the Middle East was the relationship of Saudi Arabia to the 
United States. The protection of the Saudi regime had been part of the casus belli for the 
1991 Gulf War; to protect Saudi Arabia and its oil from falling into the hands of Iraq. Yet, 
the fact 15 of the 19 terrorists on 9/11 were Saudi Arabian citizens was not lost on 
neoconservatives (National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, 2004: 
231-241). Saudi Wahhabism stood accused by William Kristol (2002f) of being the 
underlying ideology behind Islamist terror and a significant font of instability for the 
Middle East and the West. In the wake of 9/11, neoconservatives argued that the US 
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needed to treat Saudi Arabia as part of the problem not part of the solution to security in 
the Middle East. Neoconservatives were highly critical of the Bush administration’s 
refusal to criticise human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi state was experiencing 
a “moral” crisis, the establishment was “deeply implicated” in the 9/11 attacks, and eighty 
percent of the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay were of Saudi origin. There was also evidence 
provided that the Saudi government was bankrolling Palestinian terrorism to the total of 
$33 million in 2001. Instead of entertaining Saudi politicians at his ranch in Texas, Bush 
was urged to condemn Saudi terror and human rights violations, and insist the US had “no 
stake” in preserving the status quo (W. Kristol, 2002g; 2002h; D. Pipes, 2002a: 26).201 
Given the importance of Saudi oil exports to the functioning of the global economy, this 
was a radical, verging on revolutionary proposal. Neoconservative discourse on the Middle 
East increasingly eschewed caution. With the end of the Cold War there was no longer a 
compelling logic for retaining Saudi Arabia as a key ally. US oil policy could be directed 
away from the Persian Gulf to parts of the former Soviet Union (Woolsey, 2002). Instead, 
the US needed to pursue “disequilibrium, if not outright chaos” in the Middle East, starting 
with Saddam Hussein’s regime, that “might start the fall of dominoes in the Gulf” 
(Hanson, 2002: 23-28). Stability, in and of itself, was not considered a moral good. Some 
tyrannies, like Stalinist Russia, had been remarkably stable, whereas democracies like 
post-WW2 Italy had been remarkably unstable. Boot (2002b) argued that US Middle 
Eastern policy had been far too cynical and had paid the price on 9/11. Now was a time for 
moral clarity to depose the “Butcher of Baghdad” which could “send the dominos 
toppling, leading to more freedom in the most oppressed region of the world”.  
                                                 
201
 These themes in relation to Saudi Arabia continued after the invasion of Iraq and through the rest of 2003. 
William Kristol (2003c) was highly critical of attempts by the 9/11 congressional report to formally redact 
twenty-eight pages detailing Saudi Arabian links to the 9/11 terrorists. David Frum and Richard Perle (2003: 
129-142) were even more outspoken, arguing Saudi Arabia should not be treated as an ally, and as ultimate 
punishment for Saudi support for terrorism, the US could consider supporting the splitting up of the country 
and the creation of an independent, Shiite, Eastern Province. 
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By contrast, the Bush administration in the spring of 2002 appeared set on a different 
track. When Cheney was sent to the Middle East in March to garner support from Arab 
leaders for removing Saddam Hussein from power he was criticised for viewing a close 
relationship with Riyadh as instrumental in defeating Iraq. The trip was compared to 
Warren Christopher’s ill-fated 1993 trip to Europe to raise support for military action in 
Bosnia (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002d; 2002e). In addition to cosying up to the House of 
Saud, the Bush administration drew fire from neoconservatives over its willingness to 
negotiate with Arafat, and being too hard on criticising Israel’s right to self-defence in the 
face of Palestinian terrorism. PNAC produced a letter to Bush in April 2002 urging the 
president to stand with Israel as an ally which shared a “common enemy” in both Islamist 
terrorism and the regime of Saddam Hussein (Project for the New American Century, 
2002)  Indeed, the path to a wider peace in the Middle East did not lie in trying to ‘solve’ 
the Israel-Palestine question – a State Department distraction – but the road that “leads to 
real security and peace...runs through Baghdad” (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002e; 2002f; 
2002g; D. Pipes, 2002b; W. Kristol, 2002c). 
 
If neoconservatives spent the spring of 2002 worried over the direction of Bush’s foreign 
policy and whether he was, to quote Margaret Thatcher, “going wobbly”, two speeches in 
June would prove sufficient for calming their fears (R. Kagan and Kristol, 2002h). Bush’s 
Commencement Speech at West Point Military Academy on 1 June, followed by a speech 
on the Middle East from the Rose Garden of the White House on 24 June were seen by 
neoconservatives as significantly adding to his themes of pre-emption and the war on 
terror of the State of the Union address (G. W. Bush, 2002b; 2002c; W. Kristol, 2002j). 
The 2002 State of the Union had been described as the most important statement in US 
foreign policy since Reagan abandoned détente, but Bush’s speech on June 24 on the 
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Middle East was now seen as the “most profound” statement on the Middle East since 
Truman. The Bush Doctrine meant that the US had now set itself on a course in the Middle 
East to defeat terrorists and their state sponsors, and replace the hole left by them with 
“democratic and liberal principles for the sake of peace.” Bush had put on the record his 
vision of a liberal, democratic peace extending from Israel-Palestine, to Jordan and Iraq 
(W. Kristol, 2002j). Charles Krauthammer (2002c) praised Bush for having reconciled the 
American national interest in achieving peace and stability in the Middle East with the 
spread of American liberal democratic values. Bush was the first president since Woodrow 
Wilson to have “sliced across national borders and civilizational divides with an 
unqualified assertion of a moral norm.”  He had articulated a belief in the universality of 
Western norms embodied in the American constitution, which was nothing short of a 
“liberation theology” (Gerecht, 2002: emphasis added). Gerecht argued that once the Iraqi 
regime had been toppled, it could likely provoke a transformative uprising in Iran, and that 
once Iran embrace liberal democracy, the rest of the Middle East would follow swiftly.  
 
Even though neoconservatives retained doubts about the strategic direction of the State 
Department, Bush was now considered supportive of the wider neoconservative strategy 
for the Middle East and attention turned to what Iraq should look like after the United 
States removed the Iraqi regime from power. Robert Kagan (2002a) remained wary of 
Bush’s commitment to nation-building given his scepticism on the campaign trail in 2000, 
and a certain reticence on the ground in both Afghanistan and Bosnia to fully follow 
through on the nation-building project. The model for the US in Iraq, Kagan suggested, 
should be nothing less than that of the United States in Japan post-1945. The goal in Japan 
was not to simply remove a potent threat to American national security, but to “rebuild 
Japanese politics and society, roughly in the American image.” Kagan approved of the fact 
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that American troops remained stationed on Japanese soil sixty years later and argued that 
the approach with Iraq in 2003 should not be radically different. For the neoconservatives, 
this did not necessarily mean that Iraqi democracy would culminate in a strictly 
Jeffersonian model, indeed, Wolfowitz (quoted in Keller, 2002) argued that the democracy 
the US created in Japan after the Second World War was not identical to the American 
experience. Even if Iraq ‘muddled through’ with a democracy resembling post-Ceauşescu 
Romania, it would be preferable to the status quo. Wolfowitz maintained that whatever the 
precise form of democracy that Iraq ended up being, it would, nonetheless, in a variation 
of the domino argument, “cast a very long shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, but across 
the whole Arab world.” The threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction alone, was not 
justification enough for sending American soldiers to die on the battlefield.
202
 Despite 
Perle later claiming in 2005 that the Iraq War was not an exercise in democracy 
promotion, in 2002, he was not so reticent to expound on such themes. Perle (quoted in 
PBS: Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, 2002) explicitly endorsed democratic peace 
theory on PBS, and argued there was “very little we can do” to make the world more 
peaceful than “promoting a democracy”. It was in the United States’ interest in Iraq to 
topple Saddam Hussein, even if it meant short-term instability and chaos, because the 
instability and chaos of tyranny was worse in the long run. Due to Iraq’s well educated 
population, for Perle, it represented an excellent test case in whether democracy could 
flourish in the Arab world.  
 
Although the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), published in September 2002, has 
been commonly seen as the defining document of the Bush Doctrine, there was 
surprisingly little direct interaction with it by neoconservatives at the time (United States 
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 Bill Keller (2002) argued that Wolfowitz had a moral streak that struck an affinity with President Bush’s 
religious beliefs. He argues they both reinforced each other’s faith in the ability to transform the Middle East. 
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Government, 2002a).
203
 The September 2002 NSS codified and consolidated ideas of 
preemption and the democratic peace that Bush had already expressed, rather than set a 
dramatic new course. Two lengthy articles in Commentary by Podhoretz in September and 
Muravchik in December are prime examples of the neoconservative assessment of the way 
that the Bush Doctrine had unfolded in 2002.  According to Podhoretz (2002b: 22-28) the 
9/11 attacks had transformed Bush from a realist to a democratic idealist. The debate in US 
foreign policy after the end of the Cold War had been between Fukuyama’s ‘End of 
History’ and Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’. Bush had proven that he was firmly in 
Fukuyama’s camp. This was clear evidence that neoconservatives saw their foreign policy 
ideology linking back to Fukuyama’s thesis, even if Fukuyama (2006) would later 
repudiate the connection. For Podhoretz, Bush’s democratic idealism rested on a rejection 
of moral relativism and an assertion of the right to preempt threats to its national security 
by targeting regimes that sponsored terrorism. The US needed the “stomach to impose a 
new political culture” on its enemies it defeated in the Middle East. Aside from Iraq and 
Iran, the regimes in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Palestine all deserved to be 
overthrown. The domestic political culture of the Middle East had led to endemic, 
systematic abuses of human rights, and this had manifested itself in external aggression 
and terrorism. The Bush Doctrine, however, resurrected Wilsonianism and revealed a 
“sensitivity to moral considerations and an enlightened self interest”. Ultimately the safety 
and well-being of American citizens required the safety and well-being of citizens of the 
Middle East which was intimately linked to democratisation. At times this needed to be 
done militarily through brute force, like in Iraq, whereas in other states like Qatar, Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it could be achieved more through persuasion and less of a ‘blank 
cheque’ approach to those governments (Muravchik, 2002b: 24, 28-30). Regardless of the 
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method of choice in each state, the underlying reality was that the United States had a 
central leadership role in establishing and preserving the peace in the Middle East (D. 
Kagan, 2002) The Bush Doctrine, at least in its abstract, rhetorical state, had the 
neoconservatives’ full support, although quibbles remained over inconsistencies in the way 
it was applied by the administration in a less than systematic way. Its continued close 
embrace of the regimes in Islamabad and Riyadh, for example, threatened to undermine 
the principles of the doctrine (Podhoretz, 2002b: 25-26). 
 
After the summer of 2002, neoconservatives were convinced that Bush was set on 
imposing regime change on Iraq through military force, yet potential pitfalls lay ahead. 
Domestic opposition on the Left remained in addition to resistance from members on the 
UN Security Council, especially France. David Brooks (2002) attacked the Left as being in 
“a fog of peace” in which they were unwilling to provide a viable alternative to removing 
Saddam Hussein from power. He argued that they were obsessed with their local demons 
and ignoring the bigger problem, so while “Saddam is boring...Wolfowitz tears at their 
soul”. Attacks from the Left were partly neutralised by wide, bipartisan support for Bush’s 
Iraq policy. In October, two-fifths of Democrats in the House voted for the joint 
resolution: ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’, 
which was signed into law on 16 October, and were joined in doing so by over half the 
Democratic Party caucus in the Senate (United States Government, 2002b). While this 
would never placate the radical, Chomskyite fringe, it effectively countered any suggestion 
that this was simply a Republican policy. A more serious challenge would come from 
French-led opposition from other states on the UN Security Council. Robert Kagan’s 
widely-read analysis of transatlantic relations was an important feature in both American 
and European debates on Iraq and the future of the transatlantic alliance. The thesis first 
248 
 
appeared as ‘Power and Weakness’ in June 2002 in Policy Review, before appearing in 
extended form in his January 2003 publication, Of Paradise and Power: America and 
Europe in the New World Order (New York, Knopf).
204
 Kagan contended that the United 
States and Europe were growing apart, and that to speak of a unified West was 
increasingly anachronistic. The United States remained locked in a Hobbesian world 
where it needed to embrace martial policies to maintain its security. Europe on the other 
hand, had chosen to enter a post-historical, Kantian peace, which had led it to place an 
emphasis on more pacific policies.
205
 Regardless of the accuracy of Kagan’s thesis, it was 
unlikely to encourage fellow neoconservatives to advocate that the US give France and 
Germany much sway over the direction of American foreign policy in Iraq.  
 
Alongside Kagan’s argument, long-running neoconservative objections resurfaced 
concerning the lack of moral legitimacy of the United Nations, stemming back to 
perceived 1970’s anti-Semitism (Krauthammer, 2002b; 2002e). UN-based theories of 
deterrence could not keep Saddam Hussein contained. The stark choice left for the United 
States was preemptive war or choosing to live with Saddam Hussein’s WMDs 
(Krauthammer, 2002g). The fact that North Korea had recently revealed its nuclear 
programme in the face of opposition from the UN and the international community, 
necessitated the United States move against Iraq before it was too late (Schmitt and 
Kristol, 2002). There was deep scepticism among neoconservatives concerning the UN 
Security Council’s Resolution 1441, which passed on 8 November following President 
Bush’s decision to support Tony Blair’s request that UN cover was required before 
military action proceeded in Iraq (United Nations, 2002). Krauthammer (2002f) argued 
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 For a fascinating discussion of Kagan’s thesis please see Tod Lindberg (ed.) (2004) Beyond Paradise and 
Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership (London, Routledge). This collection of 
essays is anchored by two excellent articles by Walter Russell Mead and Francis Fukuyama.  
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that the resolution had effectively placed Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, in the driver’s 
seat in determining the outcome in Iraq, instead of President Bush. Although this gave a 
“window of legitimacy” for military action, the inevitable delays would give the Iraqi 
regime time to hide its WMD and prepare for war.
206
 Other neoconservatives described the 
UN route as a “trap”, and argued that it threatened to derail Bush after the success of the 
2002 midterms which had provided him with broad support for action. Crucially, the UN 
process and Hans Blix could not remove the threat, because the danger was not WMD per 
se but the Iraqi regime, as Kagan and Kristol (2002i) explained: “The problem is not just 
Saddam’s weapons. The problem is Saddam.” By embracing Resolution 1441, they argued 
that Bush had dangerously undermined this logic. 
 
In January 2003, at a debate at AEI on the respective roles the UN and the US should have 
in declaring war, Jeane Kirkpatrick (quoted in Daifallah, 2003) argued that the United 
States should continue its course and invade Iraq even if the UN did not support military 
action. Saddam Hussein’s regime was “thoroughly illegitimate” and was an “illegal regime 
which abuses its own people and has for years”. In the years after the Iraq War, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick (2007) expressed her concerns with the Bush Doctrine, and has thus been 
numbered among the critics of the more expansive form of neoconservatism developed 
during this period. Both Tony Smith and Justin Vaïsse (2007: 49; 2009) argue that 
Kirkpatrick and Irving Kristol held to a more cautious realism during Bush’s first term. 
Yet, there is little to indicate that she held a substantively different perspective than 
William Kristol or Robert Kagan in the run-up to the Iraq War. She signed PNAC’s letter 
to President Bush in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; fully supported the military 
campaign to topple the Taliban and Al Qaeda and build liberal democracy in Afghanistan; 
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 Krauthammer’s scepticism concerning the UN continued right up to the Iraq War, when he urged (2003c) 
the United States not to turn over control to the United Nations after the fall of Baghdad; “the principle 
purpose of the Security Council is not to restrain tyrants but to restrain the United States”.  
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was an enthusiastic supporter of regime change in Iraq; in addition to calling for continued 
US intervention in the Balkans with Richard Holbrooke (Kirkpatrick, 2001; Cole, 2002). 
In March 2003, shortly before the Iraq War began, she led a US delegation to the UNCHR 
and declared her commitment to universal human rights, urging the UNCHR to do all it 
could to help those attempting to move states into a transition from non-democracies to 
democratic governments (Kirkpatrick, 2003). This was a very long way from her early 
post-Cold War calls for a return to normalcy and reluctance to even support the limited 
goals of the Gulf War, and even further from her support for the Argentinian Junta in the 
Falklands War, and autocracy versus totalitarianism in ‘Dictatorships and Double 
Standards’. Indeed it could be argued that she was even more directly involved in the lead 
up to the Iraq War than those writing articles in Commentary and the Weekly Standard. It 
later emerged that Kirkpatrick was tasked by President Bush while at the UNCHR in 
Geneva in March 2003, to participate in secret diplomacy with Arab leaders to persuade 
them to back President Bush’s policy on Iraq, or at the least to not publicly object (Weiner, 
2006). The precise views of Irving Kristol between 9/11 and the Iraq War are less well 
known given that there is very little published material in these crucial months. His silence 
has been interpreted as tacit disapproval of the foreign policy direction his son was partly 
leading. In the author’s interview with William Kristol (2011), however, he stated that his 
father had fully supported military action in Iraq in 2003. Certainly Irving Kristol’s 
writings in the late 1990s showed awareness of the new foreign policy direction that 
neoconservatives were taking, and offered no rebuke. Indeed, he argued that it was an 
“ingenious effort to wed realism to idealism” (I. Kristol, 1996b). In his essay on 
neoconservatism published in September 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, Irving Kristol 
(2003) again proffered no criticism of either the Bush Doctrine or neoconservative support 
of it. He, instead, argued in much the same way that all neoconservatives of this period had 
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done so, that the American national interest was not a geographical term but an ideological 
one, and that the unrivalled power of the United States gave it responsibilities to protect 
democracy abroad.  
 
In the final few weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom neoconservatives continued to 
press for regime change in Iraq, and repeated the justifications for doing so that had 
hallmarked their discourse since 9/11. Krauthammer (2003a; 2003b) argued that regime 
change in Iraq offered the opportunity for a “real birth of freedom” and that the US was in 
a race against time to stop Iraq and such hostile states from obtaining WMD capacity 
before it was too late. Max Boot (2003) urged the United States to topple the Iraqi regime 
and in doing so insert the powerful “antibiotic” of democracy into the “diseased 
environment of the Middle East”, and that now was the time for the US to provide the 
Middle East with “effective imperial oversight”. William Kristol (2003b) pressed the US 
to have a morally-informed foreign policy that meant prioritising influencing the political 
regimes of foreign states. American security and freedom was “inextricably linked” to the 
character of foreign regimes. Other neoconservatives argued that the US had a 
responsibility to invade Iraq to save human lives from Saddam Hussein’s brutality, and 
pointed again to the likely wider effects in Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian 
territories of liberal democracy replacing Baathist dictatorship in Baghdad (F. Kagan, 
2003; Schmitt, 2003).  
 
Neoconservative arguments in favour of a US invasion of Iraq were most definitively 
collated in Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol’s, February 2003 monograph, The 
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War Over Iraq (San Francisco, Encounter).
207
 If Tony Blair is often credited for being the 
most cogent defender of the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War, Kaplan and Kristol’s book 
comes a very close second. It detailed and endorsed the arguments that removing Saddam 
Hussein was necessary for reasons of self-defence relating to WMDs and Saddam 
Hussein’s bellicosity in the region, and the likely breakdown of the containment and the 
sanctions regime. They argued (2003: 18-25) that Saddam Hussein’s regime had links with 
numerous terrorist groups including Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK); Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK); Palestine Liberation Front (PLF); Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO); in addition to 
having offered Osama bin Laden sanctuary in 1998, and funded Al Qaeda in Sudan. It is 
most striking, however, in its emphases on the need to invade Iraq for humanitarian 
reasons and the wider liberal democratic peace in the Middle East. Indeed, the very first 
chapter of the book (2003: 1-14) is not a discussion of the WMD threat, but a specific 
account of the systemic human rights abuses of the Baathist regime, detailing the 
imprisonments, gassings, shootings, bombings, and torture of thousands of Iraqi people, 
and criticising previous US indifference to them. They stated (2003: 95) that the “ultimate 
goal” of replacing Saddam’s regime was not primarily removal of a threat to the United 
States or the wider Middle East region; it was to establish liberal democracy in Baghdad. 
They acknowledged the benefits to US security of Iraq becoming a democracy and it 
reverberating through the Middle East, but they argued (2003: 95-104) that establishing 
liberal democracy in Iraq was a moral good in and of itself and rejected any suggestion 
that the Arab world was not a suitable location for liberal democracy. They further argued 
that one of the reasons why it would still be difficult soil to plant democracy was precisely 
because the United States had followed realist maxims, especially in its close relationship 
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with a Saudi Arabian state that had helped create a poisonous Islamist ideology. They 
accused the foreign policy establishment of being “consumed by the lessons of Vietnam” 
when the rest of the world “plays by Munich rules”, and concluded that the only thing 
standing between “civility and genocide” and “order and mayhem” in various locations 
around the world was American power. It was time for the United States to lose its 
Niebuhrian moral caution, and assert its “benevolent influence” on the global stage (2003: 
109, 117-119).  
 
As the final act of pre-Iraq War neoconservatism, PNAC published a letter on 19 March 
signed by leading neoconservatives and liberal interventionists. It presented the case that 
regime change in Iraq would achieve three goals: disarm Iraq of its WMDs; establish a 
peaceful and stable democratic government; and be an important stepping stone to the 
wider democratic development of the Middle East. Regime change in Iraq was “not an end 
in itself, but a means to an end”. The final paragraph of PNAC’s pre-war advice presented 
the ultimate neoconservative foreign policy goal: removing the Baathists from power in 
Baghdad and then “(t)he successful disarming, rebuilding, and democratic reform of Iraq 
can contribute to the democratization of the wider Middle East” (Project for the New 
American Century, 2003b: emphasis added). Whether this represented utopian fantasy as 
their critics claimed or wise, morally-informed statesmanship as their supporters 
countered, remained to be seen.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
As the first Tomahawk cruise missiles rained down on Baghdad’s Dora Farms complex in 
an attempt to decapitate the Iraqi regime, it was clear that neoconservatism had undergone 
an ideological shift since President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev proclaimed the end of 
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the Cold War in Malta in December 1989. Indeed, it was not even the neoconservatism of 
10 September 2001. Themes of retreat, limits and caution had disappeared. Picking and 
choosing dictatorial allies on the basis of who was the lesser evil had vanished as a 
concept, along with any real notion of keeping autocratic regimes in power to maintain the 
balance of power, or only backing opposition groups in attempts to topple threats to the 
United States. Instead, the peculiarities of the post-Cold War era had left a preponderance 
of American power, and the United States with a unique opportunity to fashion 
international crises it faced according to its liberal democratic virtues, for the benefit of its 
own citizens and those of states which were recipients of its benevolence. This is not to say 
that neoconservative foreign policy prescriptions lacked any consideration of the national 
interest of the United States. They claimed, however, that due to American unipolar power, 
that it was possible to achieve a much closer congruence between American power and 
American liberal democratic virtues. The idea that the US could use its power abroad to 
simultaneously ‘solve’ national security issues and promote human liberty and democracy 
had been developed by neoconservatives in the latter half of the 1990s. Yet, the potential 
of these ideas had not been fully perceived – even by some neoconservatives themselves – 
until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led neoconservatives to more fully conceptualise the 
threats that the United States faced as largely based on a lack of political liberty.  
 
Throughout the first two years of George W. Bush’s administration, it is striking how 
neoconservative arguments for regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq and the wider 
conduct of American foreign policy were infused with the drivers of change that were 
identified in earlier chapters. These can be broken down into broadly material and 
ideational factors, although neither is completely mutually exclusive of the other. 
Materially, the two geopolitical shocks that almost bookend this period were extremely 
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significant in framing the evolution of neoconservative foreign policy discourse. The end 
of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union had fundamentally altered the 
structure of the international system leading to a massive concentration of power in the 
American state. This realisation of unipolarity was acknowledged by neoconservatives 
during the two years before the Iraq War, as it meant there was little countervailing power 
to prevent the United States from imposing its power and values on Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was the second crucial material aspect in changing 
neoconservative thought. The destruction of the World Trade Center led neoconservatives 
to argue that a lack of political liberty overseas was a direct threat to the United States, as 
well as the peoples of the Middle East. Thus, a robust, expansive, interventionist foreign 
policy in the service of democracy and human rights was not simply a political vanity 
project, but an essential aspect of securing the United States. Without the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the World Trade Center, it would have been difficult to project that 
neoconservatism would have followed the course it did. 
 
Yet, these material catalysts for change in neoconservative thought, while necessary, were 
not sufficient in explaining shifts in their ideology of US foreign policy. Close analysis of 
neoconservative discourse between George W. Bush’s inauguration and the invasion of 
Iraq reveals that a range of more ideational factors were also important in determining 
change. In the run up to the Iraq War a wide range of neoconservatives endorsed the theory 
of the democratic peace. They did not always label it as such, and they certainly did not 
reference Michael Doyle, yet, the idea that democracies did not go to war with each other 
permeated neoconservative discourse. Their embrace of the democratic peace brought 
neoconservatives into close proximity with leading liberal interventionists who, while not 
so enamoured by American unilateral action, were nonetheless, prepared to make common 
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cause with neoconservatives to ensure that the theory of the democratic peace was not 
simply an abstract theory but able to be tested on the proving ground of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The signatories to PNAC’s various letters to President Bush are testament to 
the close ideological relationship that had developed between neoconservatives and liberal 
interventionists. The case for a foreign policy based on enhancing US security through the 
promotion of democracy and human rights, also found roots in Fukuyama’s thought at the 
close of the Cold War. Both Norman Podhoretz and Charles Krauthammer clearly 
acknowledged their debt to Fukuyama, explicitly linking his ‘End of History’ thesis to the 
Bush Doctrine and their belief that no significant ideological challenges to liberal 
democracy now remained. 
 
The overriding feature of neoconservatism during Bush’s first term, however, was a highly 
moralised account of American foreign policy that placed a high value on the moral virtue 
of the exercise of American power. The theory of the democratic peace and Fukuyama’s 
‘End of History’ showed the importance of liberal democracy as an idea to 
neoconservatives, yet this did not necessitate such a moralised edge. Neoconservatives 
argued that morality in foreign policy mattered, and that humanitarian causes were an 
important aspect of the strategic decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. Morality was 
relevant in terms of achieving specific goals in foreign policy, for example, human rights 
abuses of domestic regimes in foreign states did indicate likely foreign policy behaviour. 
Yet, morality mattered in another sense: the conduct of American foreign policy affected 
US domestic society. If the United States’ foreign policy lacked a moralised centre, this 
would detrimentally affect broader conceptions of civic morality back home. 
Neoconservatives increasingly drew links between threats to domestic morality and 
national security which brought them into common cause with leading social 
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conservatives. This was perhaps, best exemplified by William Kristol’s argument that 
scientists seeking to experiment on embryonic stem cells and develop cloning represented 
a threat to human dignity and an affront to morality that he equated with Osama bin 
Laden’s network of terrorists. Thus the neoconservatives attempts to ‘re-moralise’ 
American foreign policy can be viewed as part of a much wider socially conservative 
prospectus, where invading Afghanistan and Iraq were as much an expression of morality 
as tackling pro-life issues and battling liberal relativism in American domestic society. 
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Conclusion  
Issues and Shifts 
Events on the ground in Iraq following the March 2003 invasion severely damaged the 
standing of neoconservatives. Those outside the administration were seen as cheerleaders 
for presumptive triumphalism and guilty of over-simplifying the causes of the terrorist 
threat the United States faced. Those within the administration, notably Feith and 
Wolfowitz, were charged with foolishly disbanding the Iraqi Army and embarking on 
widespread de-Baathification, resulting in pervasive instability and anarchy on the streets 
of Baghdad.
208
 Neoconservative analysis of US failures on Iraq quickly consolidated 
around two lines of critique. First, the US had been too slow to hand over power to Iraqis 
to run their country and thus stunted the path to Iraqi self-determination. Secondly, the US 
had attempted to achieve peace and stability in Iraq with far too few American troops, and 
did not invade with sufficient force to provide the security that a transition to democracy 
required. It is striking, however, that few neoconservatives recanted their original view that 
the United States had acted prudentially in removing Saddam Hussein from power, 
although Fukuyama (2006), and to a lesser extent Kirkpatrick (2007), became high profile 
critics of the Iraq War. Most neoconservatives continued to maintain that Bush had been 
correct to invade Iraq, and were later staunch advocates of the ‘Surge’ in 2007 during 
Bush’s second term that increased the number of US soldiers on the ground in Iraq, 
successfully bringing more stability to Iraq.  
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 Feith (2008: 515-517, 2011) has vociferously defended the administration on both charges, and argues US 
troop numbers were insufficient and the US maintained an occupation government in Iraq for too long due to 
the CIA and State Department having “anxieties” about the legitimacy of Iraqi exiles in the eyes of the Iraqi 
people. US failure was not attributed to a result of neoconservative optimism, but the fact the CIA had very 
little credible intelligence on Iraqi society. 
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While the necessity or otherwise of the Iraq War will remain disputed by historians for 
decades to come, neoconservative advocacy of the conflict represented the final act in the 
ideology’s evolution in the early post-Cold War period. From the perspective of 1989, it 
would have been virtually impossible to have predicted the destination at which 
neoconservatism had arrived just fourteen years later. In 1989, close analysis of 
Fukuyama’s or Muravchik’s work could have indicated a possible direction of travel for 
neoconservatives in favour of democracy promotion as a crucial aspect of national 
security. These were, however, certainly not rubrics for the use of American hard power to 
reshape the Middle East. The end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War witnessed 
neoconservatives urging caution and a limited approach that could easily be incorporated 
within existing realist or neo-isolationist paradigms. From the vantage point of 1989, and 
without knowledge of the intervening fourteen years, neoconservative support for the 2003 
Iraq War borders on the inexplicable. Why did an ideology that largely developed as a 
stringent ‘national-interest-orientated’ reaction to the threat from Soviet totalitarianism and 
that responded to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War with calls for a return to 
‘normality’, develop into a much more ‘ideological’ and universalist advocacy of using 
American power to reshape foreign states into liberal democracies for the benefit of US 
national security and the health and wellbeing of the local population? 
 
The 1991 Gulf War was a textbook example of neoconservative caution in the early post-
Cold War period. In responding to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, neoconservative 
opinion initially ranged from Kirkpatrick’s view that the US should not use military force 
at all, to Perle’s perspective that regime change needed to occur but would happen 
organically through the Iraqi opposition. The more prevalent neoconservative argument 
stated that Iraq’s army needed to be forcibly removed from Kuwaiti territory, but Saddam 
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Hussein needed to be maintained in power as a bulwark against Iranian adventurism. 
Arguments concerning the transformative power of liberal democracy to radically alter the 
status quo in the Middle East were completely absent from neoconservative discourse. By 
contrast, neoconservative arguments after the 9/11 terrorist attacks were infused with a 
liberationist tone, eschewed notions of stability, and fully embraced the possibility of the 
widespread transformation of the Middle East which could begin with the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime by American force. While the upshot of these developments for 
neoconservatives would be enhanced US national security, the prospect of enhanced 
humanitarian conditions and the widespread furthering of liberal democracy were also 
important arguments deployed in their prescriptions for US foreign policy.  
 
In a much shorter space of time between the early and late 1990s, the beginning of a 
neoconservative ideological shift was apparent in their analysis of the Balkans. During the 
1992-1995 Bosnian War, neoconservatives proffered a range of perspectives ranging from 
Krauthammer’s suggestion that Bosnia was a peripheral issue and not a vital US national 
security interest, to the more dominant neoconservative view that the US should support a 
policy of lift-and-strike. This would have had the effect of allowing arms to flow to the 
Bosniaks to enable them to defend themselves with accompanying NATO and US 
airstrikes at Bosnian Serb positions. Yet, by the 1999 Kosovo campaign, although 
Krauthammer remained dissenting, neoconservatives openly called for US ground troops 
to expel Serbian forces from Kosovo, to topple Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in Belgrade 
and introduce democratic reform. In the space of just five years, neoconservatives had 
shifted from advocating a position which supported arming an ethnically Muslim group 
against Serbian aggression and at most aiding them with the limited use of airpower, to 
backing the direct imposition of US ground troops not simply to defend a victim of that 
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aggression but to seek the destruction of the Serbian regime. In both Iraq and the Balkans, 
neoconservative foreign policy evolved from a limited prescription that would at its fullest 
extent see the US support opposition groups against what they viewed as tyrannical 
regimes, combined with the limited use of American airpower, to backing regime change 
through the direct use of US hard power and the imposition of ground troops.  
 
This shift in neoconservative thought, best exemplified in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, was 
also evident in other foreign policy arenas, particularly in relation to missile defence, 
NATO’s expansion, and relations with China. Since the early 1980s, a national system of 
missile defence had been seen as an important requirement for US national security by 
conservatives of all stripes, and neoconservatives were no exception. Yet, analysis of 
neoconservative discourse in the late 1990s, especially around the period the Rumsfeld 
Commission was in existence, reveals neoconservatives had moved significantly beyond 
the traditional defensive conception of a missile shield. Robert Kagan argued that NMD 
was important not so much for the protection it afforded the US homeland per se, but for 
the fact that protection would embolden US public opinion to support much bolder and 
ambitious foreign policy interventions overseas, given that a rogue state would be less able 
to blackmail the US. With the American state secured behind a missile shield, the US 
would be in a much stronger position to use its power to maintain international order, 
confront dictatorships, and export its liberal democratic model. Parallel to this, the 
expansion of NATO was also conceptualised less as a defensive measure for US national 
security, but more as an expansion of the liberal democratic ideal. Expanding the 
membership of NATO also offered the opportunity to redefine NATO’s mission. Instead 
of a defensive posture vis-à-vis Russia, NATO could be used offensively, with the number 
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of missions it undertook expanded, and a greater emphasis on promoting liberal democracy 
outside NATO. 
 
On China, and especially Taiwan, by the end of the 1990s, neoconservatives had drawn 
sharp lines of demarcation from other conservative foreign policy schools. The Clinton 
administration and the bulk of the Republican Party in Congress stood accused of 
privileging commercial ties with Beijing to the detriment of the humanitarian interests of 
the Chinese population and wider strategic interests of the United States in East Asia. 
Neoconservatives urged the US to revoke China’s MFN status and revive the early 1970s 
policy of linkage. Increased commercial ties between the US and China needed to be 
predicated on improved human rights for Chinese citizens. Neoconservatives also 
highlighted the wider danger that the Chinese state posed to the US through its military 
and trade links with states such as Iran and Pakistan. By the start of George W. Bush’s 
administration, neoconservatives openly called for the United States to make democratic 
change in Beijing a specific foreign policy goal to mirror what had occurred in Taiwan. 
Neoconservatives urged the US to drop the idea of ‘One China’, and instead forge much 
closer ties with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, creating new international security 
architecture along similar lines to NATO. The end of the Cold War reduced the necessity 
to be strategically ambiguous; instead, the US should throw its full support behind Taiwan 
by creating a free trade agreement, give assurances of full US military assistance in the 
event of Chinese aggression, and openly extol Taiwanese democracy as an example of 
what needed to be emulated in Beijing.  
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Drivers of Change 
The change that occurred in neoconservative thought during these years can be attributed 
to a range of drivers. These catalysts can be categorised generally under two headings of 
material and ideational causes. At first glance, this taxonomy appears overly simplistic. It 
is not always an unproblematic task to neatly and definitively circumscribe a driver of 
change as exclusively one of ideational or material origin. Democratic peace theory, for 
example, is an idea, yet, it could be argued it is an idea resting on events in the material 
world. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis is primarily a work of political 
philosophy and thus more ideological in scope, yet, it could be cogently argued that would 
never have been written without the material events which occurred at the end of the Cold 
War. As Colin Hay (2002: 208, 212-215) has argued, ideas are only ever “relatively 
autonomous” of the material. The material context in which neoconservatives developed 
their foreign policy approach imposed a strategic and discursive selectivity on the ideas 
which were created. This thesis, however, is not primarily a theoretical contribution to the 
debate in political science on the relative importance of material versus ideational factors. 
It places drivers of change in categories from which some readers may regard as less 
distinct from one another in reality than presented here. It is helpful, however, to 
categorise in this way to summarise the central claims made.  
 
Material Factors: End of the Cold War and 9/11 
Although there were obviously numerous material foreign policy crises during the period 
under discussion, the impact of the end of the Cold War followed by the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks of 2001 were the most important in influencing the new direction that 
neoconservatism took during this period. The decline of bipolarity in the international 
system and the accompanying rise of American unipolarity that the end of the Cold War 
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brought about was almost certainly the most crucial driver in the changes that occurred 
within neoconservative thought. If the Cold War had continued into the 1990s and early 
twenty-first century, it is impossible to conceive that neoconservatives would have 
abandoned the underlying logic of Kirkpatrick’s 1979 ‘Dictatorships and Double 
Standards’. That leitmotif had favoured supporting authoritarianism as part of the more 
important struggle against totalitarianism. The removal of the Soviet Union as a counter-
weight to American power, however, reduced the fundamental constraint on the exercise 
of American power, and freed neoconservatives to develop foreign policy ideas that could 
be far bolder than those which could have been attempted without the thawing of US-
Russian relations. Essentially, the main constraint on America’s freedom of action in the 
post-Cold War world was now more likely to be US public opinion rather than the 
countervailing power of other states overseas.  
 
The realisation that the ending of the Cold War had dramatically opened up new 
possibilities for American foreign policy infuses neoconservative discourse throughout this 
period, from the development of the DPG in 1992, to US interventionism in the Balkans 
and into Iraq. Although Krauthammer was one of the first to champion the ‘unipolar 
moment’, it was Robert Kagan and William Kristol, with the publication of their 1996 
article in Foreign Affairs and the later development of PNAC, that pushed 
neoconservatism to embrace themes of national greatness, democracy promotion and 
humanitarianism overseas. These policies were predicated on an American hegemony that 
simply did not exist while the Cold War continued.   
 
For other neoconservatives, especially Krauthammer, Perle and Wolfowitz, it was not until 
after the shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that they more readily embraced the agenda that 
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had been drafted by Kagan and Kristol. The ending of the Cold War had removed the 
primary overseas constraint on US foreign policy, but it was not until after 9/11 that 
neoconservative discourse more comprehensively linked the security of the US homeland 
with lack of political freedom in the wider Middle East. It was also of instrumental value 
for neoconservatives that both President Bush and US public opinion were more amenable 
to a more radical neoconservative response post-9/11. Not all neoconservatives concurred 
with Kagan and Kristol’s approach while a direct threat to US national security seemed 
distant, but the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought the immediacy of the threat to the US much 
nearer. 
 
Ideational Factors: Fukuyama, Democratic Peace Theory and a Religious Turn 
Working concurrently with the two seminal material events of this period were a series of 
more ideational drivers of change. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, democratic 
peace theory, and a religious ‘turn’ in neoconservative thought, all contributed to placing 
the idea of promoting liberal democracy abroad with a greater concern for humanitarian 
interests, more centrally in the neoconservative foreign policy vision. Fukuyama’s thesis – 
more often simplistically parodied than comprehensively analysed – was the defining 
philosophical contribution to the early post-Cold War period. This was true across the 
political spectrum in the United States, and more specifically among neoconservatives. 
Podhoretz argued that this era would be defined by a battle of ideas between Fukuyama 
and Huntington’s more realist and pessimistic ‘Clash of Civilizations’. Podhoretz made 
clear that he favoured Fukuyama’s framing of global politics. Fukuyama’s Hegelian 
construction of the broad sweep of human history posited that the idea of liberal 
democracy would never likely be superseded. Its unique ability to satisfy the human need 
for recognition and to drive technological change and economic growth meant that the 
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regimes of Slobodan Milosevic, the Taleban, and Saddam Hussein, for example, were not 
simply threats to American national security but on the wrong side of History. Although 
neoconservatives had been attached to the idea of liberal democracy before Fukuyama’s 
thesis, during the Cold War they more readily supported authoritarianism in the wider 
battle against the Soviet Union. Fukuyama’s thesis provided an important philosophical 
bolster to the very idea of liberal democracy and the direction of human history. This is not 
to argue that all neoconservatives approved of every aspect of his thesis; certainly some 
like Eliot Cohen and Irving Kristol found it overly simplistic or utopian. It added, 
however, an overarching and distinctively universalist aspect to the idea of liberal 
democracy. It was not simply a concept with American or Western application, but had 
universal appeal and would never be bettered as an idea. This was not just a political 
system for American WASPs, but spoke to the deepest needs of human society in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and the wider Middle East. All neoconservative discourse 
during this period took place in the shadow of Fukuyama’s meta-narrative. It is much 
easier to envisage why Kagan and Kristol’s arguments on the use of American hegemony 
to spread democracy and political liberty abroad gained traction among neoconservatives 
when they wrote in an era in which the defining philosophical contribution stated that 
liberal democracy had conquered all its ideological opponents. Indeed, Fukuyama accused 
the Bush administration and neoconservatives by association, of taking his ideas and 
attempting to artificially speed up the thrust of his argument through the use of American 
power.  
 
Yet, neoconservative arguments for giving democracy promotion a central position in US 
foreign policy did not simply flow unadulterated from Fukuyama’s philosophy. 
Democratic peace theory, developed in academia by Michael Doyle among others, and 
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widely embraced by the more centrist wing of the Democratic Party of which Bill Clinton 
was a leading figure, was also a driver of change in neoconservative thought. Throughout 
the latter half of the 1990s to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush 
administration, neoconservatives frequently justified the idea of bringing democracy to 
rogue states with direct reference to the concept that democracies did not go to war with 
each other. Changing the political system of domestic regimes in Belgrade, Kabul and 
Baghdad, and then on to Tehran, Riyadh and Damascus, would alter the foreign policy 
behaviour of those states, reducing the likelihood of foreign aggression and consequently 
lessening the threat to US national security. The impact of democratic peace theory on 
neoconservatism has been both under and over estimated. In interviews with the author, 
neoconservatives generally acknowledged their familiarity with Doyle’s thesis, but tended 
to, perhaps understandably, downplay any intellectual debt they owed. On the other hand, 
Tony Smith argues that neoconservatives simply borrowed all their ideas from a liberal 
internationalist tradition, from the Progressive Policy Institute all the way back to 
Woodrow Wilson, and in doing so denies neoconservatives any real agency and originality 
in their foreign policy discourse. Neoconservatives certainly developed their arguments in 
a wider intellectual and political environment in which ideas surrounding the democratic 
peace, especially in Clinton’s first term, were predominant. These ideas, however, were 
not simply and uncritically appropriated by neoconservatives, indeed, they were very swift 
to reject accompanying liberal arguments on multilateral institutions. There is also the fact 
that at a basic level, it did not require a PhD from an Ivy League institution to hypothesise 
that wars between liberal democracies do not abound widely. 
 
A neoconservative foreign policy that sought to use American power to preserve US 
hegemony, and use that position to reshape rogue states into liberal democracies developed 
in an ideational climate that had been significantly shaped by Fukuyama’s philosophy and 
268 
 
a wider embrace of democratic peace theory. It also coincided with a religious turn in 
neoconservative thought. Given the numerous anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that have 
been attached to neoconservatism, some neoconservatives, even those religiously-inclined, 
have been reluctant to fully acknowledge that religious thought played a role in their post-
Cold War foreign policy philosophy. Yet, analysis of neoconservative discourse during the 
1990s and into the early years of the Bush administration, reveals neoconservatives to be 
widely interested in religious issues and increasingly embracing of a more socially 
conservative prospectus. This was even evident with those such as Robert Kagan who held 
no personal attachment to religious belief. This positioned neoconservatives within the 
Republican political mainstream in a manner that had not hitherto been seen. It is also 
more than coincidental that at the same time as neoconservatives turned greater attention to 
questions of domestic morality and social conservatism, their foreign policy increasingly 
reflected an approach more sensitive to questions of morality and humanitarian interests 
than realpolitik. This is not to simplistically suggest that religion and more realist foreign 
policy positions are mutually exclusive. Certainly, familiarity with the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr would quickly scotch such a conclusion. However, the 1990s saw a 
rapprochement between social conservatives of the Christian Right and neoconservatives, 
in which Gary Bauer, William Bennett, William Kristol and Elliott Abrams played 
important roles.  
 
During the 1990s, the Christian Right pursued a foreign policy agenda that pushed 
President Clinton to protect religious and political liberties abroad, defend Israel, and was 
generally supportive of a foreign policy that sought to bolster American power for the 
service of specific moral goals. This mirrored the changes afoot within neoconservative 
thought during these years. This is not to argue for a simple uni-directional causal flow 
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from the Christian Right to neoconservatives in foreign policy or vice-versa, but for a form 
of ideological cross-pollination between the two groups. Neoconservatives increasingly 
positioned themselves in the Republican Party mainstream and became more interested in 
questions of religion, morality and social conservative issues such as abortion. These were 
policy areas which animated large sections of the Republican base. Simultaneously, the 
Christian Right, which to this point had been seen as obsessed with the abortion issue and 
school prayer, for example, became increasingly energised by the need for a more 
moralised approach to US foreign policy. Broadly stated, the Christian Right-
neoconservative rapprochement brought about a significant ideological alliance, at least at 
the elite Washington level. The Christian Right began to become much more interested in 
questions of foreign policy at the same time as neoconservatives showed increased 
amenability to the placing of issues of morality, political and religious freedom more 
centrally in US foreign policy. This coincided with increased neoconservative sympathy 
with the Christian Right’s social conservatism. This culminated in a series of editorials and 
articles by William Kristol in the Weekly Standard during Bush’s first term, and in an 
edited book, in which he argued against abortion and cloning and directly linked the 
domestic battle for pro-life issues with the foreign policy objectives of defeating Al Qaeda. 
 
Counter-arguments 
The shifts in neoconservative thought during the decade and a half after the Cold War and 
the drivers that contributed to these modifications effectively counter two arguments that 
are raised in discussion of neoconservatism during this period. The first relates to the 
suggestion that changes in neoconservative thought were not really changes per se but 
changes in the personnel in the neoconservative vanguard. Thus these years did not so 
much witness an ideological shift but a generational one, with the first neoconservative 
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generation of more moderate ex-Democrats being replaced by a cadre of more radical and 
ideologically more conservative neoconservatives. Aside from the very obvious difficulty 
in determining where to draw the line temporally between the neoconservative 
generations, the argument itself suffers from a central flaw. Key figures within both the 
first and second generation cohort of neoconservatives simply do not fit within the 
simplistic stereotype. Norman Podhoretz, one of the standard-bearers of early 
neoconservatism during the 1970s, was easily numbered among the most bellicose of 
neoconservatives during the latter half of the 1990s and into the Bush administration. 
Jeane Kirkpatrick travelled an analogous journey to her younger comrades, from cautious 
realist in the early 1990s to supporter of regime change and the imposition of liberal 
democracy in the Balkans and Iraq. And even Irving Kristol, perhaps the most realist of 
neoconservatives in his foreign policy views, recognised the new direction 
neoconservatism was taking in the latter half of the 1990s and fully supported the invasion 
of Iraq (W. Kristol, 2011). Among younger neoconservatives, Charles Krauthammer was a 
consistent critic of Kristol and Kagan’s neo-Reaganite approach to foreign affairs, and a 
more realist-inclined, national interest conservative throughout the 1990s before 9/11 
finally shifted his position. This is not to suggest that neoconservatism was monolithic, but 
that the policy cleavages were not as stark as has been suggested, and certainly not 
fundamentally along generational lines. 
 
In addition to countering the argument that neoconservatives were generationally divided, 
the central thrust of this thesis also effectively opposes the argument, primarily associated 
with the radical Left, that neoconservatives were not interested in liberal democracy and 
humanitarianism, and that these arguments were only deployed to mask their real interest 
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in perpetuating American hegemony.
209
 This line of critique is extremely problematic and 
suffers from the fact that neoconservative foreign policy arguments during this period, 
especially during the late 1990s and into the Bush administration, frequently invoked 
human rights abuses in rogue states. They were also staunch supporters of the idea that a 
lack of political freedom in these countries directly contributed to aggressive foreign 
policy behaviour which threatened US security and humanitarian interests more widely. 
Regime change, for example, was not favoured simply as a strategy to remove a dictator in 
Belgrade or Baghdad and have him replaced with an authoritarian ‘strongman’ who would 
be more amenable to American interests. Instead, the development of liberal democracy 
was the favoured policy. The neoconservative preference for regime change and the 
introduction of liberal democracy across the Middle East, instead of supporting stability 
and the status quo, reached its apotheosis in late 2003 with the publication of Perle and 
Frum’s An End to Evil. Aside from the ideologically ambitious, verging on hubristic, 
nature of the title, its central argument stated that the US should not stop with regime 
change in Iraq and Afghanistan but needed to confront the Iranian, Syrian and Saudi 
Arabian regimes and force democratic change with the threat of American military action 
for non-compliance. This was not a handbook for the cynical use of US power to further 
hegemony but a highly ideological, ambitious and explicitly revolutionary manifesto for 
the wider Middle East. And again, from the vantage point of 1989, this would have been 
almost inexplicable. The neoconservative leitmotif was not simply to use American power 
to preserve and extend US hegemony, but to use that power as a revolutionary agent of 
change to protect both US national security and humanitarian interests more generally. 
Instead of a cynical power grab, US power was intended paradoxically to ultimately 
subvert American hegemony by playing an important role in toppling dictatorships. This 
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 Analogous arguments were prevalent during the Iraq War when President Bush was accused of only being 
interested in invading Iraq to gain access to Iraqi oil, and that talk of democracy and human rights was 
merely rhetorical veneer. 
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would establish liberal democracies abroad which they hypothesised would eventually 
challenge the relative power of the United States in a more systematic fashion than any 
rogue state ever could.  
 
This analysis should not necessarily be taken as tacit approval of the neoconservatives’ 
moral and philosophical framework. Whether their approach to foreign affairs was more 
ethical than other schools is another question entirely to the one discussed in this thesis. 
What is significant however is that neoconservatives considered morality and virtue to be 
an important foundation for how the United States conducted its foreign policy. Their 
numerous critics on the Left would almost certainly be better served engaging and 
debating the ethical and moral underpinnings of this approach rather than cynically 
dismissing it all as rhetoric hiding their ‘true’ interests. Such arguments perhaps reflect a 
wider philosophical bent to often reject conservative political arguments wholesale as 
simply self-interested reflections of the powerful. The cynical reading of neoconservatism 
suffers from ignoring the increased universalist and moralised edge to neoconservative 
thought during these years. The virtues neoconservatives perceived to be inherent in the 
American political system were not something to be closely guarded, protected and 
reserved for the United States alone.  
 
A series of material and ideational factors had combined to significantly shift 
neoconservative foreign policy discourse in a new direction. The threat posed by the USSR 
during the Cold War had created a fundamental constraint on the freedom of action of US 
policy-makers and the ideas deemed plausible by foreign policy intellectuals. The removal 
of this material constraint created a ‘dilemma’ which allowed new ideas to gain traction 
which were previously considered unviable. What followed saw neoconservative 
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conceptions of virtue fuse with a bolder interventionist foreign policy programme which 
favoured utilising hard American power in the service of the national interest, 
humanitarian causes and the promotion of democracy. This occurred during a period in 
which neoconservative thought was being shaped by Fukuyama’s championing of liberal 
democracy, the impact of democratic peace theory, and a religious turn in neoconservative 
thought which also had the effect of drawing some neoconservatives much closer to the 
Christian Right. This evolutionary change was quickened by a second external material 
shock – the ‘dilemma’ of the 9/11 terrorist attacks – which allowed the more ambitious 
neoconservative foreign policy ideas to prevail. These five drivers of change – two 
material external shocks or ‘dilemmas’ and three ideational developments – led 
neoconservatives to redefine what it meant for the United States to act virtuously in its 
foreign policy, and ultimately provided an important theoretical underpinning to the Bush 
administration’s approach to Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11.  
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Appendix One 
Generations of Neoconservatism 
 
The standard narrative of neoconservatism highlights two generations. Broadly stated, the 
first generation were concerned with the policy debates of the 1960s and 1970s, whereas 
the second generation are more associated with the late Cold War and post-Cold war 
period. Justin Vaïsse (2010: 283-287) provides a further refinement to this debate by 
splitting the first generation into two groups: dissenting liberal intellectuals and Scoop 
Jackson Cold War Democrats. The difficulty with this analysis, whether one adopts a two 
or three generation taxonomy, can be seen with Vaisse’s  appendix on the subject where he 
offers numerous caveats to his generational lists which serve to undermine his argument. 
For example, of the 25 names listed as second generation, 15 of them he argues should 
also be considered as third generation. The table this thesis offers below, therefore, should 
be viewed as an approximate aid to where neoconservatives were located chronologically 
rather than as evidence of profound philosophical difference. The table is not aimed to be 
exhaustive but focused largely on those discussed in this thesis. Broadly stated, the first 
generation were all born before the Second World War, with the second generation born 
during or some time after the conflict.  
 
 
First Generation (born pre-1939) Second Generation (born post-1939) 
 
Daniel Bell 
Midge Decter 
Nathan Glazer 
Gertrude Himmelfarb 
Donald Kagan 
Jeane Kirkpatrick 
Irving Kristol 
Patrick Moynihan 
Michael Novak 
Richard Pipes 
Norman Podhoretz 
Aaron Wildavsky 
 
 
Elliott Abrams 
William Bennett 
Max Boot 
David Brooks 
Eliot A. Cohen 
Thomas Donnelly 
Douglas Feith 
Francis Fukuyama 
Frank Gaffney 
Reuel Marc Gerecht 
Frederick Kagan 
Robert Kagan 
Zalmay Khalilzad 
Charles Krauthammer 
William Kristol 
Joshua Muravchik 
Daniel Pipes 
Richard Perle 
Gary Schmitt 
George Weigel 
Paul Wolfowitz 
David Wurmser 
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Appendix Two 
Interviews 
During an institutional visit to SAIS-Johns Hopkins University in Washington in the first 
half of 2011, various neoconservatives discussed in this thesis kindly allowed the author to 
formally interview them in relation to their foreign policy views during the post-Cold War 
period. Interviews were semi-structured and broadly followed the same format with each 
interviewee – focusing on the evolution of their foreign policy thought. This came in 
addition to more informal discussions with other figures at numerous think-tank and 
institutional events in Washington. Unfortunately, despite persistent and increasingly 
creative attempts to secure interviews, not every neoconservative figure discussed in the 
thesis granted the author an interview. While this was an obvious disappointment, it was 
more than compensated by the fact that the interviews with those who did agree to speak 
with the author offered a fascinating insight into the events discussed throughout this 
thesis, and the author was grateful for their time.  
 
Professor Eliot A Cohen 12 April 2011 
Joshua Muravchik  20 April 2011 
Elliott Abrams  9 May 2011 
Richard Perle   11 May 2011 
Gary Schmitt   12 May 2011 
Thomas Donnelly  20 May 2011 
Douglas Feith   22 June 2011 
William Kristol  6 July 2011 
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